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## HOUSE OF COMMONS

## Issue No. 11 (Meetings Nos. 67 to 75)

Thursday, February 20, 1997  
Monday, March 3, 1997  
Tuesday, March 4, 1997  
Thursday, March 6, 1997  
Tuesday, March 11, 1997  
Monday, March 17, 1997  
Tuesday, March 18, 1997  
Wednesday, March 19, 1997  
Thursday, March 20, 1997

**Chairman:** Bill Graham

## CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

## Fascicule n° 11 (Séances n°s 67 à 75)

Le jeudi 20 février 1997  
Le lundi 3 mars 1997  
Le mardi 4 mars 1997  
Le jeudi 6 mars 1997  
Le mardi 11 mars 1997  
Le lundi 17 mars 1997  
Le mardi 18 mars 1997  
Le mercredi 19 mars 1997  
Le jeudi 20 mars 1997

**Président:** Bill Graham

*Minutes of Proceedings of the Standing Committee on*

## Foreign Affairs and International Trade

## RESPECTING:

Bill C-81, An Act to implement the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement and related agreements

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), an examination of Canadian policy on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), an examination of issues related to Canada-United States relations

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), an examination of compensation for Canadian Far East Prisoners of War during World War II

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), meeting with Honourable Ahmed Attaf, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Algeria

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), meeting with the Joint Committee on European Affairs of the Parliament of Ireland

*Procès-verbaux du Comité permanent des*

## Affaires étrangères et du commerce international

## CONCERNANT:

Projet de loi C-81, Loi portant mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de libre-échange Canada-Chili et d'autres accords connexes

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, un examen de la politique canadienne sur la non-prolifération nucléaire, le contrôle et la réduction des armes

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, un examen des questions relatives aux relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, un examen du dédommagement pour travail pour les prisonniers de guerre en Extrême-Orient au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, rencontre avec l'honorable Ahmed Attaf, ministre des Affaires étrangères en Algérie

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, rencontre avec le Comité mixte du Parlement irlandais sur les affaires européennes





Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), an examination of NATO enlargement

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, un examen de l'élargissement de l'OTAN

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APPEARING:

The Honourable Art Eggleton,  
Minister for International Trade

The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

WITNESSES:

(See end of document)

COMPARAISSENT:

L'honorable Art Eggleton,  
Ministre du Commerce  
international

L'honorable Lloyd Axworthy,  
Ministre des Affaires  
étrangères

TÉMOINS:

(Voir fin du document)



STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND  
INTERNATIONAL TRADE

*Chair:* Bill Graham

*Vice-Chairs:* Stéphane Bergeron  
John English

Members

Sarkis Assadourian  
Eleni Bakopanos  
Hon. Michel Dupuy  
Jesse Flis  
Beryl Gaffney  
Francis G. LeBlanc  
Bob Mills (Red Deer)  
Lee Morrison  
Philippe Paré  
Charlie Penson  
Benoît Sauvageau  
Bob Speller — (15)

Associate Members

Diane Ablonczy  
Colleen Beaumier  
Réginald Bélair  
Leon E. Benoit  
Jag Bhaduria  
Bill Blaikie  
Pierre Brien  
Maud Debien  
Jack Frazer  
Christiane Gagnon  
John Godfrey  
Herb Grubel  
Jean H. Leroux  
Ron MacDonald  
Gurbax Singh Malhi  
Keith Martin  
Ted McWhinney  
Val Meredith  
Rey D. Pagtakhan  
Janko Peric  
George Proud  
Svend J. Robinson  
Andrew Telegdi  
Paddy Torsney — (24)

(Quorum 8)

Janice Hilchie

*Clerk of the Committee*

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU  
COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

*Président:* Bill Graham

*Vice-présidents:* Stéphane Bergeron  
John English

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Hon. Michel Dupuy  
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Janko Peric  
George Proud  
Svend J. Robinson  
Andrew Telegdi  
Paddy Torsney — (24)

(Quorum 8)

*La greffière du Comité*

Janice Hilchie







2nd Session/35th Parliament

**ORDERS OF REFERENCE***Extracts from the Journals of the House of Commons of Monday, February 10, 1997*

Mr. Zed (Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons), from the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, presented the 52nd Report of the Committee, which was as follows:

The Committee recommends, pursuant to Standing Orders 104 and 114, the following changes in the membership of Standing Committees:

**Foreign Affairs and International Trade**

Bakopanos for/pour Loney

The Committee further recommends, that where a Member is appointed as permanent member to a Committee in accordance with this report and to which he was previously appointed Associate Member, that the name of the Member be struck from the list of Associate Members of the said Committee.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (*Issue No. 3, which includes this Report*) was tabled.

By unanimous consent, Mr. Zed (Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons), seconded by Mr. Discepola (Parliamentary Secretary to the Solicitor General of Canada), moved, — That the 52nd Report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, presented earlier today, be concurred in.

The question was put on the motion and it was agreed to.

**ATTEST***Extract from the Journals of the House of Commons of Friday, February 14, 1997*

The Order was read for the second reading and reference to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Bill C-81, an Act to implement the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement and related agreements.

Mr. Manley (Minister of Industry, Minister for the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency and Minister of Western Economic Diversification) for Mr. Eggleton (Minister for International Trade), seconded by Mr. Dion (President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada and Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs), moved, — That the Bill be now read a second time and referred to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Debate arose thereon.

The question was put on the motion and it was agreed to.

Accordingly, the Bill was read the second time and referred to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

**ATTEST**2<sup>e</sup> Session/35<sup>e</sup> Législature**ORDRES DE RENVOI***Extrait des Journaux de la Chambre des communes du lundi 10 février 1997*

M. Zed (secrétaire parlementaire du leader du gouvernement à la Chambre des communes), du Comité permanent de la procédure et des affaires de la Chambre, présente le 52<sup>e</sup> rapport de ce Comité, dont voici le texte:

Le Comité recommande, conformément au mandat que lui confèrent les articles 104 et 114 du Règlement, les changements suivants dans la liste des membres des comités permanents:

**Affaires étrangères et du commerce international**

Le Comité recommande de plus, dans le cas où un député est nommé membre permanent d'un comité visé au présent rapport, et auquel le député avait été nommé membre associé, que le nom de ce député soit retranché de la liste des membres associés de ce comité:

Un exemplaire des Procès-verbaux pertinents (*fascicule n° 3, qui comprend le présent rapport*) est déposé.

Du consentement unanime, M. Zed (secrétaire parlementaire du leader du gouvernement à la Chambre des communes), appuyé par M. Discepola (secrétaire parlementaire du solliciteur général du Canada), propose, — Que le 52<sup>e</sup> rapport du Comité permanent de la procédure et des affaires de la Chambre, présenté plus tôt aujourd'hui, soit agréé.

La motion, mise aux voix, est agréée.

**ATTESTÉ***Extrait des Journaux de la Chambre des communes du vendredi 14 février 1997*

Il est donné lecture de l'ordre portant deuxième lecture et renvoi au Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international du projet de loi C-81, Loi portant mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de libre-échange Canada-Chili et d'autres accords connexes.

M. Manley (ministre de l'Industrie, ministre de l'Agence de promotion économique du Canada atlantique et ministre de la Diversification de l'Économie de l'Ouest canadien), au nom de M. Eggleton (ministre du Commerce international), appuyé par M. Dion (président du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada et ministre des Affaires intergouvernementales), propose, — Que le projet de loi soit maintenant lu une deuxième fois et renvoyé au Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international.

Il s'élève un débat.

La motion, mise aux voix, est agréée.

En conséquence, le projet de loi est lu une deuxième fois et renvoyé au Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international.

**ATTESTÉ**



*Extract from the Journals of the House of Commons of Monday, March 3rd, 1997*

Mr. Zed (Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons), from the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, presented the 57th Report of the Committee, which was as follows:

The Committee also recommends, pursuant to Standing Orders 104 and 114, that the following Members be added to the list of Associate Members of Standing Committees:

#### Foreign Affairs and International Trade

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (*Issue No. 3, which includes this Report*) was tabled.

By unanimous consent, Mr. Zed (Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons), seconded by Mr. Kilger (Stormont — Dundas), moved, — That the 57th Report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, presented earlier today, be concurred in.

The question was put on the motion and it was agreed to.

ATTEST

*Extract from the Journals of the House of Commons of Monday, March 10, 1997*

Mr. Zed (Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons), from the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, presented the 58th Report of the Committee, which was as follows:

The Committee recommends, pursuant to Standing Orders 104 and 114, that the following Member be added to the list of Associate Members of the **Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade**:

Roy Cullen

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (*Issue No. 3, which includes this Report*) was tabled.

By unanimous consent, Mr. Zed (Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons), seconded by Mr. O'Brien (London — Middlesex), moved, — That the 58th Report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, presented earlier today, be concurred in.

The question was put on the motion and it was agreed to.

ATTEST

*Extrait des Journaux de la Chambre des communes du lundi 3 mars 1997*

M. Zed (secrétaire parlementaire du leader du gouvernement à la Chambre des communes), du Comité permanent de la procédure et des affaires de la Chambre, présente le 57<sup>e</sup> rapport de ce Comité, dont voici le texte:

Le Comité recommande également, conformément au mandat que lui confèrent les articles 104 et 114 du Règlement, que les députés suivants fassent partie de la liste des membres associés des comités permanents:

#### Affaires étrangères et commerce international

Un exemplaire des Procès-verbaux pertinents (*fascicule n° 3, qui comprend le présent rapport*) est déposé.

Du consentement unanime, M. Zed (secrétaire parlementaire du leader du gouvernement à la Chambre des communes), appuyé par M. Kilger (Stormont — Dundas), propose, — Que le 57<sup>e</sup> rapport du Comité permanent de la procédure et des affaires de la Chambre, présenté plus tôt aujourd'hui, soit agréé.

La motion, mise aux voix, est agréée.

ATTESTÉ

*Extrait des Journaux de la Chambre des communes du lundi 10 mars 1997*

M. Zed (secrétaire parlementaire du leader du gouvernement à la Chambre des communes), du Comité permanent de la procédure et des affaires de la Chambre, présente le 58<sup>e</sup> rapport de ce Comité, dont voici le texte:

Le Comité recommande, conformément au mandat que lui confèrent les articles 104 et 114 du Règlement, que le député dont le nom suit s'ajoute à la liste des membres associés du **Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international**:

Un exemplaire des Procès-verbaux pertinents (*fascicule n° 3, qui comprend le présent rapport*) est déposé.

Du consentement unanime, M. Zed (secrétaire parlementaire du leader du gouvernement à la Chambre des communes), appuyé par M. O'Brien (London — Middlesex), propose, — Que le 58<sup>e</sup> rapport du Comité permanent de la procédure et des affaires de la Chambre, présenté plus tôt aujourd'hui, soit agréé.

La motion, mise aux voix, est agréée.

ATTESTÉ

*Le Greffier de la Chambre des communes*

ROBERT MARLEAU

*Clerk of the House of Commons*



## REPORT TO THE HOUSE

Thursday, March 20, 1997

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade has the honour to present its

### SIXTH REPORT

In accordance with its Order of Reference of Friday, February 14, 1997, your Committee has considered Bill C-81, An Act to implement the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement and related agreements, and has agreed to report it with the following amendments:

#### *Clause 51*

Strike out lines 24 to 31, on page 32, and substitute the following therefor:

- “ (i) effective on January 1, 1998, to 83.4% of the rate set out in the column “Chile Tariff”,
- (ii) effective on January 1, 1999, to 66.7% of the rate set out in the column “Chile Tariff”,
- (iii) effective on January 1, 2000, to 50% of the rate set out in the column”

## RAPPORT À LA CHAMBRE

Le jeudi 20 mars 1997

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international a l'honneur de présenter son

### SIXIÈME RAPPORT

Conformément à son ordre de renvoi du vendredi 14 février 1997, votre Comité a étudié le projet de loi C-81, Loi portant mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de libre-échange Canada—Chili et d'autres accords connexes, et a convenu d'en faire rapport avec les modifications suivantes :

#### *Article 51*

Retrancher les lignes 27 à 33, à la page 32, et les remplacer par ce qui suit :

- « (i) à compter du 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1998 : 83,4 % du taux figurant dans la colonne « Tarif du Chili »,
- (ii) à compter du 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1999 : 66,7 % du taux figurant dans la colonne « Tarif du Chili »,
- (iii) à compter du 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 2000 : 50 % »



*Clause 89*

Strike out lines 23 to 28, on page 63, and substitute the following therefor:

“ or class of goods from the application of this Act.

(2) The Governor in Council may, on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, make regulations exempting any goods or class of goods of Chile from the application of this Act or any of its provisions. The exemption may be in respect of the dumping of those goods or that class.

(3) Regulations made under subsection (2)”

A copy of the Minutes of Proceedings relating to this Bill (*Issue No. 11, which includes this Report*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

*Article 89*

Retrancher les lignes 26 à 30, à la page 63, et les remplacer par ce qui suit :

« des catégories de marchandises à l'application de la présente loi.

(2) Sur recommandation du ministre des Finances, le gouverneur en conseil peut, par règlement, soustraire des marchandises ou des catégories de marchandises du Chili à l'application de la présente loi ou de ses dispositions pour ce qui concerne leur dumping.

(3) Le règlement pris en vertu du paragraphe (2) peut préciser la durée de »

Un exemplaire des Procès-verbaux relatifs à ce projet de loi (*fascicule n<sup>o</sup> 11, qui comprend le présent rapport*) est déposé.

Respectueusement soumis,

*Le président,*

Bill Graham,  
*Chair.*

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1997

(Meeting No. 67)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met at 9:08 o'clock a.m. this day, in Room 269, West Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Stéphane Bergeron, Hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Jesse Flis, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Philippe Paré, Charlie Penson, Benoît Sauvageau and Bob Speller.

*Acting Members present:* Ron MacDonald for Francis G. LeBlanc; Geoff Regan for Eleni Bakopanos; Robert Nault for Francis G. LeBlanc; Harold Culbert for Sarkis Assadourian; and Andy Scott for Eleni Bakopanos.

*Other Member present:* Osvaldo Nunez.

*In attendance:* From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament: Daniel Dupras, Researcher. From the Committees and Parliamentary Associations Directorate: Susanne Verville and Paulette Nadeau, Legislative Clerks.

*Appearing:* The Honourable Art Eggleton Minister for International Trade.

*Witnesses:* From the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: Claude Carrière, Director, Tariffs and Market Access Division; Dan Daley, Associate Counsel, Trade Law Division. From the Privy Council Office: Keith Christie, Assistant Deputy Minister, Federal-Provincial Relations and Lead Negotiator, Canadian Delegation on Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement. From the Canadian Federation of Agriculture: Jack Wilkinson, President. From Prairie Pools: Gordon Pugh, Manager, National Affairs. From the Canadian Steel Producers Association: Jean Van Loon, President; and Derek M. de Korte, Manager, Marketing, Algoma Steel Inc.. From the Canada-Chile Chamber of Commerce: Honourable Marc Lalonde, Chairman of the Board; and José Duran, President. From the Alliance of Manufacturers & Exporters Canada: Mark Drake, Senior Vice-President; and James Moore, Policy. From General Electric Canada: Bob Weese, Vice-President, Government and External Relations; and John Wilson, Consultant, Government Relations. From the Department of Justice: Dan Hermosa, Legal Counsel.

The Order of Reference dated Friday, February 14, 1997 being read as follows:

ORDERED, — That Bill C-81, An Act to implement the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement and related agreements be now read a second time and referred to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Pursuant to Standing Order 75(1), consideration of the Preamble and Clause 1 was postponed.

On Clause 2.

The Honourable Art Eggleton made a statement and, with the departmental officials, answered questions.

## PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE JEUDI 20 FÉVRIER 1997

(Séance n° 67)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui, à 9 h 08, dans la pièce 269 de l'édifice de l'Ouest, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (*président*).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Stéphane Bergeron, l'hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Jesse Flis, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Philippe Paré, Charlie Penson, Benoît Sauvageau et Bob Speller.

*Membres suppléants présents:* Ron MacDonald pour Francis G. LeBlanc; Geoff Regan pour Eleni Bakopanos; Robert Nault pour Francis G. LeBlanc; Harold Culbert pour Sarkis Assadourian; Andy Scott pour Eleni Bakopanos.

*Autre député présent:* Osvaldo Nunez.

*Aussi présents:* Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement: Daniel Dupras, attaché de recherche. De la Direction des comités et associations parlementaires: Susanne Verville et Paulette Nadeau, greffières de comité.

*Comparaît:* L'honorable Art Eggleton, ministre du Commerce international.

*Témoins:* Du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du commerce international: Claude Carrière, directeur, Direction des droits de douane et de l'accès aux marchés; Dan Daley, avocat-conseil associé, Direction du droit commercial international. Du Bureau du Conseil privé: Keith Christie, sous-ministre adjoint, Relations fédérales-provinciales et négociateur en chef, Délégation canadienne pour l'Accord de libre-échange Canada-Chili. De la Fédération canadienne de l'agriculture: Jack Wilkinson, président. De Prairie Pools: Gordon Pugh, gérant, Affaires nationales. De l'Association canadienne des producteurs d'acier: Jean Van Loon, présidente; Derek M. de Korte, gérant, «Marketing, Algoma Steel Inc.» De la Chambre de commerce Canada-Chili: L'honorable Marc Lalonde, président du conseil d'administration; José Duran, président. De l'«Alliance of Manufacturers & Exporters Canada»: Mark Drake, vice-président principal; James Moore, Politique. De «General Electric Canada»: Bob Weese, vice-président, Relations avec le gouvernement et relations extérieures; John Wilson, consultant, Relations avec le gouvernement. Du ministère de la Justice: Dan Hermosa, conseiller juridique.

Lecture est faite de l'ordre de renvoi du vendredi 14 février 1997:

Il est ordonné, — Que le projet de loi C-81, Loi portant mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de libre-échange Canada-Chili et d'autres accords connexes soit maintenant lu une deuxième fois et renvoyé au Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international.

Conformément au paragraphe 75(1) du Règlement, l'étude du préambule et de l'article 1 est reportée.

Article 2

L'honorable Art Eggleton présente un exposé et, avec les représentants du ministère, répond aux questions.



Jack Wilkinson, Gordon Pugh, Jean Van Loon, the Honourable Marc Lalonde, José Duran, Mark Drake, Bob Weese and John Wilkinson each made statements and, with the other witnesses and the departmental officials, answered questions.

It was agreed, — That the Committee proceed to the clause by clause consideration of Bill C-81 on Monday, March 3, 1997.

At 12:15 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

MONDAY, MARCH 3, 1997  
(Meeting No. 68)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met at 3:36 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 209, West Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Sarkis Assadourian, Hon. Michel Dupuy, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Philippe Paré, Benoît Sauvageau and Bob Speller.

*Acting Members present:* Bob Ringma for Charlie Penson; Georgette Sheridan for Eleni Bakopanos; John Richardson for John English; Ron MacDonald for Francis G. LeBlanc.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Daniel Dupras, Researcher. *From the Committees and Parliamentary Associations Directorate:* Suzanne Verville and Paulette Nadeau, Legislative Clerks.

*Witnesses: From the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:* Claude Carrière, Director, Tariffs and Market Access Division; Dan Daley, Associate Counsel, Trade Law Division. *From the Privy Council Office:* Keith Christie, Assistant Deputy Minister, Federal-Provincial Relations.

The Committee resumed consideration of Bill C-81, An Act to implement the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement and related Agreements (*See Minutes of Proceedings of Thursday, February 20, 1997, Issue No. 11, Meeting No. 67*).

The officials answered questions.

By unanimous consent, Clauses 2 to 10 carried.

By unanimous consent, Clauses 11 to 20 carried.

By unanimous consent, Clauses 21 to 30 carried.

By unanimous consent, Clauses 31 to 40 carried.

By unanimous consent, Clauses 41 to 50 carried.

On Clause 51

Ron MacDonald moved, — That Clause 51 be amended by striking out lines 24 to 31, on page 32, and substituting the following therefor:

“(i) effective on January 1, 1998, to 83.4% of the rate set out in the column “Chile Tariff”,

(ii) effective on January 1, 1999, to 66.7% of the rate set out in the column “Chile Tariff”,

Jack Wilkinson, Gordon Pugh, Jean Van Loon, l'honorable Marc Lalonde, José Duran, Mark Drake, Bob Weese et John Wilkinson présentent chacun des exposés et, avec les autres témoins et les représentants du ministère, répondent aux questions.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité procède à l'étude article par article du projet de loi C-81, le lundi 3 mars 1997.

À 12 h 15, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

LE LUNDI 3 MARS 1997  
(Séance n° 68)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui à 15 h 36, dans la pièce 209 de l'édifice de l'Ouest, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (président).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Sarkis Assadourian, l'hon. Michel Dupuy, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Philippe Paré, Benoît Sauvageau et Bob Speller.

*Membres suppléants présents:* Bob Ringma pour Charlie Penson; Georgette Sheridan pour Eleni Bakopanos; John Richardson pour John English; Ron MacDonald pour Francis G. LeBlanc.

*Aussi présents: Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement:* Daniel Dupras, attaché de recherche. *De la Direction des comités et associations parlementaires:* Suzanne Verville et Paulette Nadeau, greffières législatives.

*Témoins: Du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international:* Claude Carrière, directeur, Direction des droits de douane et de l'accès aux marchés; Dan Daley, avocat-conseil associé, Direction du droit commercial international. *Du Bureau du Conseil privé:* Keith Christie, sous-ministre adjoint, Relations fédérales-provinciales.

Le Comité reprend l'étude du projet de loi C-81, Loi portant mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de libre-échange Canada-Chili et d'autres accords connexes (*Voir les Procès-verbaux du jeudi 20 février 1997, fascicule n° 11, séance n° 67*).

Les fonctionnaires répondent aux questions.

Par consentement unanime, les articles 2 à 10 sont adoptés.

Par consentement unanime, les articles 11 à 20 sont adoptés.

Par consentement unanime, les articles 21 à 30 sont adoptés.

Par consentement unanime, les articles 31 à 40 sont adoptés.

Par consentement unanime, les articles 41 à 50 sont adoptés.

Article 51

Ron MacDonald propose, — Que l'article 51 soit modifié par substitution, aux lignes 27 à 33, page 32, de ce qui suit:

«(i) à compter du 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1998: 83,4 % du taux figurant dans la colonne «Tarif du Chili»,

(ii) à compter du 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1999: 66,7 % du taux figurant dans la colonne «Tarif du Chili»,

(iii) effective on January 1, 2000, to 50% of the rate set out in the column”

After debate, the question being put on the amendment, it was agreed to.

Clause 51, as amended, carried.

By unanimous consent, Clauses 52 to 60 carried.

By unanimous consent, Clauses 61 to 70 carried.

By unanimous consent, Clauses 71 to 80 carried.

By unanimous consent, Clauses 81 to 88 carried.

On Clause 89

Bob Speller moved, —That Clause 89 be amended by striking out lines 23 to 28, on page 63, and substituting the following therefor:

“or class of goods from the application of this Act.

(2) The Governor in Council may, on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, make regulations exempting any goods or class of goods of Chile from the application of this Act or any of its provisions. The exemption may be in respect of the dumping of those goods or that class.

(3) Regulations made under subsection (2)”

After debate, the question being put on the amendment, it was agreed to.

Clause 89, as amended, carried.

By unanimous consent, Clauses 90 to 95 carried.

The Schedule carried.

Clause 1 carried.

The Preamble carried.

The Title carried.

The Bill, as amended, carried.

Ordered, — That the Chair report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

At 4:30 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 1997  
(Meeting No. 69)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met *in camera* at 9:40 o'clock a.m. this day, in Room 269, West Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Sarkis Assadourian, Eleni Bakopanos, Stéphane Bergeron, Hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Bob Mills, Philippe Paré and Benoît Sauvageau.

*Associate Member present:* Maud Debien.

*In attendance:* From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament: Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Researchers.

(iii) à compter du 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 2000: 50 %»

Après débat, l'amendement, mis aux voix, est adopté.

L'article 51, ainsi modifié, est adopté.

Par consentement unanime, les articles 52 à 60 sont adoptés.

Par consentement unanime, les articles 61 à 70 sont adoptés.

Par consentement unanime, les articles 71 à 80 sont adoptés.

Par consentement unanime, les articles 81 à 88 sont adoptés.

Article 89

Bob Speller propose, — Que l'article 89 soit modifié par substitution, aux lignes 26 à 30, page 63, de ce qui suit:

«des catégories de marchandises à l'application de la présente loi.

(2) Sur recommandation du ministre des Finances, le gouverneur en conseil peut, par règlement, soustraire des marchandises ou des catégories de marchandises du Chili à l'application de la présente loi ou de ses dispositions pour ce qui concerne leur dumping.

(3) Le règlement pris en vertu du paragraphe (2) peut préciser la durée de»

Après débat, l'amendement, mis aux voix, est adopté.

L'article 89, ainsi modifié, est adopté.

Par consentement unanime, les articles 90 à 95 sont adoptés.

L'annexe est adoptée.

L'article 1 est adopté.

Le préambule est adopté.

Le titre est adopté.

Le projet de loi, ainsi modifié, est adopté.

Il est ordonné, — Que le président fasse rapport à la Chambre du projet de loi dans sa forme modifiée.

À 16 h 30, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

LE MARDI 4 MARS 1997  
(Séance n° 69)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui à huis clos, à 9 h 40, dans la pièce 269 de l'édifice de l'Ouest, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (*président*).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Sarkis Assadourian, Eleni Bakopanos, Stéphane Bergeron, l'hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Bob Mills, Philippe Paré et Benoît Sauvageau.

*Membre associé présent:* Maud Debien.

*Aussi présents:* Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement: Gerald Schmitz et James Lee, attachés de recherche.



*Witnesses: From the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:* Jill Sinclair, Director, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division; Anthony Burger, Director, North-American and Euro-Atlantic Security and Defence Relations Division; Lorne Green, Director, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Implementation Agency; Peter McRae, Director, Legal Operations Division. *From the Department of National Defence:* Louise Bellefeuille-Prégent, Director, Nuclear and Arms Control Policy; George Betts, Senior Policy Planner.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee commenced its examination of Canadian policy on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

Jill Sinclair, Anthony Burger and Louise Bellefeuille each made a statement and, with the other witnesses, answered questions.

At 10:48 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 1997  
(Meeting No. 70)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met *in camera* at 9:17 o'clock a.m. this day, in Room 308, West Block, the Vice-Chair, Stéphane Bergeron, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Eleni Bakopanos, Stéphane Bergeron, Hon. Michel Dupuy, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Bob Mills, Philippe Paré, Charlie Penson, Benoît Sauvageau and Bob Speller.

*Acting Member present:* Ron MacDonald for John English.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch, of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Researchers.

*Witnesses: From the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:* Michael Leir, Director General, United States Bureau; Claude Carrière, Director, Tariffs and Market Access Division. *From the Canadian Steel Producers Association:* Jean Van Loon, President. *From the Dairy Farmers of Canada:* Claude Rivard, President, FPLQ. *From the Canadian Federation of Agriculture:* Don Kinnear, Trade Policy Representative (and past president). *From the Canadian Labour Congress:* Andrew Jackson, Senior Economist. *From the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL):* Hal Klepak, Director of Governance and Securities Programs; *From Prairie Pools:* Gordon Pugh, Manager, National Affairs.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee commenced its examination of issues related to Canada-United-States relations.

Michael Leir made a statement and, with Claude Carrière, answered questions.

At 9:35 o'clock a.m., the Chair, Bill Graham, took the Chair.

*Témoins: Du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international:* Jill Sinclair, directeur, Direction de la non-prolifération et du contrôle des armes et du désarmement; Anthony Burger, directeur, Direction des relations de sécurité et de défense pour l'Amérique du Nord et la région euro-atlantique; Lorne Green, directeur, Agence des affaires nucléaires, de l'application de la non-prolifération et du désarmement; Peter McRae, directeur, Direction des opérations juridiques. *Du ministère de la Défense nationale:* Louise Bellefeuille-Prégent, directrice, Politique nucléaire et contrôle des armements; George Betts, planificateur principal en matière de politique.

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité entreprend un examen de la politique canadienne sur la non-prolifération nucléaire, le contrôle des armes et le désarmement.

Jill Sinclair, Anthony Burger et Louise Bellefeuille présentent des exposés et, avec les autres témoins, répondent aux questions.

À 10 h 48, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

LE JEUDI 6 MARS 1997  
(Séance n° 70)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui à huis clos, à 9 h 17, dans la pièce 308 de l'édifice de l'Ouest, sous la présidence de Stéphane Bergeron (*vice-président*).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Eleni Bakopanos, Stéphane Bergeron, l'hon. Michel Dupuy, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Bob Mills, Philippe Paré, Charlie Penson, Benoît Sauvageau et Bob Speller.

*Membre suppléant présent:* Ron MacDonald pour John English.

*Aussi présents: Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement:* Gerald Schmitz et James Lee, attachés de recherche.

*Témoins: Du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international:* Michael Leir, directeur général, Bureau des relations avec les États-Unis; Claude Carrière, directeur, Tarif et accès au marché. *De l'Association canadienne des producteurs d'acier:* Jean Van Loon, président. *Des producteurs laitiers du Canada:* Claude Rivard, président, FPLQ. *De la Fédération canadienne de l'agriculture:* Don Kinnear, représentant de la politique du commerce international (et ancien président). *Du Congrès du Travail du Canada:* Andrew Jackson, économiste principal. *De la Fondation canadienne pour les Amériques (FOCAL):* Hal Klepak, directeur des programmes du gouvernement et des fonds d'État. *De «Prairie Pools»:* Gordon Pugh, gérant, Affaires nationales.

Conformément au mandat que lui confère l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité entreprend un examen des questions relatives aux relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis.

Michael Leir présente un exposé et, avec Claude Carrière, répond aux questions.

À 9 h 35, Bill Graham, président, occupe le fauteuil.

At 10:05 o'clock, a.m., the sitting was suspended.

At 10:17 o'clock a.m., the sitting proceeded in public.

Jean Van Loon, Claude Rivard, Don Kinnear, Andrew Jackson and Hal Klepak each made a statement and, with Gordon Pugh, answered questions.

It was agreed, — That the Committee invite the Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister of Trade, to appear before it to discuss international business development.

It was agreed, — That the Committee invite the Honourable Don Boudria, Minister for International Cooperation and la Francophonie, to appear before it to discuss the issue of child labour.

It was agreed, — That members of the Committee meet with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria on Monday, March 17, 1997.

It was agreed, — That the Committee convene an *in camera* briefing on the Main Estimates, 1997-98 for Foreign Affairs and International Trade at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

It was agreed, — That pursuant to the Standing Order 108(2), the Committee convene a meeting on NATO enlargement on March 20, to which the Minister of Foreign Affairs be invited, and that further, the Committee invite the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security, Professor Gartner from the University of Salzburg and Canada's Ambassador to NATO to appear.

It was agreed, — That the Committee meet with Rigoberta Menchu, Nobel Peace Prize Winner from Guatemala on June 2, 1997.

At 12:13 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 1997  
(Meeting No. 71)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met in a televised session at 9:13 o'clock a.m. this day, in Room 253-D, Centre Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Stéphane Bergeron, Hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Jesse Flis, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Bob Mills, Lee Morrison, Philippe Paré, Benoît Sauvageau and Bob Speller.

*Acting Member present:* Réginald Bélair for Eleni Bakopanos.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* James Lee, Researcher.

*Witnesses: From the Department of Veterans Affairs:* Dennis Wallace, Assistant Deputy Minister, Veterans' Services. *From the Department of Justice:* Bruce Mann, Counsel. *From the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:* Gilbert Laurin, Deputy Director, UN Legal Affairs Division.

À 10 h 05, la séance est suspendue.

À 10 h 07, la séance se poursuit en public.

Jean Van Loon, Claude Rivard, Don Kinnear, Andrew Jackson et Hal Klepak présentent chacun un exposé et, avec Gordon Pugh, répondent aux questions.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité invite l'honorable Art Eggleton, ministre du Commerce, à comparaître devant lui pour discuter de l'expansion internationale des entreprises.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité invite l'honorable Don Boudria, ministre pour la Coopération internationale et la Francophonie, à comparaître devant lui pour discuter de la question du travail des enfants.

Il est convenu, — Que les membres du Comité rencontrent le ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Algérie le lundi 17 mars 1997.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité tienne une séance d'information à huis clos sur le budget des dépenses principal de 1997-1998 pour les Affaires étrangères et le Commerce international, au ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international.

Il est convenu, — Que, conformément au paragraphe 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité convoque, le 20 mars, une séance sur l'expansion de l'OTAN à laquelle serait invité le ministre des Affaires étrangères et que, de plus, le Comité invite à comparaître le Conseil canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales, le professeur Gartner de l'Université de Salzbourg et l'ambassadeur du Canada auprès de l'OTAN.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité rencontre Rigoberta Menchu, du Guatemala, récipiendaire du prix Nobel de la paix, le 2 juin 1997.

À 12 h 13, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

LE MARDI 11 MARS 1997  
(Séance n° 71)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international tient aujourd'hui une séance télévisée, à 9 h 13, dans la pièce 253-D de l'édifice du Centre, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (*président*).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Stéphane Bergeron, l'hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Jesse Flis, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Bob Mills, Lee Morrison, Philippe Paré, Benoît Sauvageau et Bob Speller.

*Membre suppléant présent:* Réginald Bélair pour Eleni Bakopanos.

*Aussi présent:* Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement: James Lee, attaché de recherche.

*Témoins: Du ministère des Anciens combattants:* Dennis Wallace, sous-ministre adjoint, Services aux anciens combattants. *Du ministère de la Justice:* Bruce Mann, avocat-conseil. *Du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du commerce international:* Gilbert Laurin, directeur adjoint, Bureau des affaires juridiques de l'ONU.



In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed its examination of compensation for Canadian Far East Prisoners of War during World War II (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence dated November 19, 1996, Issue No. 7, Meeting No. 52*).

Dennis Wallace, Bruce Mann and Gilbert Laurin each made a statement and answered questions.

It was agreed, — That the Chair, on behalf of the Committee, request from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a legal opinion on the notion, in the case of Canadian Far East Prisoners of World War II, of the superceding of crimes against humanity over the 1952 Peace Treaty with Japan.

At 11:00 o'clock a.m., the sitting was suspended.

At 11:12 o'clock a.m., the sitting resumed *in camera* in Room 237-C of the Centre Block.

It was agreed, — That the Chair, on behalf of the Committee, write to the Ambassador of Japan to invite a representative of the Japanese Government to appear before the Committee or to present in writing the opinion of the Japanese Government on the issue of compensation for Canadian Far East Prisoners of World War II.

It was agreed, — That the Committee convene an additional meeting on the issue of compensation for Canadian Far East Prisoners of World War II.

At 11:20 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

MONDAY, MARCH 17, 1997  
(Meeting No. 72)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met *in camera* at 3:22 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 208, West Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Sarkis Assadourian, Stéphane Bergeron, Jesse Flis, Bill Graham, Lee Morrison, Philippe Paré and Benoît Sauvageau.

*Associate Members present:* Maud Debieen and George Proud.

*Other Member present:* Sue Barnes.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz, Researcher.

*Appearing: From the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria:* The Honourable Ahmed Attaf, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Algerian Republic democratic and popular; Abdeimadjid Falsa, Chief Executive, Department of Foreign Affairs, America; Hassene Rabehi, chef de Cabinet; The Honourable Abdesseïam Bedrane, Ambassador of the Algerian Republic to Canada; Naceur Boucherit, First Councillor, Embassy of the Algerian Republic.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2) the Committee met with a parliamentary delegation from Algeria.

The Honourable Ahmed Attaf made a statement and answered questions.

Conformément au mandat que lui confère l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité reprend son examen du dédommagement pour travail pour les prisonniers de guerre en Extrême-Orient au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale (*Voir les Procès-verbaux et témoignages du 19 novembre 1996, fascicule n° 7, séance n° 52*).

Dennis Wallace, Bruce Mann et Gilbert Laurin présentent chacun un exposé et répondent aux questions.

Il est convenu, — Que le président demande au ministre des Affaires extérieures, au nom du Comité, un avis juridique sur la notion d'exonération des crimes contre l'humanité, relativement aux prisonniers canadiens en Extrême-Orient pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, lors de la signature du Traité de paix avec le Japon.

À 11 h, la séance est suspendue.

À 11 h 12, la séance reprend à huis clos dans la pièce 237-C de l'édifice du Centre.

Il est convenu, — Que le président écrive à l'ambassadeur du Japon, au nom du Comité, pour inviter un représentant du gouvernement japonais à comparaître devant le comité ou à présenter par écrit l'opinion du gouvernement japonais sur la question du dédommagement pour les prisonniers canadiens en Extrême-Orient pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité convoque une autre séance sur la question du dédommagement pour les prisonniers canadiens en Extrême-Orient pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

À 11 h 20, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

LE LUNDI 17 MARS 1997  
(Séance n° 72)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui à huis clos, à 15 h 22, dans la pièce 208 de l'édifice de l'Ouest, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (*président*).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Sarkis Assadourian, Stéphane Bergeron, Jesse Flis, Bill Graham, Lee Morrison, Philippe Paré et Benoît Sauvageau.

*Membres associés présents:* Maud Debieen et George Proud.

*Autre députée présente:* Sue Barnes.

*Aussi présent:* Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement: Gerald Schmitz, attaché de recherche.

*Délégation: De la République algérienne démocratique et populaire:* L'honorable Ahmed Attaf, ministre des Affaires étrangères; Abdeimadjid Falsa, directeur général, Amérique, ministère des Affaires étrangères; Hassene Rabehi, chef de cabinet; l'honorable Abdesseïam Bedrane, ambassadeur de la République algérienne au Canada; Naceur Boucherit, premier conseiller, ambassade de la République algérienne.

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité rencontre une délégation de parlementaires de l'Algérie.

L'honorable Ahmed Attaf présente un exposé et répond aux questions.

At 4:21 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 1997  
(Meeting No. 73)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met on a televised session at 9:12 o'clock a.m. this day, in Room 253-D, Centre Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Sarkis Assadourian, Eleni Bakopanos, Stéphane Bergeron, Hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Jesse Flis, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Philippe Paré and Benoît Sauvageau.

*Associate Member present:* Maud Debien.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Researchers.

*Witnesses: From Project Ploughshares:* Ernie Regehr, Director, Policy and Public Affairs; Bill Robinson, Researcher; Doug Roche, Member and former Ambassador for Disarmament. *From Physicians for Global Survival (Canada):* Debbie Grisdale, Executive Director; Dr. Konia Trouton, President Elect; Dr. Alex Bryans, Member, Board of Directors. *From Lawyers for Social Responsibility:* David Matas, Member, Board of Directors. *From "Centre de ressources pour la non-violence":* Jacques Boucher, Director; Judith Berlyn, Member.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed its examination of Canadian policy on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (*See Minutes of Proceedings of Tuesday, March 4, 1997, Issue No. 11, Meeting No. 69*).

Douglas Roche and Ernie Regehr each made a statement and, with Bill Robinson, answered questions.

At 10:39 o'clock a.m., the sitting was suspended.

At 10:46 o'clock a.m., the sitting resumed.

Debbie Grisdale, Dr. Konia Trouton, Alex Bryans, David Matas, Jacques Boucher and Judith Berlyn each made a statement and answered questions.

At 12:07 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 1997  
(Meeting No. 74)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met at 3:32 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 256-S, Centre Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Eleni Bakopanos, Stéphane Bergeron, Jesse Flis, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham and Bob Speller.

À 16 h 21, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

LE MARDI 18 MARS 1997  
(Séance n° 73)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international tient aujourd'hui une séance télévisée, à 9 h 12, dans la pièce 253-D de l'édifice du Centre, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (*président*).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Sarkis Assadourian, Eleni Bakopanos, Stéphane Bergeron, l'hon. Michel Dupuis, John English, Jesse Flis, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Philippe Paré et Benoît Sauvageau.

*Membre associée présente:* Maud Debien.

*Aussi présents: Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement:* Gerald Schmitz et James Lee, attachés de recherche.

*Témoins: Du «Project Ploughshares»:* Ernie Regehr, directeur, Politique et Affaires publiques; Bill Robinson, chercheur; Doug Roche, membre et ancien ambassadeur pour le désarmement. *De l'Association des médecins pour la survie mondiale (Canada):* Debbie Grisdale, directrice exécutive; Dr<sup>e</sup> Konia Trouton, présidente élue; Dr<sup>e</sup> Alex Bryans, membre du conseil d'administration. *Des Avocats en faveur d'une conscience sociale:* David Matas, membre du conseil d'administration. *Du Centre de ressources sur la non-violence:* Jacques Boucher, directeur; Judith Berlyn, membre.

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité reprend son examen de la politique canadienne sur la non-prolifération nucléaire, le contrôle et la réduction des armes (*Voir les Procès-verbaux du mardi 4 mars 1997, fascicule n° 11, séance n° 69*).

Douglas Roche et Ernie Regehr présentent chacun un exposé et, avec Bill Robinson, répondent aux questions.

À 10 h 39, la séance est suspendue.

À 10 h 46, la séance reprend.

Debbie Grisdale, Dr<sup>e</sup> Konia Trouton, Alex Bryans, David Matas, Jacques Boucher et Judith Berlyn présentent chacun un exposé et répondent aux questions.

À 12 h 07, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

LE MERCREDI 19 MARS 1997  
(Séance n° 74)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui à 15 h 32, dans la pièce 256-S de l'édifice du Centre, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (*président*).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Eleni Bakopanos, Stéphane Bergeron, Jesse Flis, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham et Bob Speller.



*Associate Members present:* Maud Debien.

*Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs present:* Hon. John Stewart, Chair, Hon. Eymard Corbin, Hon. Jeremiah Grafstein, Hon. Peter A. Stollery, Hon. Raynell Andreychuk.

*Other Senator present:* Hon. Noel Kinsella.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz and Anthony Chapman, Researchers. *From the Committees Directorate of The Senate:* Serge Pelletier, Committee Clerk.

*Delegation: From the Joint Committee on European Affairs of the Parliament of Ireland:* Michael Ferris, M.P., Chairman of the Joint Committee; Michael Calnan, Senator; Joe O'Toole, Senator; David Andrews, M.P.; Noel Davern, M.P.; John Browne, M.P.; Liam Canniffe, Clerk.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee proceeded to meet with a parliamentary delegation from Ireland.

Michael Ferris made a statement and, with the other members of the delegation, answered questions.

At 5:09 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1997

(Meeting No. 75)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met at 9:08 o'clock a.m. this day, in Room 269, West Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Eleni Bakopanos, Stéphane Bergeron, Hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Philippe Paré and Benoît Sauvageau.

*Acting Member present:* Keith Martin for Bob Mills.

*Associate Member present:* Maud Debien.

*Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs present:* Honourable John Stewart, Honourable Raynell Andreychuk, Honourable Eymard Corbin, Honourable Pierre De Bané.

*Other Senators present:* Honourable Marcel Prud'homme, Hon. Peter Bosa.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz, James Lee and Anthony Chapman, Researchers. *From the Committees Directorate of the Senate:* Serge Pelletier, Committee Clerk.

*Appearing:* Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

*Witnesses: From the Canadian Council on Peace and Security:* Douglas Fraser, Colonel, retired, Executive Director; Alain Pellerin, Colonel, retired, Project Director, CIIPS NATO Enlargement Project. *As Individuals:* Heinz Gärtner, Research Fellow, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Laxenburg, Austria. Aurel Braun, Professor, Political Science, University of Toronto. Jacques Levesque, Professor, Political Science, "Université du Québec à Montréal".

*Membre associée présente:* Maud Debien.

*Membres du Comité sénatorial des affaires étrangères présents:* l'hon. John Stewart, président, l'hon. Eymard Corbin, l'hon. Jeremiah Grafstein, l'hon. Peter A. Stollery, l'hon. Raynell Andreychuk.

*Autre sénateur présent:* L'hon. Noel Kinsella.

*Aussi présents: Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement:* Gerald Schmitz et Anthony Chapman, attachés de recherche. *De la Direction des comités du Sénat:* Serge Pelletier, greffier de comité.

*Délégation: Du Comité mixte du Parlement irlandais sur les affaires européennes:* Michael Ferris, député, président du Comité mixte; Michael Calnan, sénateur; Joe O'Toole, sénateur; David Andrews, député; Noel Davern, député; John Browne, député; Liam Canniffe, greffier.

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité rencontre une délégation de parlementaires d'Irlande.

Michael Ferris fait une déclaration et, avec les autres membres de la délégation, répond aux questions.

À 17 h 09, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

LE JEUDI 20 MARS 1997

(Séance n° 75)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui à 9 h 08, dans la pièce 269 de l'édifice de l'Ouest, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (président).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Eleni Bakopanos, Stéphane Bergeron, l'hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Philippe Paré et Benoît Sauvageau.

*Membre suppléant présent:* Keith Martin pour Bob Mills.

*Membre associée présente:* Maud Debien.

*Membres du Comité sénatorial des affaires étrangères présents:* l'hon. John Stewart, l'hon. Raynell Andreychuk, l'hon. Eymard Corbin, l'hon. Pierre De Bané.

*Autres sénateurs présents:* l'hon. Marcel Prud'homme et l'hon. Peter Bosa.

*Aussi présents: Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement:* Gerald Schmitz, James Lee et Anthony Chapman, attachés de recherche. *De la Direction des comités du Sénat:* Serge Pelletier, greffier de comité.

*Compareait:* L'hon. Lloyd Axworthy, ministre des Affaires étrangères.

*Témoins: Du Conseil canadien sur la paix et la sécurité:* Douglas Fraser, colonel retraité, directeur exécutif; Alain Pellerin, colonel retraité, directeur du programme CCPS sur l'élargissement de l'OTAN. *À titre personnel:* Heinz Gärtner, récipiendaire d'une bourse de recherche, Institut autrichien des affaires internationales, Laxenburg, Autriche. Aurel Braun, professeur, Science politique, Université de Toronto. Jacques Levesque, professeur, Science politique, Université du Québec à Montréal.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed its examination of NATO enlargement (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Thursday, October 10, 1996, Issue No. 6, Meeting No. 44*).

The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy made a statement and answered questions.

At 10:13 o'clock a.m., the sitting was suspended.

At 11:05 o'clock a.m., the sitting resumed.

Douglas Fraser, Alain Pellerin, Heinz Gärtner, Aurel Braun and Jacques Levesque each made a statement and answered questions.

The Chair presented the Fifth Report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure which is as follows:

It was agreed, — That Roy Cullen be substituted for Sarkis Assadourian as a Member of the Sub-Committee on Trade Disputes.

It was agreed, — That the Committee meet in a joint session with the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs with the Prime Minister of Lebanon on Thursday, April 10, 1997, 3:15 to 4:10.

It was agreed, — That the Committee order a reprint of the First Report of the Committee entitled "Canadian SMEs in the World Economy: Developing Effective Business-Government Partnership for International Success" in the quantity of 800 copies.

It was agreed, — That, should the need arise, the Committee retain the services of Georges Royer to edit the French version of the report of the Committee on circumpolar cooperation for an amount not to exceed \$2,500.00.

It was agreed, — That the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Honourable Lloyd Axworthy and the Minister for International Cooperation and la Francophonie, Honourable Don Boudria, be invited to appear before the Committee in relation to the Main Estimates for Foreign Affairs and CIDA, 1997-98.

On motion of Stéphane Bergeron, it was agreed, — That Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister for International Trade, be added to the fifth paragraph.

It was agreed, — That the Fifth Report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure, as amended, be concurred in.

At 12:17 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité reprend son examen de l'élargissement de l'OTAN (*Voir les Procès-verbaux et témoignages du jeudi 10 octobre, 1996, fascicule n° 6, réunion n° 44*).

L'hon. Lloyd Axworthy fait une déclaration et répond aux questions.

À 10 h 13, la séance est suspendue.

À 11 h 05, la séance reprend.

Douglas Fraser, Alain Pellerin, Heinz Gärtner, Aurel Braun et Jacques Levesque présentent chacun un exposé et répondent aux questions.

Le président présente le Cinquième rapport du Sous-comité du programme et de la procédure:

Il est convenu, — Que Roy Cullen remplace Sarkis Assadourian en tant que membre du Sous-comité sur les différends commerciaux.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité tienne une séance conjointe avec le Comité sénatorial des affaires étrangères pour rencontrer le premier ministre du Liban, le jeudi 10 avril 1997, de 15 h 15 à 16 h 10.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité fasse réimprimer 800 exemplaires de son Premier rapport intitulé «Les PME canadiennes dans l'économie mondiale: optimiser le partenariat entreprises-secteur public pour réussir sur les marchés internationaux».

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité retienne, au besoin, les services de Georges Royer pour réviser la version française du rapport du Comité sur la coopération circumpolaire, pour un montant ne dépassant pas 2 500 \$.

Il est convenu, — Que le ministre des Affaires étrangères, l'honorable Lloyd Axworthy, et le ministre pour la Coopération internationale et la Francophonie, l'honorable Don Boudria, soient invités à comparaître devant le Comité relativement au Budget des dépenses principal pour les Affaires étrangères et l'ACDI, pour 1997-1998.

Sur motion de Stéphane Bergeron, il est convenu, — Que le nom de l'honorable Art Eggleton, ministre du Commerce international, soit ajouté au cinquième paragraphe.

Il est convenu, — Que la version modifiée du Cinquième rapport du Sous-comité du programme et de la procédure soit adoptée.

À 12 h 17, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Janice Hilchie

*Clerk of the Committee*

*La greffière du Comité*

Janice Hilchie





## WITNESSES

Thursday, February 20, 1997 (Meeting No. 67)

*Alliance of Manufacturers & Exporters Canada:*

Mark Drake, Senior Vice-President;

James Moore, Policy.

*Canada-Chile Chamber of Commerce:*

José Duran, President;

Honourable Marc Lalonde, Chairman of the Board.

*Canadian Federation of Agriculture:*

Jack Wilkinson, President.

*Canadian Steel Producers Association:*

Derek M. de Korte, Manager, Marketing, Algoma Steel Inc.;

Jean Van Loon, President.

*Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:*

Claude Carrière, Director, Tariffs and Market Access Division;

Dan Daley, Associate Counsel, Trade Law Division.

*Department of Justice:*

Dan Hermosa, Legal Counsel.

*General Electric Canada:*

Bob Weese, Vice-President, Government and External Relations;

John Wilson, Consultant, Government Relations.

*Prairie Pools:*

Gordon Pugh, Manager, National Affairs.

*Privy Council Office:*

Keith Christie, Assistant Deputy Minister, Federal-Provincial Relations.

Monday, March 3, 1997 (Meeting No. 68)

*Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:*

Claude Carrière, Director, Tariffs and Market Access Division;

Dan Daley, Associate Counsel, Trade Law Division.

*Privy Council Office:*

Keith Christie, Assistant Deputy Minister, Federal-Provincial Relations.

Tuesday, March 4, 1997 (Meeting No. 69)

*Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:*

Anthony Burger, Director, North-American and Euro-Atlantic Security and Defence Relations Division;

Lorne Green, Director, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Implementation Agency;

Peter McRae, Director, Legal Operations Division;

Jill Sinclair, Director, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division.

*Department of National Defence:*

Louise Bellefeuille-Prégent, Director, Nuclear and Arms Control Policy;

George Betts, Senior Policy Planner.

Thursday, March 6, 1997 (Meeting No. 70)

*Canadian Federation of Agriculture:*

Don Kinnear, Trade Policy Representative (and past president).

*Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL):*

Hal Klepak, Director of Governance and Securities Programs;

*Canadian Labour Congress:*

Andrew Jackson, Senior Economist.

*Canadian Steel Producers Association:*

Jean Van Loon, President.



*Dairy Farmers of Canada:*

Claude Rivard, President, FPLQ.

*Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:*

Claude Carrière, Director, Tariffs and Market Access Division;

Michael Leir, Director General, United States Bureau.

*Prairie Pools:*

Gordon Pugh, Manager, National Affairs.

Tuesday, March 11, 1997 (Meeting No. 71)

*Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:*

Gilbert Laurin, Deputy Director, UN Legal Affairs Division.

*Department of Justice:*

Bruce Mann, Counsel.

*Department of Veterans Affairs:*

Dennis Wallace, Assistant Deputy Minister, Veterans' Services.

Monday, March 17, 1997 (Meeting No. 72)

*People's Democratic Republic of Algeria:*

The Honourable Ahmed Attaf, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Algerian Republic democratic and popular;

The Honourable Abdesseiam Bedrane, Ambassador of the Algerian Republic to Canada;

Naceur Boucherit, First Councillor, Embassy of the Algerian Republic.

Abdeimadjid Falsa, Chief Executive, Department of Foreign Affairs, America;

Hassene Rabehi, chef de Cabinet;

Tuesday, March 18, 1997 (Meeting No. 73)

*"Centre de ressources sur la non-violence":*

Judith Berlyn, Member;

Jacques Boucher, Director.

*Lawyers for Social Responsibility:*

David Matas, Member, Board of Directors.

*Physicians for Global Survival (Canada):*

Dr. Alex Bryans, Member, Board of Directors;

Debbie Grisdale, Executive Director;

Dr. Konia Trouton, President Elect.

*Project Ploughshares:*

Ernie Regehr, Director, Policy and Public Affairs;

Bill Robinson, Researcher;

Doug Roche, Member and former Ambassador for Disarmament.

Wednesday, March 19, 1997 (Meeting No. 74)

*Joint Committee on European Affairs of the Parliament of Ireland:*

David Andrews, M.P.;

John Browne, M.P.;

Michael Calnan, Senator;

Liam Canniffe, Clerk.

Noel Davern, M.P.;

Michael Ferris, M.P., Chairman of the Joint Committee;

Joe O'Toole, Senator.

Thursday, March 20, 1997 (Meeting No. 75)

*As Individuals:*

Aurel Braun, Professor, Political Science, University of Toronto;

Heinz Gärtner, Research Fellow, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Laxenburg, Austria;

Jacques Levesque, Professor, Political Science, "Université du Québec à Montréal".

*Canadian Council on Peace and Security:*

Douglas Fraser, Colonel, retired, Executive Director;

Alain Pellerin, Colonel, retired, Project Director, CIIPS NATO Enlargement Project.

## TÉMOINS

Le jeudi 20 février 1997 (Séance n° 67)

*«Alliance of Manufacturers & Exporters Canada»:*

Mark Drake, vice-président principal;

James Moore, politique.

*Association canadienne des producteurs d'acier:*

Jean Van Loon, présidente;

Derek M. de Korte, gérant, commercialisation,  
«Algoma Steel Inc.»

*Bureau du Conseil privé:*

Keith Christie, sous-ministre adjoint, Relations  
fédérales-provinciales.

*Chambre de commerce Canada-Chili:*

José Duran, président;

L'honorable Marc Lalonde, président du conseil  
d'administration.

*Fédération canadienne de l'agriculture:*

Jack Wilkinson, président.

*«General Electric Canada»:*

Bob Weese, vice-président, Relations avec le  
gouvernement et relations extérieures;

John Wilson, consultant, Relations avec le  
gouvernement.

*Ministère de la Justice:*

Dan Hermosa, conseiller juridique.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du commerce  
international:*

Claude Carrière, directeur, Direction des droits de  
douane et de l'accès aux marchés;

Dan Daley, avocat-conseil associé, Direction du  
droit commercial international.

*«Prairie Pools»:*

Gordon Pugh, gérant, Affaires nationales.

Le lundi 3 mars 1997 (Séance n° 68)

*Bureau du Conseil privé:*

Keith Christie, sous-ministre adjoint, Relations  
fédérales-provinciales.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce  
international:*

Claude Carrière, directeur, Direction des droits de  
douane et de l'accès aux marchés;

Dan Daley, avocat-conseil associé, Direction du  
droit commercial international.

Le mardi 4 mars 1997 (Séance n° 69)

*Ministère de la Défense nationale:*

Louise Bellefeuille-Prégent, directrice, Politique  
nucléaire et contrôle des armements;

George Betts, planificateur principal en matière  
de politique.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce  
international:*

Anthony Burger, directeur, Direction des  
relations de sécurité et de défense pour  
l'Amérique du Nord et la région  
euro-atlantique;

Lorne Green, directeur, Agence des affaires  
nucléaires, de l'application de la  
non-prolifération et du désarmement;

Peter McRae, directeur, Direction des opérations  
juridiques;

Jill Sinclair, directeur, Direction de la  
non-prolifération et du contrôle des armes  
et du désarmement.

Le jeudi 6 mars 1997 (Séance n° 70)

*Association canadienne des producteurs d'acier:*

Jean Van Loon, président.

*Congrès du Travail du Canada:*

Andrew Jackson, économiste principal.



*Fédération canadienne de l'agriculture:*

Don Kinnear, représentant de la politique du commerce international (et ancien président).

*Fondation canadienne pour les Amériques (FOCAL):*

Hal Klepak, directeur des programmes du gouvernement et des fonds d'État.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international:*

Claude Carrière, directeur, Tarif et accès au marché.

Michael Leir, directeur général, Bureau des relations avec les États-Unis;

*«Prairie Pools»:*

Gordon Pugh, gérant, Affaires nationales.

*Producteurs laitiers du Canada:*

Claude Rivard, président, FPLQ.

Le mardi 11 mars 1997 (Séance n° 71)

*Ministère de la Justice:*

Bruce Mann, avocat-conseil.

*Ministère des Anciens combattants:*

Dennis Wallace, sous-ministre adjoint, Services aux anciens combattants.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du commerce international:*

Gilbert Laurin, directeur adjoint, Bureau des affaires juridiques de l'ONU.

Le lundi 17 mars 1997 (Séance n° 72)

*République algérienne démocratique et populaire:*

L'honorable Ahmed Attaf, ministre des Affaires étrangères;

L'honorable Abdesseiam Bedrane, ambassadeur de la République algérienne au Canada;

Naceur Boucherit, premier conseiller, Ambassade de la République algérienne,

Abdeimadjid Falsa, directeur général, Amérique, ministère des Affaires étrangères;

Hassene Rabehi, chef de cabinet.

Le mardi 18 mars 1997 (Séance n° 73)

*Association des médecins pour la survie mondiale (Canada):*

Dr Alex Bryans, membre du conseil d'administration;

Debbie Grisdale, directrice exécutive;

Dr Konia Trouton, présidente élue.

*Avocats en faveur d'une conscience sociale:*

David Matas, membre du conseil d'administration.

*Centre de ressources sur la non-violence:*

Judith Berlyn, membre;

Jacques Boucher, directeur.

*«Project Ploughshares»:*

Ernie Regehr, directeur, Politique et Affaires publiques;

Bill Robinson, chercheur;

Doug Roche, membre et ancien ambassadeur pour le désarmement.

Le mercredi 19 mars 1997 (Séance n° 74)

*Comité mixte du Parlement irlandais sur les affaires européennes:*

David Andrews, député;

John Browne, député;

Michael Calnan, sénateur;

Liam Canniffe, greffier;

Noel Davern, député;

Michael Ferris, député, président du Comité mixte;

Joe O'Toole, sénateur.

Le jeudi 20 mars 1997 (Séance n° 75)

*À titre personnel:*

Heinz Gartner, récipiendaire d'une bourse de recherche, Institut autrichien des affaires internationales, Laxenburg, Autriche;

Aurel Braun, professeur, Science politique,  
Université de Toronto;

Jacques Levesque, professeur, Science politique,  
Université du Québec à Montréal.

*Conseil canadien sur la paix et la sécurité:*

Douglas Fraser, colonel retraité, directeur  
exécutif;

Alain Pellerin, colonel retraité, directeur du  
programme CCIPS sur l'élargissement de  
l'OTAN.











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HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 12 (Meetings Nos. 76 to 78)

Thursday, April 10, 1997

Friday, April 11, 1997

Chair: Bill Graham

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 12 (Séances n°s 76 à 78)

Le jeudi 10 avril 1997

Le vendredi 11 avril 1997

Président: Bill Graham

*Minutes of Proceedings of the Standing Committee on*

## Foreign Affairs and International Trade

*Procès-verbaux du Comité permanent des*

## Affaires étrangères et du commerce international

### RESPECTING:

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), an examination of Canada's International Business Development Strategy

Main Estimates 1997-98: VOTES 1, 5, 10 and 50 under FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), meeting with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Lebanon, His Excellency Rafik Al-Hariri

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(1)(a) and 108(2), joint session with the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs in a meeting with the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, His Excellency Javier Solana

### CONCERNANT:

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, un examen de la stratégie du Développement du commerce international du Canada

Budget des dépenses principal 1997-1998: CRÉDITS 1, 5, 10 et 50 sous la rubrique AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, rencontre avec le premier ministre de la république du Liban, son excellence Rafik Al-Hariri

Conformément aux articles 108(1)a) et 108(2) du Règlement, séance conjointe avec le Comité permanent de la défense et les anciens combattants pour une rencontre avec le secrétaire général de l'Organisation du Traité du Nord Atlantique, son excellence Javier Solana

### APPEARING:

Honourable Art Eggleton,  
Minister for International Trade

### WITNESS(ES):

(See end of document)

### COMPARAÎT:

L'honorable Art Eggleton,  
ministre du Commerce international

### TÉMOIN(S):

(Voir fin du document)





STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND  
INTERNATIONAL TRADE

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*Vice-Chairmen:* Stéphane Bergeron  
John English

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Hon. Michel Dupuy  
Jesse Flis  
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Janko Peric  
George Proud  
Svend J. Robinson  
Andrew Telegdi  
Paddy Torsney — (25)

(Quorum 8)

Janice Hilchie

*Clerk of the Committee*

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU  
COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

*Président:* Bill Graham

*Vice-présidents:* Stéphane Bergeron  
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Ted McWhinney  
Val Meredith  
Rey D. Pagtakhan  
Janko Peric  
George Proud  
Svend J. Robinson  
Andrew Telegdi  
Paddy Torsney — (25)

(Quorum 8)

*La greffière du Comité*

Janice Hilchie

2nd Session/35th Parliament

2<sup>e</sup> Session/35<sup>e</sup> Législature**ORDER OF REFERENCE****ORDRE DE RENVOI**

*Extract from the Journals of the House of Commons of Thursday, February 20, 1997*

*Extrait des Journaux de la Chambre des communes du jeudi 20 février 1997*

Pursuant to Standing Order 81(6), Mr. Massé (President of the Treasury Board), seconded by Mrs. Robillard (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), moved, — That the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1998, laid upon the Table on February 20, 1997, be referred to the several Standing Committees of the House, as follows:

Conformément à l'article 81(6) du Règlement, M. Massé (président du Conseil du Trésor), appuyé par M<sup>me</sup> Robillard (ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration), propose, — Que le Budget des dépenses principal pour l'exercice se terminant le 31 mars 1998, déposé le 20 février 1997, soit renvoyé aux différents comités permanents de la Chambre comme suit:

**(8) to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade**

**(8) au Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international**

— *Foreign Affairs, Votes 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 L30, L35, 40, 45, 50 and 55*

— *Affaires étrangères, crédits 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, L30, L35, 40, 45, 50 et 55*

ATTEST

ATTESTÉ

*Le Greffier de la Chambre des communes*

ROBERT MARLEAU

*Clerk of the House of Commons*





**MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS**

THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 1997  
(Meeting No. 76)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met at 10:18 o'clock a.m. this day, in Room 269, West Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Eleni Bakopanos, Stéphane Bergeron, Hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Bill Graham, Philippe Paré, Charlie Penson and Benoît Sauvageau.

*Acting Member present:* Roy Cullen for Beryl Gaffney.

*Associate Member present:* Maud Debien.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Researchers.

*Appearing:* Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister for International Trade.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee proceeded to examine Canada's International Business Development Strategy and the Committee commenced consideration of its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated Thursday, February 20, 1997, relating to the Main Estimates for Foreign Affairs and International Trade for the fiscal year ending Tuesday, March 31, 1998.

Honourable Art Eggleton made a statement and answered questions.

At 11:08 o'clock a.m., the sitting proceeded *in camera*.

The Committee proceeded to consider its future business.

It was agreed, — That the Committee retain the services of Verena Ossent to edit the French version of the report of the Committee on circumpolar cooperation for an amount not to exceed \$3,000.00.

It was agreed, — That the Committee print 2,000 copies in English and 1,000 copies in French of its report on circumpolar cooperation.

It was agreed, — That the report of the Committee on circumpolar cooperation be printed with a special cover.

It was agreed, — That the Committee plan to present its report on circumpolar cooperation to the House of Commons on Tuesday, April 22, 1997.

It was agreed, — That the Committee approve a budget of the Committee for the period of April 1 to June 20, 1997 in the amount of \$41,235.00.

It was agreed, — That the motion be amended by reducing the total amount of the budget to \$40,735.00.

It was agreed, — That the motion be adopted as amended.

It was agreed, — That the Committee meet with the following individuals during the month of May: James Jonah, Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of New Zealand; and Honourable Ahmed Qurle, Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council.

**PROCÈS-VERBAL**

LE JEUDI 10 AVRIL 1997  
(Séance n° 76)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui à 10 h 18, dans la pièce 269 de l'édifice de l'Ouest, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (*président*).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Eleni Bakopanos, Stéphane Bergeron, l'hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Bill Graham, Philippe Paré, Charlie Penson et Benoît Sauvageau.

*Membre suppléant présent:* Roy Cullen pour Beryl Gaffney.

*Membre associé présent:* Maud Debien.

*Aussi présents:* Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement: Gerald Schmitz et James Lee, attachés de recherche.

*Comparaît:* L'hon. Art Eggleton, ministre du Commerce international.

Conformément au mandat que lui confère l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité examine la stratégie du Développement du commerce international du Canada et, conformément à son ordre de renvoi du jeudi 20 février 1997, il entreprend l'examen du Budget des dépenses principal sous la rubrique Affaires étrangères et commerce international pour l'exercice se terminant le mardi 31 mars 1998.

L'hon. Art Eggleton fait une déclaration et répond aux questions.

À 11 h 08, la séance se poursuit à huis clos.

Le Comité examine ses travaux futurs.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité retienne les services de Verena Ossent pour réviser la version française du rapport du Comité sur la coopération circumpolaire, pour un montant n'excédant pas 3 000\$.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité fasse imprimer 2 000 exemplaires en anglais et 1 000 exemplaires en français de son rapport sur la coopération circumpolaire.

Il est convenu, — Que le rapport du Comité sur la coopération circumpolaire ait une couverture spéciale.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité prévoie présenter son rapport sur la coopération circumpolaire, à la Chambre des communes, le mardi 22 avril 1997.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité approuve, pour la période allant du 1<sup>er</sup> avril au 20 juin 1997, un budget de 41 235\$.

Il est convenu, — Que la motion soit modifiée et que le montant total soit réduit et passe à 40 735\$.

Il est convenu, — Que la motion soit adoptée dans sa forme modifiée.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité rencontre les personnes suivantes au cours du mois de mai: James Jonah, ambassadeur et représentant permanent, mission permanente de la République de Sierra Leone aux Nations unies; le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Nouvelle-Zélande; et l'honorable Ahmed Qurle, Président du Conseil législatif palestinien.



It was agreed, — That the Chair, on behalf of the Committee, write a letter to the Ambassador to Canada from El Salvador regarding the situation of Antonia Maria Campos Zavala, who is imprisoned in El Salvador.

At 11:35 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 1997  
(Meeting No. 77)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met at 3:15 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 256-S, Centre Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Sarkis Assadourian, Eleni Bakopanos, Hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Bill Graham and Philippe Paré.

*Acting Members present:* Marc Harb for Francis LeBlanc; Keith Martin for Bob Mills.

*Associate Members present:* Maud Debien and Andrew Telegdi.

*Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs present:* Hon. John Stewart, Hon. Pat Carney, Hon. Jeremiah G. Grafstein, Hon. Raynell Andreychuk, Hon. Pierre De Bané.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Anthony Chapman and James Lee, Researchers; *From the Committees Directorate of the Senate:* Serge Pelletier, Committee Clerk.

*Witnesses: From the Republic of Lebanon:* His Excellency Rafik Al-Hariri, Prime Minister; His Excellency Fouad Sanioura, Minister of State for Financial Affairs; His Excellency Jean Obeid, Minister of Education, Youth and Sport; His Excellency Yassine Jaber, Minister of Economy and Commerce; His Excellency Assem Salman Jaber, Ambassador of the Lebanese Republic to Canada; His Excellency Hisham Shaar, Secretary General of the Council of Ministers.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee proceeded to meet with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Lebanon and an accompanying Parliamentary delegation.

His Excellency Rafik Al-Hariri made a statement and answered questions.

At 4:20 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

FRIDAY, APRIL 11, 1997  
(Meeting No. 78)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met in a joint session with the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs at 10:20 o'clock a.m. this day, in Room 112-N, Centre Block, Hon. Michel Dupuy, presiding.

*Member of the Committee present:* Hon. Michel Dupuy.

Il est convenu, — Que le président, au nom du Comité, écrive une lettre à l'ambassadeur du Salvador au Canada, au sujet de la situation d'Antonia Maria Campos Zavala, qui est emprisonnée au El Salvador.

À 11 h 35, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

LE JEUDI 10 AVRIL 1997  
(Séance n° 77)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui à 15 h 15, dans la pièce 256-S de l'édifice du Centre, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (*président*).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Sarkis Assadourian, Eleni Bakopanos, l'hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Bill Graham et Philippe Paré.

*Membres suppléants présents:* Marc Harb pour Francis LeBlanc; Keith Martin pour Bob Mills.

*Membres associés présents:* Maud Debien et Andrew Telegdi.

*Membres du Comité sénatorial des affaires étrangères présents:* L'hon. John Stewart, l'hon. Pat Carney, L'hon. Jeremiah G. Grafstein, L'hon. Raynell Andreychuk, L'hon. Pierre De Bané.

*Aussi présents: Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement:* Anthony Chapman et James Lee, attachés de recherche. *De la Direction des comités du Sénat:* Serge Pelletier, greffier de comité.

*Témoins: De la République libanaise:* Son Excellence Rafik Al-Hariri, premier ministre; Son Excellence Fouad Sanioura, ministre d'État aux Affaires financières; Son Excellence Jean Obeid, ministre de l'Éducation, de la Jeunesse et du Sport; Son Excellence Yassine Jaber, ministre de l'Économie et du Commerce; Son Excellence Assem Salman Jaber, ambassadeur de la République libanaise au Canada; Son Excellence Hisham Shaar, secrétaire général du conseil des ministres.

Conformément au mandat que lui confère l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité rencontre le premier ministre de la République libanaise et la délégation de parlementaires qui l'accompagne.

Son Excellence Rafik Al-Hariri fait une déclaration et répond aux questions.

À 16 h 20, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

LE VENDREDI 11 AVRIL 1997  
(Séance n° 78)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui conjointement avec le Comité permanent de la défense nationale et des anciens combattants, à 10 h 20, dans la pièce 112-N de l'édifice du Centre, sous la présidence de l'hon. Michel Dupuy (*président*).

*Membre du Comité présent:* L'hon. Michel Dupuy.

*Acting Members present:* Rex Crawford for Sarkis Assadourian; George Proud for Francis G. LeBlanc; Roy Cullen for Bill Graham.

*Associate Member present:* Keith Martin.

*Members of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs present:* Jean Leroux and John Richardson.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz, Michel Rossignol and James Lee, Researchers.

*Delegation: From the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:* His Excellency Javier Solana, Secretary General; Jorge Domecq, Director of the Private Office; Hoyt Yee, Deputy Director of the Private Office; Jamie Shea, Deputy Director of the Office of Information and Press; Victor Martin, Executive Assistant to the Secretary General.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed its examination of NATO Enlargement (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, dated Thursday, October 10, 1996, Issue No. 6, Meeting No. 45*).

His Excellency Javier Solana made a statement and answered questions.

At 11:05 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Janice Hilchie

*Clerk of the Committee*

*Membres suppléants présents:* Rex Crawford pour Sarkis Assadourian; George Proud pour Francis G. LeBlanc; Roy Cullen pour Bill Graham.

*Membre associé présent:* Keith Martin.

*Membres du Comité permanent de la défense nationale et des anciens combattants présents:* Jean Leroux et John Richardson.

*Aussi présents: Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement:* Gerald Schmitz, Michel Rossignol et James Lee, attachés de recherche.

*Délégation: De l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord:* Son Excellence Javier Solana, secrétaire général; Jorge Domecq, directeur du bureau du secrétaire général; Hoyt Yee, directeur adjoint du bureau du secrétaire général; Jamie Shea, directeur adjoint du bureau de l'information et des relations avec les médias; Victor Martin, adjoint exécutif du secrétaire général.

Conformément au mandat que lui confère l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité reprend son examen de l'expansion de l'OTAN (*Voir les Procès-verbaux et témoignages du jeudi 10 octobre 1996, fascicule n° 6, Séance n° 45*).

Son Excellence Javier Solana fait une déclaration et répond aux questions.

À 11 h 05, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*La greffière du Comité*

Janice Hilchie





## WITNESSES

Thursday, April 10, 1997 (Meeting No. 77)

*Republic of Lebanon:*

His Excellency Rafik Al-Hariri, Prime Minister;

His Excellency Yassine Jaber, Minister of  
Economy and Commerce;

His Excellency Jean Obeid, Minister of  
Education, Youth and Sport;

His Excellency Assem Salman Jaber,  
Ambassador of the Lebanese Republic to  
Canada;

His Excellency Fouad Sanioura, Minister of State  
for Financial Affairs;

His Excellency Hisham Shaar, Secretary General  
of the Council of Ministers.

Friday, April 11, 1997 (Meeting No. 78)

*North Atlantic Treaty Organization:*

Jorge Domecq, Director of the Private Office;

Victor Martin, Executive Assistant to the  
Secretary General;

Jamie Shea, Deputy Director of the Office of  
Information and Press;

His Excellency Javier Solana, Secretary General;

Hoyt Yee, Deputy Director of the Private Office.

## TÉMOINS

Le jeudi 10 avril 1997 (Séance n° 77)

*République libanaise:*

Son Excellence Rafik Al-Hariri, premier ministre;

Son Excellence Yassine Jaber, ministre de l'Économie et du Commerce;

Son Excellence Jean Obeid, ministre de l'Éducation, de la Jeunesse et du Sport;

Son Excellence Assem Salman Jaber, ambassadeur de la République libanaise au Canada;

Son Excellence Fouad Sanioura, ministre d'État aux Affaires financières;

Son Excellence Hisham Shaar, secrétaire général du conseil des ministres.

Le vendredi 11 avril 1997 (Séance n° 78)

*Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord:*

Jorge Domecq, directeur du bureau du secrétaire général;

Victor Martin, adjoint exécutif du secrétaire général;

Jamie Shea, directeur adjoint du bureau de l'information et des relations avec les médias;

Son Excellence Javier Solana, secrétaire général;

Hoyt Yee, directeur adjoint du bureau du secrétaire général.







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
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HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA



Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on  
Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Bill Graham, M.P., Chair

April 1997



Map of the Northern Circumpolar Region produced  
by GeoAccess, Canada Centre for Remote Sensing,  
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**CANADA AND THE CIRCUMPOLAR WORLD:  
MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF COOPERATION  
INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

**Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on  
Foreign Affairs and International Trade**

**Bill Graham, M.P., Chair**

**April 1997**



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HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 13 (Meetings Nos. 79 to 81)

Tuesday, April 15, 1997  
Thursday, April 17, 1997

Chair: Bill Graham

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 13 (Séances nos 79 à 81)

Le mardi 15 avril 1997  
Le jeudi 17 avril 1997

Président: Bill Graham

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*Minutes of Proceedings of the Standing Committee on*

## **Foreign Affairs and International Trade**

*Procès-verbaux du Comité permanent des*

## **Affaires étrangères et du commerce international**

---

**RESPECTING:**

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), an examination of circumpolar cooperation

**INCLUDING:**

The Seventh Report to the House  
Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the  
Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First  
Century

**CONCERNANT:**

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, un examen de la coopération circumpolaire

**Y COMPRIS:**

Le Septième rapport à la Chambre  
Le Canada et l'univers circumpolaire : relever les défis  
de la coopération à l'aube du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle



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(Quorum 8)

## **Former Members of the Committee who participated in this study**

Colleen Beaumier

David Iftody

## **Other Members of Parliament who participated in this study**

Jack Anawak  
Claude Bachand  
Shaughnessy Cohen  
John Duncan  
Wayne Easter

John Finlay  
Glen McKinnon  
Hon. Audrey McLaughlin  
Carolyn Parrish

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# **THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE**

has the honour to present its

## **SEVENTH REPORT**

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), your Committee has undertaken an in-depth study of circumpolar cooperation, focussing on the challenges and opportunities for advancing Canada's interests and values in the circumpolar region.





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# CHAIRMAN'S FOREWORD

*"Combine the unknown with the variables and the imponderables and you have it — the Canadian Arctic." [Traditional]*

Canada's Arctic region is of immense importance to our country, yet our awareness of this vast territory that Queen Elizabeth I referred to as *Meta Incognita* (beyond the unknown things), remains at a dangerously low level if we are to address its problems and realize its potential. It is the fervent hope of the Members of our Committee that this Report, unanimously supported by all our Members, may help to change this dynamic and heighten concerns for our Arctic and its future, not only among parliamentarians and officials, but all Canadians.

Many of the issues discussed in this Report, whether the concerns of the indigenous peoples of the region, or the environment, or its economic potential, have been examined before. Often, however, they have been addressed largely from a domestic perspective. We commenced this extensive review because we believed that changes in technology, communications and geopolitical factors of the past few years required a fresh look from the foreign policy perspective. For, as we found in our Foreign Policy Review, any solution to problems in the area must contain an examination of the foreign policy dimension if they are to be understood and addressed in a coherent and effective manner .

Nothing illustrates more dramatically the link between domestic and foreign factors than the state of the Arctic environment. That environment, so special and so fragile, is particularly sensitive to foreign influences. To name a few examples: pollutants borne by ocean currents such as pesticides from as far away as South America are endangering local food chains; pollutants that are borne by air currents from Europe and all corners of the globe threaten the flora and fauna of the region; the potential for a nuclear catastrophe of unimaginable proportions sits in neighbouring Russia. These environmental issues alone require a new look at how, through our foreign policy, we can protect our interests. And when we add to them the need for a fresh look at the way prosperity in the region may be increased by freer trade in Arctic products and increased communication links among Arctic neighbours, or how the lives of indigenous peoples may be enhanced by developing international interchanges, we realize the dimension of the task that faces us in our foreign policy if we are to ensure a sustainable future for this important region.

The formation of the Arctic Council last year provided an ideal focal point to encourage this study. We believe that this is an institution which deserves the serious attention of Canadians. It has great potential to serve as a forum where we can devise policies and ensure collaboration among the various Arctic states without which no effective solution to the issues canvassed in this Report may be found. To the work of the Arctic Council we also add the potential for increased understanding that will follow from our participation in

the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region; and for that reason we suggest that a member of this Committee should sit on that body to tie Arctic preoccupations to our other foreign policy objectives.

This Report contains forty-nine recommendations. If this seems at first like an ambitious number, I think the reader will agree that they all represent essential conclusions that flow logically from our studies. While those which deal with the concerns of the aboriginal peoples of the North are probably of the greatest significance, the implementation of any one of them would be useful in advancing our northern policy objectives. They do, of course, have resource allocation implications for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and other departments as well. The Committee is anxious that the departments, and the Government as a whole understand that there is all-party parliamentary support to move from talk of Canadian priorities in the Arctic to action.

In the course of preparing this Report the Committee had to undertake extensive travel. In order to reduce expense and employ our time effectively we split into two groups, both for travel within Canada and to meet with our Arctic Council partners. Travel throughout our Arctic region was essential to our understanding of the issues. Hearing directly from our Arctic residents will, we believe, ensure that this Report truly reflects their concerns and their determination to play a part in decisions affecting their lives. This Report is, as a result, not one more case of policies framed in a southern metropolis designed to dominate a northern "hinterland."

Similarly, our travel to Europe was enriching for it enabled us to hear first hand our Arctic neighbours' preoccupations and perceptions. It also enabled the Committee to discuss additional concerns such as NATO enlargement, the consequences of European integration, and further issues of common interest with parliamentarians and others, such that the Committee's overall work has been better informed.

The research, travel and preparation of this Report have required a great deal of the Members' time and attention in a year where we have also considered a review of the *Special Import Measures Act*, prepared a report on the exploitation of child labour, dealt with legislation implementing the Canada-Israel and Canada-Chile free trade agreements as well as examined the future of NATO, the issue of the treatment of our Hong Kong veterans, the deployment of our troops abroad, the issue of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and other daily tasks of the Committee. The hard work of the Members, ably assisted by our researchers, has enabled the preparation of a Report which is comprehensive and thorough. I am proud to say that this is the second report of this Committee in this parliamentary session which has the unanimous support of the Members; proof I believe, of the ability of all parties in the House to work collaboratively together and accommodate one another's views when it is in the interest of all Canadians.



Thanks are due to many people responsible for such an extensive undertaking. Firstly are the many witnesses that took the time to share their valuable experience with us. Canadians from many backgrounds gave much thought and energy to their presentations. And, in our foreign travels, high officials to simple citizens willingly took time from their concerns to share their views with us and often provided us with warm hospitality. To all these, and to the Ambassadors of our Arctic neighbours and their governments we are most grateful. The extent of our consultations and a list of those we met with is set out at the end of the Report.

During the writing of the Report we were saddened to learn of the death of Professor David Cox of Queen's University and extend our sympathy to his family and friends.

Not all our plans could be realized. We learned at first hand the imperatives imposed by Arctic weather whose conditions prevented our visiting Murmansk in Russia and made it impossible for our plane to land at Cambridge Bay. Our disappointment was great at missing the program and traditional supper prepared for us by the people of Cambridge Bay; many of us hope to have a chance to return.

Our thanks in particular go to Natasha Cayer at the Department for her extensive work in assisting our foreign travels; to Diane Lefebvre, Administrative Support Officer and Manon Auger, Administrative Assistant to the Committee, who provided tremendous administrative support throughout the study; to Christine Fisher, who ably supplemented Janice Hilchie as Clerk when we were travelling; to all our hard working editors, especially June Murray from the Library of Parliament who helped edit the English version and Verena Ossent, editor of the French version, who worked so hard with encouragement of our francophone Committee Members to ensure that it truly reflects the great capacities of the French language. To these thanks must be added those to the staff of the Publications Service of the House of Commons, and particularly their Coordinator Charline Madore, and to our many translators and interpreters who often work under difficult conditions, particularly when we travel.

The quality of the writing of this Report, and the inspiration which enabled the members to concentrate in and arrive at its conclusions are to a large extent the result of the dedicated and highly professional work of our researchers: Gerald Schmitz and James Lee of the Library of Parliament Research Branch. To them we are greatly indebted.

Finally I would like to extend on behalf of all Committee members, my warmest thanks to our Clerk, Janice Hilchie, whose professionalism, dedication to her work and even humour ensured that the preparation of this Report, as in the case of all of the Committee's work, proceeded smoothly and efficiently.

I must also warmly thank the members who spent so many long and intense hours on this matter while dealing with so many conflicting pressures on their time and resources. It



is almost a year today that we commenced this work. Our fervent hope is that it will make a lasting contribution to a greater understanding of the issues of the Arctic and enhance Canada's determination to address the increasingly important foreign policy implications of our presence there.

Ottawa, April 22, 1997

# ACRONYMS

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ACUNS — Association of Canadian Universities for Northern Studies	CAFF — Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (AEPS)
AEPS — Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy	CANDU — Canada Deuterium-Uranium (nuclear reactor)
AES — Arctic Environmental Strategy	CARC — Canadian Arctic Resources Committee
AKMNSSDV, R.F. — Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation	CCC — Canadian Circumpolar Commission
AMAP — Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AEPS)	CCI — Canadian Circumpolar Institute
AMEC — Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (agreement)	CCMS — Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (NATO)
ANWR — Arctic National Wildlife Refuge	CFCs — Chlorofluorocarbons
ASDI — Arctic Sustainable Development Initiative	CFE — Conventional Forces in Europe (treaty)
ASEP — Arctic Science Exchange Program	CIBDC — Canadian Inuit Business Development Council
ASTIS — Arctic Science and Technology Information System	CIDA — Canadian International Development Agency
ATS — Antarctic Treaty System	CIIPS — Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security
BEAR — Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region	CINE — Centre for Nutrition and Environment of Indigenous Peoples
BHP — Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd.	CIS — Commonwealth of Independent States
	CITES — Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna

CPC — Canadian Polar Commission	GOSKOMSEVER — State Committee on Northern Development (Russia)
CPAN — Circumpolar Protected Areas Network	IASC — International Arctic Science Committee
CPIS — Canadian Polar Information System	IASSA — International Arctic Social Sciences Association
CSBMs — Confidence and Security-Building Measures	IBC — Inuit Broadcasting Corporation
DEW — Distant Early Warning	ICC — Inuit Circumpolar Conference
DFAIT — Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	IEC — Canada–Russia Intergovernmental Economic Commission
DIAND — Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development	INTARIS — Integrated Arctic Resources Information System
DND — Department of National Defence	IPA — International Permafrost Association
EBRD — European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	ISIRA — International Science Initiative in the Russian Arctic (IASC)
EDC — Export Development Corporation	IUCH — International Union for Circumpolar Health
EIAs — Environmental Impact Assessments	IWC — International Whaling Commission
EPPR — Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (AEPS)	LRTAP — Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
ESPOO — Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context	MAB/NSN — United Nations Man and the Biosphere–Northern Sciences Network
EU — European Union	MARPOL — Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
GATT — General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	MMPA — Marine Mammal Protection Act (U.S.)
GEF — Global Environment Facility	



NAFO — Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization

NAFTA — North American Free Trade Agreement

NAMMCO — North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission

NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO — Nongovernmental Organization

NMP — Northern Management Program

NORAD — North American Aerospace Defence Command

NSTP — Northern Scientific Training Program

NWT — Northwest Territories

OECD — Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OSCE — Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PAME — Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (AEPS)

PCBs — Polychlorinated Biphenyls

PCSP — Polar Continental Shelf Project

POPs — Persistent Organic Pollutants

SAOs — Senior Arctic Officials

SCAR — Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research

SCPAR — Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region

START — System for Analysis, Research and Training

START I, II & III — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (treaties)

TEK — Traditional Ecological Knowledge

TFSDU — Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization (AEPS)

UN — United Nations

UNCED — United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNEP — United Nations Environment Program

UNESCO — United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

USAID — U.S. Aid

WTO — World Trade Organization

WWF — World Wildlife Fund



# INTRODUCTION TO THE INQUIRY'S ORIGINS, PROCESS, AND AIMS

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Late in 1995, the Committee decided to make the advancement of Canada's northern foreign policy interests the object of its next study, in view of both the dramatically changed post-Cold War context for achieving significantly greater cooperation among the circumpolar nations,<sup>1</sup> and the opportune, if sometimes overlooked, prospects for Canada to exercise important international leadership in this regard. Arctic cooperation stands out as an area of enormous, but still underdeveloped, potential for Canadian foreign policy. Despite recent initiatives, notably Canada's 1989 proposal, and eventually successful push, to create an international Arctic Council, and the Government's 1994 appointment of a "Circumpolar Ambassador," the subject opens a largely unfinished agenda for action.

Much attention has been given to Canada's need to position itself for the future as a Pacific Rim nation, and we do not doubt that need. But the diversification of Canada's international interests must not mean neglecting our own central, and likely increasing, geopolitical importance as a **polar rim** nation bridging North America and Eurasia (see cover map and Box 1 "The Circumpolar Region in Profile"). By focussing on this immense trans-Arctic region in transition — one-quarter of which flies the Canadian flag — we foresee unique possibilities for Canada to play a strategic role that would, in the words of a prominent international relations scholar, Oran Young, not only "fit many Canadians' image of their place in international society [but] also alleviate their fears of being sandwiched between the great powers in the Circumpolar North."<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, the Cold War's passing and the challenging promise of rapid political and economic transformations confront Canadian policymakers, as never before, with a greatly expanded horizon for joint action by the Arctic states that will encompass cooperative approaches to regional security and sustainable human development principles and prospects. Most notable of these are: environmental protection with global ramifications; new models of institution-building and participatory structures involving

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<sup>1</sup> These are the eight states that claim a territorial stake in the Arctic: Canada, the United States, the Russian Federation, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark/Greenland, and Iceland. This list includes, therefore, both of the Cold War "superpowers," and, among the Nordic countries, three that are now members of the European Union (Finland, Sweden, and Denmark).

<sup>2</sup> Oran Young, *Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North*, University Press of New England, Hanover and London, 1992, p. 188-89; cited in Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, *Canada and Circumpolar Cooperation: Meeting the Foreign Policy Challenge*, Issues Papers prepared for the Committee, March 1996, p. 1. Dr. Young testified before the Committee on 1 October 1996 (Issue No. 40).



## Box 1 — “The Circumpolar Region in Profile”

Of the two polar regions of the globe, the Arctic differs from the Antarctic in posing a complex range of evolving boundary, jurisdictional and geopolitical questions. The land mass surrounding the South pole, a continent devoid of native human settlement, has been administered multinationally since 1959 under the terms of a formal treaty. Although Canada is not without interests in the Antarctic, the North polar region, the subject of this report, is where Canada exercises important national sovereignty (even though the extent of our maritime claims remains in some dispute) and in which active foreign policy processes should come into play. As well, the Arctic is increasingly the subject of study as a primary region of international relations in its own right.<sup>1</sup>

There are eight countries which are considered to be Arctic states. At the same time, there is no firm definitional boundary of what constitutes the Arctic region or the Circumpolar North. Moreover, the “North” is a somewhat broader notion than the “Arctic.” In each country, there tends to be a mixture of geographical and political or administrative factors determining what is considered as Arctic or northern. For the purposes of this report, a useful, generally accepted international definition of the circumpolar region is Oran Young’s description of it as comprising: “Alaska (except for the area known as the Southeast); the Yukon and the Northwest Territories, northern Quebec, and all of Labrador in Canada; all of Greenland; Iceland, the northern countries of Norway, Sweden, and Finland (known collectively as Fennoscandia); and all of what the Russians treat as the Arctic and the Russian North . . . [as well as] the marine systems of the Arctic Ocean and its adjacent seas, including the Bering, Chukchi, Beaufort, Greenland, Norwegian, Barents, Kara, Laptev, and East Siberian seas.”<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, we would note that in the case of Canada, only the three Maritime provinces do not have clear northern policy interests. Besides the far northern areas of Quebec and Labrador, Arctic conditions extend below the 60° parallel, and most of the provinces have large areas that the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples identifies as “Mid-North.”<sup>3</sup>

The international Circumpolar North region as defined above covers some 8% of the earth’s surface (40 million square kilometres or 15% of the land area, 5% of the oceans), but accounts for barely 1% of world population. Of that small total, about one million, or 10%, are indigenous peoples, who constitute a majority in only a few areas (e.g. the Inuit in Canada’s eastern Arctic, northern Quebec and Greenland). About three-quarters of the Arctic’s human inhabitants live in Russia. The only sizeable cities outside of northern Russia are in Iceland and Alaska. Iceland has no aboriginal population, but is the only completely Arctic state. In the other seven countries, the Arctic has typically been treated as a “hinterland” dominated by policies and decisions made in southern metropolises. This is changing as a result of political devolution and participatory development by the region’s residents. However, southern and indeed global interests in the circumpolar region may be expected to increase in the next century. Although the Arctic is no longer a pawn of Cold War strategies, it has great potential geopolitical significance in terms of issues of environmental change, indigenous rights, and sustainable human development, given also immense natural resource endowments and consequent pressures to develop them.<sup>4</sup> Building adequate frameworks for circumpolar cooperation may therefore be essential to avoiding future international conflict scenarios.

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<sup>1</sup> See especially Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations*, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1996, Part I, “The Arctic as an International Region.”

<sup>2</sup> Oran Young, *Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North* (1992), p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> See the map of geographical zones, reflecting demographic, climatic, economic and social factors, in Volume 4 of the Commission’s *Final Report* (1996), Chapter 6, “The North,” p. 388. An even more richly delineated portrait of Canada’s multiple “norths” is given by Quebec geographer Louis-Edmond Hamelin (see *L’Écho des pays froids*, 1996, p. 243-54 and map, p. 430). It should also be noted that at the federal Government level there are varying definitions of what is included within the scope of Arctic or northern activities, and these will likely continue, given different policy contexts and program purposes.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Oran Young *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 9-13; also Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), John Wiley & Sons, in association with the Scott Polar Research Institute, Chichester, England 1996, Chapter 2, “Environment at the Poles.”

Arctic communities and indigenous peoples; circumpolar trade and investment strategies; technical assistance; and scientific, technological, educational, social and cultural exchanges.

Making a first appearance before the Committee on 21 November 1995, Canada's first Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, Mary Simon, welcomed parliamentary involvement in very practical terms, observing that:

... once the Arctic Council is created we are going to have to decide on what the key priorities are and what the main issues are that require attention at the multilateral level.  
... any assistance that we can get help on in terms of doing research or in terms of helping us shape the agenda for the Arctic Council would be extremely helpful. [81:5]<sup>3</sup>

Following the recalling of Parliament, the reconstituted Committee reaffirmed in March 1996 that it would proceed with the circumpolar study, receiving the strong endorsement of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, in his first appearance before the Committee in April.

Preliminary briefings and distribution of background discussion materials took place in the wake of two important international conferences held in the preceding month in the Canadian Arctic — the third ministerial conference of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in Inuvik and the second conference of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR) in Yellowknife. As well, during this period Ottawa was hosting delicate negotiations towards an agreement among the eight Arctic nations on establishment of the long-awaited "Arctic Council" to promote circumpolar cooperation with Canada to occupy the role of chair in its first two years.<sup>4</sup> This initiative, finally realized in September 1996, became a focal point for deliberating on the range of foreign policy interests and goals that Canada ought to be pursuing as a key actor within an emerging international circumpolar community.

The first phase of the Committee's inquiry concentrated on obtaining Canadian views on the emerging international agenda for the Arctic. During the series of panels held in Ottawa (five in late April and early May, one in early June, and a final roundtable in

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<sup>3</sup> *Evidence*, Meeting No. 81, p. 5. (All subsequent references in the text to published Committee proceedings will use this abbreviated notation.)

<sup>4</sup> Background documentation included staff issues papers (see note 2) on elements of Arctic cooperation and Canadian foreign policy and on specific themes — Arctic security, legal claims, sustainable development, environmental contaminants, science and technology — as well as expert background papers prepared for the Yellowknife parliamentarians' conference. A summary discussion paper identifying key policy questions was also circulated. The Committee was briefed on the AEPS in light of the Inuvik conference by John Rayner, Assistant Deputy Minister for Northern Affairs in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). Patricia Low-Bédard, senior policy advisor to Ambassador Simon, and Mary Vandenhoff, a former Canadian ambassador to Finland and executive director of the Arctic Council interim secretariat, briefed members on the state of negotiations and remaining sticking points (principally over the representation of aboriginal participants and the Council's "sustainable development" mandate).



October), the Committee heard from nearly 30 witnesses on major themes involved in developing a northern foreign policy for Canada and in advancing Canadian interests in strengthening circumpolar cooperation. Among those who testified were longtime Canadian leaders in the field such as Dr. Fred Roots, science advisor emeritus to the Department of the Environment; Professor Franklyn Griffiths, who joined Ambassador Simon on a panel focussed on the Arctic Council; and Rosemarie Kuptana, President of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), who underlined a broad aboriginal perspective on Arctic cooperation.<sup>5</sup> Professors David Cox and Donald McRae addressed the more traditional security and sovereignty dimensions. Spokespersons for the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) and several other environmental NGOs concentrated on the growing challenges of Arctic sustainable development in preserving a fragile ecosystem while improving the livelihoods of resident communities. Others brought forward future economic and trade potential, aboriginal business development, and Arctic transportation and communications as being important issues in furthering circumpolar cooperation.

Notwithstanding the promise of such cooperation internationally, the last panel, with leading northern experts from Quebec universities and the Quebec Public Health Centre, left members with probing questions about continuing deficiencies within the Canadian policy framework. Professor Paul Painchaud of Laval University was particularly outspoken about the overdue need for a more substantive and strategic Canadian foreign policy presence in circumpolar affairs.

Moreover, while there was strong agreement that international factors are of major and increasing importance to Canada's Arctic interests — i.e. the need for a northern focus in foreign policy terms is real and growing — questions were raised about the adequacy of current policy structures, processes, and financial muscle for supporting these international objectives in ways that are coherent and integrated with overall governmental policies towards the North. How, in concrete terms, can foreign policy initiatives both meet the needs of northerners and serve long-term Canadian goals? The importance of assuring that tangible benefits accrue to the local communities scattered across Canada's vast Arctic territories was a dominating theme during the Committee's travel in late May, from Whitehorse in the Yukon, to Inuvik and Resolute north of the Arctic Circle, and to Kuujuaq in northern Quebec.

From that standpoint, the Committee's travel north of 60°, beyond the familiar testimony from senior Government officials, NGO representatives and invited experts in

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<sup>5</sup> All three were members of the nongovernmental Arctic Council Panel, composed of independent Arctic experts, which, with private funding from the Gordon Foundation, produced a seminal report in 1990 that formed the basis for early Canadian Government efforts towards establishing such a council. Cf. Robert Huebert, "The Arctic Council: Global and Domestic Governance," unpublished paper, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, October 1996, p. 2-3. Professor Huebert was also a witness before the Committee's panel.



Ottawa, was the most crucial element of this first phase. It provided members with a rare opportunity for listening and observing, thereby ensuring that the preoccupations of people making their home in the Canadian Arctic could be voiced directly during the process of developing policy directions for government. The Committee divided into two panels in order to be able to visit more communities across the Arctic. Members heard from aboriginal peoples' organizations, including major northern-based development corporations (from Inuvialuit Regional Corp. in the western Arctic, to Dennendeh Development Corp., to Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. in Iqaluit, to Makivik Corp. in northern Quebec) and resource co-management boards; local and territorial governments (including Nunavut implementation bodies); community leaders; business people; cultural enterprises; and educational and research institutions. There were also informal public encounters, such as participation in community "open-line" radio. Members were able to get an on-site appreciation of major developments affecting Arctic communities, and to inspect facilities such as the Polar Continental Shelf Project, based in Resolute. On the Committee's return from the Arctic, panels were also convened with northern studies experts at university research centres in Edmonton, Calgary and Montreal.<sup>6</sup>

The results of the first phase of the Committee's investigations confirmed broad, though certainly not uncritical, support for the Government's plan to establish the eight-country Arctic Council as a centrepiece for circumpolar cooperation. Realization of the Council's potential beyond its formal inauguration last September is the focus of Chapter Three of the report. We found most witnesses were quite hopeful that the Council would provide a permanent multilateral forum in which the Arctic states could pursue the cooperative endeavours that are becoming increasingly necessary on environmental and other grounds. Now that the Council exists, it will have to show what it can do. Expectations also focussed on the Council's promise to include a unique structure for indigenous peoples' participation, and on its prospective mandate to address a comprehensive range of "sustainable development" issues. Questions were also raised about the rest of its proposed mandate, representative structures and functional roles, priorities for action, financing, degree of political support outside Canada, and likely substantive powers and capacities to effect change. How, in particular, could such a body bring about significant concrete improvements in the living conditions of Arctic Canadians and the opportunities available to them?

On the issue of public benefit and accountability, there was support for promoting greater parliamentary involvement on behalf of all Canadians and citizens in other Arctic countries, but also some divergence of views. For example, during the Committee's third panel, on 2 May, held jointly with the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Environment and Sustainable Development, Canadian Government and parliamentary

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<sup>6</sup> Findings from the Committee's travel will be referred to throughout the report. In addition, detailed trip reports are available upon request.

representatives and ICC President, Rosemarie Kuptana, were not in agreement as to the nature and form of any such parliamentary-Council linkage, and when that should be determined. (Among other Arctic states, the matter of parliamentary involvement had been left open to that point. For example, an Arctic cooperation agreement adopted by the Nordic Council of Ministers in February 1996 stated somewhat equivocally: "The governments will emphasise that cooperation with the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region is to be accorded a high priority. The final forms of parliamentary participation are to be determined following the establishment of the [Arctic] Council, and decisions on its structure.")<sup>7</sup>

The Committee has taken note of the strong position taken by our colleagues on the House Environment Committee in their June 1996 report on the Yellowknife and Inuvik conferences. In urging vigorous Canadian action to implement the resolutions of the parliamentary gathering, they had recommended that: "the Government of Canada make appropriate representations in support of the proposition that the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region have a substantive and permanent role on the Arctic Council."<sup>8</sup> In that regard, we see as a promising sign the provision for Canadian M.P. Clifford Lincoln to make a formal statement on behalf of the parliamentary group during the 19 September inauguration ceremony in Ottawa. The important issue of active future parliamentary roles in the development of institutions of circumpolar cooperation is one to which we will return in Chapter Three, in the context of the Arctic Council's constitution and working procedures, and again in Chapter Seven, in relation to democratic approaches to circumpolar development.

In the second phase of the Committee's inquiry, the focus moved to a consideration of international views on the policy approaches and priorities that should guide future circumpolar cooperation activities. Shortly following the Arctic Council's inauguration, the Committee was privileged to benefit from an astute, and challenging, assessment by preeminent American scholar Oran Young, Director of the Institute of Arctic Studies at Dartmouth College.<sup>9</sup> In December, several other prominent American witnesses added to that testimony. Appearing by video conference from Anchorage, Alaska, was Stephen Cowper, a former Governor of Alaska, who currently serves as executive director of the

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<sup>7</sup> *Programme on Cooperation in the Arctic Region*. Adopted by the Nordic Council of Ministers (Cooperation Ministers), the Nordic Council, Stockholm, February 1996, p. 9-10.

<sup>8</sup> Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, *First Report on the Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Yellowknife, NWT, March 13-14, 1996 and the Third Ministerial Meeting on the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Inuvik, NWT, March 19-21, 1996*, Ottawa, June 1996, p. 5. Cf. also Charles Caccia, "A Parliamentary Perspective on the Arctic Council," *Canadian Parliamentary Review*, Autumn 1996, p.7-9. (An earlier article highlighting the issue in contention appeared in *The Hill Times*, "'Nobodies' in Ottawa, Backbenchers Set Sights on Global Scene: MPs Want a Piece of Arctic Council Action," 20 May 1996, p. 13.)

<sup>9</sup> Oran Young also made available to the Committee his just-published monograph, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), which is the best and most thorough analysis to date.



Northern Forum, an organization linking a number of subnational entities within ten countries in the high latitudes. More directly on U.S. Arctic interests and outlooks, George Newton and Garrett Brass, Chairman and Executive Director respectively of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, were among the last witnesses, on 12 December.

The major aspect of the second phase was the Committee's travel in early November to five of the six other Arctic Council member nations.<sup>10</sup> Again, to maximize coverage and efficient use of resources, the Committee divided into two panels. One panel travelled to Oslo and Tromsø in Norway, Stockholm in Sweden, and Copenhagen in Denmark (this last city has the offices of the Greenland Home Rule Government and also hosts the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat of the Arctic Council). This group also met with leading researchers at the renowned Scott Polar Research Institute at Cambridge University, England. The other panel visited Helsinki, Finland, and Moscow and St. Petersburg in Russia. While it was unfortunate that this second group was prevented by poor weather from attending scheduled meetings in the key Arctic port of Murmansk, members nevertheless gathered valuable insights on the serious problems in the Kola peninsula that have attracted international concern (see the references in Chapters Four, Five and Nine).

In the course of these intensive visits, the Committee met with Government ministers and senior officials, parliamentary counterparts, spokespersons for indigenous peoples, nongovernmental representatives, academics and experts in Arctic research, Canadian private sector contacts, and participants in significant joint projects involving Canadian partners. In Russia, some of these projects are supported through the technical cooperation program of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). A noteworthy example is the Gorbachev Foundation, which is involved in significant common undertakings with the University of Calgary, including funding of an innovative project led by its Arctic Institute in the Murmansk region. The Committee members were able to meet with Mr. Gorbachev himself. While discussions in each country were directed at bettering our understanding of Euro-Arctic perspectives on the many aspects of circumpolar cooperation, the broader context of enhancing bilateral ties with Canada, transatlantic and interregional relations also formed part of the agenda. The findings from this enriching cross-cultural experience are particularly reflected in Part III of the report.

The report proceeds from a consideration of overarching concerns — constructing a coherent framework for Canada's international policies on circumpolar cooperation — to the more programmatic elements of policy and process, and then to the specifics of strengthening relationships with other Arctic rim countries.

Part I looks at building the policy and institutional framework within which Canada can exercise leadership in an emerging circumpolar community. Chapter One explores the

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<sup>10</sup> Iceland could not be included because of lack of time and resources.



growing significance of the Arctic as a dynamic region in global affairs and the implications for setting out a strategic Canadian agenda. Chapter Two then turns to the domestic challenge of realizing at last the long-delayed vision of a “northern dimension” in Canada’s foreign policy, and of doing so in ways that integrate international and domestic concerns while benefiting northern Canadians. Chapter Three looks at Canada’s pivotal role in making the Arctic Council work as the key new multilateral instrument at our disposal. The Council stands out, not only because it owes much to Canadian inspiration and persistence, but because it uniquely associates all of the circumpolar nation-states in a partnership with aboriginal peoples. Now that we have it, we must ask where should it be going, both in the immediate and the longer term, in developing its mandate, expanding its representation, working out effective structures and processes, establishing clear priorities for action, and not least, firming up funding and political support.

Part II tackles the more specific elements of Canada’s interests and goals in advancing some priority areas for circumpolar cooperation. Chapter Four makes the historical transition from an older Arctic foreign policy, premised on the constraints of interstate conflicts, to the new agenda of post-Cold war cooperation. This chapter addresses the legacy of traditional national preoccupations over Arctic “sovereignty and security,” and suggests ways of moving beyond those to take advantage of the opportunities for peace-building to promote human security and regional stability. Chapter Five is at the heart of the report as it sets out the emerging sustainable development agenda that most consider to be the primary human and environmental “security” challenge facing the circumpolar region in the coming decades. This chapter focusses on the first-order environmental priorities, and considers how Canada can work towards putting in place a comprehensive international Arctic “regime” for preserving vulnerable ecosystems and safeguarding the health of populations.

Continuing the central theme of sustainable development, Chapter Six looks to the equally crucial issues of use of sustainable resources and development of economic opportunities for Arctic peoples in a rapidly evolving international context. How can such things as public- and private-sector investment, promotion of circumpolar trade and commerce, and transport and communications links be employed responsibly to build a sustainable economic base that can provide for viable communities in the Arctic region? Chapter Seven delves more deeply into the need to evolve participatory models of Arctic sustainable development that will not only affirm the rights of indigenous peoples but allow for wider forms of democratic participation and establish the overall Canadian public interest in the accountability of Arctic policies and institutions. Chapter Eight considers a range of issues that might be grouped under the umbrella of knowledge-based capacity building; that is, a circumpolar system to support the sharing of scientific and technological research, indigenous knowledge networks, and educational and cultural

cooperation. In short, how can Canada contribute to developing the region's human "capital" for the benefit of current and future generations?

Part III of the report examines more specific geopolitical considerations in meeting the challenges of Canada's international Arctic relations. Chapter Nine looks at bilateral cooperation initiatives with the other Arctic Council states. In the case of North American and Canada-Nordic Arctic cooperation, there is also a significant regional integration context (e.g. NAFTA, the European Union) to be taken into account. Looming large in Canadian foreign policy interests in Canada-Russia Arctic cooperation are the need for transatlantic understanding and assistance for democratic and market reforms. Chapter Ten goes on to consider further the possibilities for effective multilateral collaboration among the growing number of intergovernmental and nongovernmental regional and circumpolar entities (e.g. the Nordic and Barents councils, subnational initiatives like the Northern Forum, bodies on circumpolar health, Arctic science, etc.). We are concerned that important Arctic cooperation goals not suffer from having scarce resources and energies dispersed rather than being effectively concentrated and coordinated.

A concluding section brings us back to the need for Canada to have a systematic forward-looking approach to circumpolar cooperation, and to continue to upgrade our foreign policy instruments — in particular, the capacity of the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador — in order to carry out the multiple aims described above in the long-term Canadian interest. Canada's chairmanship of the newly formed Arctic Council until 1998 is now a principal strategic test of Canadian resolve, and more concretely, of our ability to deliver internationally on promising intentions. But the Committee views this as only the first step of many. In order to keep moving forward, more Canadians must recognize that it is time for Canada to begin to act on an emergent consciousness that the circumpolar world is crucial to fulfilling our own foreign policy vocation and destiny. Accordingly, this report signals that essential public recognition and aims, above all, to contribute to the political momentum needed to sustain circumpolar cooperation in the Canadian interest.





# **PART I**

## **BUILDING THE CIRCUMPOLAR FRAMEWORK — EXERCISING CANADIAN LEADERSHIP**



# CHAPTER 1 — THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARCTIC COOPERATION: A NEW ERA AND A CANADIAN AGENDA

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The Arctic has emerged over the last decade as a prominent region in international society with a distinctive political agenda and a constituency of its own. As prospects of cultural, economic, environmental, and political benefits and losses have risen in the high latitudes, so too have the incentives of all Arctic stakeholders to devise ways to cooperate with one another . . . Increasingly, moreover, Arctic problems transcend jurisdictional boundaries, so that they cannot be addressed effectively in the absence of sustained international cooperation.

We stand today at the threshold of a new era in Arctic international relations.

Dr. Oran Young<sup>11</sup>

Despite this optimistic forecast in Oran Young's stimulating essay for the parliamentarians assembled in March 1996, as he put it soberly to the Committee in October: "We're still in the first grade in terms of learning to cooperate in the Arctic" [40:8]. In his longer monograph sketching out the complex scenarios which lie ahead for the Arctic Council, Dr. Young also observes that the current momentum for formal multilateral cooperation on a circumpolar basis may be undermined by the numerous existing arrangements and result in inefficiencies, incoherence and incongruent interests.<sup>12</sup> Learning to cooperate on Arctic policies is becoming more important precisely because there are more actors involved with deeper concerns about what happens to this globally sensitive region.

True, the Arctic has long been the object of scientific curiosity, daring exploration and romantic legend. And for too long, in the southern imagination, it was a remote, forbidding place — portrayed as virtually unknown and unpeopled, though held to be a sovereign asset and perhaps a storehouse for future wealth extraction. Little notice was taken of the fact that the Arctic was a homeland that had sustained ingenious human civilizations and marvellously adapted native species for tens of thousands of years. In the postwar period, the Arctic became a strategic "theatre" of the Cold War, and policymakers' attention tended to wax or wane in accordance with national security calculations. Gradually,

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<sup>11</sup> Oran Young, "Arctic Governance: Meeting Challenges of Cooperation in the High Latitudes," Background Paper for the Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Yellowknife, 13-14 March 1996, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 14 and passim.



however, the emergence of an international environmental movement and of politically articulate leaders among Arctic indigenous peoples began to draw attention to the higher and longer-term stakes in the high latitudes.

Today, with the geopolitical constraints of the Cold War lifted, there is indeed a heightened consciousness of these rising stakes and the potential for mutual losses as well as gains, both regionally and globally, from Arctic developments and those affecting the Arctic. Among the diverse “stakeholders” are — in addition to the national governments, which will continue to retain primary political responsibility — increasingly assertive aboriginal peoples’ organizations; territorial governments and local authorities; promoters of commercially viable Arctic research and development; investors seeking to exploit vast mineral and hydrocarbon resources; communities, troubled by threats to social health, seeking to become more self-sufficient and in control of such development; militaries possessing still potent polar capabilities (for example, nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines); environmental and other nongovernmental advocacy organizations; scientists deeply worried by the Arctic evidence of global environmental change; and southern citizens and consumers finally waking up to the realization that “what goes on in the Far North may well have far-reaching consequences for the welfare of large numbers of people living elsewhere.”<sup>13</sup>

In short, the Arctic has become a crucial arena, in which multiple interests may converge or conflict, for confronting the challenges of “sustainable development” and human and environmental “security.” A further complication is that the tremendous impact of external forces on this northern “hinterland” contrasts with the growing political resistance there to “colonial” control by more southern metropolitan centres. At the same time, Arctic problems are multiplying thorny transboundary questions which can adequately be resolved only at an international level and, accordingly, through foreign policy channels. Determining the appropriate scale and scope of the policy responses to these issues raises some truly daunting issues of global and domestic “governance.”

The awareness of interconnected and long-term global environmental issues with serious consequences for human habitation has spawned lively debates over the redefinition of security, the meaning of concepts such as “environmental security” and “sustainable development,” the ability of existing governments to cope with the effects of “internationalization” on their domestic publics and policy processes, and the desirability, therefore, of creating normative transnational or even supranational regimes, with the

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

capacity to manage common problems through collective action.<sup>14</sup> Foreign ministries everywhere are having to engage in such rethinking and to wrestle with the implications for achieving expanded international policy objectives.<sup>15</sup>

Applied to the polar regions, the challenge that lies ahead cannot be overstated.<sup>16</sup> In this regard, it is important to differentiate between the uninhabited Antarctic region — which for some time has had a reasonably successful international governance regime under the terms of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty System (ATS)<sup>17</sup> — and the circumpolar North, the subject of this report, a region divided among a number of sovereign nation-states, and until recently a prime sphere of “bipolar” superpower confrontation. The choices in moving from conflict-driven to cooperative scenarios have only begun to present themselves across the Arctic as a whole. It is here that, as Sanjay Chaturvedi observes: “A new geopolitical order is in the making as the Arctic nations strive to establish agreements to regulate their joint efforts in science, economic development and environmental protection.”<sup>18</sup>

This is not to say that international Arctic cooperation is a new phenomenon of the 1990s. Indeed, while the Cold War constrained the development of a pan-Arctic internationalism, it also provided an incentive, especially for those caught in the bipolar middle — aboriginal peoples, and “middle powers” such as Canada and “like-minded” European Nordic countries — to look to functional ways of cooperating among themselves in keeping with their own northern region interests. As early as 1952, the five Nordic states and three associated Arctic territories formed a Nordic Council, which also

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<sup>14</sup> Within the vast and growing international literature on these subjects cf. Oran Young, George Demko, and Kilaparti Ramakrishna, eds., *Global Environmental Change and International Governance*, University Press of New England, Hanover and London, 1996; Lamont Hempel, *Environmental Governance: The Global Challenge*, Island Press, Washington, D.C. 1996; Geoffrey Dabelko and David Dabelko, “Environmental Security: Issues of Conflict and Redefinitions,” *Environment and Security*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1996, p. 23-49; and from a political economy perspective, Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds. *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.

<sup>15</sup> For an example in Canadian terms, see “Proceedings of the Seminar on Environmental Security,” Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Global Issues Bureau, Ottawa, 29 February 1996.

<sup>16</sup> An outstanding contribution to the required “new thinking in geopolitics” is Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), John Wiley & Sons in association with the Scott Polar Research Institute, Chichester, England, 1996.

<sup>17</sup> Canada is one of 42 countries to have ratified the Treaty, though only in 1988, and it is not among the 26 Consultative Parties to the ATS. However, in 1994, Canada joined the nongovernmental Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research. For details of the Antarctic Treaty, its genesis and contribution to the debate over multilateral governance regimes, see Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), Chapters 5 and 8. Canada’s role is usefully analyzed in Olav Loken, *Toward a Canadian Antarctic Research Program*, study prepared for the Canadian Polar Commission, Ottawa, April 1996.

<sup>18</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. xii.



included as observers the indigenous Saami peoples of Fenno-Scandinavia.<sup>19</sup> Certain limited bilateral exchanges and intergovernmental agreements that included the Soviet Union, were also possible: for example, the agreement in the early 1970s between Canada and the U.S.S.R. on scientific research and involving northern regions with similar interests;<sup>20</sup> and the 1973 agreement among five states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) for the conservation of polar bears. Beyond the level of national governments, there was also significant international activity. An important event in the late 1970s was formation by the Inuit of their own internationalist movement, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), eventually spanning the polar rim across North America to Siberia (Russian Inuit were not able to participate until 1989), which presaged the emerging and increasingly important foreign policy roles of northern native peoples.<sup>21</sup>

It is only since the Gorbachev era, however, that a truly circumpolar diplomacy has come into its own. The Soviet Union's last leader's famous speech at Murmansk in October 1987 calling for an "Arctic zone of peace" (though still excluding the nuclear naval bases there) is often considered a watershed.<sup>22</sup> Symbolically at least, it broke the ice and opened the way to multilateral initiatives, culminating in the creation of the Arctic Council almost a decade later. In 1989, the same year that Prime Minister Mulroney proposed such a council in an address in Leningrad (St. Petersburg), a conference held in Rovaniemi in neighbouring Finland was attended by representatives from the eight Arctic states and produced a process leading to the major 1991 agreement on an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. Although a Nordic initiative, the AEPS also "strongly reflects Canadian thinking"<sup>23</sup> and is to be incorporated within the work of the Arctic Council during 1997. We will consider the future of the AEPS commitments in detail in Chapter Five.

During this decade, other important multilateral bodies and processes, both governmental and nongovernmental, have been established to deal with common concerns; for example, the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), the Arctic

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<sup>19</sup> For more details see Chapter Ten.

<sup>20</sup> See Robert Doherty, "Social, Economic and Technical Links Between Northern Regions of Canada and Russia," in L. Lyck and V.I. Boyko, eds., *Management, Technology and Human Resources Policy in the Arctic (the North)*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, 1996, p. 19-30.

<sup>21</sup> Minority Rights Group, eds., *Polar Peoples: Self-Determination and Development*, Minority Rights Publications, London, 1994, p. 144.

<sup>22</sup> Robert Huebert, "The Arctic Council: Global and Domestic Governance" (1996), p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Robert Huebert, "The Canadian Arctic and the Development of an International Environmental Regime," Paper for the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Montreal, June 1995, p. 11. Professor Huebert points out that "the entire AEPS process could not have occurred had the U.S.S.R. not collapsed. The individual state programs such as Canada's Northern Contaminants Programme would have continued on its own, but there would have been little international cooperation." (p. 21)



Aboriginal Leaders Conference, the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR), the Northern Forum, the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), and within northern Europe, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAR), as well as other regional initiatives.<sup>24</sup> We will be commenting further in subsequent chapters on the Canadian interest in some of these channels for promoting Arctic cooperation, and returning to the overall theme of multilateral cooperation in our last chapter on Arctic international relations.

It is important to recognize that the powerful international dynamics for change and innovation in the Arctic during the 1990s have been matched by equally compelling domestic transitions within countries. As recently summarized by Canadian Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs Mary Simon:

Here in Canada, the northern map is changing too. The process of political devolution has been accelerating, with territorial governments taking a growing role in all manner of northern affairs. The establishment of Nunavut in three years time will take this trend further still. At the same time, improved communications have brought the North more into the mainstream of Canadian life. Southern Canadians are much more aware than in the past of threats to the Arctic environment, of the social and health problems facing northern aboriginal peoples, and of the enormous riches and beauty of the North. Meantime, northerners are more engaged than ever before in the public affairs of their region and of their country.<sup>25</sup>

The evolving international and domestic consciousness of Arctic challenges and initiatives for controlling pollution, sustaining viable communities, sharing knowledge, and supporting democratic transformation in Russia enabled the establishment of an Arctic Council to promote such aims. The overarching question for the Canadian and other Arctic governments is what should be the next stage in developing circumpolar cooperation. To come back to Oran Young's comment to the Committee cited at the beginning of this chapter, we are still very early on in an uncertain process. (Indeed, the continued commitment of the United States, the last reluctant party to the Arctic Council negotiations, to a substantive program of cooperation remains open to question, in the view of some analysts.<sup>26</sup>) There are a great many gaps to be filled. Moreover, to progress towards the ultimate goal of a comprehensive regime for circumpolar cooperation, it is important to be clear about what is at stake, to examine closely the policy options for addressing the most

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<sup>24</sup> A useful introductory survey is Young, *The Arctic Council* (1996), p. 6-9. On European perspectives, see the excellent comprehensive study by Lassi Heininen *et al.*, *Expanding the Northern Dimension*, Research Report No. 61, Tampere Peace Research Institute, University of Tampere, Finland, 1995.

<sup>25</sup> Mary Simon, "Building Partnerships: Perspectives From the Arctic," Address to the Canadian Club, Toronto, 4 November 1996, p. 2.

<sup>26</sup> See Robert Huebert, "The Arctic Council: Global and Domestic Governance" (1996), p. 21.

pressing issues, and to consider the instruments needed to handle these issues within a coherent and efficient international Arctic framework.<sup>27</sup>

For Canadian foreign policy, this means there is a lot of work to be done. Through the rest of the report, the Committee will be reflecting on what it has heard and learned, and contributing ideas towards accomplishing the task. The next chapter examines strengthening Canada's foreign policy capacities as a necessary foundation for exerting credible, effective leadership within an Arctic Council process that works to our benefit domestically and internationally. At the outset, however, we think it is important that there be a firm public commitment to constructing an explicit policy framework setting out a comprehensive Canadian agenda for circumpolar cooperation into the new millenium. If Canada is ever to realize its aspirations as a major Arctic power, we owe ourselves and future generations no less; an accretion of ad hoc and uncoordinated measures will not suffice.

In light of the above:

### **Recommendation 1**

**The Committee recommends that the Government, in making a comprehensive response to this Report, elaborate an explicit international policy framework in which Canada's objectives in pursuing circumpolar cooperation and the proposed means for their achievement are systematically set out. In order to build public awareness and seek additional input, we further recommend that such a "Canadian Circumpolar Cooperation Framework" be considered by a national public forum, with representation from all regions, especially from northern Canada, and from interested provincial and territorial governments, to be held during the period of Canada's chairmanship of the Arctic Council.**

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<sup>27</sup> See Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 5.

## CHAPTER 2 — REALIZING A ‘NORTHERN’ DIMENSION IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

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Important new developments unfolding in the circumpolar north have the potential to impact significantly on the Canadian Arctic. Current initiatives now underway will determine the direction that circumpolar cooperation will take well into the 21st century. . . . Much of the credit for these developments is due to the action of Canadian officials. But, in keeping with Canadian tradition, little public attention has been brought to bear on these pending new milestones, nor has the Government deemed it necessary to provide extensive resources to support them. Canada may pretend to be an Arctic nation, but that vision of the Arctic ends at about 200 miles north of the American border.

Professor Robert Huebert<sup>28</sup>

“This is Canada . . . but it’s almost another country.”

George Eckalook, Mayor, Resolute Bay<sup>29</sup>

### ***Learning from the Past***

The “North” has long exercised a powerful claim on the Canadian imagination, at times figuring in attempts to define a Canadian “identity” that could be nurtured domestically and projected internationally (see Box 2 “Defining Canada’s Northern Identity Among Nations”). Yet it is only in more recent decades that our Arctic regions — primarily everything north of the 60th parallel in the west and north of the 55th parallel in Quebec and Labrador — have taken on even a modest international role. Following the building of the Alaska highway and with the onset of the Cold War, the Arctic came to be regarded as a strategic asset, though with Canadian “sovereignty” sometimes put as much at risk by our American ally as the Soviet enemy. From the 1950s on, more of the North was being opened up to transport, commerce and accompanying southern influxes and influences. Resource discoveries with the potential for large rewards accelerated the pull of modernization, often coming up against the traditional cultures of the people of the region and confronting delicately balanced Arctic ecosystems.

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<sup>28</sup> Robert Huebert, “The Arctic Council: Global and Domestic Governance” (1996), p. 1.

<sup>29</sup> In a meeting with the Committee at Resolute Bay in the High Arctic, 30 May 1996.



## Box 2 — “Defining Canada’s Northern Identity Among Nations”

Canada seems indisputably to be a “northern” country, and this geographical fact has left its mark on the country’s diverse political and cultural expression. In a recent short essay, the western Canadian novelist Rudy Wiebe declares: “When I look at Canada, I see a country capped by ‘North’; perhaps only ‘North’ holds our disparate regions together.”<sup>1</sup> A forthcoming interdisciplinary study, *Canada and the Idea of North*, promises to explore the wide range of representations of the North, but also what northern Canadians themselves think of southern Canadian appropriations of northern identity. There is, as well, ambivalence and ambiguity in the attitude of the majority of Canadians who “live South” and only occasionally look North. Four decades before the Committee began this inquiry, Pierre Berton won the Governor General’s non-fiction award for his 1956 book *The Mysterious North*. Two decades later, the same award went to the distinguished social geographer and founder of Laval University’s Centre d’études nordiques, Louis-Edmond Hamelin, for his landmark *Nordicité canadienne*, elaborating a richly textured concept of “nordicity” applicable to Arctic and northern locations and modes of life.<sup>2</sup> Yet the Arctic remains far from the consciousness of the over 99% of Canadians who do not live there, and the majority who have never visited our far northern regions.<sup>3</sup>

The territories north of 60° account for nearly 40% of Canada’s land area, but only 0.35% of the Canadian population (despite a demographic growth double that of the country as a whole, and social problems to match). If one includes the substantial provincial “norths” in addition to Arctic Quebec and Labrador, a more substantial range of interests and policy processes come into play, some with international circumpolar dimensions. For example, Manitoba’s northeastern port of Churchill on Hudson’s Bay played an important role in Canadian grain shipments to the Soviet Union, and it was mentioned by Russia’s current minister of northern development during a meeting with the Committee in Moscow in connection with future Arctic shipping possibilities. The region’s proximity to polar bear habitat has also become a prime tourist attraction. Alberta, which is a member of the Northern Forum, is a leader in developing cold-climate technologies and home to several internationally known Arctic research institutes. Generally, however, the provincial dimensions have not been very prominent in analyzing Arctic affairs affecting Canada; the exception being Quebec which is clearly the most advanced in terms of examining its distinctive “nordicité” within a domestic and international context.<sup>4</sup>

At the same time, as Laval University’s Paul Painchaud has often lamented, Canada as a whole has been slow to develop a proper circumpolar consciousness of its position among nations. Some years ago, Franklyn Griffiths described a partially emerging northern awareness which was still rather fragmented, as well as being limited in terms of international expression by the lack of any coherent overall Canadian foreign policy perspective:

At present, English-speaking southern Canadians, francophone Quebeckers, and the Indians, Metis, and Inuit are realizing their northern identities separately, with varying vigour and self-awareness, and in regard to various aspects of Canada’s external

environment. English-speaking southern Canadians seem to be least aware of their northerness and yet respond protectively to foreign intrusion in the Canadian Arctic. Quebecers have however begun to act on a sense of shared identity with Nordic countries, as have Indians and Metis with regard to the Nordic indigenous peoples. . . . Northern identity appears to be most explicit among Canada's Inuit and is expressed in action to further an Inuit circumpolar community. What is lacking in this picture is a foreign policy that encourages each of the constituencies in the Canadian political process to realize its northern essence in its own way and thereby to contribute actively to a larger awareness and common purpose that transcend separate identities.<sup>5</sup>

Almost two decades after that was written, the possibilities for circumpolar cooperation are much wider, and there are new institutional mechanisms for Canadian participation in developing international Arctic policies. The importance of the North to all Canadians, in political, socio-economic and environmental terms, should be more apparent than ever before. Yet there is evidence of a missing consciousness still to be overcome. For example, the new edition of a noted text on Canadian foreign policy, which appeared as the Arctic Council was being inaugurated, dismisses in a rather cursory fashion the idea of Canada defining its international identity within a circumpolar community.<sup>6</sup> This report stands as a strong statement of the Committee's disagreement with that preemptory assessment. Nevertheless, as this chapter acknowledges, there is a legacy of policy deficiencies to be overcome. Only a deliberate and substantive commitment to a circumpolar foreign policy for Canada can begin to address the as yet unfulfilled promise of Canada's northern identity among nations.

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<sup>1</sup> "The Elusive Meaning of 'North'," *Canadian Geographic*, January/February, 1996, p. 83.

<sup>2</sup> *Nordicité canadienne*, Hurtubise HMH, Montreal, 1975 (2nd ed. 1980). An English translation, *Canadian Nordicity: It's Your North Too*, was published by Harvest House, Montreal, in 1978. In 1988, Hamelin produced a shorter bilingual summary, *The Canadian North and its Conceptual Referents*, for the Canadian Studies Directorate, Ottawa. In his recently published retrospective, Hamelin reflects as well on the influence which the concept has had internationally -- *L'Écho des pays froids*, Chapter 6 "Le Monde nordique."

<sup>3</sup> Most tourists to Canada's Arctic are non-Canadians. The owner of one remote High Arctic lodge contends that: "Most Canadians have no idea what the top half of this country is about" (Quoted in Brian Bergman, "Arctic Thrills", *Maclean's*, 17 June 1996, p. 44.)

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Louis-Edmond Hamelin and Micheline Potvin, eds., *International Symposium on the Future of Northern Quebec*, Sillery, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1989. That forward-looking perspective is in distinct contrast to Kenneth Coates and W. Morrison, *The Forgotten North: A History of Canada's Provincial North*, Lorimer, Toronto, 1992.

<sup>5</sup> *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada*, Wellesley Papers 7, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1979.

<sup>6</sup> As viewed by Kim Richard Nossal: "Efforts have also been made to forge closer links with Canada's transpolar neighbours in Norden [the Nordic countries] and Russia — such as the appointment in October 1994 of Mary Simon, the founder of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, as Circumpolar Ambassador — but the demographic realities of Canadian society make such linkages both restricted and symbolic. . . . Canada has no other neighbours to offset the preponderance of the United States." *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, Prentice Hall Canada Inc., Scarborough, 3rd edition, 1996, Chapter 2 "Canada's International Location," p. 29.



In the 1960s, as pressures were building up for a major domestic debate over northern development, attention also turned to the role of the Arctic “frontier” in establishing a more “independent” Canadian foreign policy.<sup>30</sup> In the wake of the notorious 1969 voyage of the U.S. oil tanker *Manhattan* through the Canadian Northwest Passage, there was a flurry of alarm over the threat to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. Canada moved boldly to protect its Arctic waters with extra-territorial anti-pollution legislation and the first proposals were made for an international protective Arctic-region regime.<sup>31</sup> But the public and policy concern did not last.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, in a prescient 1979 study that observed a “quickening [of international activity] in the circumpolar North,” Franklyn Griffiths found Canadian governments still ill-prepared to develop, much less implement, any sustained or systematic policy:

The unfortunate state of affairs in Ottawa has clearly served to inhibit the thought of coordinating Canada’s northern international relations. This is because effective coordination of foreign affairs in the North requires the participation not only of externally oriented departments such as External Affairs and National Defence, but also of domestic agencies whose operations have foreign policy effects . . . The bureaucracy is not to be expected to set things rights on its own. Political leadership and political will are required, and for both of these informed public concern is a necessary precondition.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. R. St. John Macdonald, ed., *The Arctic Frontier*, University of Toronto Press in association with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Arctic Institute of North America, Toronto, 1966.

<sup>31</sup> The distinguished international legal scholar Maxwell Cohen, who was involved with the management of Canada-United States transboundary issues in the great lakes region through the International Joint Commission, foresaw a “superb opportunity for Canadian leadership in the development of an Arctic basin approach having relevance to the polar area as a whole and to the Canadian archipelago and its waters in particular.” (“The Arctic and the National Interest,” *International Journal*, Vol. 21, 1970, p. 1.)

<sup>32</sup> In a recent retrospective on this period, Pierre E. Trudeau, who was Prime Minister at the time, and his then international policy advisor Ivan Head, observe with regret that, apart from the *Manhattan* incident: “To those relatively few Canadians [themselves included] deeply interested in the Arctic, the universe seemed to be unfolding as it should: in relative obscurity.” (*The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign Policy 1968-1984*, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1995, p. 27.) Academic interest was stimulated, however; see Edgar Dosman, ed., *The Arctic in Question*, Oxford University Press, 1976.

<sup>33</sup> Griffiths, *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada*, Wellesley Papers 7, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1979, p. 7 and 10. Griffiths identified five missing requirements for a successful northern foreign policy: comprehensive information-gathering by and communication among governmental actors (including the government of Quebec) in regard to their northern activities; a planning capability geared to advancing Canadian interests; public consultation and information; interdepartmental coordination at the federal level; and a mandate “to direct, according to established criteria, Canada’s overall performance in circumpolar international relations.” Beyond administrative remedies, he recommended enhancing a range of relations with Nordic countries, promoting a peace-based “polar orientation,” developing Arctic science and technology in areas of Canadian excellence, and responding constructively to northern indigenous peoples’ concerns and aspirations, in particular “Canadian Inuit proposals that have international content.” (p. 74-75 and 80-86)



While within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canada now has an Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs who chairs an interdepartmental committee on circumpolar affairs that includes over a dozen other federal Government departments and agencies, the comments from a number of our witnesses (including Professor Griffiths himself — see next section) indicate persistent deficiencies in the system's ability to achieve convergence on and efficiently carry out international Arctic policy goals.

In the mid-1980s, a second controversial transit of the Northwest Passage by a U.S. vessel, the coastguard icebreaker *Polar Sea*, again briefly propelled the Arctic into the headlines. Indicative of the overall lack of preparedness noted above, however, the Mulroney government's 1985 foreign policy "green paper" *Competitiveness and Security* had opened with a description of Canada as an Arctic nation and "special because of it," and then had never referred to the Arctic again.<sup>34</sup> That absence was remedied somewhat during the subsequent public review by the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations. Taking to heart Paul Painchaud's challenge ("We have so long neglected the only international and regional system to which we really belong: the circumpolar system. . ."), the Committee's 1986 report devoted a full chapter to the subject, declaring: "The North must be part and parcel of Canada's foreign policy, because the stakes and interests that Canada has in the North are vital to its sovereignty and security."<sup>35</sup> However, the results from this episode proved disappointing. Critics continued to see Government responses as narrowly reactive, and then not always followed through.<sup>36</sup> Indeed, Professor Painchaud repeated his charge just as vigorously when he appeared before this Committee more than a decade later [47:5ff].

In the late 1980s, several private groups moved to fill the void in policy development. A working group of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, chaired by former Clerk of the Privy Council Gordon Robertson, issued a seminal report in 1988. This outlined the objectives of a comprehensive and coherent Canadian "northern dimension" in foreign policy that would encompass, in addition to the familiar sovereignty and security issue, environmental protection, aboriginal peoples' well-being and "self-reliance," social issues, economic development and transportation,

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<sup>34</sup> John Honderich, *Arctic Imperative: Is Canada Losing the North?*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1987, p. 10-11.

<sup>35</sup> *Independence and Internationalism*, Chapter Ten "A Northern Dimension for Canadian Foreign Policy," Ottawa, June 1996, p. 127, which cites Professor Painchaud's declaration to the parliamentary review committee.

<sup>36</sup> A case in point was the Mulroney government's abandonment of its promise to construct a more powerful "Class 8" polar icebreaker. More generally, see Robert Huebert, "Arctic Maritime Issues and Canadian Foreign Policy," in John Lamb, ed. *Proceedings of a Conference on 'A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada,'* Canadian Polar Commission and the Canadian Centre for Global Security, Ottawa, October 1994, p. 103-105.

advancement of northern science and knowledge, northern political development, and circumpolar cooperation, especially involving northern native peoples and the Nordic countries. The report emphasized the need to follow up ideas on sustainable development flowing from the 1987 Brundtland Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development and to embrace the overtures in Gorbachev's proposed "Arctic zone of peace."<sup>37</sup>

This report also resurrected the idea of an international body for the Arctic region, preparing the way for Prime Minister Mulroney's official call for an Arctic council in late 1989. In the early 1990s there was a burst of activity, much of it still privately sponsored, to flesh out this proposal (for details see Chapter Three, Box 4). Another seminal report by an Arctic Council panel provided the basis for some preliminary negotiations. In 1991, the Canadian Polar Commission was created by Act of Parliament to promote Canadian interest in polar affairs, especially in areas of environmental, scientific and technological cooperation. In June 1992, this Committee's predecessor, having visited Moscow and Kiev, issued a report endorsing the creation of an Arctic Ocean "demilitarized zone" and of an "International Arctic Council" that would deal primarily with security and environmental matters. Canadian ideas attracted considerable support within the Nordic countries and Russia, and from the first Nordic Council-sponsored Arctic parliamentarians' conference in Reykjavik in 1993.<sup>38</sup> The movement to establish an Arctic-region council faltered, however, when faced with U.S. resistance and disinterest.

The Chrétien Government early in its mandate promised it would move forward on a circumpolar cooperation agenda with renewed energy and a new outlook.<sup>39</sup> A Northern Foreign Policy Conference convened in April 1994 was addressed by both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, while the Government announced its intention to create the post of "Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs" reporting to both Ministers but located in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).<sup>40</sup> However, for every optimistic comment on Canada's

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<sup>37</sup> *The North and Canada's International Relations*, Report of a Working Group of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, March 1988. Cf. also "L'Arctique: Ses dimensions économiques, politiques, stratégiques et juridiques," *Études internationales*, numéro spécial, vol. xx, No. 1, March 1989; Edgar Dosman, ed., *Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic*, Routledge, London, 1989.

<sup>38</sup> See *Arctic Challenges*, Report from the Reykjavik Parliamentary Conference, The Nordic Council, Stockholm, 1993.

<sup>39</sup> The May 1993 Liberal *Foreign Policy Handbook* had advocated: "a policy which will bring together all Arctic states and peoples into a cooperative arrangement designed to scale back militarization of the Arctic region, preserve the fragile ecosystem and protect the interests of indigenous peoples."

<sup>40</sup> Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 58.



propitious position for leading on international Arctic affairs,<sup>41</sup> there were also more sceptical cautionary notes. For example, Ron Doering, Chair of the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy, noted that the March 1994 "Canada 21" report, which had set the stage for the first national forum on foreign policy just weeks earlier, "includes a section on the environment — and does not mention the Arctic. People still have a kind of absence of mind about the Arctic."<sup>42</sup>

While Arctic issues struggled for attention on a crowded foreign policy renewal agenda, the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy nevertheless heard some compelling testimony, notably from the organizers of the above-mentioned April conference, from major aboriginal groups, and during public hearings in Yellowknife and Saskatoon.<sup>43</sup> The Committee's November 1994 Report welcomed the 31 October appointment of Mary Simon, a prominent Inuit leader from northern Quebec, as Canada's first Circumpolar Ambassador, and recommended that "the Government work urgently with other states to establish the Arctic Council," with a first priority being "to deal with threats to the Arctic environment."<sup>44</sup>

The security chapter of the Government's February 1995 statement *Canada in the World* affirmed the broad objectives of the Arctic Council and further asserted Canada's "particular role in defending and developing the **Arctic environment**, an area where international cooperation is vital and is just beginning."<sup>45</sup> U.S. President Clinton's first state visit to Ottawa that same month removed a crucial impediment, as the Americans finally

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<sup>41</sup> The newsletter of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee exclaimed:

In the past, the circumpolar Arctic was dominated by defence needs — a policy arena in which Canada played only a minor role. Today, this region is emerging as a venue in which all facets of policy can be exercised, if we have sufficient imagination. Sustainable development and environmental security promise to be policy touchstones well into the next century. ("Sovereignty, Security, and Surveillance in the Arctic," *Northern Perspectives*, Winter 1994-95, p. 1)

However, CARC's own Executive Director, Terry Fenge, was rather less sanguine, given that: "the Arctic is unlikely to become a major focus of Canada's foreign policy. . . . The circumpolar Arctic is coming of age as a region. But the environmental, economic and social implications of this fact seem not to be fully appreciated by Canada's foreign policy elite, who concentrate on events on the Potomac River, and in Bonn and Tokyo" ("Canada Should Put More Emphasis on Arctic Concerns," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 26 August 1994, p. A3.).

<sup>42</sup> Ron Doering, "Canada's Northern Foreign Policy: Issues and Principles," in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 78. (See also Lamb's own essay in these proceedings, "Strategic Directions for Canada's Circumpolar Relations in the 1990s.") Ironically, the National Roundtable commissioned a 1994 paper by University of Toronto international relations scholar John Kirton on "Sustainable Development and Foreign Policy," which itself had no specific section on the Arctic!

<sup>43</sup> For more details see Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, *Canada and Circumpolar Cooperation: Meeting the Foreign Policy Challenge* (1996), p. 18ff.

<sup>44</sup> *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future*, Report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada Communication Group, Ottawa, November 1994, p. 45-46.

<sup>45</sup> Government of Canada, *Canada in the World*, Canada Communication Group, Ottawa, February 1995, p. 19 and 29. The Statement affirms that: "Our goal is to create an Arctic Council to meet the challenge of sustainable development in the North and to deal with the critical issues faced by all Arctic countries."



agreed to join negotiations to create the Council. These negotiations proved to be protracted and difficult, continuing through the first part of the Committee's inquiry until finalization in August 1996. Yet the commitment seemed at last to be there. As Canada's ambassador to the negotiations Mary Simon put it:

What seemed only a dream a decade ago is now within reach. A true partnership may finally be emerging where governments and indigenous peoples can, together, develop a vision for the Arctic where national agendas can be harmonized and cultural diversity encouraged. If this is achieved, it is my hope that we can quickly move on to properly define and apply the principles of sustainable and equitable development to the Arctic.<sup>46</sup>

The next few years will determine whether a northern dimension in Canadian foreign policy has truly arrived, in practice as well as intention. As we have seen, previous episodes of policy attention to the Arctic too soon gave way again to years of relative passivity and neglect. If Canada is to rise to the challenge of the "Arctic imperative," it will be necessary for it to break out of that traditional foreign policy pattern, and what analyst described as its "Mercator mind-set,"<sup>47</sup> to recognize the circumpolar region as a primary, not just secondary or occasional, field of activity for achieving Canada's objectives in the world. Hence, as the Committee argued in Chapter One, comes the need to work out this systematic and integrated circumpolar element within the progressive evolution of foreign policy as a whole.

### **Looking Forward**

We are not dealing with abstract and distant issues when we talk "foreign affairs." We are dealing with the international dimension of national issues. More than ever, Canadians have a direct stake in developments outside our boundaries. . . . I can report to you that despite. . . or perhaps because of the struggles in [Russia] to achieve viable democracy and sustainable economic growth, the potential for "constructive engagement" between our two countries is enormous, in particular on northern issues. . . . Your Committee's decision to focus on this issue [establishing the Arctic Council] has been timely in every way.

The Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, "Foreign Policy at a Crossroad"<sup>48</sup>

The first statement to the Committee by the new Foreign Affairs Minister, coming at the beginning of its circumpolar study, was significant not only for its encouragement but for its

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<sup>46</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Global Agenda: Canada's Foreign Policy and the Environment*, Vol. 3, No. 3, December 1995, p. 4.

<sup>47</sup> See John Honderich, *Arctic Imperative* (1987), Chapter 2.

<sup>48</sup> Notes for an Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 16 April, 1996, p. 1 and 5.

acknowledgement of the expansive basis on which the northern dimension of Canadian foreign policy needs to be developed and carried out. This emerging dimension will require a close and concrete linkage between domestic and international policy fields, a focus on cooperation among countries on many levels, and the strategic use of international organizations, in particular the newly established Arctic Council.

The result could be an important departure from a northern foreign policy that has been criticized as reactive, episodic and unsustained. Canada's "northern vision," as we have seen, has been impaired because of being more symbolic than substantive, and because of being dominated by rather narrow sovereignty and security-related incidents during the Cold War period. It is already a decade since the Gorbachev-initiated thaw opened up a more promising horizon; yet, following the 1985-86 foreign policy review, then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark had stated in a speech in Norway in 1987 that an "integrated and comprehensive northern foreign policy" would be based on: affirming Canadian sovereignty; modernizing Canada's northern defence; preparing for commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and promoting enhanced circumpolar cooperation.<sup>49</sup> The agenda at that point was still heavily weighted towards the first three familiar issues rather than the promise of the fourth, and still tended to be driven by Ottawa's only occasional concerns about Arctic events.

Since then, the momentum has been shifting towards new opportunities for non-military circumpolar cooperation and security, notably with respect to environmental and sustainable development issues. Just as important has been the much greater emphasis on domestic process and content. Canadians living in the North, especially those represented by aboriginal peoples' organizations, are demanding to be involved in developing policies for their region, including those that may have a transnational dimension. The agenda is being focussed on issues that matter to northerners (their livelihoods, health, and cultural survival) and on seeking means whereby they can participate fully in making development choices. Rather than being treated as an exceptional periphery, defined by outside frameworks and dependent on external forces, this emerging North might be better understood as a series of human struggles and transitions that, although taking place in a harsh, remote environment unfamiliar to most Canadians, hold important lessons for future forms of development and international cooperation.<sup>50</sup>

Such a northern-based orientation was apparent in the perspectives advanced during the Committee's first panel on "northern visions for Canadian policy." Elaborating on the

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<sup>49</sup> Cited in Robert Huebert, "Polar Vision or Tunnel Vision," *Marine Policy*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1995, p. 360-61.

<sup>50</sup> See the analysis in Kenneth Coates, "The Discovery of the North: Towards a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Northern/Remote Regions," editorial in *The Northern Review*, Nos. 12/13, Summer 1994/Winter 1994, p. 15-43.



conclusions from the 1994 northern foreign policy conference that was held in conjunction with the last foreign policy review exercise, Whit Fraser of the Canadian Polar Commission stressed that, in determining Canada's national interests and priorities in the Arctic, foremost consideration should be given to the concerns of northerners themselves. They should participate in formulating the principles of a northern foreign policy, in sharing in the benefits of sustainable development, and in promoting "peaceful civil relations" among Arctic countries<sup>51</sup> [10:2]. Canada was viewed as embarking on this road, but without a clear compass. Still lacking is an overall strategy for the Arctic region into which the expanding international dimensions of policy can be integrated.

Fred Roots, science advisor emeritus to the federal Department of the Environment, concurred. He remarked that the problem is not ineffective use of funds but that, rather, "there is no connection and coordination in what is happening. . . . We badly need some view of what we want in the North. My feeling is that this Committee has a very important goal of finding out from people who are affected by what happens in the North what it is they think is most important. Certainly it won't work if the priorities are designed by a central government or designed at a distance" [10:21].

This witness observed that Canada has been "a northern country without a conspicuous northern foreign policy. And many times that lack has been evident" [10:4]. The challenge will be to come to terms with the multiple and sometimes contradictory forces impinging on the Arctic. We see fragile terrestrial and marine environments whose carrying capacity is being degraded and that are particularly at risk from transboundary pollutants and global climatic changes. As well, we see marginalization of Arctic interests in economies increasingly dominated by southern and global markets. At the same time, emerging are political devolution, decentralization of decision-making, and growing assertion of the place of indigenous peoples. Such dichotomies must be addressed if the circumpolar region is to become a positive example of sustainable development and multilateral cooperation. In summary:

On the one hand, it is increasingly essential to realize and recognize the Arctic regions as distinct regions . . . It is increasingly clear that national policies and international arrangements that are designed for the more southern parts of the countries often cannot be applied without change to the Arctic regions without risk of failure or of being counter-productive.

On the other hand, it is also becoming increasingly apparent that from a policy regulation or investment point of view, the Arctic regions cannot be considered in isolation. The Arctic regions, the economy, the people, and the environment are increasingly affected by, and in turn have an effect on, the rest of the world.

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<sup>51</sup> Testimony of 23 April 1996. Mr. Fraser appeared again in February 1997 on specific Arctic environmental issues and on the role of the Commission itself in addressing them.



It is because of the inescapable multiplicity of scales and perspective in almost all Arctic issues, from the environment and natural resources to military rivalries, that Arctic policies and international relations are especially complex. They require deliberate planning rather than the extension of existing policies, and have led to a number of distinctive circumpolar international arrangements and institutions. [10:7]

In effect, the management of Arctic issues not only tests the ingenuity of governments' internal policies but, as observed in Chapter One, also brings into play questions of larger international development and governance.

The other witnesses on this panel, Terry Fenge and former Yukon premier, Tony Penikett, representing the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC), agreed on the need for national Arctic policy with a strong foreign policy component, while stressing more direct northern involvement and utilization of local knowledge in its development and execution. Mr. Penikett pointed to the emergence of "a kind of international northern community, a northern community consciousness," with numerous subnational initiatives (whether sanctioned by Ottawa or not) flowing from that [10:13]. Terry Fenge also emphasized recognition of the roles that aboriginal peoples must have in this process and preservation of the renewable resource economy upon which they rely.

Several witnesses in subsequent Ottawa panels pushed that analysis further. Professor Franklyn Griffiths of the University of Toronto suggested that the absence of any organized, inclusive Arctic policy process means we need to "think a little bit about a new institutional mechanism that would allow us to create a coherent, comprehensive and proactive approach to our Arctic policies, domestic as well as foreign." In his view, such a process should give northerners "a very loud voice," should not be southern-based, and should encompass all issues, including those of a transboundary, and therefore foreign policy, nature, rather than artificially segregating or compartmentalizing such issues and ignoring the integrated approach so often necessary in Arctic matters. He envisaged a consensus-based, multi-stakeholder body bringing together nongovernmental actors and all levels of government, with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and specifically the Office of the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, in a chairing/coordinating role [15:8-10].

This raises the issues of how to put in place and then to sustain such a process in order to support diverse participation across the country, and to develop the requisite policy capabilities; for example, a number of witnesses urged that the meagre resources available to the Circumpolar Ambassador be strengthened. Historically, as Robert Huebert of the University of Manitoba observed, "the political leadership tends to have a relatively short attention span when it comes to the issue of northern international cooperation." Moreover, much of Canada's contribution to date has depended on the earlier work of a

few dedicated public servants such as Fred Roots, whose shoes may be difficult to fill in an era of government downsizing and deregulation. And while NGOs and indigenous peoples' organizations have become more prominent in driving new policy initiatives,— notably the Inuit Circumpolar Conference with respect to issues of sustainability — their work could also be curtailed by further cutbacks in Government support [15:11]. All of this accentuates the need to consider in concrete terms how northerners can best be served by a broadly based, participatory public policy process with staying power over the long term.

Not surprisingly, the theme of northern input was reinforced during the Committee's travels in the region and discussions with northern researchers in late May. Former Government Leader of the NWT and current chair of the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation Nellie Cournoyea cautioned that foreign policy formulation and international responses must be "cognisant of the interests, traditions and way of life of northern peoples" [Submission of 28 May 1996, p. 4]. Adequate and appropriate representation of aboriginal peoples was a point raised repeatedly in this regard. In Yellowknife, Gary Bohnet, President of the Metis Nation, citing the issue of wild fur exports and relations with the European Union, recommended "some formal provisions for aboriginal input into positions on [departmental] policy and strategies that affect them." In Whitehorse, consultant Nicholas Poushinsky stressed a democratized, bottom-up process that would be relevant to northerners. Southern political institutions must explore ways to listen more to people in the North, not just in terms of Arctic-specific aspects of foreign policy, but in terms of foreign policy development as a whole.<sup>52</sup> At the same time, Aaron Senkpiel, of Yukon College, observed the continuing lack of public awareness in the rest of the country that means northern issues have a hard time getting on, and then staying on, the agenda.

How, therefore, to fill the gaps and bridge the solitudes? New communications technologies linking remote communities and more outreach activity by the Circumpolar Ambassador were among some suggestions. David Malcolm, Director of the Aurora Research Institute in Inuvik, also saw as a foreign policy priority assisting "northern communities, institutions and businesses to partner with their counterparts in the circumpolar region." In Iqaluit, Committee members met with Bruce Rigby, Executive Director of the Nunavut Research Institute, and senior staff of the Nunavut Arctic College,

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<sup>52</sup> Two year earlier, Nicholas Poushinsky, a former deputy minister in the Yukon government who is currently engaged in the mining business, had given a similar message to the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy when it visited Yellowknife as its only stop in northern Canada: "... a delegation of Canadian parliamentarians has never come up to the North to get an orientation. . . . if you're going to have an Arctic Council and an Arctic ambassador, you enter into a formal democratization by having an advisory group of northern people that reflects the cultural, regional and economic diversity of this territory, so that people [in Ottawa] can be kept plugged into northern initiatives as they make northern foreign policy," (Testimony of 2 June 1994, *Proceedings*, Special Joint Committee, Issue No. 20, p. 120-125).



who stressed the importance of continuing to build up knowledge-based capacities and community outreach **within** the Arctic itself. The goal is to provide local people with the tools and training to be able to take over more of these responsibilities, rather than perpetuating their dependence on imported skills. Policy development in that sense means northerners becoming better equipped to communicate and act on their own articulated circumpolar objectives, not better communication of policies already decided on their behalf by southern bureaucracies.

There is nevertheless still a need for capacity-building at the national level to support international policy objectives. Milton Freeman, senior research scholar at the Edmonton-based Canadian Circumpolar Institute (CCI), pointed out in a written follow-up to his presentation that “Canada lacks a public policy research centre equivalent to the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Norway (a country having about one-sixth of the population)” [Submission of 3 June 1996, p. 7]. Committee members who visited Norway can attest to these impressive resources and the quality of the analytical work being done in that country. It might be noted that the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS), until its sudden demise in 1992, had been a significant source of national funding for some Arctic-focussed research. The CCI’s director, Clifford Hickey, expressed the hope that perhaps the Canadian Polar Commission could do more to bring together expertise from established Canadian centres of excellence — notably those in Alberta and Quebec — and to make this available to inform the work of the office of the Circumpolar Ambassador. However, a number of witnesses appeared to doubt that the Commission was up to the task, and perceived the whole of Canadian Arctic policy research capability as being less than the sum of its individual parts.<sup>53</sup>

Speaking in Calgary at the Arctic Institute of North America, Professor Nigel Bankes argued that Canada “should give Arctic issues prominence in global and multilateral treaty negotiations.” He had serious doubts, however, about the necessary national-level expertise and institutional capacity being there to support this. The Calgary-based institute also submitted to the Committee its own “low-cost alternative” to the Canadian Polar Information System abandoned by the Canadian Polar Commission for lack of funds. Several of Quebec’s leading authorities on northern research and international policy, Michel Allard, head of Laval University’s Centre d’études nordiques, and Gérard Duhaime, head of Groupe d’études inuit et circumpolaires, appeared before the Committee in May and again in October. They spoke in detail about the measures needed for building up research and educational capacity and furthering cross-country linkages. Paul Painchaud,

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<sup>53</sup> The Committee nonetheless acknowledges the efforts of the Association of Canadian Universities for Northern Studies to promote support for the research activities of their member institutions, which have been constrained by recent federal cutbacks. The point is that such diverse and scattered activities do not in themselves add up to a strong base for assisting the development of a circumpolar foreign policy.



of Laval's International Institute for Environmental Strategies and Security, noted the telling lack of input from Quebec in developing the original mandate of the Polar Commission. Branko Ladanyi, of Montreal University's École polytechnique, suggested that the United States may be considerably in advance of Canada in terms of developing a systemic informational capacity as an element of national policy. Dr. Jacques Grondin of Quebec's Public Health Centre, which has pioneered international cooperative research projects in the North, including in Russia, described having to turn for funding to the United States because it is not available within a poorly coordinated Canadian policy environment [see *Evidence*, Meeting No. 47]. We will be returning to the important issues of building knowledge and communications capabilities on a circumpolar basis in Chapter Eight, but the point about the internal Canadian gaps needing to be addressed first has been registered.

In northern Quebec and the eastern Arctic, where the permanent population is predominantly Inuit and scattered among a handful of tiny communities, the issues of aboriginal representation and distance from power centres were especially pronounced (the partial exception being Iqaluit, which is confidently preparing itself as the prospective capital of the new Nunavut territory in 1999). A lot of northern residents clearly feel remote from and often poorly represented by southern-based institutions. In contacts with the Committee, they wanted to make sure that their concerns would be listened to and that they would have opportunities to participate directly in setting Arctic policy agendas in the various areas under consideration — the environment, economic development and trade, research, education and health, and cultural and social affairs. As well, a common hope was that the Inuit's own efforts in developing circumpolar ties should be recognized and supported by southern governments.

Because present needs such as housing are so acute, as emphasized by many Inuit speakers, it also became apparent that initiatives at the foreign policy level have to be presented so as to bring home to local people the tangible potential benefits from circumpolar cooperation, and the need to explore innovative ways to bridge the domestic and international arenas. Returning from a meeting with the mayor and local councillors of Resolute Bay in the High Arctic, Committee members bore this in mind during a 31 May 1996 roundtable in Montreal as they listened to northern studies experts from Laval and McGill universities emphasize that the mere existence of a Circumpolar Ambassador or an Arctic Council, would not accomplish much for northern communities in the absence of substantive investments in Arctic programs working on practical solutions to the region's problems. Dr. Gary Pেকেles, of McGill's Baffin region health project, pointed out that "foreign affairs" may not normally figure in the day-to-day preoccupations of citizens in

Canada, but many Arctic issues affecting daily life (e.g. contaminants in country foods) are international in scope and accordingly require foreign policy responses.

In short, developing a stronger northern dimension for Canadian foreign policy can be deeply relevant to domestic needs. The appointment of the Circumpolar Ambassador, located within DFAIT<sup>54</sup> but reporting also to the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs and chairing an interdepartmental committee on circumpolar affairs, promises at least the beginning of a more coordinated domestic-international focus. However, this office, consisting of little more than Ambassador Simon herself and several support staff, is tiny, considering the growing scale and complexity of responsibilities. At the same time, Paul Painchaud insisted to the Committee that the primary onus for developing a credible circumpolar foreign policy must rest in DFAIT; such a policy should be an important objective for all Canadians and should engage fully our relations with other countries of the circumpolar region.

[The appointment of an ambassador for circumpolar affairs] is not at all sufficient. Within the structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs, there should be experts, people who focus on circumpolar matters. . . There are no Arctic or circumpolar region specialists within that department. . . If the Arctic is seen in a geopolitical perspective, that will mean that we will not only be interested in the Arctic because of environmental problems, because of aboriginal populations, the economic potential, etc., but essentially because the Arctic or the circumpolar region is the important region for Canada. If we make the geopolitical choice of putting the Arctic in a central position — not only a region of concern, but in a central position — in our thinking on our foreign policy, that will mean that we will concentrate on a whole series of problems that we are dealing with separately, such as, to begin with, the management of our relations with all the countries of the circumpolar region. [47:6-7]

In his recent study on the significance of the Arctic Council for international relations, Oran Young calls for the elaboration of a multilateral “Arctic 2000 Action Plan” that in an integrated way will address establishment of a proper institutional framework, articulating common objectives, and “improving the knowledge base on which to build the procedural, programmatic, and regulative elements of a comprehensive regime for the Arctic.”<sup>55</sup> In order for Canada to assert international leadership in this regard, the Committee called in Chapter One for a Canadian Circumpolar Cooperation Framework to be set out. In the next chapter we will turn specifically to how the Arctic Council might be

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<sup>54</sup> Previously, responsibilities for circumpolar issues had been shuffled among several units and eventually into the Western Europe Bureau, but had never had their own dedicated place within DFAIT’s bureaucratic structure, even though a circumpolar liaison directorate created within DIAND continues to have some international relations responsibilities notably in relation to bilateral agreements on northern cooperation with Russia — see Chapter Nine.

<sup>55</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 56.



utilized as the primary institution of a growing internationalism region-wide. To achieve those ambitions, however, we believe that Canada must at the same time strengthen its own internal capacities for realizing a northern dimension in Canadian foreign policy by integrating its policy for the Arctic with particular attention to domestic-international linkages; including adequate representation and participation of northerners, particularly of aboriginal peoples, in policy development; establishing better mechanisms for coordination of governmental and of nongovernmental activities for the international Arctic; supporting knowledge-based networking and communications, especially through building up the capacity of northern-based institutions; and promoting broader public awareness of Canada's circumpolar interests and objectives (in which instruments such as the recently established Centre for Foreign Policy Development might also play a facilitating role assisting outreach efforts by the Circumpolar Ambassador).

As a first step, the Committee believes it is time for Canada to move towards a comprehensive domestic strategy for the Arctic region as a more effective foundation from which to identify and pursue Canadian circumpolar interests internationally. With respect to the bolstering of foreign policy instruments for achieving those Canadian objectives abroad, we believe the logical step would be a substantial enhancement within DFAIT of the capacities of the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador, whose duties include not only multilateral responsibilities but also policy integration and coordination.

Accordingly:

## **Recommendation 2**

**The Committee recommends that the federal Government lead in devising an "Arctic Region 2000 Strategy" that would establish a coherent set of Canadian priorities for the next century, including pursuit of foreign policy objectives in the context of Recommendation 1 for a Canadian Circumpolar Cooperation Framework. The process for developing and carrying forward this strategy should fully involve provinces and territories whose interests are affected, but should also be more than just interdepartmental and intergovernmental. In particular, provision should be made for direct public and parliamentary input, participation by NGOs and, especially, northern-based and aboriginal groups. To that end, we recommend that a continuing consultative mechanism be attached to the Strategy which would promote consensus-building around long-term solutions and advise on policy evolution and implementation issues. As part of that mechanism, a circumpolar foreign policy working group should be established to focus on effective ways of achieving Canadian interests through international**



**initiatives and through leadership in multilateral cooperation bodies, notably the Arctic Council.**

Furthermore, in order to build the requisite capacity to execute circumpolar foreign policy:

### **Recommendation 3**

**The Committee recommends that a Division for Circumpolar Affairs be established within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to support the work of the office of the Circumpolar Ambassador in spearheading and coordinating the Government's role. In addition to managing the external dimensions of circumpolar relations, the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador should also be enabled to increase outreach activities within Canada to ensure that all interested constituencies are kept abreast of circumpolar developments and are provided with opportunities to contribute to international Arctic policy processes. To this end, existing resources within the Government should be reallocated and consolidated, and increased as necessary. Northern governments, organizations and research institutes should be consulted first about the best ways to improve information networks and communications with the Ottawa office.**



## CHAPTER 3 — ENTRENCHING CIRCUMPOLAR INTERNATIONALISM: MAKING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL WORK

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Canadians have been accused of living North and looking South. The foundation of the Arctic Council will, I hope, make Canadians look North, and realize, to the North, we belong to a region: the circumpolar region. . . . Let us, through the Arctic Council, affirm and implement our commitment to act as members of this circumpolar community.

The Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, Address at the  
Inauguration of the Arctic Council, Ottawa,  
19 September 1996

### ***Context, Genesis and Establishment***

As indicated in Chapter One, international cooperation within the Arctic region is not a new phenomenon. Historically, however, its scope has been narrow. Groups of Arctic states may have established particular arrangements among themselves, and states occasionally reached bilateral or multilateral agreements on Arctic matters for specific limited purposes (for example the 1973 pact for the conservation of polar bears). But there seemed to be no real possibility of having a permanent institutional mechanism for international political cooperation linking the circumpolar countries as a whole. Mikhail Gorbachev's 1987 call for pan-Arctic peaceful cooperation was therefore a revolutionary watershed which broke the ice in that regard. The Cold War's demise produced a wave of new interest in international organizations contributing to common Arctic aims (see Box 3). Above all, it revived long dormant Canadian hopes for a region-wide organization of all Arctic countries. The proposal for an international council made up of the eight Arctic states was officially advanced by Canada during a visit by Prime Minister Mulroney to northern Russia in 1989. The substance of the idea had actually come from Canadian Arctic policy advocates rather than from Government, and indeed in the next several years most of the work of fleshing out the features of such an organization was done by veteran nongovernmental activists and northern specialists (see the chronology outlined in Box 4). Also in 1989, a Finnish initiative led more concretely to consultations among the eight Arctic countries on circumpolar environmental cooperation. A conference in Rovaniemi in 1991 produced a consensus declaration among the eight and inaugurated a continuing process under the aegis of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). Thus begun an incipient, if still rather limited, new stage of international Arctic activity conducted on a circumpolar basis.



Whereas the Nordic-led “Rovaniemi process” was able to establish itself and outline an agenda early on, the more ambitious Arctic Council proposal associated with Canada ran into obstacles and eventually languished, even though a draft declaration was drawn up in May 1993. These preliminary multilateral consultations had also established that, as in the AEPS, there would be a significant role for Arctic aboriginal peoples’ organizations, and seemed to have overcome the Nordic countries’ caveats about the Canadian designs for such a body based on the grounds that they did not want it to compete with the AEPS. The real stumbling block was U.S. resistance and lack of interest.<sup>56</sup> Until that was overcome the Council’s existence remained academic.

During 1994, a renewed push to revive the faltering initiative within Canada (notably from those associated with the nongovernmental Arctic Council Panel urging the new Liberal Government to act on its Arctic policy promises) coincided with an important review of U.S. Arctic policy by the new Clinton-Gore administration which signalled a more positive engagement with sustainable development issues and in international Arctic forums. In late 1994, Canada appointed Mary Simon, a leading aboriginal NGO advocate of the Council, to be the country’s first Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs. A few months later, at the Chrétien-Clinton summit in February 1995, it was announced that the U.S. would participate in formal negotiations towards creating the Council. Following initial discussions led by Ambassador Simon, Canada produced a detailed draft document in May 1995, to which the U.S. responded with its own discussion paper.<sup>57</sup> At this stage a number of the elements of the Council were already apparent: it would build on but go beyond the AEPS to pursue and coordinate a broad range of sustainable development and cooperation objectives; it would have the eight Arctic states as founding voting members but would also grant “permanent participant” status to the three major indigenous peoples’ organizations<sup>58</sup> similarly recognized within the AEPS process; it would be a modest, consensus-based body established through a political declaration rather than a legally binding charter.

Despite this headstart, negotiations among the eight countries’ Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) were protracted. The major Arctic meetings held in Yellowknife and Inuvik in March 1996 helped to sustain the momentum. Sticking points remained, however, notably over the inclusion of environmental protection and sustainable development goals within the Council’s mission, and over the criteria for broadening aboriginal representation beyond

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<sup>56</sup> For an excellent comparative insight into these evolving international perspectives see David Scrivener, *Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic: From Strategy to Council*, The North Atlantic Committee, Security Policy Library No. 1/1996, Oslo.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 22ff for a useful synopsis of the bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

<sup>58</sup> These are the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), the Saami Council, and the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (AKMNSSDV, R.F.). The three first gained participant standing within the AEPS, supported by an indigenous peoples’ secretariat established in 1993.

### Box 3 — “The Growth of International Organizations with Arctic Concerns”

The Arctic Council established in 1996 is unique in terms of the broad political mandate given to it by the eight Arctic states and which includes the incorporation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), a looser and more limited arrangement that is the only other fully circumpolar intergovernmental institution in existence to date. There are nevertheless, especially since 1989, a growing number of other bodies of an international nature addressing Arctic issues, which are relevant to Canadian interests in circumpolar cooperation. Some of these are nongovernmental and focussed on a particular set of issues (e.g. the International Union for Circumpolar Health). Others have been created by the region's indigenous peoples. At least one aims at promoting practical cooperation among regional governments below the national level. Several involve multilateral arrangements among some Arctic, and also in several cases non-Arctic, states. As Oran Young advised the Committee, the work of implementing the Arctic Council's mandate should consciously take into account activities related to Arctic cooperation already underway through these various channels. While these are referred to as appropriate at different points through the rest of this report, the following provides a brief initial guide to the range of organizational actors currently operating within the international Arctic arena.

#### Bodies relevant to Arctic cooperation established before 1989:

- **The Nordic Council** — Established in 1952 to promote dialogue and joint action on regional issues, the Council brings together representatives from the parliaments and governments (an executive Nordic Council of Ministers was added in 1971) of the five Nordic states — Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Finland — and the three associated “home-rule” territories of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Aaland Islands. There are several levels of membership, including observer status for the indigenous Saami peoples of Fenno-Scandinavia. The Council was **not** established for the purposes of Arctic cooperation. In recent years, however, it has become active in elaborating Nordic positions on Euro-Arctic interests at the multilateral level. The Council has also been instrumental in supporting the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (see below).
- **The Saami Council** — The first transboundary organization of Arctic native peoples was established in 1952 to link the Saami minorities in the three Scandinavian countries. Russian Saami were only able to join this body after 1989.
- **The Inuit Circumpolar Conference** — Inaugurated in Barrow, Alaska, in 1977, the ICC built a common front among Inuit from Alaska, Canada and Greenland, particularly around resource development and self-determination issues. Russian Inuit were not able to attend until 1989 and only became full members in 1992.



Canadians have been leaders in the evolution of the ICC movement and in its leading advocacy of sustainable development initiatives and the Arctic Council, in which both it and the Saami Council have now become founding “permanent participants.”

- **The International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH)** — Founded at a 1981 symposium in Denmark, the IUCH is a formal NGO with a secretariat based at the University of Alaska in Anchorage that works closely with the International Arctic Science Committee, the ICC, the AEPS Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, and global bodies such as the World Health Organization and the International Council of Scientific Unions. The primary organizational members are the Canadian and American Societies for Circumpolar Health, the Nordic Council for Arctic Medical Research, and the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences. In addition, there are a number of affiliated members, and a commitment has been made to ensure substantial aboriginal involvement from all circumpolar countries. The IUCH has many ongoing working groups and holds major triennial congresses, the last in May 1996.

*Bodies engaged in international Arctic cooperation and established since 1989:<sup>1</sup>*

- **The Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (AKMNSSDV, R.F.)** — Founded in 1990 and constituted under its current name in 1993, the Association now represents over 30 of Russia’s “small peoples.” The Association is not strictly speaking an international body but it has achieved international recognition and a commensurate role as the third of the indigenous peoples’ organizations to become founding “permanent participants” in the Arctic Council.
- **The International Arctic Science Committee (IASC)** — Founded in August 1990, the Committee is a nongovernmental organization made up of the representatives from national science organizations in the eight Arctic states and eight other countries with longstanding interests in Arctic research. While the IASC has quasi-official affiliations (e.g. the Canadian Polar Commission represents Canada), its members do not act on behalf of governments. However, this type of body should be distinguished from voluntary NGOs, such as the World Wildlife Fund, which are active in international Arctic advocacy and supporting research.
- **The Northern Forum** — Following up a Northern Regions Conference held in Anchorage in 1990, the Forum was formally established in November 1991 to promote useful exchanges among subnational governments in these regions on issues of mutual interest (e.g. northern technologies, socio-economic development). The membership is expected to grow beyond the present 20, which includes 11 regional



governments in Russia where the 1997 annual meeting will again be held. The Forum is at present both less and more than circumpolar: the Northwest Territories, northern Quebec, Labrador, and Greenland are not members; whereas there are members from China, Mongolia, Japan, and Korea is also a national observer.

- **The North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO)** — Created under the terms of an agreement signed in April 1992, this is a mechanism which has been created by the participating governments — Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands, with Canada, Russia, and Japan as observers — in order to promote the sustainable utilization of living marine resources and also to be a counterweight to certain actions by the International Whaling Commission. Its Arctic relevance to Canada relates to issues of sustainable renewable resource harvesting, especially by indigenous peoples.
- **The Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR)** — Created in January 1993 at a conference in Kirkenes, Norway, the Council brings together the five Nordic countries, the European Union and Russia with the overarching aim of helping to reintegrate Russia within Europe, and specifically to work on common environmental and sustainable development challenges in the Barents sea area. Canada and the U.S. are among several observer countries to this process. The last ministerial conference was hosted by Russia in Petrozavodsk in November 1996 while the Committee was in Russia. Sweden has since assumed the duties of chair. A significant innovation of the Council is that below the interstate level, it provides for a second-tier regional council which includes representation from seven high northern countries in Fenno-Scandinavia and Russia as well as from the region's indigenous populations.
- **The Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR)** — Created following the first plenary conference of Arctic parliamentarians in Reykjavik, Iceland, in August 1993, the Committee began its activities as an organizing body in September 1994 with secretariat support which has continued since that time from the Nordic Council. The Committee includes representatives from the Nordic region, the other Arctic countries, the European Parliament, and from the ICC and Saami parliaments. Canadians participated actively in the first conference, and Canada hosted the second such gathering in Yellowknife in March 1996. The next is to be held in Russia in 1998.

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<sup>1</sup> Other than the AEPS, cited above in connection with the Arctic Council and discussed at length in Chapter Five.

#### Box 4 — “The Arctic Council: From Idea to Inauguration”

- 1944 — The idea of having a pan-Arctic regional arrangement is first broached by the United States Vice-President. The onset of the Cold War freezes any further consideration for decades.
- 1970 — In the context of the *Manhattan* incident, the perceived threats to Canada's Arctic sovereignty and from marine pollution, law professor Maxwell Cohen proposes the creation of an “Arctic Basin Council.”
- 1987 — The idea of political cooperation among Arctic governments is promoted in a seminal paper on scientific cooperation co-authored by Canadian Fred Roots. Subsequently Gorbachev's famous Murmansk “Arctic zone of peace” speech breaks the geopolitical ice.
- 1988 — The idea for an Arctic-region council is revived and fleshed out in an influential report, *The North and Canada's International Relations*, by the Working Group of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) and the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC).
- 1989 — Prime Minister Brian Mulroney embraces the concept and advances it abroad, declaring in a November address at the Arctic and Antarctic Institute in Leningrad (St. Petersburg): “And why not a council of Arctic countries eventually coming into existence to coordinate and promote cooperation among them?”
- 1990 — An independent Arctic Council Panel, supported by the Gordon Foundation and co-chaired by Franklyn Griffiths and Rosemarie Kuptana (other members were then ICC president Mary Simon, John Amagoalik, Bill Erasmus, Cinday Gilday, Stephen Hazell, and John Lamb) began work developing the proposal and submitted a preliminary report to the Government which responded positively. Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark affirmed in November that: “Canada is willing to host a small secretariat for this Council and contribute to sustaining it from the outset.”
- 1991 — Encouraged by that the Panel completed its work. The comprehensive final result, *To Establish an International Arctic Council: A Framework Report*, was also published in the summer issue of the CARC periodical *Northern Perspectives*. The landmark study included a set of basic principles of pan-Arctic cooperation, founding articles of a council, and recommendations to both aboriginal peoples and the Canadian Government. Among the latter were for Canada to use the June 1991 Rovaniemi ministerial meeting (which led to the AEPS) to “seek convocation of a plenary preparatory conference, with direct aboriginal and other northern participation” and to “consider seeking an Arctic Council comprised of ten delegations representing the Arctic states, aboriginal peoples, and territorial governments. . .”. The Council's agenda and decisions should be determined by consensus but “without prohibition of any matter judged to be of international arctic



significance.” Also in 1991, a CIIA working group on the Arctic environment reinforced the panel’s case and attached to its report a proposal developed by law professor Donat Pharand for a “Draft Arctic Treaty” as the constitution for an Arctic Regional Council.<sup>1</sup>

- 1993 — The Canadian proposals had lost intergovernmental momentum despite this promising work. The Mulroney government’s pursuit of the initiative was lukewarm. The U.S. was opposed and had decreed security issues to be off-limits. The Nordic countries were concentrating instead on the AEPS. However, with the election of the Chrétien Government there was a renewed Canadian commitment. The new Clinton administration also launched a major review of U.S. Arctic policy indicating receptivity to a broad non-military and multilateralist agenda of Arctic cooperation.
- 1994 — Ministers Ouellet and Irwin announced at an April conference on northern foreign policy the Government’s intention to appoint an ambassador for circumpolar affairs. Mary Simon, a member of the earlier Arctic Council Panel, was named to the new post in October. The initiative had been relaunched.
- 1995 — At the February Chrétien-Clinton Summit in Ottawa, the U.S. finally agreed to take part in negotiations towards establishing an Arctic council. A detailed working paper elaborating the Canadian position was prepared within the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Ambassador Simon led Canadian efforts as negotiations began in earnest among senior Arctic officials from the eight prospective member states.
- 1996 — Despite strong international political reinforcement from the Yellowknife and Inuvik conferences, negotiations became bogged down and drawn out, notably over the nature of aboriginal representation in the council and the scope of its sustainable development mandate. Compromises were made and agreement finally reached in August on a the wording of a draft political declaration. On 19 September, representatives of the eight Arctic member states and the three aboriginal permanent participants formally signed the *Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council* at an inauguration ceremony in Ottawa. Canada assumed the position of first chair and host of the Arctic Council secretariat located in Ottawa.
- 1997 — Senior Arctic officials met again in March to prepare for the June ministerial conference of the AEPS, which under the terms of the *Declaration* is to be incorporated within the Council. However, concerns are raised about sustaining momentum so that the Council becomes fully operational and able to move forward on a substantial work program during the period of Canada’s chairmanship.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Donat Pharand, “The Case for an Arctic Region Council and a Treaty Proposal,” *Revue générale de droit*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1992.



the original three permanent participant organizations. (This was the focus of a northern aboriginal consultation on the Arctic Council held in Ottawa in mid-April.) Following Ambassador Simon's appearance before the Committee on 30 April 1996, there were two further negotiating sessions of SAOs in Ottawa, in June and again on 5-6 August 1996, when the text of the *Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council* was finalized for ministerial approval. The *Declaration* was not made public until the signing ceremony and formal inauguration in Ottawa on 19 September 1996 (for the complete text, see Box 5), as announced by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy on 14 August 1996. However, a "backgrounder" released by the Government stated in summary that:

The Council, which will operate on the basis of consensus of its members, will meet at the ministerial level biannually. The Chair and the Secretariat of the Council will rotate concurrently every two years among the eight Arctic states, beginning with Canada in 1996. The main activities of the Council will focus on the existing programs established under the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and a new sustainable development program dealing with economic, social and cultural issues.

The Ottawa location for the founding conference and headquarters of the secretariat until 1998 could give rise to a problem of perception. While this location may appear the most logical and practical for conducting international diplomacy, the Committee was repeatedly told in its travels in the Canadian Arctic that the Council should not be another "southern-based" institution. Two NWT communities, Inuvik in the West and Iqaluit (the future Nunavut capital) in the East, made strong pitches to serve as the site of the Council. Inuvik's Aurora Research Institute went so far as to prepare a formal proposal to the Government outlining its case to "play a substantial role in Canada's hosting of the Arctic Council." As its director confidently told the Committee: "Collectively, we have the research and international development experience to take on the responsibility of coordinating Arctic Council affairs from our headquarters here in Inuvik." The Inuvik proposal received support from several aboriginal organizations in the region as well as other Arctic research centres. The Gwich'in Renewable Resource Board argued that: "We do not need another southern-based organization with a northern issues mandate." The director of the Calgary-based Arctic Institute of North America agreed that: "A northern location will guarantee closer contact with northern realities, and further raise the profile of indigenous northern organizations in the national policy process."

The counter to these arguments is that the Council must be cost-efficient (for example by benefiting from existing services within federal departments DFAIT, DIAND, and Environment) and able to operate effectively as an international organization made up of nation-states (for example through access to other capitals). Local rivalries (Inuvik versus Iqaluit) also complicate the case for an Arctic location. Nor will northerners' sense of grievance and suspicion of southern power centres be overcome simply through the

## **Box 5 — “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council”**

The representatives of the Governments of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the Arctic States) meeting in Ottawa;

Affirming our commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic, including recognition of the special relationship and unique contributions to the Arctic of indigenous people and their communities;

Affirming our commitment to sustainable development in the Arctic region, including economic and social development, improved health conditions and cultural well-being;

Affirming concurrently our commitment to the protection of the Arctic environment, including the health of Arctic ecosystems, maintenance of biodiversity in the Arctic region and conservation and sustainable use of natural resources;

Recognizing the contributions of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy to these commitments;

Recognizing the traditional knowledge of the indigenous people of the Arctic and their communities and taking note of its importance and that of Arctic science and research to the collective understanding of the circumpolar Arctic;

Desiring further to provide a means for promoting cooperative activities to address Arctic issues requiring circumpolar cooperation, and to ensure full consultation with and the full involvement of indigenous people and their communities and other inhabitants of the Arctic in such activities;

Recognizing the valuable contribution and support of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Saami Council, and the Association of the Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation in the development of the Arctic Council;

Desiring to provide for regular intergovernmental consideration of and consultation on Arctic issues.

Hereby declare:

1. The Arctic Council is established as a high level forum to:
  - (a) provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues,<sup>1</sup> in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.
  - (b) oversee and coordinate the programs established under the AEPS on the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); and Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR).
  - (c) adopt terms of reference for, and oversee and coordinate a sustainable development program.
  - (d) disseminate information, encourage education and promote interest in Arctic-related issues.



2. Members of the Arctic Council are: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America (the Arctic States).

The Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Saami Council and the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation are Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council. Permanent participation equally is open to other Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples<sup>2</sup> with majority Arctic indigenous constituency, representing:

- (a) a single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic State; or
- (b) more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state.

The determination that such an organization has met this criterion is to be made by decision of the Council. The number of Permanent Participants should at any time be less than the number of members.

The category of Permanent Participation is created to provide for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council.

3. Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to:
  - (a) non-Arctic states;
  - (b) intergovernmental and interparliamentary organizations, global and regional; and
  - (c) nongovernmental organizationsthat the Council determines can contribute to its work.
4. The Council should normally meet on a biennial basis, with meetings of senior officials taking place more frequently, to provide for liaison and co-ordination. Each Arctic State should designate a focal point on matters related to the Arctic Council.
5. Responsibility for hosting meetings of the Arctic Council, including provision of secretariat support functions, should rotate sequentially among the Arctic States.
6. The Arctic Council, as its first order of business, should adopt rules of procedure for its meetings and those of its working groups.
7. Decisions of the Arctic Council are to be by consensus of the Members.
8. The Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat established under AEPS is to continue under the framework of the Arctic Council.
9. The Arctic Council should regularly review the priorities and financing of its programs and associated structures.

Therefore, we, the undersigned representatives of our respective Governments, recognizing the Arctic Council's political significance and intending to promote its results, have signed this Declaration.

Signed by the representatives of the Arctic States in Ottawa, this 19th day of September 1996.

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<sup>1</sup> The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security.

<sup>2</sup> The use of the term "peoples" in this Declaration shall not be construed as having any implications as regard the rights which may attach to the term under international law.



symbolism of the site of a small secretariat.<sup>59</sup> Nonetheless, it will be particularly important for Canada, during the two years of its chairmanship of the Council, to affirm the role of Arctic Canadians in its work and establish meaningful communications between the Ottawa headquarters and our northern communities. The Aurora institute's director complained that northerners had had very little contact to date with the Circumpolar Ambassador. With the negotiations phase completed, Ambassador Simon, as the senior Canadian official responsible for coordination and liaison with the Council, will need to reach out to these communities as much as possible to make them feel included in the process.

The announcement that the Nunavut Secretariat office, which opened in Iqaluit on 30 November 1996, will house a "branch office" of the Arctic Council Secretariat is a positive step. We agree with Minister Axworthy's observation that: "Canada's work on the Council will benefit by its visibility in the Canadian Arctic."<sup>60</sup> While the intent has been signalled, a concerted effort will be needed to accomplish it. It is important that residents in all parts of the Canadian Arctic begin to feel more "plugged in" to the Arctic Council process. Consultations should be pursued with northern governments and aboriginal organizations as to the most cost-effective way of achieving this, perhaps using other federal administrative offices in key territorial centres — e.g. Whitehorse for the Yukon, Inuvik and Yellowknife for the NWT, and Kuujuaq for Nunavik (northern Quebec).

Canada must also beware of being prematurely satisfied with the mere fact of the Council's inauguration. Along with general support, international as well as domestic, for the idea of the Council, the Committee also heard some incisive criticisms. Oran Young noted that the 19 September *Declaration* "contains very few, if any, substantive commitments on the part of the signatories to take concrete action" [40:3]. He also expressed disappointment at what he saw as the quite narrow and conservative, top-down nature of the organization, compared to the functional flexibility of European regional bodies, for example. Dr. Young wondered whether there might be something to the scepticism with which foreign ministries viewed the Council as a way to recapture some of the action on Arctic issues which has been generated by the AEPS process. There is a real danger that the Council will be driven and dominated by calculations of interstate diplomacy rather than grounded in Arctic realities:

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<sup>59</sup> Kenneth Coates has observed that "inter-town rivalries are legendary across the North," which also suffers from an ingrained "culture of opposition . . . [that] has distracted northern attention from the construction of internal and external networks of support. Instead of pulling together to capitalize on the availability of limited resources, northern regions tend to engage in internal contests and struggles that ultimately make it easier for southern authorities, be they corporate or governmental, to skirt northern expectations and to exploit divisions within the region" ("The Discovery of the North" (1994), p. 27, 42.)

<sup>60</sup> "Nunavut Secretariat Office Opens in Iqaluit," Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development news release, Iqaluit, 30 November 1996, p. 2.

Although there is this provision for permanent participants, were I sitting in a small community in the Arctic and looking at this initiative, I'd be quite concerned, frankly, as to whether this initiative was going to be responsive or sensitive to the kinds of concerns uppermost in my mind. (. . .) A question in my mind is whether or not this Arctic Council process will be so dominated by foreign ministries with poor connections or relatively little experience in dealing with grassroots people that they will end up somewhat disenfranchised. [40:11, 17]

Yet since the Council represents an opportunity that is "simply too good to be missed . . . we have to take this rather limited, cautious, conservative first step and really do something with it. Here, of course, is where Canada's role is likely to loom very large as the first chair of the council" [40:4].

The extent of the challenge was indicated by the views of other international witnesses. Canada will have to manoeuvre very skillfully during the coming months when tackling a number of unsettled issues (for example, adding to the number of aboriginal permanent participants, observer roles, rules of procedure, integration of the AEPS within Council structures, and the nature of a sustainable development program). The United States may be a lukewarm joiner and lagging in its support for the AEPS, but clearly it can use its power to try to constrain and shape the agenda and process to its liking; Canada will have to work cooperatively to overcome this. Russian representatives will be looking for signs of material assistance to help them deal with their huge Arctic problems but funding commitments remain uncertain. Nordic country representatives have expressed concern that the Council should carefully carve out a useful niche that does not take anything away from their existing strong Arctic environmental initiatives. Norway in particular is sensitive as current chair of the AEPS process (due to be incorporated within that of the Council at the next ministerial meeting in June 1997 — see next section and Chapter Five).

During meetings held at the Scott Polar Research Institute at Cambridge University, David Scrivener of Keele University (and Secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Northern Waters and Arctic Study Group) offered a penetrating and frank perspective on what the Council founders face in this critical post-establishment period. He argued that there are still many tensions left over from some very difficult final negotiations last year, and that "intensive care" is required to bring the hopes for the Council to fruition in the transitional phase that Arctic cooperation has now entered. It remains an open question whether the Arctic Council will be able to add significant value to the work of existing circumpolar bodies such as the AEPS. As yet it is an empty vessel with no agreed program or working groups. David Scrivener advised that Canada should reassure Norway and others that it sees the Council structures as building organically on the forms of international cooperation that are already working reasonably well, and will not seek to reinvent them. If not, in his arresting phrase, the Council risks not being a "one-stop shop," but a "one-more stop shop" with little impact.



In short, Canada's early leadership on Arctic Council consolidation faces at least a two-fold challenge. Domestically, it must stress that this is not just a matter for a few people operating through privileged foreign affairs channels, but is meant to engage public concerns, especially those of Canadians living in the Arctic. Multilaterally, it is equally important to emphasize that this is not just a Canadian-sponsored initiative, but one that is meant to enhance international partnerships in the circumpolar concerns shared by the peoples of all member countries.

In light of these challenges:

#### **Recommendation 4**

**The Committee recommends that the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador consult with northern governments and aboriginal organizations on cost-effective means to link Arctic communities with Canada's activity at the level of the Arctic Council. In addition to and independantly from the office of the Secretariat serving Nunavut through Iqaluit, other permanent liaison offices could be established in the Yukon, NWT, and Nunavik in northern Quebec with continuing responsibility for channelling regular input from all of Canada's Arctic regions into the Ottawa-based structures. Consideration should also be given to having the Council's first ministerial conference in 1998 held in a Canadian Arctic community.**

#### **Recommendation 5**

**The Committee recommends that Canada, as chair of the Arctic Council Secretariat, collaborate closely with Council partners to ensure that Canadian ideas to consolidate the Council are tested multilaterally as well as domestically, and are therefore capable of attracting broad circumpolar support beyond the period of Canada's initial chairmanship.**

#### **Mandate**

The nongovernmental Arctic Council Panel's seminal framework report of 1991 declared that: "the ultimate mandate of an Arctic council should be to make the circumpolar region a domain of enhanced civility — an area in which aboriginal peoples enjoy their full rights, and where the governments that speak for southern majorities accord progressively greater respect to the natural environment, to one another, and, in particular, to aboriginal peoples."<sup>61</sup> This report put forward "principles of pan-Arctic cooperation" that were ambitiously comprehensive in scope — including longstanding

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<sup>61</sup> Cited in Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, *Canada and Circumpolar Cooperation* (1996), p. 25.



demilitarization and common security objectives, with which we will deal in the next chapter. In the interest of consensus and U.S. acceptance, the contentious security elements have been withdrawn from subsequent versions of the Council's mandate. The *Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council* includes a caveat that in tackling common Arctic issues "the Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to **military** security" (emphasis added). The restrictiveness of this formulation is open to interpretation. With agreement of the parties, there should be nothing to prevent some security issues not directly of a military nature from being put on a future Council agenda under the rubric of promoting peaceful cooperation.

In addition, notwithstanding U.S. and Russian national-security sensitivities, David Cox noted the close links that may exist between the cumulative impact of many years of military activities in the Arctic and important transboundary environmental issues such as the containment and cleanup of radioactive or other forms of contamination [21:9]. Oran Young's paper on "Arctic governance" prepared for the Yellowknife parliamentarians' conference had argued against trying to introduce ambiguous concepts such as "environmental security" into the Council agenda at this time. However, appearing before the Committee, Dr. Young conceded that "expanding the definition of security through notions of environmental security is probably the way to overcome the resistance of the United States, for example, to allowing security issues to be discussed in the council" [40:17]. Indeed, that appeared to be confirmed days earlier by the oral statement of the U.S. representative, Timothy Wirth, Undersecretary for Global Affairs, at the Council inauguration ceremony in Ottawa.

Mr. Wirth's remarks also underlined the need to link the Council's activities with global issues affecting the environment and human well-being. Hence, "we need to ensure that [the] Arctic Council will be a mechanism open to other nations and organizations that have active programs in or knowledge and experience of the Arctic. We need to be able to draw upon all available technical and scientific resources if we are to be able to effectively respond to those issues requiring region-wide cooperation. This is especially true given our understanding of the relationship between the Arctic and our global environment. We all have a stake in what happens in the Arctic." Canada's Lloyd Axworthy agreed that:

increasingly, Arctic issues are becoming global issues. The policies and practices of non-Arctic as well as Arctic governments directly affect the lives of northerners. Some of the pollution in the Arctic originates in countries that are far distant from it. And development in the Arctic has brought new international attention to the region. The Council must therefore be prepared to involve non-Arctic states and nongovernmental organizations in its deliberations and in its work.

A number of our witnesses observed that many environmental issues affecting the Arctic (for example, long-range pollutants) are not confined, or specific, to that region; therefore, the Council can only be one piece of a larger international policy matrix. Even in

regard to relations within the circumpolar regions, some worried that the Council could overshadow the less visible activities of more specialized bodies, both inter- and nongovernmental, which are already working on Arctic issues.<sup>62</sup> We acknowledge these concerns and reservations. In Chapter Five we will deal with the contribution that circumpolar cooperation can make to action on the global environmental issues as part of a post-UNCED agenda. In Chapter Ten, we will come back to the issues of multilateral coordination among diverse international bodies with specific Arctic interests. At this point, it is most important to frame and entrench the position of the Council itself, which, uniquely among these institutional actors, exists to unite all the circumpolar nations in a partnership with Arctic aboriginal peoples' organizations around a common vision.

Oran Young was persuasive in making the case to the Committee that:

one of the most fundamental contributions the Arctic Council can make really falls under this generative heading: trying to raise consciousness, to develop a vocabulary, to articulate a vision, so the Arctic becomes a visible, well-defined, well-understood region in the world on a circumpolar basis and we have a sense of participating in a common enterprise, we know what it's about, we know the vocabulary, we understand how to deal with these issues and how to develop an agenda of more concrete Arctic questions. . . . I believe in the discourse of Arctic cooperation sustainable development is really the overarching question. . . . it's the basic program. . . . We should be developing a sustainable development architecture, or framework or structure, to which everything else could then be related or connected. [40:4-5]

We believe that the Council's mandate, as well as its representative structures and processes (see next section), can accommodate the concerns of all parties under the rubric of *environmentally sustainable human development*. We note that Canada appears to have had some success in pushing for a relatively broad and open Council agenda. As was stated in the Government's press release of 14 August 1996 announcing the finalization of the Arctic Council Declaration, this accord will outline its "mandate to oversee a range of issues affecting the region, including environmental protection, economic and social development, improved health conditions and cultural well-being." Ambassador Simon was similarly expansive in describing to the Committee the Council's mission:

. . . to bring political focus to addressing the urgent issues affecting the circumpolar North. These issues go well beyond those related to the protection of the environment and include the economic development of northern regions, the utilization of renewable and non-renewable resources, circumpolar trade, the improvement of transportation and communication systems, the health and welfare of northern residents, tourism development and cultural exchange. [15:2]

It must be acknowledged, however, that it may be difficult to integrate goals of international environmental protection with those of northern economic development in

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<sup>62</sup> Refer to Box 3; cf. also David Scrivener, *Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic* (1996).



defining the Council's mandate. Minister Axworthy stated in his address at the 19 September inauguration: "The major challenge for the Arctic Council lies in promoting sustainable development in the North. . . . At the same time, we recognize that sustainable development remains an elusive objective." It is worth noting that Ambassador Simon reports jointly to the Minister of Indian and Northern Development (DIAND) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that both departments will jointly fund the first two years of the Council secretariat's operations. DIAND Assistant Deputy Minister Jack Stagg told the Committee's Arctic Council panel that, given the demographics of a young growing population in need of jobs, "The role of an Arctic council, if nothing else, should be to promote community economic development and wealth creation locally." He added that "an extremely important factor in achieving sustainable development in the circumpolar North is improvement in the socioeconomic conditions of the Russian North. Canada is in an excellent position to assist in this area" [15:6-7]. We will be addressing those specific economic dimensions of Arctic cooperation in Chapter Six and again in Part III.

Of course, Canada's Department of the Environment, whose Minister has the leading Canadian role within the AEPS, is also crucially involved in the Council's mandate. Minister Marchi and Minister Irwin both made statements at the Council's inauguration and, together with Minister Axworthy, represented the Government of Canada's position. With respect to the continuation of the work of the AEPS and implementation of the commitments reached at its last ministerial meeting, hosted by Canada in March 1996, Ambassador Simon reassured the Committee that the Council "will incorporate it [the AEPS] as a cornerstone and reinforce its objectives" [15:3]. How this will be done, however, was unclear and our subsequent discussions with experts in England and the Scandinavian countries suggest that it remains so.

A particular challenge is the appropriate bridge between the primary environmental protection goals and other elements of a comprehensive sustainable development agenda. Although the AEPS had created a "Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization" (TFSDU) in 1993, the Council was envisaged as adding its own new Arctic Sustainable Development Initiative (ASDI). Robert Huebert observes that the September 1996 *Declaration* omits mention of the TFSDU in mandating the Council to "oversee and coordinate" AEPS activities, while calling for an apparently separate, unspecified "sustainable development program."<sup>63</sup> It might be asked whether the AEPS processes ought not logically be brought within an encompassing sustainable development framework (as Oran Young suggests), since, in the words of Ambassador Simon:

Sustainable development is both a goal and integrating concept of the Arctic Council, to incorporate not only environmental protection but also the economic and social aspects of the Arctic agenda. (. . .) Sustainable development refers to planned

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<sup>63</sup> Robert Huebert, "The Arctic Council: Global and Domestic Governance" (1996), p. 8-9.



development that is clearly within the carrying capacity of the Arctic and global ecosystems. Such development must contribute to a safe and healthy environment, as well as safeguard the cultures of indigenous people and respect their fundamental rights, values and priorities. [15:2-3]

Notwithstanding such inclusive language, there may still be a problem of perception, as to whether the existence of the Council will shift the emphasis from the AEPS focus on *protecting* the Arctic environment to sustaining the *utilization* of Arctic resources for development. Prior to the Council's establishment, some worried that the perception of a two-track AEPS/ASDI approach would lead to such future misunderstandings and conflicts. David Scrivener noted that "U.S. environmentalist NGOs pressured Washington to ensure that Arctic cooperation's current focus [on the AEPS] would not be diluted in favour of economic development and sustainable utilization."<sup>64</sup> Some concerns also surfaced during the Committee panel that heard from Canadian environmental groups working on Arctic issues. Would environmental considerations continue to predominate within the Council's mandate? Sarah Climenhaga of the World Wildlife Fund argued that the founding declaration should outline integrating mechanisms to "ensure that sustainable development is not treated separately from environmental protection. . . We must be confident that the council will strengthen and clarify ongoing circumpolar efforts, such as the AEPS, not weaken them. We must be assured that sustainable development means development that sustains the Arctic environment and its peoples" [27:10, 12].

There is considerable work to be done in interpreting the real nature and scope of "sustainable development" as a mandate for the Council. In Chapter Five, we will be elaborating on this central concept and its applications for the purposes of circumpolar cooperation. At this point, what needs to be acknowledged is that tensions which emerged in the course of the negotiations on establishment will have to be dealt with.

As recently acknowledged by Ambassador Simon:

While the "Arctic 8" have agreed to establish the Council, many differences remain over its priorities and the pace of its work. Some countries want to forge ahead on establishing tight standards for environmental protection. Others see sustainable economic development as the priority. Forging a consensus on cooperation that does not merely reflect the lowest common denominator, the slowest ship in the convoy, will pose an ongoing challenge.<sup>65</sup>

In general, Canada has pushed for a broad and open agenda, while the U.S. favours a more explicit definition of Council objectives. Indeed, at the first meeting of Senior Arctic Officials in Oslo following the inauguration, the United States jumped in with its own

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<sup>64</sup> David Scrivener, *Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic* (1996), p. 24.

<sup>65</sup> Mary Simon, *"Building Partnerships"* (1996), p. 7.

document outlining sustainable development terms of reference and rules of procedure. That manoeuvre seemed to backfire, however. Rather than sitting back and waiting to react, Oran Young expressed the hope to the Committee that "Canada could take the lead in initiating the process. . . of identifying, thrashing out and negotiating a framework of sustainable development principles for the Arctic with counterparts from other countries" [40:6]. We noted earlier that Russia and the Euro-Arctic countries have been generally receptive to Canadian positions, though the former has perhaps a greater interest in the prospects for economic cooperation and assistance, while the Nordic member states are intent on carrying forward their leadership on environmental issues. In the months ahead, it will be especially important to cooperate closely with Norway, the current chair of the AEPS, to ensure a smooth transition that preserves all of its elements within the working out of the Council's mandate.

While arguments over institutional boundaries and mechanics, or over definitions of sustainable development, may quite legitimately preoccupy those involved in these international negotiations, there is a danger that this activity could become a substitute for action on the ground and that it might occupy officials while delaying getting down to business. Indeed, the visions of the Council's mandate that emerged from the Committee's travel in the Canadian Arctic had a markedly immediate and practical emphasis. There is, given the pressing needs and social problems of many northern residents, an understandable impatience with diplomatic initiatives unless they lead to direct, tangible benefits that will improve quality of life. Witnesses from aboriginal peoples' organizations, beginning with ICC President Rosemarie Kuptana, also stressed that the Council should give priority to issues affecting their rights and livelihoods. Indeed, in the international debate over environmentally sustainable development and resource utilization, indigenous groups have led the way in putting forward a substantive agenda for Arctic cooperation.<sup>66</sup>

Ambassador Simon, herself an Inuk, nonetheless acknowledged in an early Ottawa panel that Inuit had repeatedly questioned how an international organization could benefit them at the community level [15:19]. She suggested one area could be in promoting shared learning about social and environmental assessment processes for northern development (a point subsequently raised during meetings in Kuujuaq, northern Quebec, and in regard to the diamond mining proposals in the western and central Arctic.) During the same panel, Jack Stagg, of DIAND, had advised that the real challenge would be to get the Council "doing concrete things that quickly benefit those small communities. This is not to be some larger kind of international foreign policy forum. Those of us who worked towards it have seen it more as a practical forum and a tool that will mean something to

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<sup>66</sup> Robert Huebert observes that: "while the ICC has limited resources, it, and not any of the Arctic governments, has been responsible for the introduction of the principles of sustainable development into a circumpolar context" ("The Arctic Council: Global and Domestic Governance" (1996), p. 17). See also Chapters Five through Seven.



people in small communities in the various circumpolar regions” [15:18]. Franklyn Griffiths agreed that the Council would need to focus in order to show some results early on.

Oran Young, though advising that the Council should not attempt to start running existing programmatic activities like those of the AEPS working groups,<sup>67</sup> told the Committee that it should help to initiate concrete projects in the sustainable development area: “We need to do tangible, focussed, identifiable, useful things so that the Arctic Council is not just some kind of talk shop, allowing for very broad, general kinds of discussions, but is actually seen to be doing useful things” [40:5]. Gary Pেকেles, of McGill University’s Baffin health project, nevertheless summed up northern “wait and see” scepticism by remarking that it would be important to “minimize [the Council’s] uselessness” by curbing new bureaucratic/jurisdictional tendencies and instead stressing how it might support ongoing functional efforts to address Arctic problems.

In a later panel, an environment NGO witness suggested that the Council should concentrate only on areas where there is a strong international environmental consensus, leaving out controversial issues like the utilization of marine mammals (e.g. the harvesting of seals); however, this was definitely not the impression the Committee received during its Arctic trips. Aboriginal witnesses especially hoped the Council could be helpful in resolving matters such as the European Union’s regulations on wild fur imports, and other measures with extraterritorial effects which they regard as threatening their communities’ economic base, and impeding their progress towards self-determination. As Milton Freeman, of the Canadian Circumpolar Institute, argued: “The Arctic Council should include in its activities addressing legal questions in respect to U.S./EU trade-restrictive actions, and the human rights implications of EU and U.S. actions that adversely affect the rights of Arctic peoples to self-determination and security of livelihood” [Submission of 3 June 1996, p. 7].

In short, the challenge of working out the Arctic Council’s mandate reflects a complicated mixture of domestic and international considerations. It is essential that the conceptual framework be capable of accommodating the priority concerns of the entire circumpolar community, while reaching out to make global connections. We agree with Oran Young that Canada should lead here, and we think environmentally sustainable human development offers a sufficiently broad compass for orienting the Council’s goals. At the same time, the Committee recognizes that these goals must be translated quickly into concrete activities with benefits visible to Canadians in the Arctic. The mandate, no matter how cleverly articulated, will not work if the Council comes to be seen as another externally based organization far removed from the human populations most directly affected by Arctic problems.

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<sup>67</sup> See Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 59.



Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 6**

**The Committee recommends that Canada work closely with Arctic Council counterparts to ensure that the Council's formal mandate is carried out so as to integrate environmental protection with sustainable human development goals, without thereby jeopardizing existing AEPS activities. Canada should also interpret the mandate sufficiently broadly that any important issue affecting Arctic quality of life can be brought on to its agenda, even if this entails a lengthy process of consensus-building. In particular, matters affecting human security and prospects for peaceful cooperation within the circumpolar region should not be excluded from consideration over the longer term.**

In addition:

#### **Recommendation 7**

**The Committee recommends that, within Canada, the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador should lead in identifying concrete applications of the Arctic Council's sustainable development mandate, in order to advance Canadian Arctic interests. Furthermore, staff of this office and of the Arctic Council Secretariat should make it a priority to meet with residents of small northern communities to explore how the Council's mandate might be implemented most effectively to respond to their concerns.**

#### ***Representative Structures and Process***

The aspect of the Arctic Council that has been most celebrated, perhaps prematurely, is its hybrid inter- and extra-governmental structure of representation, whereby, "permanent participant" status is accorded not only to the eight member states, but also to the three largest indigenous peoples' organizations in the circumpolar Arctic: the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), the Saami Council, and the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (AKMNSSDV, R.F.). Ambassador Simon told the Committee that: "This level of participation is unique in international fora, where such groups are ordinarily observers and not participants. In this way the Arctic Council breaks new ground in creating a framework that allows those who are directly affected by Government policies, particularly indigenous peoples, to participate in the discussions of the issues that affect them and to influence the decision-making process among the member states" [15:2]. Franklyn Griffiths affirmed: "This is not going to be states talking among themselves while the people whose interests

they are deliberating on are far away. This is going to be an institution at which those people most directly affected and concerned will be at the table itself" [15:8]. Robert Huebert was equally strong in his endorsement.

That optimism should be tempered, however. First, having an aboriginal presence in this intergovernmental organization is more of an elaboration than a total innovation, since the ICC, Saami Council and AKMNSSDV, R.F. were already participating in the working bodies of the AEPS, which, although weakly institutionalized, managed to create an indigenous peoples' secretariat in 1993. Denmark has provided for this secretariat ever since, though it is currently headed by a Canadian, Chester Reimer, with whom the Committee met in Copenhagen and who expressed a more general concern about the level of Canadian support. As for the secretariat itself, the *Arctic Council Declaration* acknowledges its continuation; however future material support among Council members seems somewhat unclear. It is worth pointing out as well that formal aboriginal representation has been entrenched in the regional council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council linking the Nordic countries and Russia, one of the European bodies seen by Oran Young as having more creative flexibility in their operating structures. Dr. Young also observed that the chosen three founding aboriginal participants are themselves limited in their ability to speak for aboriginal interests: "They are high-level organizations that cover huge territories. They are manned, or staffed, by people who are often in the national capitals. It's very unclear to what extent these organizations are able successfully to reflect and represent the concerns of grassroots people" [40:18-19].

The Arctic Council's two-tier structure of member states and "permanent participants" (who are not "members" *per se* — see the text of the *Declaration*, Box 5) is in fact considerably weaker than the option preferred by the original Canadian Arctic Council Panel which was co-chaired by Franklyn Griffiths (see Box 4). That scenario envisaged putting representative delegations from the Arctic aboriginal peoples and the territorial governments on a more equal footing with those from the eight national governments.<sup>68</sup> Oran Young argued the merits of still trying to move closer to this model. As it stands, the Arctic Council will be run by the member governments, which alone have voting powers.

Ambassador Simon acknowledged to the Committee that: "One weakness in the Arctic Council could be if we shut out the northern organizations too much, because governments ultimately have the right to hold their own meetings. So we will have to be careful in terms of when we have closed-door sessions without the northern peoples involved" [15:15]. The actual text of the September 1996 *Declaration* provides for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council" (see Box 5, Clause 2). In a recent address, although contending that the Council represents a "solid step" in the direction of a "true partnership" between states and

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<sup>68</sup> Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, *Canada and Circumpolar Cooperation* (1996), p. 25.



indigenous peoples, she concedes that “the issue of indigeneous participation was very contentious, and to be honest, the final outcome was not completely satisfactory to the indigenous representatives at the negotiations. While they had hoped to gain as close to equal status as possible to member countries, there was resistance from some governments. The final results were, of course, a compromise.”<sup>69</sup>

Another key point delaying the Council’s start up was the issue of broadening aboriginal representation beyond the original three recognized organizations. The U.S. in particular pushed the case of the Alaskan Athabascan and Aleut native communities,<sup>70</sup> while in Canada, the ICC could not claim to speak for all northern native peoples. In mid-March 1996, the Dene Nation hosted a meeting which included representatives from Alaskan First Nations to discuss Arctic Council options. The Dene also prepared a summary report of the Northern Aboriginal Consultation on the Arctic Council held in Ottawa a month later, which stated: “The member countries have agreed in principle that equitable representation of indigenous peoples is necessary. The mechanism for admitting new permanent participants must now be developed.” Ambassador Simon subsequently confirmed to the Committee that: “As other indigenous organizations in Alaska, the western Arctic and the Russian Federation that are not represented by the existing three permanent participants have also expressed a desire to be part of the council, provision will be made for additional permanent participant seats in the council to accommodate them” [15:2]. The *Declaration* opens the door to “other Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples with majority indigenous constituency, representing: (a) a single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic state; or (b) more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state.”

How this will work in practice remains to be seen. It is left to the Council to determine eligibility and accession (presumably by consensus), with the proviso that the number of such permanent participants should always be fewer than the number of state members. Committee members who travelled to the western and central Canadian Arctic were reminded by witnesses such as Chief Bill Erasmus of the Dene Nation of the complexities of aboriginal representation in that region. Professor Gurston Dacks of the University of Alberta stressed the importance of getting this issue right. Gary Bohnet of the Metis Nation argued strongly for an expanded number of Council seats, and also for diverse aboriginal participation in Canada’s national delegation, with an advisory role for senior officials and the resources made available to facilitate such meetings. The Committee later heard a strong presentation in Ottawa from the Grand Council of Crees of northern Quebec advancing their case for Arctic Council recognition. Their Ambassador to the United

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<sup>69</sup> Mary Simon, “Building Partnerships” (1996), p. 5.

<sup>70</sup> David Scrivener points out that: “Although not organized transnationally, they exploit migratory species and live on both sides of the U.S. border with Canada and Russia, respectively.” (*Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic* (1996), p. 25)



Nations, Dr. Ted Moses, declared further that: "The establishment of the Arctic Council provides Canada and the indigenous peoples with an opportunity to begin a new relationship" [41:13]. However, the Quebec Crees would not appear to meet the criteria in the *Declaration* cited above.

The representation abroad of Canadian indigenous peoples could, moreover, be burdened by the legacy of unresolved "self-determination" claims.<sup>71</sup> Indeed, it is probably no coincidence that the *Arctic Council Declaration* includes a caveat that: "The use of the term 'peoples' in this *Declaration* shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law." Furthermore, it should not be assumed that aboriginal groups will necessarily share one view on key development issues. For example, with respect to the possible opening up parts of the U.S. Arctic wildlife refuge to hydrocarbon exploration, the Canadian Gwich'in are adamantly opposed to the idea, because of the threat they perceive to the Porcupine Caribou herd, while some Alaskan north slope native groups give it limited support.

Of course, there are also powerful interests at stake for non-aboriginal residents. For example, both Alaska and the Yukon have large non-native majorities, yet their governments will not have any formal standing within the Arctic Council. This may be where the Northern Forum could help to fill a gap. This association of subnational regional governments now has members from 10 countries, including 11 regions in Russia, though from Canada only the Yukon and the Province of Alberta are members. Indeed there may be greater interest from the Russian side than we sometimes detected in the Canadian North. The Forum, at its last assembly in Khanty-Mansiysk in Russia, passed a resolution requesting the Arctic Council to "consider the question of participation of the Northern Forum in further activity of the Arctic Council as a permanent observer. We believe that it is impossible to solve region-wide problems of the Arctic and the North without consolidation of joint efforts." When the Forum's Alaska Executive Director Stephen Cowper appeared before the Committee, he added:

We're finding now that there is an ongoing devolution of power in Government. . . Many of the decisions that were previously made at a federal level are being made, at least in part, by regional governments. That's a trend that probably is not going to stop. For that reason alone, we think it would be useful if the Arctic Council would allow the Northern Forum at least sufficient access to its proceedings to make our view known when it's necessary. [58:4]

The *Arctic Council Declaration* would open general "observer status" to a potentially wide range of others (states, intergovernmental and interparliamentary organizations, NGOs) "that the Council determines can contribute to its work." But according to Stephen

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<sup>71</sup> For example, within the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations. In addition to the testimony of the Crees, see that testimony of Rosemarie Kuptana [18:28-29]; also Russell Barsh, "The Aboriginal Issue in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-1994," *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, Fall 1995, p. 107-33. On "self-determination" principles as applied to Arctic indigenous peoples, see the paper prepared for the Committee by Joelle Martin, "Internal Self-Determination at International Law: Case Examples," May 1996.

Cowper, "It's a passive kind of role. Our members feel that the nature of our organization merits a little more status there." At the same time, he admitted to being aware that the U.S. government is not yet on side: "there's some resistance to having a higher level of participation in the Arctic Council proceedings" [58:4-5].

This example is just one indication that achieving "northern representation" will not be easy. Oran Young's governance background paper for the March 1996 Arctic Parliamentarians' Conference in Yellowknife contended that to be successful, the Arctic Council

must find a way to combine the interests of disparate groups of stakeholders, including states or national governments with their concerns for developing the region's oil and gas reserves and preserving ecosystems of interest to tourists and scientists and local communities scattered throughout the Circumpolar North with their intense concerns for maintaining traditional cultural practices and subsistence lifestyles. . . . Local residents show a marked tendency to view efforts to create multilateral regimes for the Arctic as irrelevant at best and as a source of serious threats to the viability of their way of life at worst.<sup>72</sup>

A further challenge, in Dr. Young's view, "centers on the need to establish feedback mechanisms that will prevent the Far North from being treated as a sacrifice zone by actors located in the mid-latitudes who neither know nor care about the consequences of their actions in the Circumpolar North. The arrangements currently under consideration to allow non-Arctic actors to participate as observers in the work of the Arctic Council are wholly inadequate to deal with this problem." Dr. Young elaborated on this before the Committee, arguing that:

There needs to be a mechanism — I'm not suggesting a legal mechanism like seats at some table for these organizations — such as a consultative process through which the users, the stakeholders, the identifiable human communities and groups that have long-term interests and stakes feel they have ready access to channels through which their concerns can be transmitted in a way in which they have confidence and trust. Given the structure that has emerged in the [Arctic Council] declaration, I see this as a very major challenge. [40:19]

Not only is effective aboriginal and northern representation crucial for the Council's legitimacy, it ought also to offer channels for interaction with wider public constituencies in the member countries.<sup>73</sup> In this regard, the role of elected representatives clearly needs further attention, and specifically that of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR), which has been a strong advocate for the AEPS and Arctic Council

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<sup>72</sup> Oran Young, "Arctic Governance: Meeting Challenges of Cooperation in the High Latitudes" (1996), p. 7 and 15.

<sup>73</sup> The issue of public participation and process was emphasized in the original vision developed by the Canadian Arctic Council Panel, which had called upon Ottawa "to include Canadians, above all Canada's aboriginal peoples, in the formation of its negotiation position on an Arctic Council . . . [the creation of which] must from the start be an exercise in public diplomacy if it is to be done right." (*To Establish an International Arctic Council: A Framework Report*, Ottawa (1991), p. 16.) It can be argued that this broader public dimension remains an unfulfilled promise of the Council initiative.



initiatives, yet has no formal status in either process. In the joint meeting of our Committee and the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, held to follow up the results from the Yellowknife and Inuvik conferences, this point was addressed by both the former and current parliamentary secretaries to the Minister of the Environment, Clifford Lincoln and Karen Kraft Sloan. Mr. Lincoln, Canadian representative on SCPAR, underlined the urgency of giving a more solid base to this parliamentary body and making it part of the component structure of the Arctic Council at the time of establishment [18:4-6]. Mrs. Kraft Sloan agreed: "It's necessary that there is a formal recognition of the role of parliamentarians vis-à-vis the Arctic Council, because that then makes it clear that something has to be done and we get the resources we need" [18:20]. Given the importance for Canadian foreign policy of the issues to be addressed by the Council, we believe that an effort should also be made to have a member of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade included as part of a strong Canadian representation within the SCPAR (see also Chapter Seven).

As noted in Chapter One, this parliamentary appeal exposed significant divergence, with ICC president Rosemarie Kuptana testifying in the same panel that, while a "close dialogue" with parliamentarians would be welcome, a formal status in the Council would not be appropriate: "I believe the interest of the general public can be met by the state representatives. There is also a category for observers, and perhaps this could be used by the standing committee if they wished to formally participate" [18:14]. Mr. Lincoln was unsatisfied with such a compromise, arguing that having a seat within the Council itself "would be a tremendous opportunity for the Arctic Council to get the support of parliamentarians from eight countries, who are . . . action-oriented, and who will be an independent voice in many ways. They'll be able to point out sometimes that the official policies may not really be what is best for the Arctic. At least it will add a little fire in what otherwise may be a very process-oriented council" [18:16]. Members from both committees spoke in favour of that approach, and the environment committee subsequently adopted a report in June 1996 which included recommendations to this effect.

The September 1996 *Arctic Council Declaration* allows simply for an observer status for interparliamentary organizations of a global or regional nature, although an accompanying "Joint Communiqué" by member countries does affirm that "Ministers welcomed the attendance of the Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region and looked forward to its future participation in the meetings of the Council." We believe that this limited opening needs to be widened and pursued further in the interest of the Council's own effective operation. As Oran Young pointedly advised the Committee:

. . . these initiatives or international agreements, which are signed by foreign ministers, or whoever signs them, are likely to remain paper operations or dead letters unless some real foundation of public or popular support is injected into them through the electoral process. . . . I also think the parliamentary channel is one that can be



important in making sure that certain voices that are often not heard very clearly in the more administrative hierarchy are heard. [40:24]

During discussions with counterparts in the Nordic countries and Russia, the Committee heard considerable support for strengthening the parliamentary dimension of the Council's work. In particular, Brigitta Dahl, Speaker of the Swedish Parliament, who had attended the Yellowknife conference, stressed this point. She suggested that an independent associated parliamentary body should be set up, perhaps on the model of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. In Moscow, Speaker Likhachev of the Federation Council argued that organizations, such as the Northern Forum and SCPAR, linking diverse regions and parliamentarians from those regions were important vehicles for promoting Arctic dialogues and expressing the mutual interests of peoples, not just of national governments. He had ambitions for a Council that would be proactive in undertaking environmental cooperation and economic assistance, as well as performing analytical and coordinating functions. In Helsinki, Guy Lindstrom, Secretary to SCPAR and head of the Finnish delegation to the Nordic Council, contended that having only observer status for parliamentary groups in the Arctic Council reflected governments' continued "old-fashioned" attitude. Moreover, parliamentarians should keep pressing foreign ministries and working to strengthen and flesh out the rather minimal nature of the Arctic Council as established, especially with respect to substantive action on sustainable economic development.

An earlier note of caution was raised with the Committee, however, by Milton Freeman of Edmonton's Circumpolar Institute, who observed:

Arctic/northern people are a minority in each of the Arctic Council nations (except Iceland perhaps) and they are a very diverse citizenry even within a given jurisdiction. . . . Many well-funded special interest groups in such urban centres as, e.g. Stockholm, Toronto, Vancouver, or Helsinki, support agendas quite at odds with people in Cambridge Bay, Old Crow, Kuujuaq or Iqaluit (and equivalent small communities in northern Norway, Greenland, Alaska, etc.) The problems that trappers and hunters in northern Canada and Greenland experience with the European Parliament or the International Whaling Commission (where urban interests predominate and parliamentary traditions prevail) should serve as a warning of what needs to be carefully thought through. [Submission of 3 June 1996, p. 1]

We agree that Arctic indigenous peoples need particular representative channels to ensure that their rights are respected and that their concerns receive prominent attention by the Arctic Council. However, the achievement of democratic approaches to the future development of the Arctic requires additional elements or representation in the public interest, an issue to which we will return to in Chapter Seven. As well, we believe that SCPAR representatives would prove to be sensitive to the perspectives of northern peoples — as was manifested by the Yellowknife conference in March 1996, in which

aboriginal spokespersons participated actively — and would not come to the Council table seeking to impose a “southern” agenda on the North.

Similarly, representatives of environmental NGOs who appeared before the Committee following its trips in northern Canada were very conscious of the need to bridge these barriers and past differences, referring to their efforts to work with aboriginal people. For Sarah Climenhaga of the World Wildlife Fund:

It is essential that all interested aboriginal groups be able to participate in the deliberations and decision-making processes of the Arctic Council.

With regard to observers, the declaration should establish criteria for observer status within the charter, and accreditation procedures should allow for the granting of permanent observer status to non-Arctic countries, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations that provide meaningful and constructive contributions to the process. . . . all interests must be welcome in an open process. [27:9-10, 12]

Kevin Jardine of Greenpeace made the point that “most of the environmental damage . . . [is] not caused by development in the Arctic itself. We have to start changing our behaviour here in the South to prevent that damage from occurring. . . . The Arctic Council has a unique role to play, because it’s not only representing the North; it’s also representing the South. . . . it’s not only an organization that can represent the interests of an area that has been very much affected by global environmental destruction, but it’s also made up of the very countries that are causing most of the problem”[27:15-17]. The sense of taking global responsibilities seriously in a circumpolar context was reflected at the Council inauguration in statements by Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy and U.S. Undersecretary of State Wirth.

Another issue of representation is that the Council must take full account of the interests of all of the member countries (including the United States), so that all will remain equally committed to the process. The opportunity for early Canadian leadership does not imply the imposition of a Canadian agenda. North American, European and Russian perspectives will have to be balanced, a view that was reinforced during our overseas meetings. In Oslo, Committee members were advised by Norway’s senior Arctic advisor, Ambassador Jon Bech, to keep a realistic perspective on the Council, which should focus on common objectives where it can do something differently and better than other bodies; it should not become a supranational entity that takes over from national jurisdictions or can be led by any one country.

In an earlier Ottawa panel, Dr. Gerald Lock of Edmonton observed that the Euro-Nordic group of countries are a majority in the Arctic Council (five of the eight member governments) but together represent only about 25-30% of the Arctic area. As a result of his experience with the regional board of the International Arctic Science



Committee, he suggested a tripartite structure in order to avoid any tendency to “Eurocentrism” and achieve balance: “For example, as we chair the Arctic Council, it might be prudent to appoint a vice-chair from Russia and a vice-chair from the Nordic countries and use that as an executive to ensure questions are dealt with in a fully circum-Arctic way before the agenda allows full discussions by the council” [20:4]. Borrowing from the inventive flexibility that Oran Young ascribed to European institutions, another suggestion would be to have a trio of countries involved in directing the Council’s administration over time, similar to the “troika” structure of the European Union’s rotating presidency. In other words, the immediate past and prospective chairing countries would share some of those responsibilities with the current chair.

In addition, the Council will need to establish practical working relationships with other multilateral arrangements that have Arctic-relevant mandates. According to Ambassador Simon, “The Arctic Council is designed to be an umbrella organization with a strong coordinating function.” It is supposed not to duplicate but rather “reinforce those initiatives and organizations that are already working to address and resolve Arctic issues and focus attention on areas where more cooperative efforts are needed” [15:3]. In carrying out this task, Oran Young suggested applying the principle of “subsidiarity,” which is well known in the European context: “That is to say, decisions about Arctic issues should be made at the lowest level at which the competence to make these decisions exists” [40:5]. Such a principle would no doubt be welcome by many regional governments and aboriginal groups in the circumpolar north, especially so as to avoid intrusion into their efforts to work out co-management arrangements for the sustainable development and utilization of Arctic resources based on locally determined values and needs.<sup>74</sup>

More generally, Dr. Young cautioned:

The only way we will have any hope of success is if we can somehow find a way to integrate these various initiatives into a coherent whole, perhaps with the Arctic Council as a sort of overarching framework, as a body that gives coherence to or helps with the integration of all of these other initiatives. But if it tries to set itself up in competition with or as an alternative to these bodies in some new initiative, my sense is that it will go nowhere. [40:23]

For example, in dealing with the critical issues of environmental contaminants in the North — a process that Dr. Jacques Grondin of Quebec’s Public Health Centre described as being sometimes frustrated because of duplicated or poorly coordinated efforts within Canada [47:16-18] — the Arctic Council should not develop its own separate initiative. Rather, it should first examine existing work in this area and identify competencies and areas where additional research and policy responses are needed; only then should it

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<sup>74</sup> On this question see also Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 31, and Chapter Ten.



bring the various communities, governments and other actors together in order to foster productive synergies. While other organizations are already working on Arctic contaminants, the Council, if properly constituted and directed, would uniquely be able to play a systemic, facilitating policy-related role, being the only comprehensive circumpolar body at the interstate level with a mandate to do so.

In other words, the Arctic Council, no matter how nominally representative, must avoid being perceived as an uninvited superstructural body that spends scarce energies and resources inventing more processes yet ends up taking more decisions out of the hands of the Arctic people and those working with them on solving Arctic problems. Instead, the Council's aim as a circumpolar institution must be to try to create an environment that empowers and enables the peoples of the Arctic to realize their aspirations. It is fair to say that the Committee encountered some scepticism about this, which will be important for the Council to overcome in its initial phase. As well, as David Scrivener has observed, "for some, the Council's gestation itself raised the spectre of the proliferation of overlapping and competing institutions." It will be crucial therefore for the Council to prove early on the value that is added by its unique circumpolar structure and process. Certainly, as David Scrivener affirms, the purpose is a valid one: "The existence of an Arctic Council could generate more effective channels through which to nurture the ability of the Arctic states to coordinate and concert their policies on issues affecting the Arctic in international forums not confined to the region. . . . In these cost-conscious days governments are keen to maximize the impact and efficiency of the various cooperative processes in the Arctic."<sup>75</sup>

In sum, beyond adequate representation of a broad range of Arctic interests, the Council will have to strive to achieve a functional coherence in implementing its mandate. Otherwise, it risks alienating the very constituencies it is supposed to help, while adding yet another layer of complexity to the existing jigsaw of organizations and transboundary arrangements within the Arctic region.

Accordingly:

### **Recommendation 8**

**The Committee recommends that the Government work to achieve inclusion, at the earliest possible date, of additional representation for Canadian aboriginal peoples' organizations based in the North, and for all northern residents through their regional governments (including that of Nunavik in Quebec) within the Arctic Council's formal structures. Interested aboriginal organizations that do not meet the current criteria for becoming permanent participants should in any event be granted early observer**

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<sup>75</sup> David Scrivener, *Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic* (1996), p. 28.

status. At a minimum, these groups and the subnational Arctic-region governments should be assured of some representation, in an official advisory capacity, in the development of Canada's positions on all Arctic Council matters.

Furthermore:

#### **Recommendation 9**

The Committee recommends that the Northern Forum, and the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, (which should include a representative from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade), be granted permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. As such, they should have the right to intervene in its deliberations on matters of special interest with the agreement of the Council's members and permanent participants. In addition, NGOs that have developed particular expertise in working on Arctic issues should be granted a consultative observer status with the Council.

Finally:

#### **Recommendation 10**

The Committee recommends that the Arctic Council beyond the first stage of incorporation of the AEPS be encouraged to develop an overall plan for coordinating circumpolar initiatives at the intergovernmental level and consolidating them where possible for consideration by the Council's first ministerial conference in 1998. Careful attention should also be given to establishing mutually supportive subsidiary linkages between the Council and other more specialized organizations working on transboundary Arctic issues.

#### ***Priority Objectives and Activities***

The Committee will be making recommendations in subsequent chapters on specific elements of circumpolar cooperation, including those possible through the Arctic Council. We think it is important, however, to signal the kinds of things on which the Council could work beyond matters of structure and process. As noted earlier, at our first Ottawa panel, witnesses stressed that the Council could not afford to be perceived as just another forum for endless talk among international officials; it would have to resolve to take action quickly on issues of direct concern to northern peoples.



In her testimony, Rosemarie Kuptana, President of the ICC, which will occupy one of the Council's permanent participant seats, indicated that its agenda would be to maintain support for AEPS programs (e.g. research on contaminants affecting Inuit health) while beginning new work to promote sustainable development that might affect the future economic base of Arctic communities.

ICC wishes to work on strategies for the revitalization of the Inuit sealing industry, its harvesting and marketing of marine mammal products in general. . . . The Arctic Council could also be an important forum for coordinating cultural exchanges and exchanging information and views on a wide range of social and economic issues. . . . [It] provides an opportunity for the circumpolar nations to establish a model of partnership and cooperation with indigenous peoples on the most vital northern policy issues." [18:27]

Suggested areas in that regard included learning from models of resource co-management and native self-government and developing appropriate guidelines for northern development projects and for increased tourism.

Other aboriginal spokespersons also emphasized issues affecting well-being and livelihood. For example, in Yellowknife, Gary Bohnet of the Metis Nation submitted that "the evolution of circumpolar relations and international cooperation requires that aboriginal trappers and commercial wildlife harvesters have free markets to support their traditional livelihoods and thereby maintain aboriginal cultural survival and obtain economic independence. The Arctic Council can promote the environmental importance of trapping as well as free international trade with other circumpolar countries." The Inuit of the eastern Arctic felt equally strongly about the importance of enhancing free movement of northern products and peoples. Kevin Knight of Unaaq International and Don Axford of the Canadian Inuit Business Development Council argued that current international trade agreements and regional blocs such as NAFTA and the European Union should be examined in this light [20:17-18]. Beyond that, Gerald Lock proposed that the Arctic Council "should explore an Arctic free trade agreement" [20:5]. David Malcolm of Inuvik's Aurora Research Institute advised that "Canada should use the Arctic Council opportunity to build circumpolar marketing networks, so that circumpolar northerners can easily trade with each other, without having to rely on southern products with inadequate specifications for northern conditions" [Submission of 28 May 1996, p. 4].

Northern research institutes saw the Arctic Council as needing to become directly engaged in efforts promising clear benefits to northern residents, such as resource management; sustainable economic development and trade; environmental science and anti-pollution measures; applied research and development; health and education cooperation; and improved communications and transport networks. In Calgary, the Arctic Institute of North America put forward as four initial priority objectives: "circumpolar



promotion of the process of co-management by regional land claims co-management boards” (possibly an annual conference to discuss practical issues of administration and delivery); “circumpolar action on air and water borne contaminants” (including promotion of international pollution standards); “circumpolar development of sustainable tourism guidelines that focus on the preservation of the traditional land-based economy. . .”; and “constructive circumpolar opposition to the European fur ban” (including support for efforts “to find humane trapping methods and to train a new generation of trappers”) [Submission of Michael Robinson, 31 May 1996].

In several Committee roundtables, northern studies experts from Laval University in Quebec City, McGill University and University of Montreal stressed the value of cooperative educational and scientific exchanges with those in other countries working on common Arctic problems. The Arctic Council could be of real service by supporting circumpolar progress in building up and disseminating relevant knowledge — not only technical but also more broadly social and cultural. In effect, how can the Council really assist those who are trying to build healthy, environmentally responsible and economically sustainable communities across the circumpolar region? Oran Young mentioned moving on items such as technical assistance, skills development, and resources for local investment, especially targeted to indigenous people, as well as giving consideration to more environmentally protected areas. He also advised that “we need to think carefully about fostering a dialogue between the world of research and the world of policy, the world of science and the world of practice. . . . [and] within the context of the Arctic Council, about how to make mutually beneficial links between the scientific or the research community, including those who are concerned with traditional ecological knowledge, and the world of policy” [40:5-6].

Given that the AEPS is to be brought within the Arctic Council’s mandate, environmental issues will obviously have a high priority, both short and long term. But there are numerous questions to be worked out. How, for example, will the Council, established through a non-binding political declaration, be able to move from simply acknowledging the problems to taking joint remedial actions, as a number of those we met in Russia and the Nordic countries hope? Is it feasible that the Council might eventually oversee compliance with multilateral standards? Robert Huebert observed that to date “the two major focusses of the AEPS have been on the examination of existing international cooperative measures and how bad the problem is. The question now that will be facing the Arctic Council is what steps will be taken?” He suggested that global trends towards deregulation and privatization could make it more difficult to negotiate an effective international environmental regime for the Arctic [15:13].

However Stephen Cowper of the Northern Forum, argued that, from a practical business perspective, “It’s important that there be a consistent set of environmental standards for development in the Arctic. It is not in anybody’s interest to have a competitive

resource development situation where the key variable . . . is that one of the countries doesn't have any environmental safeguards. . . . that is, I believe, one of the most important subjects to be tackled by the Arctic Council." He went on to highlight "the subject of the proper disposal of nuclear waste, much of which is in the Arctic region," as a priority activity for the Arctic Council [58:10].

Clearly, the creation of an environmentally sustainable basis for circumpolar economic development must be a Canadian priority. The Committee was therefore pleased by Minister Irwin's statement at the September 1996 inauguration that "as a first activity of the Council, Canada proposes an international conference on Arctic Sustainable Development be held in 1997 . . . [that] would bring together a wide range of Arctic stakeholders from Government, nongovernmental organizations, and, in particular, practitioners of business development." At the same time, as already discussed, the approach should at all times integrate environmental protection into the sustainable development program.

Ambassador Simon referred in her testimony to the AEPS-initiated "report card" on the state of the Arctic environment, due to be released in 1997, and indicated that follow-up action by the Council with respect to Arctic sustainable development "could be seen as a regional implementation of Agenda 21" (the UN program of action agreed to in 1992 at the Rio Conference on Environment and Development, but which did not specifically target the Arctic) [15:32]. Milton Freeman, of Edmonton's Circumpolar Institute, cautioned, however, against expecting the Council to evolve into a powerful enforcer of multilateral environmental standards: "In the present era of downsizing Government, the Arctic Council will likely have to be quite minimalist as an organization . . . and to fully respect national traditions and differences. . ." [Submission of 3 June 1996, p. 4]. He advised more modest steps such as replicating the successful model of the international polar bear treaty, or working through existing bodies like the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission.

Witnesses representing environmental NGOs, on the other hand, wanted to see an Arctic Council backed up by the political resolve to address the Arctic environment in a comprehensive way. Kevin Jardine of Greenpeace outlined the many destructive effects of the release of greenhouse gases contributing to global warming (for example, forest fire and insect outbreaks, sea ice and shoreline erosion, and permafrost degradation). Louise Comeau of the Sierra Club urged fast action by the Council to have Arctic interests included in the global negotiations towards a framework convention on climate change: "If the Council waits until the Arctic monitoring and assessment program releases its state of the environment report in early 1997, it may be too late" [27:7]. Sarah Climenhaga of the World Wildlife Fund highlighted work on a circumpolar protected areas network; mechanisms for incorporating the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and utilization of "quality of life" rather than more conventional economic indicators of development; adequate environmental assessment procedures (notably for mining, oil



and gas, and forestry projects); circumpolar guidelines for eco-tourism; strengthening of international environmental laws (e.g. the marine pollution convention, MARPOL, “taking into account the increasing shipping traffic in the Arctic,”<sup>76</sup> and implementation of the Law of the Sea provisions) [27:9-11].

Clearly, there is no shortage of challenging items on the “menu.” A 1995 Canadian Government position paper had foreseen the working groups of the Arctic Council tackling over the longer term, in addition to an expansive environmental protection agenda, a whole series of issues such as sustainable economic development, social and cultural development, emergency measures, and science and technology. Beyond continuing the current work of the AEPS, a long list of “substantive priorities for the Council’s initial period” was also identified:

- management and development of renewable resources;
- promotion of circumpolar trade;
- development of Arctic transportation and communications systems;
- fostering of cultural exchanges among northerners, especially indigenous peoples;
- improvement of social services, including circumpolar health care and housing;
- management and development of non-renewable resources;
- review of Arctic institutions and programs; and
- consolidation and coordination of national and regional emergency preparedness and response systems<sup>77</sup>

While all of the above can be seen as important to the Arctic quality of life, it is difficult to imagine a small organization dependent on goodwill and consensus simultaneously taking on so many of “priorities” at least without being very selective about where it would focus its energies. Even before an action agenda can be determined, the Arctic Council Ministers’ “Joint Communiqué” of the September 1996 inauguration identified as the Council’s “initial priority tasks” such basic matters as developing rules of procedure, terms of reference for its sustainable development program, and effective incorporation of the AEPS.

In short, the Arctic Council will probably have to trim advocates’ ambitions in order to be effective in making a difference on at least a few issues. We believe that Canada should

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<sup>76</sup> Related to that prospect, former Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker captain Patrick Toomey told the Committee: “The Arctic nations . . . must be prepared to supervise and assist such polar ocean navigation by the harmonization of standards with competency in ice navigation for the navigators and by the standardization of ice classification for ships . . . There must be a means of enforcement of these international rules” [20:2]. On the Council’s potential role in the application of international conventions to Arctic marine transportation, see also Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 57.

<sup>77</sup> “The Arctic Council: Objectives, Structure and Program Priorities,” Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, internal working document, Ottawa, May 1995, p. 15-16 and Annex C.



be proactive in working to establish early consensus on a short list of key objectives and activities. Canada has a window of opportunity as the founding chair to make good on Oran Young's challenging affirmation to the Committee that "beyond the signing of the *Declaration*, Canada is in a unique position to work out a really well-defined proposal about the roles the Council can and should play" [40:6].

Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 11**

**The Committee recommends that Canada use the two-year period of its initial chairmanship of the Arctic Council and hosting of its secretariat to build consensus on a manageable short-term work program, starting with the commitments already agreed to by the eight Arctic states in the Inuvik AEPS declaration of March 1996 (see Chapter Five). Following up the release of the AEPS state of the environment report in 1997, the Government should work closely within Canada with aboriginal peoples and other northern residents to establish the most urgent priorities for international environmental action (for example, the issue of contaminants affecting health). Canada should put forward concrete proposals in these areas to the Council's 1998 ministerial conference.**

In addition:

#### **Recommendation 12**

**The Committee recommends that the Government use the proposed conference on Arctic sustainable development to further the integration of environmental and economic development objectives within the Arctic Council's mandate. Canadian officials should also work closely with northern constituencies to identify priority activities related to sustainable community economic development, and especially to create opportunities for a growing aboriginal population, where international action is required (e.g. dealing with trade barriers, improving transnational communications and transport links). During the remaining period of Canada's chairmanship and beyond, Canadian energies should be focussed on encouraging the Arctic Council to deal with such issues, which are of greatest practical concern to our northern citizens.**

#### ***Funding and Political Support***

Without significant resources and political commitments from the member governments, the Arctic Council could end up as a rather empty shell — periodically

issuing fine declarations of intent but not actually able to do much for the well-being of the environment and peoples of the circumpolar region. The Council could inherit the weaknesses of the AEPS and its working groups, which depend on a patchwork of voluntary contributions and have had to weather several funding crises. The worry, as expressed by David Scrivener, is that the prospect of adding new Council mechanisms on to this "shoestring" operation has simply "reinforced the long-standing reluctance of governments to assume major financial commitments in Arctic environmental cooperation."<sup>78</sup> More generally, a number of people told the Committee that, while resources for the Council's own organization did not have to be large, it would be desirable to put the Council's activities on a more substantial and secure foundation.

The 1995 internal Canadian Government working paper on setting up the Council appropriately devoted considerable attention to funding issues. It recommended that the Council give priority to programs that "have received an offer from a Member to accept lead responsibility and for which necessary financial support has been identified; and are feasible within the available resource base and time frame." The paper accepted that "basic funding" of the Council secretariat would be the responsibility of the host country, while proposing a mix of voluntary contributions and "burden-sharing" arrangements for other activities. There would be established a "common fund, based on an agreed cost-sharing formula, to support common program initiatives." As well, functional components, such as the work of the indigenous peoples' secretariat, would be among "the most obvious candidates for cost-sharing."<sup>79</sup> However, other countries did not demonstrate much enthusiasm in that direction, with David Scrivener observing that: "The idea of common funding was dropped in the face of U.S. opposition which masked a widely shared reluctance to assume new financial commitments."<sup>80</sup> Indeed, as Ambassador Simon bluntly acknowledged in recent remarks:

These days governments, including Canada's, are extremely reluctant to agree to setting up new bodies that will place demands on time and resources. . . . The Council itself will not be endowed with more than a modest budget to operate a secretariat and other maintenance functions. It will be up to the member governments to commit to spending on agreed activities.<sup>81</sup>

In earlier testimony to the Committee, Mary Simon, as Canada's Ambassador to the Council, had indicated that Canada's hosting of the secretariat through 1998 would entail a very modest commitment of resources from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Indian and Northern Affairs. In addition to providing a few core staff, DIAND would supply about

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<sup>78</sup> David Scrivener, *Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic* (1996), p. 17ff.

<sup>79</sup> DFAIT and DIAND, "The Arctic Council" (1996), p. 12-15.

<sup>80</sup> David Scrivener, *Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic* (1996), p. 24.

<sup>81</sup> Mary Simon, "Building Partnerships" (1996), p. 2 and 7.



\$275,000 for operational and maintenance funding over the two years, and DFAIT would pick up office space and common user costs. An article in *The Economist* on the Council's Ottawa inauguration put the total cost to Canada at \$900,000.<sup>82</sup> That is not a large sum for an international organization whose members include three of the world's four largest countries; in fact it is rather less than what Canada alone has been spending on the little-known Canadian Polar Commission. (The latter's annual budget came in for some pointed criticism during the Committee's Arctic travels. Given the pressures on governments to get the best value for money, former GNWT leader Nellie Cournoyea even recommended in Inuvik that funding now allocated to the Commission "be redirected through the Arctic Council to [do] research in the North."<sup>83</sup> We will return to the question of how best to utilize the Commission's role in Chapter Eight.)

As previously noted, some witnesses were concerned about the low level of resources being devoted to the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador and the functioning of the Arctic Council secretariat, given the size of their mandates and responsibilities. There was a feeling that their capacities should be strengthened, possibly through a consolidation of some existing Government spending on Arctic and circumpolar affairs. As well, aboriginal spokespersons sought assurance of adequate support for their full participation in Canadian foreign policy development and Arctic Council activities. None of this means that the advent of the Council should result in a circumpolar bureaucratic empire, only that it should be undertaken as a serious, if economical, operation.<sup>84</sup>

Organization and funding are linked to political support. That is another reason why the first two years under Canada's chairmanship are so critical. If the Council can show enough early promise of being able to do an effective job on a few issues of importance to Canadians, and northern Canadians especially, it will have a strong case for increased and sustained Canadian funding. Of course, Canada cannot be just a one-man band; there will have to be a work program that convinces other Council partners, and perhaps in particular the U.S. — with whom we have the closest relationship of any Arctic Council country — that it is worth supporting materially and not merely on paper.

The Council's inauguration, long sought by Canada, is an achievement in itself. But the first real test, under Canada's watch, will be whether the first substantive ministerial

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<sup>82</sup> "Hands across the Ice," *The Economist*, 21 September 1996, p. 48.

<sup>83</sup> Submission of 28 May 1996, p. 2. The Commission also seemed to have lost the support of the Dene Nation in the NWT. ("Dene Want Polar Panel Disbanded," *Montreal Gazette*, 19 September 1996.)

<sup>84</sup> Oran Young argues that the Arctic Council should "not require a large or elaborate organizational apparatus of its own to administer its operations. Nonetheless, a modest permanent secretariat would serve the Council well. Experience in other areas has made it clear that small and efficient secretariats can play a variety of constructive roles in maintaining and enhancing international cooperation that go well beyond the technical tasks without overstepping the bounds of what is appropriate for administrative bodies," (*The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 58-9).



conference scheduled for 1998 can deliver on a clear action-oriented program that is backed by political resolve and solid funding from the Council's members.

Accordingly:

### **Recommendation 13**

**The Committee recommends that the Government review existing resources for federal circumpolar initiatives at the national, bilateral and multilateral levels in order to identify any that might more effectively be consolidated under the aegis of the Circumpolar Ambassador and through Canada's participation in the Arctic Council. Canada should also take the early lead in exploring long-term funding and administrative support for the Council's operations with other Arctic governments, as well as with aboriginal participants and observer organizations. Finally, the Arctic Council secretariat should identify potential program areas for circumpolar cooperation (for example, encouraging utilization of environmentally superior technologies, trade promotion, training and business development) where the financial participation by private-sector partners might be appropriate within the Council's overall sustainable human development mandate.**

# **PART II**

## **ADVANCING CIRCUMPOLAR PRIORITIES: CANADIAN INTERESTS AND GOALS**





## CHAPTER 4 — POST-COLD WAR COOPERATION IN THE ARCTIC: FROM INTERSTATE CONFLICT TO NEW AGENDAS FOR SECURITY

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In the past, the circumpolar Arctic was dominated by defence needs—a policy arena in which Canada played only a minor role. Today this region is emerging as a venue in which all facets of foreign policy can be exercised, if we have sufficient imagination. Sustainable development and environmental security promise to be the policy touchstones in the circumpolar Arctic well into the next century.

“Sovereignty, Security, and Surveillance in the Arctic”<sup>85</sup>

The key difference between then and now is that there are no enemies to confront across the artificial “East-West divide” in the Arctic, which again was largely a creation — and now a legacy — of the Cold War. The old threat perceptions having become more or less redundant, the dividing line between military security and civil security is much less blurred now than it could ever be during the Cold War.

Sanjay Chaturvedi<sup>86</sup>

### ***Arctic Security in Transition between Past and Future***

Security concerns have traditionally focussed on the protection of nation-states and their sovereignty; “security” was commonly seen as synonymous with “defence,” resulting in a focus on military-technical considerations.<sup>87</sup> In the Arctic, security concerns during the Cold War focussed on the region’s location between the superpowers, with the Soviet Union basing its most powerful ballistic missile submarine forces on the largely ice-free Kola peninsula near Norway, and the U.S. seeing the region as a “northern flank” to be defended through an aggressive Maritime Strategy. As Dr. John Heap of Cambridge University’s Scott Polar Research Institute put it to the Committee, a “superpower permafrost” covered the region. The end of the Cold War has resulted in revolutionary

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<sup>85</sup> Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, editorial essay on the 1994 parliamentary foreign policy and defence reviews, *Northern Perspectives*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, p. 1.

<sup>86</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, “The Post-Cold War Arctic: International Cooperation and Dispute Management,” in *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 173.

<sup>87</sup> Franklyn Griffiths, “Defence, Security and Civility in the Arctic Region,” in *Arctic Challenges: Report from the Nordic Council’s Arctic Parliamentary Conference in Reykjavik, August 1993*, p. 135-136.

changes in the international security situation, which have had important implications for the Arctic as a region. The most obvious and of these changes has been the end of the global military confrontation between the United States and Russia, but the deeper change has been a rethinking of the nature of security. Discussions of security should now focus on the political more than the military aspects of the relations between states, and the past several years have seen a broadened understanding which recognizes these non-military factors.

Following wide-ranging public hearings in 1994, the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy called for “a broader concept of security.”<sup>88</sup> The Government agreed, and in its February 1995 foreign policy statement *Canada in the World*, developed the concept of “shared human security,” adding:

This demands a broadening of the focus of security policy from its narrow orientation of managing state-to-state relationships, to one that recognises the importance of the individual and society for our shared security. . . There is consensus that such a broader orientation can best be achieved — at least cost, and to best effect — through approaches that broaden the response to security issues beyond military options and focus on promoting international cooperation, building stability and on preventing conflict.<sup>89</sup>

On the issue of security in the Arctic region, the statement said:

The focus in the Canadian Arctic is increasingly on non-traditional security threats. Canada’s recent appointment of an Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs will increase the focus on such threats. Our goal is to create an Arctic Council to meet the challenge of sustainable development in the North and to deal with the critical issues faced by all Arctic countries.<sup>90</sup>

The Arctic Council has now been created, but it cannot address the continuing traditional security concerns, which, while less important than before, must be confronted if the Arctic states are to be able to move on to broader security agendas. U.S. opposition to discussions of military security in the Arctic was a major factor in the American hesitation about participating in an Arctic Council; at American insistence the Council’s founding declaration specifies that “The Arctic Council should not deal with issues of military security.” This does not mean it cannot help advance regional security, however. As Oran Young told the Committee:

The United States, at least in its public position, is very explicit in saying that security issues should not be on the Arctic Council agenda. I wouldn’t over-interpret that

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<sup>88</sup> *Canada’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future*, November 1994, p. 11.

<sup>89</sup> *Canada and the World*, Ottawa, February 1995, p. 25.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.



though. It's not easy to definitively separate issues. As you begin to talk about concrete, substantive issues, the security aspect of these issues often arises. I suspect there may be ways of drawing the United States into some discussions involving security questions without publicly saying that's what is happening. [40:13-14]

Given the broader interpretation of security increasingly being accepted by all governments, the Arctic Council can help address such "modern" security issues as military-related contamination of the region. By helping build confidence between the United States and Russia, the Council can also indirectly help prepare the way for any future bilateral or multilateral discussions of military security issues and thereby enhance the prospects for such discussions.

Canadian strategic analyst Peter Gizewski argued several years ago that:

It is time for the nations of the Arctic to adopt a circumpolar perspective on Arctic security. This is based on the belief that today there are common regional interests among the eight Arctic states and the people living in them, and that all circumpolar nations, not just the United States and Russia, have a responsibility for ensuring the peaceful development of the region. Crucial to this development is a recognition that the concept of security encompasses not only military, but social, economic and, indeed, environmental dimensions as well. With the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia must once and for all adapt military activities to the new political realities. The Arctic must no longer play host to military activity based on the logic of a bygone era. Not only are the military threats too low, but the environmental risks may well be too high.<sup>91</sup>

Notwithstanding the uncertainties during the Cold War transitions and tensions over such issues as NATO enlargement, the fact that political relations among all eight Arctic states remain peaceful and reasonably stable provides the positive context for moving forward on cooperative security approaches. The Arctic states are now all members of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As Kari Möttölä of the Finnish Foreign Ministry pointed out in a background paper prepared for the Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, held in Yellowknife in 1996, this means they have already agreed to help develop "a common space of comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible security" on their territory. They have also agreed to continue to respect the non-use of force as a basic norm in international security; not to pursue their national security interests at the expense of other states; not to create spheres of influence or privileged or grey zones of security; and to adopt new cooperative security principles based on guidelines such as the sufficiency rule for defence capabilities, the democratic political control of armed forces, and the observance of international humanitarian law in

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<sup>91</sup> "Military Activity and Environmental Security: The Case of Radioactivity in the Arctic," in Joan Debardeleben and John Hannigan, eds., *Environmental Security in a Post-Communist World*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1994, p. 37.



the internal and external use of armed forces.<sup>92</sup> More generally, in Mr. Möttölä's opinion, the states should focus on the promotion of stability, including the transition to democracy and a market economy in Russia; the development of measures and mechanisms for conflict management; and military-strategic stability through transparency, openness and arms control. In Helsinki, Möttölä's co-author, Lt. Colonel Arto Nokkola, of the Tampere Peace Research Institute, underlined to the Committee the need to address critical socio-economic concerns as well as the environmental situation in northern Russia, particularly in the Murmansk region of the Kola peninsula, as part of a circumpolar partnership for peace. The message more generally is that through such forms of multilateral cooperation each nation's security in the international Arctic can be advanced.

### ***Reviewing Canada's Arctic "Sovereignty and Security" in a Circumpolar Context***

Now that the multilateral environment has been transformed, Canada needs to rethink and adjust its own strategic policies in the Arctic. In the post-war period, successive Canadian governments viewed Arctic defence and security issues within the confined framework of the Cold War. Change was not easily accepted. Canada expressed "serious reservations" about President Gorbachev's 1987 Murmansk initiative, and the Canadian Government always rejected the idea of Arctic-specific arms control measures, arguing that the threat was global rather than regional. As David Cox told the Committee,

I think it is fair to say that throughout the Cold War Canada also saw the Arctic not as a region of concern but primarily as a set of activities — talking in security terms — which were a part of the east-west confrontation and therefore had to be dealt with in terms of the main negotiations east-west, those being the nuclear disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and the discussions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. [21:7]

Sovereignty and security issues have traditionally been closely linked. In the Canadian Arctic, the United States has been, paradoxically, a close partner with Canada on defence issues but its only significant challenger on sovereignty issues. Through the NORAD and other agreements, Canada and the United States have cooperated in the defence of North America for almost four decades. Military construction during and after World War II brought many changes to the Canadian Arctic and raised the issue of Canadian sovereignty, which was emphasized in the Canadian Defence White Paper of 1971. In 1985, Canada and the United States agreed to upgrade radar coverage in the North through the construction of the North Warning System across northern Canada. The mid-1980s saw another wave of interest in sovereignty and security in the North, culminating in the 1987 defence White Paper *Challenge and Commitment*.

Following the transit of the American Coast Guard vessel *Polar Sea* through the Northwest Passage, in 1986 the Government declared "straight baselines" around the

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<sup>92</sup> Kari Möttölä and Arto Nokkola, *Political and Military Aspects of Security in the Arctic*, paper prepared for the Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Yellowknife, March 1996.

edges of Canada's Arctic archipelago and announced a mixture of military and civilian programs to increase both Canadian sovereignty *and* security in the Arctic. These included a polar class 8 icebreakers capable of year-round operation in Arctic waters; the purchase of some 12 nuclear-powered submarines capable of spending long periods under the Arctic ice; five Forward Operating Locations for fighter aircraft, and the establishment of a northern training centre for the Canadian Forces; and a Sub-surface Surveillance System to be installed at strategic choke points in the Arctic. In 1988, Canada and the United States entered into an Arctic Cooperation Agreement (the so-called "Icebreaker Agreement") under which future transits of U.S. icebreakers through the waters of the Arctic archipelago would be made with Canada's consent, although a non-prejudice clause also meant that neither state had changed its original position. The end of the Cold War and budget reductions resulted in the cancellation of such projects as the nuclear submarines and the polar class icebreaker, while others, such as the Forward Operating Locations, were reduced in number. On Canada's initiative, Canada and the United States also agreed in early 1994 to end the testing of U.S. cruise missiles in northern Canada.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Canadian Government has continued most of its sovereignty and defence policies in the Arctic, although they have received less attention in Canada's foreign policy than have cooperative regional issues such as the establishment of the Arctic Council. Ongoing Canadian Forces operations and capabilities in the Arctic are defensive and modest and include: the operation on behalf of Canada and the United States of the largely automated North Warning System at a reduced level of readiness; the Ranger program; sovereignty patrols flown by long-range patrol aircraft; land, air, signals, survival and other exercises carried out throughout the year; mapping and charting and scientific support operations; and the clean-up of former DEW line sites. The Canadian Forces have also improved their cooperation with the indigenous peoples of the North in at least one case, having signed an agreement with the Inuvialuit of the Western Arctic in 1996 to govern the use of Inuvialuit land for training by the Department of National Defence.

On the question of sovereignty, the Arctic Council cannot help to resolve long-standing disputes between members, such as those between Canada and the United States or between Norway and Russia; such disputes are likely to become less important over time, however, as regional cooperation replaces national sovereignty as a priority for Arctic States. Canada maintains its claims to sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago, but, once it has done its best to strengthen its claim, its concentration on the creation of a broader regime for the Arctic will probably benefit the residents of the region more than the narrow pursuit of sovereignty, though this may be helped thereby also. As Donald McRae of the University of Ottawa explained to the Committee, though the concerns that over the years led Canada to assert its sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago remain important, in an increasingly interdependent world the assertion of this sovereignty may not be the most useful means of securing Canada's goals. In his words,



I'm not suggesting that a sovereignty claim to the waters of the Arctic is obsolete or that it should be forgotten. What I am saying is that the idea of claiming sovereignty as a means of securing those objectives has more of a 19th-century than a 21st-century ring about it. The objectives that led Canada to pursue vigorously the claim to sovereignty in the Arctic may well be achievable rather through bilateral, regional, and multilateral mechanisms. . . . Placing emphasis on collaborative activity with other states in the region and respective of Arctic waters rather than focussing on sovereignty does not seem to me to impair Canada's claim. It may even be interpreted as Canada acting as the sovereign in the region rather than being seen as perhaps defensively reacting every time some state does something that looks as if it is prejudicial to our claim. [21:5]

According to Donald McRae, following the decision to declare straight baselines and the negotiation of the 1988 icebreaker agreement, with one exception "there is little if anything more to be done to enhance Canada's claim to sovereignty over Arctic waters" [21:5]. The outstanding issue is the detection of U.S. submarine transits through the Arctic archipelago, since these take place without Canada's knowledge and may therefore weaken its claim to sovereignty.<sup>93</sup> The Government has had difficulty in finding technology for an Arctic Sub-surface Surveillance System that is both affordable and effective in Arctic conditions. As a result (and, probably, because of the potential negative impact on Canada-U.S. relations), in a letter to a Member of Parliament in January 1996, former Defence Minister David Collenette said "there is at present no intention to deploy a system."<sup>94</sup> The Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) and others have argued that a surveillance system remains necessary to strengthen Canadian claims of sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago. Terry Fenge, the Executive Director of CARC, raised the issue before the Committee. While such a system could only help Canada's sovereignty case, it is impossible to say by how much. According to David Cox, ". . . really the question is how much we are willing to pay to find out how few submarines transit the Northwest Passage" [21:6]. He added, "If I were making a guess, I would be very surprised if there are more than three transits a year of American submarines through the Northwest Passage. It would not surprise me if there are years in which there are no transits at all. So if you paid the \$60 million for that sensor system, you have to ask yourselves how you would feel about the pay-off to it" [21:10]. According to Franklyn Griffiths:

For sovereignty, in a way there's an institutionalized need not to know what's going on up there. If we really knew, what would we do about it? I guess we would protest. The Chinese used to protest daily about the nationalist occupation of Quemoy and Matsu islands. These were daily protests in defence of Chinese sovereignty. I don't know if they added to a record; in fact they probably didn't. [15:36]

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<sup>93</sup> As Donald McRae had concluded in an earlier review of the legal issues: "A precondition for exercising enforcement jurisdiction—for taking measures against unauthorized sub-surface traffic—is knowledge of occurrence. To exercise the sovereign authority it claims and to preserve its claim to sovereignty over Arctic waters, Canada must at least be in a position to monitor sub-surface use of the waters of the Arctic Archipelago." ("Arctic Sovereignty: Loss by Dereliction?", *Northern Perspective*, Winter 1994-95, p. 9.)

<sup>94</sup> Paul Koring, "Collenette Drops Plan to Monitor Arctic," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 3 February 1996, A.3.



In light of the new agenda for international cooperation in the Arctic, the Committee agrees with the Government's decision to focus on such cooperation rather than legal confrontation. At the same time, Canada must be sure that its sovereignty claim to the waters of the Arctic archipelago is as strong as possible.

Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 14**

**The Committee recommends that the Government reaffirm its claim to sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago. In view of the financial and technical difficulties associated with the Arctic Sub-surface Surveillance System, the Committee recommends that the Government review the need for such a system, and explore alternative technical and diplomatic mechanisms for advancing Canada's sovereignty position.**

#### ***Continuing Military-Strategic Concerns in the Arctic***

Traditional military-strategic concerns in the Arctic continue to focus on the relationship between the U.S. and Russia, which are still the world's two largest nuclear powers and the dominant military powers in the region. More attention is paid to Russia, both because of its ongoing reforms and because, mainly for reasons of geography, it has the largest military forces permanently stationed in the Arctic. Mikhail Gorbachev's 1987 Murmansk speech called for an end to the Cold War and for increased "civilian security" in the Arctic, as well as for the creation of a demilitarized "zone of peace," though most Soviet forces would have been excluded from its area of application. While this speech did usher in a new era of cooperation on other issues, Western governments quickly dismissed its traditional security elements as self-serving. Russia's policies obviously changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War, but its military capabilities in the North did not diminish as quickly, and in fact increased temporarily as Russia moved conventional military equipment out of Europe as required by the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The CFE Treaty is now being re-negotiated by Canada and the other parties to take into account the new political and military realities in Europe, and it is hoped that this will resolve many of the residual concerns in the region (see Box 6 "The Balance of Conventional Military Forces in the Arctic Region").

Like the United States, Russia continues to see its nuclear deterrent force as the bottom line guarantee of its security, and, some have argued, as its last claim to superpower status. In fact, a large and growing percentage of this force is based in the Arctic. The two states have already made significant cuts in their strategic nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, down from the 10,000-12,000 warheads each deployed in

the late 1980s to 6,000-7,000 each under the START I Treaty. The Russian parliament has yet, however, to ratify the follow-on START II agreement, which would further reduce the arsenals to 3,500-3,000 for each side. The Committee met with both the Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Lukin, and the head of its subcommittee on legal issues while in Moscow. They told us that the START II treaty is seen by Duma members as flawed, since its reductions are unbalanced, put a disproportionate onus on Russia, and cost more than that country can afford to implement. The ratification of START II has also been increasingly linked to such broader security issues as NATO enlargement and U.S. proposals for national and theatre missile defence systems. The March 1997 Helsinki Summit between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin saw welcome progress in the area of strategic arms reductions; in return for U.S. agreement to extend the deadline for its implementation from 2003 to 2007, President Yeltsin pledged to recommend ratification of START II to the Duma. This would be followed immediately by negotiations for a follow-on START III agreement that would further reduce strategic arsenals to 2,000–2,500 deployed warheads each by 2007. Some progress was also made in Helsinki on the question of missile defences, including a reaffirmation by both parties of the importance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. They agreed to work, both together and with others, on a high-level political document that would establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system; however, the two presidents continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement.

As the Committee heard during its trip to Russia, feelings on the subject of NATO enlargement run high. Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov told the Committee in Moscow that Russia is not fixated on NATO, but the issue keeps being provoked from the other side. Arguments for NATO enlargement imply that Russia is still a threat in the region, which makes that country feel unfairly targeted, since it is “not an amputated U.S.S.R. but a new country (and democracy) too.” Russia is interested in cooperation with NATO but, given the history of that organization, does not believe that an effective European security system can be built around it and would prefer a more inclusive model such as the OSCE. Vladimir Lukin agreed that Duma members are “firmly against” any NATO enlargement that would isolate Russia and imply it is a threat to its neighbours. On the day the Committee was scheduled to be in Murmansk, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov told the ministerial conference of the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, chaired by Russia:

Lately an alarming aspect has appeared in the positions of certain states: emphasis is made not on the formation of an all-European system, but on an arrangement between Russia and NATO, which those states try to present as an alternative to such an architecture. Moreover, we witness attempts to make NATO the main axis of the European security system. We do not share this point of view. We are convinced that the central role in providing European security and stability must belong to the OSCE



## Box 6 — “The Balance of Conventional Military Forces in the Arctic Region”<sup>1</sup>

Country	Forces	Remarks
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>20+ North Warning system early warning radar sites</li> </ul>	—
Denmark (Greenland)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>air base (Thule)</li> <li>Ballistic Missile Early Warning System station at Thule</li> <li>Spacetrack station at Thule</li> </ul>	U.S. forces. Early warning stations relate to strategic defences.
Finland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Jaeger Brigade, Sodankylä</li> <li>Lapland Wing, Rovaniemi (20 fighters)</li> <li>Lapland Frontier Guard</li> </ul>	Peacetime forces.
Iceland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Keflavik air base (4 fighters, tanker aircraft, 8 maritime surveillance aircraft, helicopters, personnel strength about 3000)</li> </ul>	U.S. forces.
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6 divisions (4 brigades)</li> <li>Border guard company</li> <li>Mobilization forces in Tromsø: 1 brigade; in Finnmark: 4 battalions</li> <li>5 air stations; 32 fighters, 6 maritime surveillance aircraft, transporters, helicopters</li> <li>Coastal artillery, torpedo batteries, and mine stations</li> <li>Submarines, missile-torpedo boats, at least 1 frigate</li> </ul>	<p>NATO reinforcement plans under revision. Former reinforcements relevant for deployment to Norway:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Force (55000 personnel); part of being a marine expeditionary brigade (total 13 000 personnel, about 80 aircraft)</li> <li>British/Netherlands Amphibious force</li> <li>NATO's Composite Force</li> <li>Allied air forces, about 200-300 combat aircraft</li> <li>ACE Mobile Force (AMF)</li> <li>Naval forces according to situation</li> </ul>
Russia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2 motorized rifle divisions, 2 naval infantry brigades</li> <li>1 coastal defence brigade (Arkhangelsk), border guard troops, 1 Spetsnaz brigade</li> <li>1030 main battle tanks, 1264 artillery pieces, and 1600 armoured combat vehicles in active units<sup>2</sup></li> <li>About 450 aircraft and helicopters of the northern Fleet</li> <li>Part of the helicopters of the tactical air forces in the Leningrad Military District</li> <li>About 100 air defence fighters on Kola</li> <li>Northern Fleet: 32 tactical submarines, 49 major and 43 minor surface combatants; 14+ naval bases</li> </ul>	According to the CFE Treaty and an agreement reached among CIS states, Russia is allowed to keep in the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts altogether 1300 tanks, 1680 artillery pieces, and 1380 armoured combat vehicles. Of these, Russia is allowed to store 600 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, and 800 armoured combat vehicles in the southern part of the Leningrad Military District.
Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Parts of the Northern Command</li> <li>Norrland-brigades (total in Sweden 5)</li> <li>Territorial defence and Home Guard units</li> </ul>	—
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 light infantry brigade</li> <li>5 squadrons of air force (72 fighters, 6 attack aircraft)</li> <li>North Warning System early warning radar sites</li> <li>Ballistic Missile Early Warning System station at Clear</li> <li>Spacetrack station at Clear</li> </ul>	Early warning stations relate to strategic defences.

Source: Kari Möttölä and Arto Nokkola, *Political and Military Aspects of Security in the Arctic*, prepared for the Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Yellowknife, NWT, 13-14 March 1996.

References: *The Military Balance 1995-1996*; *The Military Balance in Northern Europe 1994-1995*.

<sup>1</sup> The Arctic region here consists of Alaska and Canada, both above 60° latitude, the whole of Greenland and Iceland, but only those parts of Scandinavia, Finland, and Russia that are above the Polar Circle. Only the most important forces (including dual-capable) are included in this table.

<sup>2</sup> Leningrad Military District and Northern Fleet combined (about 200 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, and 400 ACVs in Arctic areas).



which should be acting in coordination with other organizations, including EU, WEU and NATO.<sup>95</sup>

Serious reservations on the question of NATO's enlargement also surfaced during the Committee's meetings in Finland. While the Committee will continue to monitor this issue separately from that of circumpolar cooperation, it should be noted that the goal of enlargement is to increase the security of all states and this cannot be accomplished by isolating Russia, or by allowing it to see enlargement of the Alliance as a threat to its security. Despite the relative success of the Helsinki Summit—including its emphasis on the role of the OSCE—the tension between Russia and the West which has developed over years is unlikely to disappear overnight. Continued cooperation across a range of issues in the Arctic and elsewhere can only help increase overall confidence and trust, and Canadians should therefore use these Arctic cooperation channels to help bridge differences and build understanding with our Russian counterparts.

One unchanging aspect of the military situation in the Arctic is Russia's deployment of significant nuclear submarine forces in the region. Given that country's lack of other secure ice-free ports for its submarines, the Kola peninsula will undoubtedly remain the home base for most of its powerful ballistic missile submarines and the forces protecting them until well into the future. Russia's smaller ballistic missile submarine force is already more important than it was in 1990, and, in the opinion of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, this importance will continue to grow whether or not the START II agreement is ratified and implemented.<sup>96</sup> In recent years, the Russian Navy has struggled to keep its smaller submarine forces effective, increasing "blue water" operations and exercises, such as the firing in August 1995 of a ballistic missile from under the polar ice within 500 kilometres of Canada's land mass. In November 1996, on the eve of the Committee's visit to Russia, for the first time in a decade Russia launched construction of a new class of ballistic missile submarines.<sup>97</sup> (The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that this submarine will not reach initial operational capability until 2005, and Russian authorities are still not sure whether it will be based in the Northern or Pacific Fleets). While this initiative is at least partly related to Russia's desire to preserve the most advanced segment of its shipbuilding industry, Leonid Petrov, Chairman of the Ecology Committee, pointed to the submarine development in a meeting with Committee members in St. Petersburg as an example of

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<sup>95</sup> Statement by the Chairman of the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation E. Primakov, Fourth Session, Petrozavodsk, 6 November 1996, p. 5-6.

<sup>96</sup> U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, *Worldwide Submarine Challenges*, Washington, February 1996, p. 22.

<sup>97</sup> "Nuclear Sub Launched," *The Moscow Times*, 5 November 1996, p. 4. The start of construction was described as marking "a new stage in the development of Russia's nuclear strength and its drive to maintain the status of a nuclear power." The 2 November launching ceremony at the Arctic port of Severodvinsk was presided over by President Yeltsin's chief of staff Anatoly Chubais, since appointed first deputy prime minister in the revamped Cabinet of March 1997, and considered by many to be the real power in government.

how NATO enlargement must be weighed carefully since it could be used to justify new Russian defence spending compounding further the environmental risks.<sup>98</sup>

On the military level, two schools of thought have emerged with respect to Arctic security. The more traditional of these welcomes the reduction of tensions in the region following the end of the Cold War, and argues that further actions are unnecessary. The other argues that, because of U.S. and Russian resistance, the Arctic region has yet to catch up with Europe and elsewhere in terms of arms control and confidence-building, and urges that such measures be negotiated in this respect to lock in the benefits of the post-Cold War world. As David Cox told the Committee:

In the past five years or so in the Arctic tensions have been very low in the post-Cold War period. By and large, all of the governments involved and most of the individuals who look at these issues have drawn the conclusion that it's therefore not necessary to discuss security issues. In fact, one should have drawn the opposite conclusion and said that when tensions are low, that's the time to put in place institutions and procedures that guard against the difficulties when tensions rise. [21:24]

Canadian and other experts have argued for years that a number of possibilities exist for regional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), which would enhance the stability of the Arctic as a theatre of military operations, minimize the impact of any such operations on the region and its peoples, and help keep the overall strategic balance. As Oran Young points out, these possibilities include explicit agreements or, perhaps more likely, tacit understandings. In his opinion, "interesting" possibilities for first measures include: codes of conduct governing the operations of nuclear-powered attack submarines, the elimination of forward operating bases for military aircraft in the high Arctic, advance notification of military manoeuvres, the organization of joint military exercises in the region, and the dedication of additional submarine cruises to scientific research in the central Arctic Ocean.<sup>99</sup>

Some of these initiatives have already begun. Since 1994 Canada, Russia and the United States have carried out several small joint search and rescue training exercises in the Arctic. As George Newton, Chairman of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, told the Committee, "One of the most significant recent achievements in cooperative Arctic research has been a submarine Arctic science program. In this program, now in its second of five years, the U.S. Navy has agreed to provide annually a nuclear submarine to operate in the central Arctic Ocean, with the sole mission of providing support for the civilian science community" [62:4]. On the question of nuclear attack submarines, these are "the most dangerous vessels to global environmental safety," in the opinion of the

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<sup>98</sup> On the extent of these risks in the Arctic region around Murmansk see Fred Barbash, "Nuclear Specter Rises from Naval Graveyard," *The Washington Post*, 11 October 1996.

<sup>99</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 37-38.



Washington-based Center for Technology Assessment, and the most provocative, given their practice of “cat and mouse” surveillance operations.<sup>100</sup> After a number of collisions between U.S. and Russian nuclear submarines in the Arctic had resulted in a U.S. presidential apology at the Vancouver summit in 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that there had been a “dramatic” change in the U.S. Navy’s submarine operations to avoid recurrence of the problem; however, Russia was still accusing U.S. submarines of violating its waters a year later.

The principle of reducing military forces in the Arctic as much as possible is difficult to argue against, yet the U.S. reluctance suggests that such a prospect is unrealistic at the moment. This does not mean, however, that Canada and the other Arctic states cannot take useful steps to increase regional security in the meantime. As David Cox told the Committee, “In my view, what we should do as our long-term objective is to state that our ultimate goal is to demilitarize the Arctic. For example, in regard to the most lethal pollutants of all, nuclear materials, the circumpolar states could set as their long-term goal a nuclear regime to regulate all aspects of nuclear activity.” Given that the United States and Russia have always opposed the idea of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Arctic, Professor Cox and others have recommended a “zone within a zone” approach, focussing first on the establishment of an “Arctic Zone of Peace and Cooperation.” Once such a zone was established, Canada and the Nordic states could declare a smaller Nuclear Weapon Free Zone on their territory, which the U.S. and Russia could join as their comfort level increased.<sup>101</sup> Professor Cox told the Committee that “the challenge is to think of a process, and I emphasize process, that would take us step by step towards that notion of demilitarizing the Arctic while not ignoring these very serious issues, which pose specific problems for the United States and Russia” [21:9]. In his opinion, this could best be done through a long-term process beginning with so-called “track two” or nongovernmental diplomacy:

Without making any excessive, grandiose claims for a demilitarized zone, my suggestion would be that this Committee might look very carefully at the creation and encouragement of a parallel discussion — which could be and perhaps ought to be, in the first instance, a nongovernmental discussion group — to consider specific steps towards it. I’m not suggesting that this should be pushed onto the agenda of the Arctic Council, because it would be the surest way to raise the objections of the United States. To create a parallel group could simply be a recommendation. Then it would look very much like some other proposals that have taken five to ten years to come to fruition. [21:19]

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<sup>100</sup> *The Threat of Nuclear Submarine Operations to Global Security and Environmental Safety: A Preliminary Report*, International Center for Technology Assessment, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 4.

<sup>101</sup> David Cox, “Reflections on International Peace and Security in the Circumpolar Arctic,” in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada*, John B. Lamb, ed., Ottawa, The Canadian Polar Commission and the Canadian Centre for Global Security, October (1994).



The strategic importance of the Arctic during the Cold War prevented it from being formally demilitarized like the Antarctic. Yet the Committee is convinced that the residents and states of the Arctic would benefit from the ultimate elimination of military forces in the region. Given current realities, Canada's most useful contribution is probably to declare its support for the principle and facilitate its further study outside the Arctic Council process.

Accordingly:

### **Recommendation 15**

**The Committee recommends that the Government pursue as a priority the elimination of nuclear weapons in the Arctic, as well as international agreement on the demilitarization of the region. Given that not all the Arctic states are interested in pursuing discussions of confidence-building or other regional arms control measures at the moment, the Government should also encourage and support the establishment of a "Track Two" process by which nongovernmental experts from the various states could consider such measures, and pay special attention to the integration of Russia into a broader cooperative security system for the region. The Government should raise these subjects as feasible with other Arctic states.**

### ***Towards Cooperation on Arctic "Environmental Security"***

As discussed earlier and noted in Chapter Three, the Arctic Council cannot deal directly with questions of military security or, indeed, national sovereignty. It can, however, address other security issues. Oran Young put it to the Committee this way:

If one were to raise the question of security in the sense of military aircraft deployed over the Arctic, the United States would be very resistant, but my hope is that by reframing the security agenda and talking, as you suggested, about these larger questions, that may be a way to allow the security questions to be raised in the Arctic Council setting in a manner that isn't rejected or opposed, for example, by the United States. [40:17]

The term "environmental security" embraces both the environmental factors behind potentially violent conflicts and the impact of global environmental degradation on the well-being of societies and economies. A key point is that, since it addresses common problems, environmental security demands *cooperative* rather than confrontational responses. Unfortunately, since many of these problems are by nature long-term and political, systems focussed on short-term results may be inadequate for addressing them.<sup>102</sup> As has been argued by Jan Syse, a Norwegian parliamentarian whom the Committee met in Oslo, this is why a broader set of coordinated multilateral policy

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<sup>102</sup> Gareth Porter, "Environmental Security as a National Security Issue," *Current History*, May 1995, p. 218-222.

instruments and institutions is needed in working towards a collective environmental security regime for the Arctic.<sup>103</sup>

The environmental effects of military activity in the Arctic were put on the regional security agenda in early 1992, when Norway proposed that NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) should, in cooperation with the new North Atlantic Cooperation Council, study the issue of "Cross-Border Environmental Problems Emanating from Defence-Related Installations and Activities." Some 23 countries participated in the study, which focussed on radionuclide and chemical contamination, and the completed Phase One report was published by NATO in April 1995. Within the United States, environmental issues have taken on a higher profile in the past two years, and in April 1996 then Secretary of State Warren Christopher signalled a new priority for such issues in U.S. foreign policy in a major speech at Stanford University. The U.S. military does not spend large sums of money on environmental security, but it is an important element of the concept of "preventive defense" introduced by former Defense Secretary William Perry. As the U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Environmental Security) explained, "our security depends on more than being able to prevent missile attacks. Our security depends equally as much on preventing the conditions that lead to conflict and on helping to create the conditions for peace."<sup>104</sup> Commenting on the Arctic, Perry said in late 1996: "I have been to the Arctic twice this year. I will never forget the pristine landscape, the crystal waters and the fresh air. Anybody who has seen the Arctic knows why we must preserve this raw and fragile environment. Geographically, the Arctic is the closest route between the United States and Russia, so it is fitting that in preserving this route, we bring our nations closer together."<sup>105</sup>

While not as heavily militarized as some other regions throughout the Cold War, parts of the Arctic have seen significant military activity over the years, which has resulted in damage to the environment; a 1995 Finnish study identified as examples of this: Soviet nuclear testing at the twin islands of Novaya Zemlya and the dumping of nuclear waste and reactors in the Barents and Kara Seas; NATO low-level flying in Labrador; and a nuclear accident near the American airbase at Thule, Greenland in 1968.<sup>106</sup>

NATO's CCMS Study considered a number of sources of chemical contamination in the region, including chemical munitions dumped at sea and contamination of land-based sites by chemical warfare agents, explosives and other pollutants, such as fuel and lubricants. In addition, the "normal" use of fuel and other lubricants has resulted in

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<sup>103</sup> Jan Syse, "Collective Environmental Security," Presentation to the Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Yellowknife, March 1996.

<sup>104</sup> Sherri Goodman, *The Environment and National Security*, National Defense University, 8 August 1996.

<sup>105</sup> *Remarks by Secretary of Defense Perry at the Society of American Engineers Luncheon Re: Environmental Security Policy*, Arlington, Virginia, 20 November 1996.

<sup>106</sup> Lassi Heininen, Olli-Pekka Jalonen and Jyrki Käkönen, *Expanding The Northern Dimension*, Tampere Peace Research Institute Research Report No. 61, 1995, p. 87-93.



significant contamination over the years. The study concluded that the dumping of chemical munitions at sea does not currently pose an acute threat to either human beings or the environment. In the case of land-based sites, it recommended that redemption be accelerated and that more effort be put into research and development of new, alternative techniques such as biological redemption. Finally, the Committee recommended international standardization of soil quality parameters and threshold values for civilian and military uses of land areas, as well as better training to help military personnel understand chemical pollution and how to prevent it.<sup>107</sup>

Since Russia has the largest military forces in the region, its North, including the Kola peninsula with its nuclear waste problems, is the most severely contaminated. Meeting with the Committee in Moscow, Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, told the Committee that, while nuclear contamination in the Murmansk region was important, contamination by heavy metals and chemicals was the most serious imminent environmental and health danger. Nor has the territory of other states been immune to the effects of the military. In Canada, for example, a number of current and former military sites, including some 42 that were originally part of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar line, require varying degrees of clean-up, mostly because of hydrocarbon-contaminated soil. The Committee had planned to discuss this issue among others during a scheduled visit to Cambridge Bay in the Canadian Arctic, but bad weather prevented the visit. However, we note the work done by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, which did visit dumpsites in Cambridge Bay and Iqaluit in the preparation of its 1995 report *It's About Our Health!: Towards Pollution Prevention*.

Responsibility for the clean-up of these sites in northern Canada is divided between two government departments, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), and the Department of National Defence (DND). DIAND is responsible for cleaning up former military sites, including 21 of the DEW line sites which were turned over to it in the 1960s and a number of others. DND is responsible for cleaning up current military sites, including the 21 DEW line sites not turned over to DIAND. In formulating their clean-up priorities and plans, both departments first consider the risk posed by the various sites to human health and safety and then treaty and other legal obligations. DND began the clean-up of its 21 DEW line sites in 1996, and plans to finish the rest over 10 years at a cost of some \$242 million, with cost-sharing being negotiated with the United States. DIAND has already cleaned up several sites, and it, too, plans to complete the rest over ten years.

During the NATO study, Canada emphasized the need to involve local communities in the initial phase of clean-up planning. As a result of its mandate, DIAND (and, to a lesser

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<sup>107</sup> NATO/CCMS/NACC Pilot Study: *Cross-Border Environmental Problems Emanating from Defence-Related Installations and Activities, Summary Final Report Phase 1 1993-1995*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Report No. 206, April 1995.



extent, DND) has involved local communities in the site clean-ups, providing employment to local residents and teaching them skills that they may go on to employ elsewhere. An example was the 1994 clean-up of DIAND's first DEW line site, at Horton River in the Northwest Territories. This operation created jobs for over 40 local residents, and involved removal from the site of more than 800 barrels of oil, diesel fuel, gasoline and grease, a gravel conveyor, a warehouse, the contents of two 20,000-gallon fuel tanks, and PCB-contaminated soil. Given funding constraints, priorities must always be established, and Canada is fortunate that the low population density in its Arctic means that sites that pose little threat to communities can simply be contained while others are dealt with first; however, other states may not have this option.

The most significant and welcome recognition of the link between military forces and the environment in the Arctic came in September 1996, when, on Norway's initiative, the United States, Russia and Norway entered into the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) agreement to ensure that their military activities do not harm the Arctic environment. AMEC will initially focus on six projects, four that are nuclear-related and two that are not. The projects will range in duration from 6 to 36 months, and initial results are expected within a year. During the Committee's trip to Norway, Norwegian officials told members that AMEC was a "landmark" agreement from both environmental and broader political points of view, since it has engaged the two nuclear superpowers in environmental clean-up work. The intention is to keep AMEC trilateral, but provision was made in the agreement for the participation of other states in specific projects as appropriate. Such participation would not necessarily be expensive, since the need would likely be for scientific and technical expertise.

The participation of other states in AMEC would emphasize the multilateral nature of the military-environmental threats in the Arctic, as would a conference on environmental security cooperation like those already held in other regions.

In light of that:

### **Recommendation 16**

**The Committee recommends that the Government continue the cleanup of abandoned military sites in the Canadian North and pursue an equitable sharing of costs with the United States. Given Canadian expertise in the clean-up of Arctic military sites, the Committee recommends that the Government offer to participate in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) program. The Government should also convene with the United States and Norway an environmental security cooperation conference for the militaries and environmental agencies of the Arctic region.**

For many, the most important — and symbolic — environmental security issue in the Arctic, in terms of the threat to human health and the environment, is radioactive pollution, perhaps the ultimate legacy of the Cold War.<sup>108</sup> During its trips to Scandinavia and Russia, the Committee was convinced of the importance of nuclear issues in the region, including the safety of civilian power reactors, nuclear waste management and nuclear proliferation. In Moscow, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov told the Committee that progress on nuclear safety issues “is a matter of survival.” While international action in this area has been very slow, the past year has seen some welcome progress as well as evidence that the danger is finally being appreciated and is starting to be addressed at all levels.

Radionuclides in the Arctic derive from a number of sources, including fallout from atmospheric nuclear testing in the 1950s and 1960s, European nuclear power stations, and the 1986 Chernobyl accident. These sources have all declined over the years and, with Russia and the other declared nuclear powers having signed a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, nuclear testing will not cause further contamination in the Arctic. Attention is now focussed on northern Russia, where local radionuclide concentrations also derive from some 130 nuclear tests carried out at the twin Arctic islands of Novaya Zemlya between 1955 and 1990; the pre-1992 regular dumping by the Navy of low and medium-level liquid (and, less frequently, solid) radioactive waste at sea; a number of accidents involving nuclear submarines; and, potentially the most serious for the future, the continuing problems associated with Russia’s aging nuclear submarine fleet.

As speculation and international concern mounted, in 1993 the Russian government published the so-called “White Book” or Yablokov report, which provided solid background information on Russian nuclear dumping and tests and accidents during the Cold War. Russia has voluntarily observed the international ban on the dumping of radioactive waste at sea since 1993 and, although it has yet to ratify the necessary amendment to the 1972 *London Convention*, it has promised to abide by it, most recently at the April 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit attended by Prime Minister Chrétien. Fortunately, experts feel that international action need not focus on radioactive materials already dumped in the Arctic marine environment. International expeditions have visited key sites of radioactive dumping and accidents, such as the site of the sinking of the *Komsomolets* nuclear-powered and armed submarine in the Norwegian Sea in 1989, and have generally concluded that the risk of further radionuclide leakage is minor. The International Atomic Energy Agency has been studying associated long-term risks, and a report is expected in 1997. Attention is now focussing on onshore activities which could result in further (and worse) radioactive contamination.

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<sup>108</sup> Peter Gizewski, “Military Activity and Environmental Security: The Case of Radioactivity in the Arctic,” in Debardeleben and Hannigan (1994).



The most high-profile nuclear issue in the Arctic, and the one most directly linked to military operations, is Russia's inability to safely deal with the nuclear fuel and waste produced by the simultaneous operation and reduction of its nuclear submarine fleet. These both rely on the same infrastructure of service ships, on-shore storage facilities, secure transport containers and rail and other links, all of which are totally inadequate in the Russian North. During the Cold War, Russia built the world's largest fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, most of which were based in the Northern Fleet, which has been operating vessels with nuclear propulsion since 1960.<sup>109</sup> The normal operation of nuclear submarines requires the regular removal and replacement of spent nuclear fuel (generally every seven years in the case of Russian submarines, or twice in the lifetime of the vessel). In Russia, however, the necessary infrastructure for removing, storing and transporting spent nuclear fuel and other by-products was traditionally given low priority and so even years ago was inadequate, poorly maintained and near capacity. In recent years, the combination of mass obsolescence, severe military budget cuts and treaty-mandated reductions of nuclear missile firing submarines has compounded this problem, and has left Russia (and particularly the Russian Navy, which has basically been left to deal with the problem alone) with a very serious situation in both its Northern and Pacific Fleets. The United States and Japan are helping Russia address these issues in the Pacific, and the United States and Norway have so far taken the lead in the North.

The process of decommissioning submarines is time-consuming and expensive. Unable to handle the spent nuclear fuel and other waste, the Russian Navy often resorted to what amounted to floating storage, whereby many of these older submarines were kept floating at dockside with this material intact on board. Some submarines have been in this situation for 15 years. As early as 1991, the Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence pointed out that "the scrapping of old nuclear submarines (in 1990) was being slowed not by a requirement to keep the boats in the order-of-battle, but by the unavailability of enough scrapping facilities to accommodate them and the absence of a program to dispose of the reactors and nuclear material." The situation has not improved over the last six years, and in fact has become worse as on-shore storage facilities have become even more filled up.

According to material submitted to the Committee by Bellona, "The greatest risk to safety is presented by the 52 submarines which have not yet been defuelled. The submarines are not brought into dock, and are in very poor condition. The vessels still containing their nuclear fuel are undermanned. If the work of decommissioning these submarines is to proceed in a proper way, a significant infusion of funds either from the state or from some other source will be necessary."<sup>110</sup> In September 1995, a "nuclear catastrophe" nearly occurred when the Kola peninsula power authority turned off the electricity to a nuclear submarine base because of unpaid bills. The cooling system on one

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<sup>109</sup> Oleg Bukharin and Joshua Handler, "Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Decommissioning," *Science and Global Security*, Vol. 5, 1995, p. 245-271.

<sup>110</sup> The Bellona Foundation, "Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel at the Kola Peninsula," material provided to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, November 1996.



of the four decommissioned submarines at the base failed without outside power, and its reactors began to overheat; power was finally restored by armed soldiers sent to the power authority by the local military commander.

Apart from the environmental risks, this issue has also been highlighted by the actions of the Russian government. After cooperating for several years with environmental activists who were monitoring the nuclear waste storage and other problems in northern Russia, Russia's attitude changed. In February 1996, Russian authorities arrested Alexander Nikitin, a former Soviet naval officer and employee of Bellona, and accused him of divulging state secrets during his work on the exhaustive Bellona report *The Russian Northern Fleet*. Bellona denied the accusations, and the case caused an international outcry. Amnesty International declared Mr. Nikitin a prisoner of conscience, and the Committee was among many who communicated with the Russian government to urge a free and fair trial for him. In addition to military secrecy, observers speculated that the Russian government was positioning itself as more hard-line in the runup to the presidential election in 1996, after becoming tired of continual criticism without much real assistance. In December 1996, Mr. Nikitin was released after ten months in jail, although the charges against him were not dropped.

Critics fear environmental catastrophe from a number of sources, including the sinking of partly decommissioned submarines moored near shore with intact nuclear reactors or spent fuel aboard, the leakage of such material from inadequate and poorly maintained land-based storage facilities, or the resumption by the Russian Navy of the dumping of nuclear reactors or waste at sea. Poor security at on-shore waste storage sites could also lead to theft of such material, and it has also been suggested that the nuclear material from the *Komsomolets* and three other Russian submarines that sank during the Cold War could be a proliferation hazard.

In one of its last reports, in September 1995, the U.S. Congress's Office of Technology Assessment estimated that at Russia's current capacity for dismantling submarines, its decommissioning program will take at least another 20 years, and emphasized the need for "care, caution, awareness and prudence."<sup>111</sup> NATO's CCMS Study modelled the impact of two sorts of hypothetical accidents related to decommissioned Russian submarines moored near the Kola peninsula. It concluded that, though accidents involving large releases of radioactivity would clearly have significant local consequences, their cross-border, international impacts would be modest. At the same time, it was concluded that the present rate of submarine decommissioning, and the Northern Fleet's limited capacity for defuelling, storing and transporting nuclear waste, indicated a problem of "considerable magnitude" in northwest Russia. The Committee accepts that the danger

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<sup>111</sup> Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress. *Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic: An Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts from Soviet Nuclear Contamination*, OTA-ENV-623, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1995, p. iii.

to the waters of the European Arctic is more serious than that to Canadian waters, but feels strongly that all states — and particularly all Arctic states — must move quickly to address these issues or face a much more expensive and damaging crisis in the future.

The first elements of this cooperation are now in place. Assisting Russia in dismantling its excess nuclear submarines is in the interest of all the states of the region, since it will reduce the military threat, protect the environment and provide jobs for Russian workers. The U.S. Navy, which has considerable expertise in decommissioning nuclear vessels, is helping Russia to dismantle its submarines as required by the START I treaty. In October 1996, U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry visited the Little Star shipyard outside Archangel to observe the dismantling of a Russian nuclear submarine. As he put it:

A few years ago that submarine was out on patrol, carrying enough nuclear missiles to destroy dozens of American cities. Now it is being dismantled by some of the same Russian workers who built it, using equipment provided by the United States Department of Defense. The waters all around the Little Star shipyard are packed with old Russian nuclear submarines. These submarines no longer threaten the world with a nuclear holocaust. However, they are still a major environmental hazard to the Arctic region. By helping Russia dismantle these subs we are creating a win-win-win situation.<sup>112</sup>

While everyone recognizes the dangers to the environment and health posed by these submarines, some feel Alexi Yablokov's September 1995 comment (that they are "floating Chernobyls") is an exaggeration, pointing out that the nuclear reactors on board submarines are typically much smaller than civilian nuclear power reactors, that the Russian experts who built the submarines are aware of the dangers, and that the reactors are in any case enclosed. A former nuclear submariner, Chairman of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission George Newton, told the Committee:

The Murmansk situation is indeed very severe; however, much of the radioactive material is contained within reactor vessels and they are within submarine hulls. Maybe they are not built to the integrity of submarine hulls that we in the United States or you in Canada would traditionally like to see after a certain lifetime; nonetheless there is some form of containment for that radioactive material. . . As a nuclear submariner I feel confident, through my association with the nuclear reactor program, to think the reactors that have been dumped on the ocean bottom — albeit it's absolutely abhorrent — are probably not the contamination problem we should be worrying about, because the land-based contamination is the true unknown. [62:5-6]

Norwegian officials agreed, telling the Committee in Oslo that, while the Norwegian government was helping Russia deal with the submarines, they were less concerned with the submarines themselves than with such issues as storage and treatment of nuclear

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<sup>112</sup> Remarks by Secretary of Defense Perry at the Society of American Engineers Luncheon Re: Environmental Security Policy, Arlington, Virginia, 20 November 1996.



waste which could leak into the surrounding ground or water or be stolen. International cooperation has already begun; Russian and Western experts sealed a crack in the bow of the sunken submarine *Komsomolets* in the summer of 1995 in what Bellona described as "... an important pilot project that will prove invaluable in developing cooperation between Western and Russian authorities."<sup>113</sup> Another important pilot project involved the cooperation of Russian and Western companies to remove spent and damaged nuclear fuel from the Russian storage ship *Lepse* in Murmansk; the technology proposed for this project could also be used to handle spent nuclear fuel in other locations.

In view of Norway's proximity to the Kola peninsula, the Norwegian government has taken a lead in addressing regional nuclear issues at all levels, and sees itself playing a "catalytic" role in the international arena by raising awareness and encouraging action on these issues. The Norwegian government has adopted a multi-year Plan of Action with four priority areas: safety measures at nuclear facilities; management, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste; the dumping of radioactive waste in the Barents and Kara Seas and inputs into the sea via Russian rivers; and arms-related environmental hazards. The Barents Euro-Arctic Region process has also begun to address nuclear issues.<sup>114</sup> At the November 1996 conference referred to earlier, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, as outgoing Chair, noted the progress made on the nuclear issues in the past year, adding that:

These measures will to certain extent lower the risk of radioactive contamination in the region. But the scale and complexity of current tasks make it necessary for other member countries and observers of the CBER to join the process of their implementation. The Russian side will provide considerable financial resources for the purposes of radiation safety.<sup>115</sup>

Norwegian authorities told the Committee that there is no reliable estimate of the cost of a clean-up of the region, since this would depend on the definition of "clean-up." In Moscow, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov, who is familiar with both nuclear issues and the region, having spent 20 years as a senior physicist at the Novaya Zemlya weapons development complex, tried to reassure the Committee that the cost of a nuclear clean-up would be "not very huge" — perhaps \$16-17 million (U.S.) for the construction of interim storage facilities, and \$40-50 million to transport the radioactive material out of the region. As an indication of the budgetary problems, however, his Ministry had received only \$2 million of the \$16 million allotted for this purpose in 1996. Whatever the exact amount needed, the Committee agrees with Norwegian Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal, who

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<sup>113</sup> *The Russian Northern Fleet*, Bellona Factsheet No. 6, 14 November 1996 (retrieved through Internet).

<sup>114</sup> Erlends Calabuig Odins, "Après-guerre froide en Europe arctique," *Le monde diplomatique*, September 1996.

<sup>115</sup> Statement by the Chairman of the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, p. 4.



**TABLE 1 — Assessment of the Radioecological Significance of Various Problems of Operation of the Russian Nuclear Fleet**

Type of Problem	Potential Radionuclide Release Level	Probability of Harmful Impact	Urgency of Remedial Measures	Expense Level	Priority Level
Unloaded SNF in floating nuclear submarines <sup>1</sup>	VERY HIGH	HIGH	VERY HIGH	VERY HIGH	VERY HIGH
Storage of SNF at naval facilities <sup>1</sup>	VERY HIGH	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
Storage of SNF at the FTB <i>Lepse</i> <sup>1, 4</sup>	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
SRW storage at open temporary sites <sup>2</sup>	MEDIUM	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	MEDIUM
LRW storage in tanks and insufficient treatment facilities <sup>3</sup>	LOW	LOW	MEDIUM	LOW	MEDIUM
Reactor Compartment storage	MEDIUM	LOW	LOW	MEDIUM	LOW
Dumped radioactive waste and reactors in the Kara Sea	MEDIUM	LOW	LOW	HIGH	LOW

1. SNF — Spent Nuclear Fuel

2. SRW — Solid Radioactive Wastes

3. LRW — Liquid Radioactive Wastes

4. FTB — Floating Technical Base

*Source:* Vitaly N. Lystsov, and Nikolai S. Khlopin; "Current Radioactive Contamination Issues in the Arctic North and Operation and Infrastructure of the Russian Nuclear Fleet;" in Elizabeth J. Kirk, ed.; *Decommissioning Nuclear Submarines in the Russian North West: Assessing and Eliminating Risks*; Kluwer Publishers, Dordrecht, Netherlands, forthcoming, 1997. This book resulted from a NATO Advanced Research Workshop held in Kirkenes, Norway, in June 1996.

told the *Storting* in October 1996 that, “the main responsibility for dealing with the problem lies with the Russians themselves, but the problems are so enormous that they cannot be solved by Russia alone.”<sup>116</sup>

For years the United States has (slowly) assisted Russia in the dismantling of submarine and other strategic nuclear weapons under its Cooperative Threat Reduction (or Nunn-Lugar) program. The creation of the AMEC program broadens the military/environmental cooperation in the region beyond a bilateral focus on nuclear weapons. The Committee agrees with the suggestions for action that Bellona made to the Committee in Norway for establishing priorities with the Russians and concentrating on interim measures that will improve the situation until Russia is in a better position, economically and otherwise, to address it.

Canada has cooperated with Russia on nuclear issues for several years, focussing mainly on improving the safety of Russian civilian nuclear reactors. It has also done considerable work on the proposal to burn surplus plutonium from the Russian nuclear weapons program in Canadian-based CANDU reactors, although the Committee has heard differing opinions on the merits of this proposal. Current Canadian work to improve nuclear safety in northern Russia must continue but, given the importance and symbolism of the military-related nuclear problems with respect to the Arctic region, it should also be broadened.

Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 17**

**The Committee recommends that Canada continue to cooperate with the Russian Federation and the other Arctic states to address the serious nuclear problems in northern Russia. Despite financial constraints, Canada should also extend its cooperation to help address nuclear issues related to the Russian Northern Fleet (see Table 1, page 98).**

#### ***Security of Arctic Peoples and Environment***

With the appointment of a Circumpolar Ambassador and the creation of an Arctic Council, Canada has achieved a number of the goals that analysts and the Government's own 1995 Foreign Policy Statement felt could help increase security in the region. Further work must be done to meet modern security challenges in the region, but this can be accomplished only in cooperation with residents of the North. By ensuring that the interdependent nature of modern security is better understood and that mechanisms for

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<sup>116</sup> “Nuclear Safety Issues,” Statement to the Norwegian *Storting* by Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal, 29 October 1996.

regional cooperation, such as the Arctic Council, function properly in the meantime, however, Canada and the other Arctic states can strengthen the broader foundation for future security measures.

The end of the Cold War has seen a welcome inversion of security concerns, so that the security of individuals and the environment in the Arctic is now placed above the traditional state sovereignty and defence issues that dominated throughout the Cold War. Yet as one analyst cautions: "The transition from the old geopolitics to the new geopolitics in the Arctic may not be as smooth as one would wish."<sup>117</sup> Canada and the other Arctic states must deal with the legacy of the Cold War in the region before they can focus totally on the new agenda, which will include the process to establish confidence-building and other measures. But it is clear that the needs of Arctic residents in the future will focus less on the protection of states and sovereignty than on the protection of environment and culture. As the Committee was told in Stockholm by Richard Langlais, the Canadian author of *Reformulating Security: A Case Study From Arctic Canada*, "negative security" looks at threats, but "positive security" looks at needs. At their March 1996 meeting in Yellowknife, parliamentarians from the Arctic states recommended:

The adoption of national policies and international arrangements that broaden Arctic security issues from a predominantly military focus to the development of collective environmental security that includes the values, life styles, and cultural identity of indigenous northern societies. . .<sup>118</sup>

This new agenda for security cooperation is inextricably linked to the aims of environmentally sustainable human development. Meeting these challenges is essential to the long-term foundation for assuring circumpolar security, with priority being given to the well-being of Arctic peoples and to safeguarding northern habitats from intrusions which have impinged aggressively on them. The legacy of the past, as reviewed above, cannot be ignored. But the goal must be to move forward on the future agenda to which we now turn.

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<sup>117</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, "The Post-Cold War Arctic: International Cooperation and Dispute Management," in *The Polar Regions* (1996), Chapter 7, p. 201.

<sup>118</sup> Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region *Conference Statement*, Yellowknife, 14 March 1996.



# CHAPTER 5: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FOR PRESERVING THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT

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The next decade will be crucial to determining the future of the Arctic. Whether we can proceed into the next century with a healthy, intact Arctic ecosystem with abundant wildlife populations that can support traditional indigenous social and economic structures or whether the Arctic is degraded due to short-sighted economic interests will be determined in large part by the ability of Arctic nations to cooperate and coordinate their activities. [27:11]

Sarah Climenhaga, World Wildlife Fund

## ***Defining Environmentally “Sustainable Development” in a Circumpolar Context***

Having described the historical transition from the old security-dominated agenda, the report will now concentrate on affirming sustainable development as the centrepiece of future circumpolar cooperation. According to Oran Young, sustainable development in the Arctic is “the search for ways to achieve socio-economic development and protect the environment simultaneously under the cultural and ecological conditions characteristic of Arctic systems.”<sup>119</sup> The Committee agrees, viewing sustainable development as: *development which seeks human well-being through an equitable and democratic utilisation of society’s resources, while preserving cultural distinctiveness and the natural environment for future generations.* As discussed in Chapter Three, Dr. Young told the Committee that sustainable development should be *the* overarching concept for the Arctic Council, which can play a “generative” role in helping develop a common understanding of it. He believes that the Council should first set out an integrated set of sustainable development principles, such as subsistence preference, co-management and subsidiarity and then move ahead on a small number of specific projects based on these principles. As Dr. Young argued before the Committee, “I think the meaning of sustainable development is more likely to emerge as an outgrowth of practice” [40:18].

Building a common understanding among the Arctic states of the concept and implications of sustainable development will take time, and in the interim Arctic governments must ensure that the Arctic environment is protected (see Box 7 “Arctic Sustainable Development Principles”). This means that they must ensure that the critical work already well advanced under the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) does not suffer as it becomes part of the Arctic Council. The states must go further through a variety of both “soft” and “hard” legal-institutional instruments at the global, regional and national levels (see Box 8, “International Environmental Agreements Relevant to the Arctic”).

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<sup>119</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 56.

## Box 7 — “Arctic Sustainable Development Principles”

Governments around the world have agreed to pursue sustainable development, but little progress has been made bridging the gap between the definition of the concept popularized by the Brundtland Commission in 1987 — “development to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” — and the 40-chapter blueprint *Agenda 21* agreed to in 1992. Sustainable development cannot be implemented in the Arctic in isolation from the rest of the world; however, the Arctic peoples’ long sustainable development and utilization traditions, together with the region’s simpler ecosystems and smaller population, makes the results of unsustainability more obvious there, suggesting that progress toward sustainability may be more easily achieved in the Arctic than elsewhere. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference has played a key role over the years in ensuring that the Arctic sustainable development agenda goes beyond narrow environmentalism to reflect the knowledge, consciousness, needs and concerns of the indigenous peoples of the region; the relevant political declarations of the past several years have benefited from this challenging linking of environmental sustainability and human development principles.<sup>1</sup>

As Dr. Oran Young told the Committee, an important first step in addressing the “overarching theme of sustainable development” in the Arctic would be to articulate a set of sustainable development principles. As he noted, “Principles in this sense are not really the same as policies of the ordinary sort. Principles are general framework guidelines. . . general guiding themes people should pay attention to.” He continued:

Some principles that might be interesting in the Arctic context are things such as the principle of subsistence preference: with living resources, when there are not enough stocks to satisfy the demands of commercial, recreational, and subsistent users, subsistence users should get preference. Another principle could be the principle of co-management. With respect to decision-making regarding living resources, the user groups or communities should have a recognized voice in the decision-making process. Another principle could be the principle of subsidiarity. That is to say, decisions about Arctic issues should be made at the lowest level at which the competence to make these decisions exists, a principle that many of you will know has been widely developed and articulated in the European Union context. [40:5]

In addition to **subsistence preference**, **co-management** and **subsidiarity**, other useful principles of sustainable development in the Arctic might include: a **long-term perspective**, to ensure that the rate of use of renewable resources is compatible with the best knowledge of the rate of regeneration, and that the extraction of non-renewable resources takes into account the expected rate of discovery of new resources or substitute commodities; the **precautionary principle**, to ensure that all resource development is based on available scientific and local knowledge, and that, where such knowledge is insufficient, development should either be postponed until better knowledge is available or proceed only with extreme care; the **primacy of prior rights and clear responsibilities**, to ensure that all development programs and decisions in areas traditionally used by or claimed by indigenous peoples should be planned and undertaken with due regard to the rights, practices and responsibilities of the former or present inhabitants, and with their participation as appropriate. Any compensation for the disruption of traditional lifestyles and resources, for environmental liabilities, and responsibility for rehabilitation or alternate uses in the future should be clearly set out in advance, and there should be prior agreement about the period for which the various parties can be held responsible for “sustainability”; **true cost accounting**, to include both the direct and indirect economic, environmental, health, and other costs and benefits of development over short and longer periods; and use of **environmentally appropriate technologies and practices**, to ensure that the technologies and practices employed are suited to the environmental conditions of that part of the Arctic, compatible with the socio-cultural values of the residents, and have adequate monitoring and feedback so that they can be changed or improved with experience.

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<sup>1</sup> The Inuit Circumpolar Conference has produced a number of relevant statements and documents on this issue, including: *Towards an Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy* (1986); *Principles and Elements for a Comprehensive Arctic Policy* (1992); and *Agenda 21 From an Inuit Perspective* (1996).



## **Box 8 — “International Environmental Agreements Relevant to the Arctic”**

The post-war period has seen the creation of numerous multilateral environmental agreements, with a related tendency toward globalization of arrangements to address problems that cannot be controlled without global cooperation. Few specific binding agreements relate to the Arctic environment, but the Arctic is included within the scope of many broader international arrangements. The most significant of these agreements include:

### **A. Legally-Binding International Agreements**

#### **1. Prevention of Pollution**

Protection of the Seas: (1982) *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*; (1972) *Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and other Matter* (London Convention); (1972/78) *International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships* (MARPOL); (1992) *Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic* (OSPAR Convention).

Air Pollution: (1992) *Framework Convention on Climate Change*; (1985/88) *Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer*, including the *Montreal Protocol*; (1979) *Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution* (LRTAP) and Protocols.

Radioactive Pollution: (1994) *Convention on Nuclear Safety*; (1986) *Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident*; (1986) *Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency*.

#### **2. Protection of Wildlife and Habitats:**

(1992) *Convention on Biological Diversity*; (1973) *Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears and their Habitats*; *Convention and International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna* (CITES); (1971) *Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat* (RAMSAR); *The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling*; (1991) *Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context* (ESPOO).

### **B. “Soft Law” Agreements**

In addition to such “hard law” or legally-binding mechanisms, an increasing number of “soft law” political instruments have relevance to the Arctic, particularly: (1991) the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy; (1996) the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council; (1993) the Kirkenes Declaration; (1992) the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and Agenda 21; (1995) the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities.



The protection of the environment is the *sine qua non* of sustainability. Accordingly, after briefly looking at major environmental threats that can be addressed only through global responses, this chapter will look at the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, the principal international mechanism for environmental cooperation in the Arctic, and the broader environmental stewardship objectives of circumpolar cooperation. Chapter Six addresses circumpolar approaches to sustainable economic development that will benefit Arctic communities. Chapter Seven focusses on the human actors who must be the agents of such future development, which must therefore affirm the roles of indigenous peoples and provide for democratic participation and public accountability.

The growth of understanding of the environment in the late twentieth century has been one of the most significant processes in human history; nowhere is the environment more unique than in the Arctic. This uniqueness must be understood if policies are to be formulated for the region. As Fred Roots put it in a submission to the Committee, “the formulation and implementation of appropriate policies for the Arctic requires a knowledge of the environment and of the environmental consequences of alternative actions to a greater degree than is ordinarily required for policy decisions in other areas.”<sup>120</sup> While the Arctic environment is of most immediate concern to the residents of the region, it is also of concern internationally because the Arctic is an important world commons which will be affected first and hardest by such threats as global climate change.

Fortunately, environmental protection is already the most developed area of Arctic cooperation; in the words of Peter Prokosch of the World Wildlife Fund, “As a result of the Rovaneimi Process, the Arctic is the largest region in the world where environmental protection is the primary basis for international cooperation.”<sup>121</sup> This work must continue as a priority but, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, the new demands and opportunities in the region mean that environmental protection in itself is not enough. The challenge will be to use the Arctic Council and other mechanisms to continue the environmental protection work already begun through programs such as the AEPS, while linking it to broader economic, social and cultural progress through sustainable development. While the concept of “sustainable development” has been widely hailed as the paradigm for the future of the planet, a debate still rages over its exact meaning. The most widely used definition remains that of the Brundtland Commission, which argued in 1987 that “sustainable development” is development “to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”

The UN’s 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development produced a blueprint for sustainable development in the form of AGENDA 21, which called on

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<sup>120</sup> Dr. Fred Roots, *Environmental Issues in the Arctic — That Are Important to Policies and International Relations*, submitted to the Committee on 23 April 1996.

<sup>121</sup> Peter Prokosch, “Arctic Council Established — What’s Next?,” *WWF Arctic Bulletin*, No. 4.96, p. 3.

governments to prepare national sustainable development plans; by 1996 some 117 governments had begun this process. A UN Commission on Sustainable Development was also created in conjunction with Rio to review national implementation of AGENDA 21 and coordinate UN action. Beyond national plans, work is beginning on sustainable development plans for specific regions. In Stockholm, Committee members were briefed by Canadian Nicholas Sonntag, Executive Director of the Stockholm Environment Institute, on work now underway to develop a BALTIC 21 plan for the Baltic region. As he pointed out, this experience could be very useful in formulating sustainable development plans for other regions, including the Arctic. Also useful will be the ongoing work of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, in particular its 1996 publication *Agenda 21 From an Inuit Perspective*<sup>122</sup>.

### ***Global Environmental Issues Affecting the Arctic***

“The Arctic is an environmental early warning system for our globe.”

Hon. Sergio Marchi, Environment Minister,  
Ottawa,  
Statement at the Inauguration of the Arctic  
Council  
19 September 1996

Given the interdependence of global and regional environmental issues, Arctic challenges can be fully understood only as part of the global environmental agenda. At the broadest level, in order to protect the environment the Arctic states must first address the global issues that affect it. In the past quarter century, humanity has come belatedly to realize that, far from controlling the earth, it is only one part of the living environment or biosphere. Environmental concerns emerged first in individual countries; the realization that global environmental challenges demand global responses did not come easily to states used to unilateral action. As Donald McRae told the Committee, “If you ask how states have been able to deal with environmental issues through multilateral agreement, the answer is not very well and very slowly” [21:20]. The early 1970s saw important milestones in the development of global environmental awareness, with the holding of the UN’s Stockholm Conference on The Human Environment and the creation of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the major international institution dealing with environmental issues.

Understanding of the interdependence of environmental concerns deepened over the next quarter century, and the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development saw a number of achievements, such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, a Framework Convention on Climate Change and a Convention on

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<sup>122</sup> Inuit Circumpolar Conference, *Agenda 21 from an Inuit Perspective*, 1996.



Biological Diversity, and “Agenda 21,” which will have implications for generations to come. Progress on the broad agenda of sustainable development has been much too slow since Rio, but advances on the narrower issue of environmental protection provide some hope for future action on such critical issues as global climate change, the long-range transboundary transport of pollutants, and the loss of biodiversity.

The most significant and promising international environmental achievement in recent years has been action through the 1987 Montreal Protocol to reduce the production of gases that deplete the ozone layer. The success in this case is proof that states *can* deal effectively with global environmental problems and a valuable lesson for action on other issues. Speculation that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) could harm the earth’s protective ozone layer began in the mid-1970s; by the end of the decade, even before the scientific case was completely proved, popular pressure led to a ban on the use of CFCs in aerosol sprays in the Arctic states of Canada, the United States, Sweden and Norway. As research continued, governments began to develop mechanisms for addressing the problem, such as the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. After a large “ozone hole” was discovered above the Antarctic in 1985, citizens demanded action, and governments responded quickly with the Montreal Protocol.

In the opinion of one observer, this protocol was “a landmark in international environmental diplomacy,” whose subsequent success in reducing global CFC production “offered the first clear example that countries can work together to head off shared threats.” By 1995, the success of the Montreal Protocol was clear, as global production of CFCs was down 76% from its peak in 1988. An important point was that, although there was still some scientific debate over the exact role of CFCs in creating the ozone hole, states moved ahead even without conclusive proof of environmental damage. According to Hilary French,

Their actions represented the first significant application of the “precautionary principle” — an emerging tenet of international environmental law that stipulates that lack of complete scientific certainty is insufficient reason to delay an international policy response if such delay might result in serious or irreversible damage.<sup>123</sup>

The ozone case provides other lessons for future environmental action. The Montreal Protocol stipulated that the parties should reconvene periodically to determine if its provisions were adequate, and, as research continued and new information emerged, the Protocol was strengthened three times over the years. The Protocol also set new precedents in North-South relations, including the establishment of an Interim Multilateral Fund to reimburse developing countries for “all agreed incremental costs” of complying with it. In many respects, this fund was the model for the Global Environment Facility (GEF)

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<sup>123</sup> Hilary F. French, “Learning From the Ozone Experience,” in *State of the World 1997*, Worldwatch Institute, Washington D.C., 1997, p. 154-155.



established in 1991. The establishment of an intergovernmental panel pooling the expertise of independent, unbiased and knowledgeable scientists working on ozone issues also proved very useful.

Following the success on ozone, the international community must now address such major environmental challenges as human-induced climate change, long-range pollutants and the loss of biological diversity, and it must do so using the lessons of early and coordinated action learned from the ozone experience. Both climate change and biological diversity were the subject of Conventions at Rio and are now going through the slow process of scientific debate and government negotiations. As well, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has made significant progress in establishing a scientific consensus on the issue. Its Second Scientific Assessment Report, which involved more than 2,000 scientists from over 130 countries and took more than two and a half years to complete, concluded that “the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate.” The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change has begun to address the issue by requiring all states to prepare full inventories of greenhouse gas emissions and set out a national climate plan, with OECD countries and those in transition to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Unfortunately, global carbon emissions are still rising, and, according to one observer, “roughly half” of the states that signed the Convention are likely to miss their targets for emissions in the year 2000.<sup>124</sup> Canada acknowledged in December 1996 that it would be one of those states; while its emissions are declining, estimates are that they will still be some 8% above the baseline 1990 level by the year 2000.

Meeting in Berlin in April 1996, the parties concluded that the measures in the Convention were not sufficient; work is now underway to conclude by December 1997 a Kyoto Protocol to outline emissions targets beyond the year 2000; it is hoped that this will accomplish for climate change what the Montreal Protocol did for ozone depletion. In fact, in order to fully address the problem, the parties must also begin to negotiate reductions for developing countries, including such important states as China and India.

In the case of transboundary air pollution, the major international treaty is the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), signed by Canada and 19 European states in 1979, primarily to deal with the challenge of acid rain. Several protocols are already in force under this Convention, and work is underway to negotiate others on persistent organic pollutants (POPs), such as PCBs and dioxins, and heavy metals. The Convention does not apply to states outside Europe and North America, however. Given this limitation, work is now underway through the United Nations Environment Program to negotiate a global and legally binding POPs protocol.

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<sup>124</sup> Christopher Flavin, “The Legacy of Rio,” in *State of the World 1997*, p. 11.

The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity recognizes the “intrinsic” value of biodiversity. It provides the first comprehensive framework for preserving diversity across the globe and encourages the “sustainable and equitable use” of those resources. As a framework document for regional and national programs, the Convention lacks timetables, targets and enforcement mechanisms. It does, however, contain provisions that should assist implementation, such as a permanent secretariat, conferences of the contracting parties, technical cooperation measures and reporting requirements.

### ***The Arctic Environmental Agenda***

Noting the sensitivities and vulnerabilities of Arctic and northern terrestrial and marine ecosystems to chemical contaminants from both near and distant sources; the threats presented by such contaminants to the health of present and future generations, and the extreme difficulty, imposed by Arctic environmental conditions and biological processes, of removing such contamination or counteracting its effects once it has become dispersed in the Arctic regions;

That these sensitivities and vulnerabilities, and the challenges and opportunities presented by Arctic resources of many kinds, emphasize the continued need for protection of the environment and preservation of biological diversity in the Arctic region, and for respect for the principles of sustainable and responsible development in the utilization of its natural resources

*Conference Statement, Second Conference of  
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region,  
Yellowknife, March 1996*

The environmental challenges facing the Arctic region are particularly difficult, given that its unique environment, at the heart of the lives of Arctic peoples, is challenged in specific ways by global and regional threats. It must also be remembered that, while the Arctic is affected by global changes, the Arctic in turn significantly affects the global environment. The Arctic is in many respects a living laboratory, a cooling system for the planet, and, as Jørgen Taagholt of the Danish Polar Centre told the Committee in Copenhagen, an archive within whose ice sheets are stored thousands of years of vital environmental and other information. Although the 1992 Rio Summit itself did little to address the Arctic directly, Maurice Strong, the Canadian chair of that landmark conference, told the Committee in February 1997 that, “The Arctic regions of the world represent one of the most important pieces of the ecological structure of our world community. They have a very major bearing on our future out of proportion to the number of people living there” [65:10].

As it began its hearings, the Committee benefited from the testimony of Fred Roots, who pointed out that of all the realities that underlie Arctic issues, those related to the environment are the most fundamental. According to this witness,



The climate and geography of the North cause its low biological productivity. And this of course causes very limited and, more importantly, very fluctuating living resources from place to place and from time to time. Stability is not characteristic of low biological productivity, but rather fluctuation is. This leads, of course, to sparse and scattered human resources. . .the indigenous cultures adapted to the environment are small scale. [10:5]

Threats to the Arctic environment come from two main sources. The most serious threats come from outside in the form of man-made pollutants such as POPs, heavy metals, and radionuclides, carried mainly by air but also by water from lower latitudes. As a Norwegian researcher observes: "Anywhere in the world can be a source region for contaminants in the Arctic."<sup>125</sup> Other threats come from within the region, from increased human activity, particularly that associated with the exploitation of oil and other non-renewable resources. Environmental concerns in the Arctic can therefore generally be grouped into three areas: global environmental change and its effects; the increase and spread of pollutants; and habitat alteration and destruction.

### ***Towards Multilateral Cooperation: The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS)***

The Arctic countries realize that the pollution problems of today do not respect national boundaries and that no state alone will be able to act effectively against environmental threats to the Arctic. . . The implementation of an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy will therefore benefit the Arctic countries and the world at large.

*Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy,  
Chapter 1, 1991*

Arctic nations such as Canada, the United States, and the Scandinavian countries were among the first to see the emergence of national environmental concern, and, since the end of the Cold War, the Arctic states have made significant progress on regional environmental cooperation. While such cooperation in northern Europe continues as one element of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region process, its centrepiece in the Arctic is the six-year-old Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, whose work will be integrated into the Arctic Council after the final AEPS Ministerial, to be held in Tromsø in June 1997. The AEPS is not perfect, with criticism focussing over the years on the facts that it is non-binding, underfunded and too narrow. Nonetheless, as Oran Young told the Committee, "a remarkable amount has happened under the auspices of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy" [40:2], both in terms of progress on scientific research and assessment and lessons that can be applied to the broader Arctic Council.

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<sup>125</sup> Dr. Frank Wania of Norway's Institute of Air Research quoted by Andrew Nilsforuk, "Arctic Pollution: Poisons for a Pristine Land," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 20 July 1996, p. D8. For a useful survey see Hajo Versteeg, "Environmental Contaminants in the Arctic," Theme Paper for the Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Yellowknife, March 1996.



Attempts to launch Arctic environmental cooperation initiatives during the 1950s and 1960s failed because of the Cold War. In an atmosphere of improved East-West relations and increased awareness of the deterioration of the Arctic environment, Finland in 1989 officially launched what would become known as the "Rovaniemi process" to examine the possibilities for circumpolar environmental cooperation, including, where appropriate, action based on legally binding agreements.<sup>126</sup> Over the next two years, the more ambitious aspects of the initiative were pared back for a number of reasons, including some that resurfaced during the negotiations to establish the Arctic Council.

The Arctic states finally agreed to formalize the Finnish initiative and at Rovaniemi, Finland, in 1991, the first ministerial meeting on the Arctic Environment resulted in a Ministerial Declaration on Protection of the Arctic Environment and an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). The text of the Strategy was drafted mainly by Canadian officials and "strongly reflects Canadian thinking," according to Robert Huebert.<sup>127</sup> It consisted of a set of objectives and principles; identification of six main types of pollutants and priority areas for action (persistent organic pollutants, oil pollution, radioactivity, heavy metals, acidification and noise); identification of the existing mechanisms for the protection of the Arctic environment; and proposed action for countering the pollutants. In an omission later criticized, the Strategy did not address systemic global environmental change, noting that "other environmental problems including the depletion of the ozone layer and global warming were not addressed because they were already being addressed in other fora."

In order to implement the Strategy, the states agreed to meet on a regular basis at ministerial level, to involve indigenous peoples, and to establish four working groups of experts to concentrate on specific areas. The working groups were based on the main programs of the Strategy: the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP); the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF). The working groups operate through a system of lead countries. As Ambassador Simon acknowledged in a 1996 interview, "There is no legal obligation for the governments to contribute to these programs so any funding committed is on a voluntary basis. That has been a weakness, however at the moment it is the only way in which the countries are willing to cooperate."<sup>128</sup> In terms of their operation, the working groups allow the representatives of the various Arctic states to coordinate their work in specific areas, and, as Robert Huebert notes, "For the most part these working groups and task forces have

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<sup>126</sup> David Scrivener, *Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic* (1996), Library No. 1/1996, Oslo, p. 6.

<sup>127</sup> Robert Huebert, "The Canadian Arctic and the Development of an International Environmental Regime," Draft paper prepared for the 1995 Canadian Political Science Association Meeting, Montreal, June 1995, p. 12.

<sup>128</sup> Interview with Canada's Arctic Ambassador Mary Simon, "Ensure that Environmental Protection in the Arctic is Secured," *WWF Arctic Bulletin* No. 1.96, p. 8.

two main objectives, to determine the nature and extent of the problem and to examine options to remedy them.”<sup>129</sup>

The AEPS has expanded significantly since Rovaniemi, broadening both its participation and its agenda. As Saami Council representatives told Committee members in Tromsø, the second AEPS Ministerial, held in Nuuk, Greenland, in 1993, increased the participation of indigenous peoples in the AEPS. Pressure from the Inuit Circumpolar Conference also resulted in the broadening of the AEPS agenda. The Ministers at Rovaniemi had considered the establishment of a working group on sustainable development; however because the United States and others were suspicious of the concept, preferring the more limited term “environmental protection,” no agreement was reached. Over the next two years, the ICC criticized the AEPS for its narrow focus on conservation, and Canada finally convinced the other states to expand the agenda beyond pollution and conservation and establish a Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization (TFSDU) that would propose steps the states should take to meet their commitment to sustainable development in the Arctic. Finally, although the Rio Summit in the previous year had conspicuously ignored the Arctic, the Nuuk ministerial stressed the links between the AEPS and Rio and emphasized the importance of adopting the principles of the Rio Declaration, even calling the Nuuk Ministerial document *The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development*. The Ministers also pointed to the need for “precautionary approaches” to environmental protection, and for strong national legislation in the Arctic states.

At the third AEPS Ministerial, held in Inuvik in March 1996, just days after the Yellowknife Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, the Ministers reflected the new broader agenda of the AEPS by issuing an *Inuvik Declaration on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development* (see Box 9 “AEPS Objectives and Commitments: Rovaniemi to Inuvik and Beyond”). The Ministers also upgraded the TFSDU to a working group and expanded its mandate to include sustainable economic development; however, given the uncertainties surrounding the role of sustainable development in the Arctic Council, this change was made “pending the expeditious creation of the Arctic Council.” With the creation of that Council in the fall of 1996, the Working Group on Sustainable Development and Utilization effectively ceased to function, although its preliminary work in such areas as creating a plan for the regional application of Agenda 21 in the Arctic will be presented to the final AEPS Ministerial, and can serve as a basis for future work.

A good example of the significant scientific work done by all the AEPS working groups is that of AMAP, the “cornerstone” of the AEPS, according to Robert Huebert. As a

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<sup>129</sup> Robert Huebert, “The Canadian Arctic and the Development of an International Environmental Regime” (1995), p. 15.



### Box 9 — “AEPS Objectives and Commitments: Rovaniemi to Inuvik and Beyond”

Finland launched the “Rovaniemi process” in 1989 and, following two years of discussions, the First Ministerial meeting on the Arctic Environment, held at Rovaniemi in June 1991, resulted in a Ministerial Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment and an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). The objectives of the latter are:

(i) to protect the Arctic ecosystem, including humans; (ii) to provide for the protection, enhancement and restoration of environmental quality and the sustainable utilization of natural resources, including their use by local populations and indigenous peoples in the Arctic; (iii) to recognize and, to the extent possible, seek to accommodate the traditional and cultural needs, values and practices of the indigenous peoples, as determined by themselves, related to the protection of the Arctic environment; (iv) to review regularly the state of the Arctic environment; and (v) to identify, reduce and, as a final goal, eliminate pollution.

As noted in the text, the second AEPS ministerial meeting, in Nuuk, Greenland, in September 1993, saw the adoption of *The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic*, which recognized the special role of indigenous groups in the protection of the Arctic environment, established an AEPS Task Force on Sustainable Development and sustainable use of renewable resources and stressed the links between the AEPS and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development the previous year. The third AEPS Ministerial, held in Inuvik in March 1996, resulted in the *Inuvik Declaration on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development in the Arctic*. At a joint meeting of the Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Environment and Sustainable Development held in May 1996, the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, Charles Caccia, compared the Inuvik Declaration with that of the Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, held in Yellowknife only weeks earlier. In his words, “the Yellowknife declaration is strong, very action-oriented and very little process-oriented. It has a very precise sense of mandate, so to speak. The ministerial instead, you will see, is very much process oriented. Also, it speaks about environmental protection of the Arctic and that’s all it says, nothing more, very little.” [18:11]

Apart from accepting reports from and mandating the AEPS Working Groups and committing ministers to the earliest possible establishment of the Arctic Council, the following excerpts from the Inuvik Declaration highlight points which remain central to the Arctic environmental agenda:

1. **We reaffirm** our commitment to protection of the Arctic environment as a priority, and to the implementation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), as outlined in the Rovaniemi and Nuuk Declarations.



. . .

5. **We recognize** that a strong and vibrant AEPS is an essential component of a sustainable development approach in the Arctic, and emphasize the importance of integrating the AEPS Programmes with Arctic economics and social initiatives to uphold the principles of sustainable development. In view of this we **agree** to establish a Working Group on Sustainable Development and Utilization (SDU).
6. **We set the following priorities** for Senior Arctic Affairs Officials (SAAOs) and the AEPS Programmes.

For SAAOs, the priorities are directing the AEPS process and providing integration, policy and management direction to the AEPS programmes and the AEPS Secretariat, as well as conducting an assessment of the present organizational structure of the AEPS with a view to ensuring cost-effective and well coordinated programmes; developing a framework and estimate for common-cost sharing, including in-kind contributions for our consideration at the next Ministerial Conference; and exploring opportunities for obtaining funds from other international programmes and international financial institutions. The SAAOs, with the assistance of the permanent participants, will also undertake to develop revised Terms of Reference for SDU and an initial workplan for the Arctic Council's sustainable development work, to be presented for discussion to the Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs).

. . .

For SDU, the priority is for the Working Group to continue to operate with the current terms of reference of the Task Force on SDU and with specific direction from the SAAOs, pending the expeditious creation of the Arctic Council.

. . .

7. **We note with satisfaction** the establishment of the Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat and the support it has given the AEPS permanent participants to facilitate their participation in the AEPS. We further note the success of the Seminar on Integration of Indigenous Peoples' Knowledge held in Iceland, and its useful recommendations, and express our thanks to the governments of Denmark and Iceland for moving forward this major component of the AEPS.
8. **We recognize and affirm** the right of all Arctic indigenous peoples to be represented in the AEPS. We acknowledge the contributions of the AEPS permanent participants, and encourage them and other indigenous peoples' organizations to participate

actively in the work of the AEPS. We emphasize the importance of indigenous peoples and their knowledge to the AEPS and its programmes.

9. **We affirm** the need for a clear statement of ethical principles for research, data gathering and dissemination, agreeable to all countries, to Arctic indigenous peoples and to other northern residents and to the scientific community; we note the work underway by the AEPS and the International Arctic Sciences Committee (IASC). We urge that this work be completed and presented at the next ministerial meeting.
10. **We support** the efforts of the Russian Federation in addressing the environmental problems in the Russian Arctic bearing in mind the Declaration of the Pan-European Ministerial Conference in Sofia, October 1995 in which matters concerning environmental financing in the central and eastern European countries for reducing current levels of pollution and the risk of environmental degradation are given particular attention
11. **We support** the continuing negotiations and collaboration in relevant international fora to integrate the AEPS with local, regional, circumpolar and global environmental protection activities such as: the work currently undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to prepare for the negotiation of a global legally binding instrument for controlling emissions and discharges of persistent organic pollutants (POPs); the protocol negotiations on POPs and metals under the framework of the UN ECE–LRTAP Convention; the International Atomic Energy Agency's International Arctic Seas Assessment Programme; and highly value the contribution being made by the AEPS countries in the evolution of new international agreements.

. . .

13. **We agree to cooperate** with the Russian Federation in searching for investments required for implementing programmes and projects aimed at the conservation and restoration of the traditional habitats of the indigenous peoples of the North of the Russian Federation.
14. **We agree** to ensure implementation of the priorities as listed in the present *Declaration* and to make every effort to provide and maintain the necessary resources to enable each country and indigenous peoples to participate fully in the activities of the AEPS.

The fourth and final AEPS ministerial will take place in Tromsø, Norway, in June 1997.



Department of Foreign Affairs publication noted in late 1995, "The work of AMAP is a good example of the AEPS in action. Backed by scientific evidence and combined political strength, the Arctic countries have brought the issue of persistent organic pollutants to the attention of the international community."<sup>130</sup> AMAP is also to produce its long-awaited *State of the Arctic Environment* report immediately before the Tromsø Ministerial. While the AEPS itself will not meet again after Tromsø, the working groups will be given a plan for future work by the Ministers there. Thus the work of the AEPS can continue as the Arctic Council decides whether it wants to recreate its own system of standing working groups to continue working between ministerial meetings. A minority view would prefer the abolition of the standing working groups in favour of a more project-oriented approach; however, the majority of states are likely to prefer a system which can continue work between ministerial meetings, although this might require more flexible task forces or expert groups.

During its travel in Europe, the Committee was repeatedly warned of the importance of not allowing the work of the AEPS to be diminished under the Arctic Council, either by being marginalized within the new broader agenda or because of the failure of the Arctic Council itself. In particular, David Scrivener told the Committee in Cambridge that the results of the AEPS self-assessment currently being undertaken by Norway will yield valuable lessons for the functioning of the Arctic Council. Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 18**

**The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada, as the first chair of the Arctic Council, restate its commitment to the continuation and strengthening of the environmental protection work of the AEPS under the Arctic Council. In addition, while the specific mechanisms may change, Canada should stress that the Tromsø Ministerial should adopt a significant plan for each of the AEPS working groups, to ensure that their work continues. Given the importance of the six years of work carried out by the AEPS, the procedural and other recommendations of the AEPS self-assessment currently being undertaken by Norway should be adopted for use by the Arctic Council.**

#### ***Beyond the AEPS***

Those of us who have looked closely at the documents that have come out of the AEPS acknowledge that it has played a major role in our understanding of Arctic environmental issues. But the two major focusses of the AEPS have been on the examination of existing international cooperative measures and how bad the problem is. The question now that will be facing the Arctic Council is what steps will be taken?  
[15:13]

Robert Huebert

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<sup>130</sup> "The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy," *Global Agenda*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Ottawa, December 1995, p. 5.



As a mechanism, the AEPS has been criticized from a number of perspectives over the years. For environmentalist NGOs, the principal flaws of AEPS have been its non-binding nature, the fact that it has addressed issues in a piecemeal fashion, and the fact that it has been slow to link itself to broader global issues.<sup>131</sup> For others, the AEPS has been both underfunded and too rigid, with working groups seemingly taking on lives of their own after formation. As Chaturvedi concluded,

The Rovaneimi process is no doubt a concrete and relevant step in the direction of realizing environmental protection for the Arctic. However, given the linkages between economic development and conservation practices, and the need for proactive (rather than reactive) management of increasingly diverse exploitation of the Arctic natural environment, a far more comprehensive and legally binding regime is required. Arctic-specific realities require such a regime to be based on the principles of sustainable development. . . Treating the symptoms of unsustainability only, while the fundamental causes remain more or less untouched, may not lead the Arctic countries far enough on the road to sustainable development. Even the former require far more specific commitments of both a political and a financial nature from the Arctic states than has been the case so far.<sup>132</sup>

In fact, while the “soft law nature” of the AEPS may not be ideal, it allowed cooperation at a time when the Arctic states were unwilling to commit themselves to formal agreements, and such mechanisms can often set the stage for more binding ones later. Nevertheless, the witnesses and others whom the Committee met recognize the need for the Arctic states both to preserve the core work of the AEPS, and to move beyond it, through the Arctic Council and other mechanisms, to address the important environmental issues identified by the AEPS. While binding mechanisms are obviously preferable if they can be negotiated, the success of the AEPS shows that the Arctic states should not limit their cooperation only to those areas where binding agreements are possible.

Oran Young also suggested to the Committee two complementary approaches to the broad ecological problems of the Arctic. The first would take advantage of the fact that a number of global agreements — such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1973/78 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) — include the Arctic, and can perhaps be adapted to better suit its specific needs. As Dr. Young argues “At this stage, it would make sense to initiate a systematic review of existing global environmental agreements in order to see which ones contain provisions authorizing special supplements designed to deal with the needs of individual regions to determine which of these seem particularly relevant to the Arctic.”<sup>133</sup> Nigel Bankes, past chair of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee and currently of the University of Calgary, pointed out to the Committee that taking advantage of such

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<sup>131</sup> Paul Samson, *Thin Ice: International Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic*, Pacific Press, Wellington, New Zealand, 1997, 69-70.

<sup>132</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 245-246.

<sup>133</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 63.

agreements also means taking responsibility for their success; Canada should accordingly ratify existing agreements such as the Law of the Sea Convention.

Sarah Climenhaga, of the World Wildlife Fund, agreed that existing agreements should be used to further Arctic environmental protection. She told the Committee that the Arctic states should use the information gained under the AEPS and “take action through other existing international agreements” [27:13]. As we will see in Chapter Nine, the same broad strategy of employing existing mechanisms in novel ways led Nigel Bankes to advocate joint Canada-U.S. World Heritage Designation under the UNESCO World Heritage Convention as a way of solving a bilateral issue and providing long-term international protection of the calving grounds of the Porcupine Caribou herd.<sup>134</sup>

Accordingly:

### **Recommendation 19**

**The Committee recommends that the Government initiate a systematic review of existing global environmental agreements to see which contain provisions authorizing special supplements for dealing with the needs of individual regions and determine which of these are particularly relevant to the Arctic. Canada should also move quickly to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention, and, as recommended by the AEPS Ministers at Inuvik, the Government should encourage all Arctic states to ratify international agreements relevant to the Arctic.**

Oran Young’s second suggestion would involve adopting a strategy of “mitigation” and seeking to alter behaviour that causes environmental problems in the Arctic. The most promising mechanism for doing this is through Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). As Dr. Young told the Committee:

There’s an effort under way now to see whether we could come up at the Arctic level with some mutually agreeable set of environmental assessment guidelines that would be shared by all the members of the Arctic Council. I think that’s an interesting initiative, not only to deal with transboundary and cumulative types of impacts but to share experiences on what kinds of practices in environmental assessment seem to have produced good results in environmental protection in different countries. [40:18]

By working toward such a common set of standards, the Arctic states would be protecting both the region as a whole and the territory of individual states like Russia. Observers agree that the Russian North is desperately in need of strong environmental standards, especially given the likelihood of increased resource extraction there in the

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<sup>134</sup> Nigel Bankes, *Notes For Remarks to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade*, 31 May 1996.



near future. As Alf Håkon Hoel told the Committee at the University of Tromsø, the current fear in northern Europe is of future oil and other development carried out with a combination of U.S. capital and Russian environmental standards. As mentioned earlier, Northern Forum Director and former Alaskan Governor Stephen Cowper also argued that common environmental standards are necessary in the region. Nicholas Poushinsky argued before the Committee in Whitehorse that environmental standards in the Arctic must be harmonized “up” to prevent mining and other companies from fleeing to jurisdictions (such as Russia) with lower standards.

Major pollution sources within the Arctic region are largely limited to the industrialized Kola peninsula and White Sea region. As noted in Chapter Four, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Mikhailov told the Committee in Moscow that contamination by heavy metals and chemicals was a more serious and imminent threat to health and the environment in the Murmansk region than nuclear contamination. Significant damage has already been done in the Russian North by oil and gas extraction, with an estimated six million hectares of reindeer pasture destroyed in the Yamal-Nenets region alone over the past two decades. The Komi oil spill in 1994 was another warning of the scale of the danger, and, as Committee members heard at the World Conservation and Monitoring Centre in Cambridge, the Internet quickly helped researchers understand and communicate the scale of the damage. George Newton and Garrett Brass of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission agreed that oil was a major concern in Russia. According to Newton,

Last spring, on the Senate floor, Senator Murkowski provided our country with a very grim picture of the Russian oil infrastructure. The pipelines and the system that transport oil were leaking oil onto the Russian soil at a rate equal to one *Exon Valdez* a day. A day! The degree of severity of that problem is astounding. We tend to worry about radioactivity — and indeed we should — but the oil contamination is almost overwhelming when one thinks about it. . . Oil is Russia’s largest cash crop. Unfortunately they don’t have the means to deliver to the market at the present time. It’s a real dilemma. How do you control it to enable them to survive, prosper, grow, develop and convert to an enterprise-based, democratic way of life, yet at the same time not rain havoc on the rest of the world in their efforts to do so? [62:10]

As Professor Peter Williams of Carleton University pointed out to the Committee during meetings at Cambridge University, these problems will also put a premium on soil remediation expertise, such as that developed at Carleton in collaboration with the Scott Polar Research Institute and others. Some Canadian assistance is being directed at raising environmental standards in Russia; CIDA announced in 1996 that it would help establish a centre for Arctic environmental assessment in Moscow. Given that further resources development will take place in the Russian Arctic, as Garrett Brass argued, “perhaps the most promising avenue is that future developments will probably be done in a major way with joint venture developments. The developed country companies that engage in those joint ventures will bring their environmental standards to bear” [62:14].



While the Russian case is the most striking, the need for a strong system of Environmental Impact Assessment applies equally to all Arctic states. It has been underlined in Canada in the past two years as a result of the controversial BHP plan to mine diamonds in the Northwest Territories. As Sarah Climenhaga put it to the Committee, "Current environmental assessment procedures are not adequate to protect the vulnerable Arctic environment. Proposals for a diamond mining project in the central Arctic illustrate this inadequacy, as they are being considered without regard to the cumulative impacts of the mining initiatives that are likely to be launched in the Northwest Territories over the next few years" [27:11]. The Committee was briefed on the proposed BHP mine in Yellowknife by BHP, CARC and others. Kevin O'Reilly of CARC, who appeared before the Committee in Yellowknife, has pointed out that Canada set a high standard for environmental assessment in the North with the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline (Berger) inquiry in the mid-1970s. Following a debate in the early 1990s, the current *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act* was proclaimed in January 1995.

After extensive public hearings in the North, the four-person panel charged with the environmental assessment of the BHP mine issued its report in mid-1996. Most have welcomed the subsequent socio-economic and environmental agreements that will allow the BHP project to begin; however, Kevin O'Reilly and others remain critical of the environmental assessment process itself, arguing that it was "fundamentally flawed; the process was neither rigorous, comprehensive nor fair." Mr. O'Reilly stated that the Government's decision to give conditional approval to the mine had been taken despite the environmental assessment panel's "superficial report and over-general recommendations" and not because of it.<sup>135</sup> In January 1997, the World Wildlife Fund announced that, following their discussions, the Government had agreed to strengthen its environmental assessment procedures so that any future project subject to the Act must take into consideration the impact of the project on existing protected areas throughout Canada, and on the opportunity to complete a network of protected areas for the natural region in which the project is located.<sup>136</sup>

Some progress has already been made in developing common environmental assessment standards in the Arctic. As Garrett Brass told the Committee, the AEPS Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment has developed a draft set of voluntary guidelines for offshore oil development using the best modern standards and technologies. He explained, "once again, not to be coy about it, it's aimed primarily at the Russian experience so that they'll understand what best practices in the West are"[62:15]. Finland argued at the Nuuk Ministerial in 1993 for an Environmental Impact Assessment expert group; however, Canada and the United States argued that as the first

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<sup>135</sup> Kevin O'Reilly, "Diamond Mining and the Demise of Environmental Assessment in the North," *Northern Perspectives*, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Fall/Winter 1996.

<sup>136</sup> *Canada Withdraws Court Action on BHP Diamond Mine*, World Wildlife Fund News Release, 13 January 1997.

priority all the Arctic states should ratify the 1991 *ESPOO Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context*, although this, by definition, does not cover activities that take place solely within states. In the end, the issue was given to the existing Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization. Finland has continued to lead work in this area, and has produced draft *Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in the Arctic*. While these are only voluntary guidelines and not perfect, they do provide a basis for further work. Accordingly:

## **Recommendation 20**

**The Government should increase efforts to develop common standards for Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic, and should ensure that the draft guidelines prepared through the AEPS are adopted for this purpose by the final AEPS Ministerial in Tromsø.**

As the Arctic states move beyond the AEPS, then, they have at their disposal a solid and growing body of scientific knowledge and, in the Arctic Council, a new higher-level mechanism for coordinating regional action and putting regional priorities on the global agenda. These resources will be challenged immediately as the states are being forced to respond to such broader challenges as climate change, pollutants and related health concerns, and the loss of biodiversity.

## ***Climate Change and the Arctic***

While debate over the details will continue for years, the Arctic will be the part of the world affected first and hardest by global climate change. As Louise Comeau of the Sierra Club of Canada put it to the Committee, all the “laudable goals” of circumpolar cooperation are at risk from climate change [27:8]. According to Fred Roots, while climate models differ in detail, “all of those accepted for serious discussion indicate that the effect of global warming will be most dramatic in Arctic regions.” According to him, an average of the more “conservative” models indicates that the increase in the Arctic is likely to be two and a half to four times greater than that in lower latitudes.<sup>137</sup> Often unrecognized in the South is the fact that the Arctic, rather than being simply a passive victim of global warming and likely to experience increased snowiness, the disappearance of sea ice, and problems of permafrost stability, will go on to affect the rest of the globe. The region contains large quantities of carbon and methane gas trapped in its permafrost which will be released into the atmosphere if the permafrost melts and further hasten global warming. The melting of glaciers and ice sheets will also contribute to a rise in the sea level and the possible flooding of coastal areas.

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<sup>137</sup> Fred Roots, *Environmental Issues in the Arctic* (1996).



A six-year study initiated by Environment Canada in 1990 concluded that climate change has already been observed in Canada's Mackenzie Basin region, which includes parts of the Yukon and Northwest Territories as well as northern British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan. There has been a warming trend of 1.5° C this century, and there is evidence that this has lowered lake levels and thawed permafrost. Kevin Jardine of Greenpeace pointed out to the Committee that, while northerners may not often speak about "global warming," they are already observing significant climate changes, and are concerned about such things as increased drought, dropping water levels and forest fires [27:18].

Regional action by the Arctic states can obviously be only a partial response to this global threat, but regional **coordination** of action will be very important, given that, in the words of the Worldwatch Institute, the United States and Russia are two of the eight "environmental heavyweights" ("E-8") which "disproportionately shape global environmental trends."<sup>138</sup> While Russia faces grave ecological and other challenges, after a hiatus of several years the United States now seems to be resuming the environmental leadership role it played through the later 1980s. Louise Comeau told the Committee that a coordinated circumpolar policy could actually help the Clinton administration in its struggle with Congress over environmental issues. As she put it, "As the Committee knows, the U.S. administration has not received much support from Congress for action on environmental issues. Support from the Arctic Council could strengthen the U.S. administration's hand in climate negotiations" [27:7]. Increased support from Congress would also help improve U.S. environmental performance and cooperation in general, since, as Garrett Brass of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission told the Committee, budget cuts had already affected the U.S. contribution to the AEPS. In his words, "We had already been doing what, in our own self-criticism, we considered to be a rather inferior job in AEPS because of the budget restrictions we're all going through. We didn't want to do a worse job in the Council than we had already been doing in the AEPS if its responsibilities were larger" [62:13].

At the same time, according to Louise Comeau, another major role for the Arctic Council would be to show the world the extent to which the Arctic is affected by climate change. As she argued:

Under the climate change convention there's a global environment facility. If northern communities were in developing countries, they could apply to that fund for financing to help them adapt to climate change. . . Canadian northern communities cannot apply to that fund, and they are just as affected by these issues, through no fault of their own, as any of the countries in the Caribbean or in Africa. [27:14]

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<sup>138</sup> Christopher Flavin, "The Legacy of Rio" (1997), p. 6.



The Arctic Council, in Ms. Comeau's view, could help to make the South more aware of its impact on the North, and accept some responsibility.

The hope I have for the Arctic Council is that it will establish itself as a presence in defence of the Arctic, a political presence — and that's what we're lacking. You don't see either Arctic representation or indigenous representation. . .demanding that the South take responsibility, demanding that we have international protocols on persistent organic pollutants, sulphur dioxide, and greenhouse gas emissions. We need a political presence.

So while it's very important that local issues be dealt with, issues related to contaminants and existing problems, the real role of the Arctic Council, for me, is a political presence that gets the issues on the agenda and starts to articulate those interests in every form possible. That's what I'm lacking. That's what I'm not seeing yet. [27:14]

Nigel Bankes agreed that Arctic issues should be more closely related to the global agenda, arguing that "Canada should give Arctic issues prominence in global and multilateral treaty negotiations. . .Canadian negotiators and this Committee should always be encouraged to ask 'what are the implications of such and so convention for the Arctic' "?<sup>139</sup> The Arctic states must also understand their own share of responsibility for global environmental problems and solutions. According to Kevin Jardine,

The Arctic Council has a unique role to play, because it's not only representing the North; it's also representing the South. We have to remember that the eight countries on the Arctic Council, whether it's Russia, the United States, Canada or various representatives of the European Union, are also the countries creating the greenhouse gas problem, primarily. They're the countries emitting the persistent organic pollutants and so on.

So one of the reasons Greenpeace is very interested in the Arctic Council is that it's not only an organization that can represent the interests of an area that has been very much affected by global environmental destruction, but it's also made up of the very countries that are causing most of the problem. [27:17]

While the greatest impact will come from a coordinated approach to climate change and other issues, the Arctic states must begin by developing their positions at the national level. As Louise Comeau pointed out to the Committee, the Canadian Government has created a nongovernment Stakeholders Advisory Group to facilitate the development of Canada's position in the climate change negotiations. This Group is chaired by the Departments of Environment and Foreign Affairs, which lead the Canadian delegation at international climate negotiations. Given the importance of the issue to the North, however, Louise Comeau recommended the inclusion of a northern perspective in the Advisory

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<sup>139</sup> Nigel Bankes, *Notes For Remarks to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade*, 31 May 1996.

Group, either from DIAND, the Canadian Polar Commission or the office of the Circumpolar Ambassador.

Accordingly:

### **Recommendation 21**

**The Committee recommends that the Government renew its efforts, in cooperation with the other Arctic states, to work toward stronger international action on climate change. Given the importance of this issue to the Arctic and the need for an Arctic perspective, the Government should also appoint the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador as a co-chair of the nongovernment Stakeholders Advisory Group, to be backed up by appropriate environmental expertise within the Circumpolar Affairs Division recommended in Chapter Two.**

### ***Long-Range Pollutants and Health Concerns***

As we have seen, pollution originating within the Arctic is largely limited to northern Russia. The rest of the Arctic was long thought to be protected from pollutants by its distance from the centres of human activity. Over the past two decades, however, scientists have realized that the Arctic is in some senses a “sink” for chemicals originating in the southern latitudes and carried North primarily by air, but also by water. One obvious manifestation of this pollution is the brown smog known as “Arctic haze,” in the words of Oran Young, “a seasonal soup of pollutants originating in the mid-latitudes, [which] rivals the air pollution over Los Angeles or Mexico City during peak periods.”

The 1986 Chernobyl disaster highlighted the degree to which what Dr. Roots described as a “comparatively small amount” of radioactivity could find its way into the Arctic. Saami representatives in Norway told the Committee of the lingering effects of Chernobyl on their reindeer herds. The Arctic region has seen ozone depletion (though not to the same extent as the Antarctic); reduction of CFC production under the Montreal Protocol has been particularly welcome, although Arctic peoples may still be threatened by the enhanced intensity of ultra-violet radiation in the North due to reflection from snow or ice.

Among the most far-travelled pollutants found in the Arctic are chemicals such as DDT, PCBs and toxaphene, and heavy metals such as mercury. Although many of these have been banned in northern states for years, they are still used in the South, and may travel to the Arctic from as far away as India, China or Guatemala. The amount of these pollutants in the North may actually be lower than in the South, but the chemicals are very persistent and collect in fatty tissue; as northerners eat more fatty “country foods” than southerners,



the health threat to them may be much more significant. As an example, the highest known concentrations of PCBs have been found in the breast milk of women in the Canadian Arctic who eat large quantities of local fish and wildlife. As one member of the Committee told witnesses "Personally, I was nearly stunned in Resolute Bay, one evening as we attended a graduation ceremony, when I saw mothers giving the bottle to their infants. I was very shocked to see that. We were told that breast milk is very contaminated with chemical pollutants, mercury and some other mineral" [27:12].

As mentioned above, all Arctic states and a number of other European nations are already parties to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP). This Convention commits the contracting parties to broad principles and objectives and provides a framework for coordinating pollution control measures and common emission standards; however, only two protocols are in force, one for nitrogen oxides and one for sulphur. Two more have been developed but are not yet in force, and three more are being considered. From an Arctic point of view the most significant of these relates to POPs, and it now seems likely that a POPs protocol under the LRTAP Convention will be negotiated by the end of 1997. Work is also taking place under the LRTAP Convention to negotiate a protocol on heavy metals, but this will take longer. While the work through the UN Environment Program (UNEP) to negotiate a legally binding global protocol on POPs is welcome, it will take some time to complete. Meeting at Inuvik in March 1996, AEPS ministers agreed "to engage non UN-ECE countries in the reduction of global pollution." Arctic states cannot afford to wait until a legally binding global instrument on POPs is negotiated.

Accordingly:

## **Recommendation 22**

**The Committee recommends that, in cooperation with other Arctic Council states and aboriginal permanent participants, Canada redouble efforts to conclude LRTAP protocols on POPs and heavy metals and a legally binding protocol on POPs. In the meantime, the Committee recommends that Canada and the other Arctic states continue work to identify those states that are the major sources of pollutants in the Arctic, and to encourage and assist them to phase out the contaminant chemicals of greatest concern.**

On the national level, Canadian scientists began realizing that high levels of pollutants were entering the Arctic ecosystem in 1980, and work began seriously with the establishment of an interagency technical committee in 1985. In 1989, this committee was expanded to include indigenous groups, and became known as the Northern Contaminants Program, delivering advice to northerners on the health aspects of their



traditionally harvested foods and pursuing contaminant emission controls in the international arena.<sup>140</sup>

In 1991, as part of its Green Plan initiative, the Canadian Government launched a six-year Arctic Environmental Strategy (AES) to look at four issues: environment/economy integration; action on waste; action on water; and action on contaminants. While significant progress has been made in all these areas (including the clean-up of former military sites described in Chapter Four), the \$25- million Northern Contaminants Program has been a particular success, giving Canada the most comprehensive set of data on Arctic contaminants in the world, which it has shared with other states through the AEPS. Since the AES was initially funded for six years, it is due to end in the spring of 1997; however, the Government has announced that it will continue funding at least the contaminants element of the AES, which currently costs some \$ 5-6 million per year. In 1996, DIAND published *The Arctic Environmental Strategy: Five Years of Progress*. A more comprehensive *Canadian Arctic Contaminants Assessment Report*, summarizing the work carried out under the AES and suggesting areas for future priorities, will be released in April 1997. While this report will deal primarily with contamination and health issues in the Canadian North, it will also address the circumpolar situation.

Testifying before the Committee in February 1997, Whit Fraser, the Chairman of the Canadian Polar Commission (CPC), argued strongly that simply refunding the existing Northern Contaminants Program was not enough. According to the recommendations of the Commission's October 1996 conference *For Generations to Come*, what is needed is a new national program (to include northern Quebec, Labrador and the northern portions of some provinces) which would focus more clearly on the links between human health and contaminants. The Commission also proposed the creation of a small blue-ribbon panel to look more closely at these issues and advise the Government on future priorities.

The presence of contaminants in food is a major health concern in the North, and one about which the Committee heard much throughout the Canadian Arctic. The dilemma is that, although significant studies now exist on the effects of contaminants on animals, there is still not enough information on the effects of long-term exposure on human beings. It may seem logical to advise northerners to limit traditional diets that include "country food," but the choice is not easy if the alternative is highly processed food that may put them at risk of such diseases as diabetes. Such questions have been dealt with by McGill University's Centre for Nutrition and Environment of Indigenous Peoples (CINE), whose board is composed of six aboriginal organizations and which has been funded by the AES since 1992. Even after its six years of work, a draft of the Canadian Arctic Contaminants Assessment Report concluded that, "At this time, the known risks are not adequately

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<sup>140</sup> Robert Huebert, "The Canadian Arctic and the Development of an International Environmental Regime" (1995), p. 13-15.

quantified to recommend or warrant a change in the diet of northern residents, in particular aboriginal northerners. Further studies are required to evaluate these risks.”<sup>141</sup>

According to John Fraser, Canada’s Ambassador for Environment and Sustainable Development, and a co-chair with Mary Simon of the *For Generations to Come* conference, “The uncertainty that many northerners feel about contaminants in their environment and their concerns about how research had been done in the past came through clearly.” The uncertainty stems in large part from the fact that scientists have traditionally not paid enough attention to how to communicate often technical findings to indigenous northerners and others. The Committee met in Kuujuaq with the members of Nunavik Board of Health and Social Services, several of whom — Jean Dupuis who also chairs the Kativik Regional Development Council, and Minnie Grey, the local hospital director and former ICC executive member — had just returned from the Tenth Congress of the International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH), in Anchorage, Alaska. They were encouraged that scientists and health researchers are now focussing on areas of concern to aboriginal peoples as well as learning more from them, though most of the funding still goes to southern-based institutions. In Grey’s words, “people that are the subject of research [should] be more involved.” Regional organizations as in Nunavik could be involved in the evaluation and monitoring of research proposals and in looking to apply benefits from research locally. For example, in regard to the serious issue of contaminants, there is a need to utilize the results of scientific research and to communicate findings to people in ways they can understand and then be able to act on accordingly. Instead of just spreading general fears about the risks from eating country foods, “what they lack is practical knowledge and advice about appropriate responses.” Dr. Gary Pেকেles, of McGill University’s Baffin Project, an IUCH Vice-President, reported to Committee members at a roundtable in Montreal that there had recently been progress with health researchers learning to work collaboratively with aboriginal communities; an “indigenization” process in terms of health means that local people are taking over more responsibility for their own health service delivery.

As John Fraser concluded,

Action to reduce the impact of . . . pollutants on the people of the North is more than a question of environmental and human health. It has a strong moral quality. The preservation of aboriginal cultures in the Arctic depends in large part on the preservation of the traditional food supplies, so much a part of those cultures. These people want to maintain their traditions. They deserve to be heard as the world sets its environmental priorities.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Canadian Arctic Assessment Report, Chapter 6, “Conclusions and Knowledge Gaps For Future Directions,” Draft, December 1996, p. 24.

<sup>142</sup> The Honourable John Fraser, “Looking North For Answers,” *Global Agenda*, Vol. 4, No. 3, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, December 1996.



Accordingly:

### **Recommendation 23**

**The Committee supports the recommendation of the Canadian Polar Commission that the Government broaden the replacement for the Northern Contaminants Program so as to focus more clearly on the links between contaminants and human health and to provide for more effective communication of research results.**

### ***Biodiversity and Wildlife Management***

The Arctic is home to hundreds of unique species and habitats which are threatened by all the issues discussed above, from global climate change to pollutants and increased human activity. Conservation of species such as the polar bear is central to the indigenous cultures of Arctic peoples. The challenge goes beyond the region, however. Observes one recent report by a Canadian expert: "It is among birds, however, that the importance of the Arctic from a global perspective is truly spectacular. An estimated 15% of all of the world's species breed in the Arctic."<sup>143</sup> Activities such as those described above have already resulted in habitat alteration and destruction and have exterminated some Arctic species. As Chaturvedi points out, "In Alaska, massive oil development at Prudhoe Bay has destroyed thousands of acres of wildlife habitat and left hundreds of open pits containing millions of gallons of oil-industry waste."<sup>144</sup> According to the World Wildlife Fund, at least 35 species are at risk in the Canadian Arctic alone.<sup>145</sup> Although some environmental NGOs have argued that Bill C-65, the *Canada Endangered Species Protection Act* should be further strengthened, its provisions would give the federal Government responsibility for species protection and management on all public lands, which includes both Yukon and the Northwest Territories.

On the broadest level, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity provides a framework for regional and national programs for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. According to Chaturvedi, "The Convention. . .is based on an ecosystem approach and therefore is of exceptional significance in the Arctic." Other relevant global conventions are the 1973 Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) and the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.

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<sup>143</sup> Jay R. Malcolm, *The Demise of an Ecosystem: Arctic Wildlife in a Changing Climate*, World Wildlife Fund Climate Change Campaign, November 1996, p.1.

<sup>144</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 243.

<sup>145</sup> WWF's *Species At Risk: Focus on Arctic Canada*, Spring 1996.

Specific management regimes have also been adopted by the Arctic states over the years. The successor of one of the earliest examples of multilateral cooperation to protect the Arctic environment, the 1911 Convention on the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, lapsed in 1984 when the U.S. refused to allow its extension. The most successful example of cooperation is probably the five-nation 1973 Polar Bear Convention, which is the sole legally binding conservation agreement in the Arctic. As Milton Freeman of the Canadian Circumpolar Institute at the University of Alberta informed the Committee, "Under this treaty, Canada has pursued quite different actions (yet fully consistent with the treaty's objectives) compared to those of the U.S., Russia and Norway. Despite the diversity of action allowed treaty signatories, treaty goals have been more than successfully achieved [Submission of 3 June 1996, p. 5].

Other examples of international agreements include some specific to caribou and whales. After a decade of negotiation, in 1987 Canada and the United States signed an Agreement on the Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou herd, although, as Chaturvedi points out, the agreement "represents only a formal commitment to cooperate between the two parties rather than a resource-management agreement."<sup>146</sup> After years of dissatisfaction in Scandinavia with the International Whaling Commission, in 1992 Iceland, Greenland, Norway and the Faroe Islands established as an alternative the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) for states interested in the management, utilization, and conservation of whales and other marine mammals. As the Committee was told in Oslo, Canadian scientists already participate in the work of NAMMCO and while Canada and Russia are currently observers there is a standing invitation for them to become full members.

The AEPS has also addressed Arctic biodiversity through the Working Group on the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), established, according to Robert Huebert, at the suggestion of Canada. Significant progress has been achieved in terms of Protected Areas (national parks or reserves) in the Arctic, which do much to protect species and habitats. Some 14% of the Arctic was already protected in 1994 and CAFF has been working on a Circumpolar Protected Areas Network (CPAN) Strategy and Action Plan, which it plans to accelerate. By February 1997, each Arctic state was to have submitted a summary of measures taken to implement CPAN; CAFF plans to present a progress report to the June 1997 AEPS Ministerial in Tromsø. In June 1996, Canada formally established Tuktut Nogait, its fifth-largest national park, in the Inuvialuit settlement region of the Western Arctic. This park is particularly important in that it encompasses the calving grounds of the Bluenose Caribou herd. In October, the Government announced the withdrawal of land for two more proposed northern national parks, one at Wager Bay on the western coast of Hudson Bay, and the other on northern Bathurst Island near the magnetic North Pole. In January 1997, it was announced that the Government of the

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<sup>146</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 250.



Northwest Territories and the Canadian Government would by 1998 have jointly developed a Protected Areas Strategy for the whole of the Northwest Territories, to be implemented by the year 2000.

An important feature of the AEPS has always been its integration of western scientific knowledge (such as that Canada has compiled under the AES), and traditional indigenous ecological knowledge (TEK). One example is the work done under CAFF on Indigenous Knowledge and Conservation, which includes reviews of co-management systems, projects on beluga whale mapping and a TEK data directory. A very important element in the protection of habitat and wildlife in the North is what Oran Young calls the “institutional innovation” of co-management, which the Committee learned about at several locations in the Canadian Arctic. According to Oran Young,

Although many variants are possible, all forms of co-management feature an approach to resources management that involves joint decision-making and implementation on the part of local users whose actions are at stake and representatives of agencies of regional or national governments possessing the legal authority to promulgate regulations and make managerial decisions about the resources in question. Handled properly, co-management offers a means of incorporating traditional ecological knowledge into resource management and giving users a sense of ownership that alleviates problems of non-compliance.<sup>147</sup>

Canada leads the world in resource co-management regimes. In Calgary, Michael Robinson of the Arctic Institute of North America explained to members of the Committee that the Institute was then engaged in a co-management mapping project with the Saami of Russia’s Kola peninsula. Traditional ecological knowledge enhances the management of living resources and is also an important element in engaging aboriginal Canadians in the North and elsewhere in the protection of their cultures and futures. As the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples put it in November 1996,

For aboriginal people, environmental stewardship is more than a question of politics, it is a matter of cultural and economic survival. The long-term effects of global pollution on the residents of the entire circumpolar region present a challenge for the affected nation-states, as well as the communities and people who live within their borders. Concerted multilateral efforts will be required. Environmental management regimes offer a different kind of challenge, and the promise — just beginning to be realized — of effective systems that make the best use of the knowledge and skills of aboriginal and non-aboriginal science.<sup>148</sup>

Significant examples of co-management regimes in the Canadian North include the Porcupine Caribou Management Board, on which Chair Joe Tetlichy briefed the Committee

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<sup>147</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 30-31.

<sup>148</sup> Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, *Minister of Supply and Services Canada*, Ottawa, 1996, *Volume 4: Perspectives and Realities*, p. 459-460.

in Whitehorse. Another example is the Alaska and Inuvialuit Beluga Whale Commission, created in 1988. In light of this experience, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recommended in its consideration of Environmental Stewardship in the North that:

4.6.8 The Government of Canada recognize the contribution of aboriginal traditional knowledge to environmental stewardship and support its development;

4.6.9 The Government of Canada make provisions for the participation of aboriginal governments and organizations in future international agreements concerning environmental stewardship;

4.6.10 The federal department of health continue the close monitoring of contamination of northern country food by atmospheric and other pollution and, given the importance of these foods to northern people, communicate the results of this work quickly and effectively to users of these renewable northern resources.

4.6.11 All governments in Canada support the development of co-management regimes along the lines of those already established in the North.<sup>149</sup>

The Committee agrees with these recommendations. Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 24**

**In order to better protect northern species and habitats, and build on Canadian leadership in the integration of indigenous and non-indigenous knowledge, the Committee recommends that the Government accept and implement fully the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples concerning Environmental Stewardship in the North.**

#### ***Arctic Environmental Cooperation and the Future***

Since 1991, the Arctic states have cooperated in learning to understand the issues threatening the Arctic environment. The success of the Arctic states in pushing beyond the gathering of knowledge to put the issue of persistent organic pollutants on the global agenda shows the sort of concerted action they must take to address other regional and related global environmental challenges. The Committee agrees wholeheartedly that the scientific work pioneered under the AEPS must continue as part of the Arctic Council, but the Council must go beyond preserving the AEPS if it is to succeed.

As the first chair of the Arctic Council, Canada must have a clear vision of the extent of Arctic environmental cooperation it would like to see at the beginning of the next century. In this case, the issues are not primarily scientific, but depend on political will. As Canadian

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<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 460.



Paul Samson concluded in his recent study of international environmental cooperation in the region, "It is likely that politics, even more than science, will continue to set the environmental agenda in the Arctic."<sup>150</sup> The Arctic Council creates an opportunity to bring circumpolar environmental cooperation to a new level by both deepening and broadening current environmental protection activities and making substantial progress on such broader issues as sustainable development. While a comprehensive binding international environmental regime for the Arctic is a long way off, strong measures can still be pursued when these are possible and softer measures when they are not. Following the lessons of the ozone experience, the Arctic states must act more quickly to address environmental challenges before they become crises.

More than a quarter century after the Stockholm Conference, the Arctic Council must build on the AEPS work led by environment ministers in shouldering the task of integrating global, regional and national actions on Arctic environmental protection and sustainable development into the mainstream foreign policy of all circumpolar countries. Whether Canada is able as the inaugural chair to show an example in this regard may well be the ultimate test of our resolve and record. With a priceless natural heritage at stake, future generations of Canadians are owed nothing less than the Government's best efforts to achieve the optimum circumpolar environmental cooperation possible today.

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<sup>150</sup> Paul Samson, *Thin Ice: International Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic* (1997), p. 70.





# CHAPTER 6 — SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY FOR ARCTIC COMMUNITIES

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Sustainable development will continue to mean different things to different people, but the goal of integrating ecological and economic concerns in decision-making in the Arctic is here to stay, as is the shared objective of living within the region's carrying and assimilative capacities.

Terry Fenge<sup>151</sup>

Another key challenge facing the Arctic countries is achieving sustainable and equitable economic development. Across the region, levels of unemployment are high, much, much higher than in the South. This has exacerbated the social disaster we periodically read about on teen suicide, alcohol and drug abuse, family violence, that has reached epidemic proportions in northern parts of all Arctic countries. . . . How are people in these communities to live?

Ambassador Mary Simon<sup>152</sup>

## ***Towards a Framework for Sustainable Economic Development in the Arctic***

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the challenges of achieving environmental sustainability in the Arctic are extremely complex. There is still a great deal to be done in terms of entrenching principles of circumpolar environmental cooperation, working towards common standards of environmental protection, and following through on intergovernmental commitments, notably through the AEPS process. If anything, however, the task is even more daunting with respect to meeting the pressing economic needs of the communities of the region, especially those of indigenous peoples, on a basis that respects sustainability principles.

That task is complicated by value-laden controversies over the costs and benefits of current and proposed forms of development and resource utilization, rooted in the often negative experiences of the past. To quote Mary Simon again: "As desperately as northerners want to work, all too often the pattern has been for southern companies to exploit the northern resources using southern labour, removing the north's wealth and leaving little behind them but environmental damage."<sup>153</sup> Yet there are also many promising northern-based initiatives, as the Committee heard from territorial and municipal officials, community spokespersons, leaders in aboriginal business and trade

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<sup>151</sup> Terry Fenge, "Toward Sustainable Development in the Circumpolar North," Theme Paper prepared for the Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Yellowknife, NWT, March 1996, p. 9.

<sup>152</sup> Mary Simon, "Building Partnerships" (1996), p. 4.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

development, and firms exporting cold-climate infrastructure technologies, among others. Numerous federal Government programs and activities have been undertaken to support both “northern development” and a range of public-sector services.<sup>154</sup> What seems to be lacking, however, is any coherent overall Canadian strategy for advancing sustainable economic development on a circumpolar basis.<sup>155</sup> While we welcome Canada’s proposal for a conference on this subject sometime this year under the aegis of the Arctic Council, we are therefore concerned with addressing that gap and taking practical steps to move the agenda forward.

The circumpolar area presents some special challenges in achieving economic sustainability. With the exceptions of some parts of the Russian North and perhaps Alaska, populations are tiny and scattered among remote widely separated settlements. Fewer than 10% of Canada’s aboriginal citizens live in the “Far North,” even if high birth rates contribute to chronic crowded housing and youth unemployment.<sup>156</sup> Historically, most of the outside, and especially international, economic interest in the region has not focussed on the needs of its permanent residents. Instead, the Arctic has been treated as a resource-rich hinterland, potentially exploitable but destined to stay on the periphery of the world economy (see Box 10 “The Arctic as an International Economic Region”). In recent decades, while the utilization of renewable resources by the indigenous population continued to be important to northern Canadians, and to attract sporadic external controversies — for example, the disputes with Europe and the United States over harvesting wild fur and marine mammals — strategic attention shifted to large-scale “mega-projects” and non-renewable resources.<sup>157</sup> Large corporate and public investments have gone to the mining, oil and gas, and hydroelectric sectors, and the related development of exploration, production and transmission infrastructures (drilling sites, dams, pipelines, shipping lanes, etc.). In turn, concerns have arisen about the resulting impacts on the sensitive ecology of the region and on socio-economic conditions in local communities.

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<sup>154</sup> While federal spending has been declining since the early 1990s, total public expenditure north of 60°, excluding the provincial norths, was still over \$2.5 billion in 1994-95 by 27 federal organizations and the two territorial governments. Federal transfers account for almost 90% of territorial government’s budgets. Interestingly, the Department of National Defence is listed as the federal agency that spends the most, followed by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (DIAND); together they account for over 50% of direct federal spending. Foreign Affairs and International Trade is not even listed. (Cf. DIAND, *Annual Northern Expenditure Plan 1994-1995*, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, Ottawa, published 1996, especially Table 2, p. 12.)

<sup>155</sup> This point was made to the Committee, in particular by Kevin Knight of Unaaq Inc., an enterprise owned by northern Quebec and Baffin region Inuit, and Don Axford of the Canadian Inuit Business Development Council (see Issue No. 20). Witnesses generally criticized a lack of coordination at the federal level, although Tony Penikett, a former government leader of the Yukon, put a positive accent instead on the growing diversity of initiatives being generated by northerners themselves, without waiting for federal direction or support (see Issue No. 10).

<sup>156</sup> For an extremely useful and detailed socio-economic profile, see the *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* (1996), Vol. 4 “Perspectives and Realities,” Chapter 6 “The North,” p. 387-517.

<sup>157</sup> For example, W. Harriet Critchley, “L’importance internationale du développement économique des régions arctiques,” *Revue études internationales*, March 1989.



## Box 10 — “The Arctic as an International Economic Region”

Perhaps the most important observation that can be made is that, even as the Arctic's resources are increasingly coveted for their economic value, the economies of the Arctic regions are still primarily driven by, and dependent on, their external and separate southern linkages. There is no circumpolar economic region as such within the world economy, although many northerners are working, despite the technical challenges and high costs, to build East-West transpolar commercial ties and to improve transportation routes and communications infrastructures. Given the very small populations in most of the circumpolar North, there will never be an internal market sufficient to sustain such development on an endogenous basis. Northern regions and communities have become much more assertive of their rights to control the pace of economic development, and to regulate the manner in which it takes place, emphasizing environmental effects and local benefits. Nevertheless, under the most optimistic scenario, most of the region's economic inputs will necessarily have to be brought in, often from long distances, and most of the Arctic's commercial output will also be exported to southern consumers. Calls to create a circumpolar trade area do not alter the facts that, with few exceptions among the Arctic states, current national economic approaches and multilateral trade and investment agreements (e.g. the European Community and NAFTA in North America) have yet to give significant attention to the distinctive needs of Arctic regions or the development of a circumpolar basis for economic cooperation.

With respect to the Arctic's immense non-renewable resources (potentially recoverable hydrocarbon reserves alone are estimated at up to 200 billion barrels of oil and 300 trillion cubic feet of natural gas), Chaturvedi observes that: “The striking trend towards industrialization of the Arctic during the 1970s and 1980s, focussing primarily on energy resources but extending to other raw materials, may well be seen in retrospect as part of the great ‘scarcity’ debate that raged in the late 1960s and early 1970s.”<sup>1</sup>

While those fears have subsided, there is still major hydrocarbon exploration taking place (especially in Siberia and offshore of the vast Russian Arctic sea coast), and new mineral “rushes” (notably in the Canadian Arctic for diamonds and nickel) are generating headlines in the business pages of southern newspapers. Canada's northernmost “Polaris” lead-zinc mine on Little Cornwallis island will likely be exhausted early in the next century. However, expectations are for multi-billion returns from the exploitation of diamond-bearing deposits in the central Arctic and high-grade nickel deposits in Labrador and northern Quebec. Northern Alaska, which has the largest oil and gas reserves in the United States, is also the site of a mine producing over 60% of that country's zinc (an estimated in-ground value of over US\$11 billion). But it is Russia, especially Siberia, that contains the greatest known energy and mineral reserves in the Arctic. Regions such as the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) have worked out promising revenue-sharing arrangements with the Moscow government. Across the Arctic, negotiations are certain to heat up over the distribution of both the costs of, and the economic rents from, major resource development.

The Arctic also has huge renewable natural resource wealth. For example, its waters support some of the most productive fisheries in the world. At the same time, much of this economy is being put at risk from environmental pollution and industrial development approaches. The accumulation of contaminants within Arctic food sources has emerged as an important global problem. Species that play an integral role in the indigenous cultures of the region are threatened. The livelihoods of aboriginal hunters and many small Arctic communities have been devastated by restrictions on trade in fur and seal products. Some hope that responsible tourism can compensate by bringing in badly needed income and employment for local residents. The Yukon hosted over 60,000 wilderness adventure travellers (twice its population) in 1995, and for Canada's territories as a whole, receipts from this growing tourist sector exceeded \$55 million in that year. The promotion of such sustainable economic activities can only benefit from a more considered and coherent circumpolar approach to the development of the Arctic as a distinctive region in its own right.

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<sup>1</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 30.

In the course of the Committee's visits to Arctic communities, we heard a great many of these concerns repeated. At the same time, local people are looking for opportunities to earn income and acquire skills so that they can secure more control over their economic futures. Aboriginal groups want a more equitable stake in developments on their ancestral territories, provided that these developments do not pose any threat to human health or to the physical environment and animal life to which they feel such a powerful connection. Yet several witnesses strongly questioned the wisdom and realism of applying standard industrial development thinking to the North. Gérard Duhaime of Laval University described the "Third World" character of extractive export-oriented resource exploitation that brings little positive benefit to local economies, the extreme dependence on the "industry" of government (and on many imported inputs, including food supplies), and a social health crisis that cannot easily be addressed. Appropriate strategies for intervention require a deep knowledge of the particular circumstances within communities. These trends are apparent throughout the circumpolar North, he argued [47:12ff]. Fred Roots referred to a marginalization of Arctic interests as southern market forces become increasingly dominant.

Contrary to what we might like in terms of a political design, there is an increasingly peripheral or colonial status of the northern economy. The industrial economy, which has attempted to generate wealth, is not adjusted to the local environment. Therefore it leads to escalating costs.

The indigenous or resident local economy, often politically supported, was originally self-sufficient, but now it is increasingly a cultural artifact, despite what we might wish it to be.

The high cost of development and the political desires to keep northern regions intact as functioning parts of each nation has led to a net economic and administrative subsidy to the regions of the Arctic in each circumpolar country, even including Iceland. There is little reasonable expectation, if you look at it coldly, that northern resource development will result in a net long-term addition to the national economic wealth. [10:5]

The implications of this are that no simplistic economic "quick fix" should be expected to cure the dysfunctional aspects of Arctic economies, which, as Chaturvedi observes, are characterized by a mixture of: "(i) old, traditional economies developed from a barter economy based on subsistence practices; (ii) public economies, based on transfers of capital from the metropolises located to the South; (iii) private economies, principally based on large-scale production in the utilization of land resources." If any generalization can be made, it is that "so far economic strategies designed in the industrialized South have brought at best mixed results to the hinterland regions, undermining sustainability in every sense of the term."<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), Chapter 9 "Sustainable Development in the Arctic: Options and Obstacles," p. 236.



Other studies, such as those done for the Arctic parliamentarians' conferences in Reykjavik and Yellowknife, have pointed to the inherent difficulties and man-made change factors that need to be confronted in conceiving more viable development strategies.<sup>159</sup> Among familiar obstacles are: the sheer harshness of climate that creates demanding requirements for suitable technologies; the isolation and vast distances, transportation limitations and costs that inhibit commercial exchanges with and within the North; the high costs of imported capital and other inputs, of developing infrastructure to service small populations, and of doing business generally; the expenses of environmental clean-up necessitated by poorly planned past developments; the complexity of environmental regulatory processes, given the slow self-healing capacity of Arctic ecosystems are especially vulnerable to large-scale economic development; ongoing jurisdictional disputes, especially those involving outstanding native land claims, resource ownership, and revenue sharing; divisions within local communities over the merits and pace of certain kinds of development (e.g. major mining projects). Arctic populations are at the same time coming under increasing stress from externally driven dynamics:

The pace of change is accelerating as the Arctic's oil, gas, minerals, and hydro resources are more fully delineated and developed for the global market and as the region is integrated into the broader world through mass communications technology. The need for sustainability policies is pressing in this vibrant economic and social environment, but the very pace of change poses major challenges in successfully implementing such policies.<sup>160</sup>

Terry Fenge, who appeared before the Committee as executive director of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) and has since become director of research for the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), contends that the most promising development approaches are those initiated by northern peoples themselves and which aim at allowing them to take charge of their economic futures. According to this witness: "Sustainability as an approach toward the future resonates among Arctic aboriginal peoples. Passing on unimpaired the natural environment from one generation to the next, adopting cultural health and diversity as unashamed goals of economic development, and integrating these goals with carrying and assimilative capacities all fit well with aboriginal views and advocacy." The recent report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples contains a number of proposals for nurturing northern indigenous economies to sustainable health through community-based diversification and a focus on developing human resources in a context of environmental stewardship. Within such an approach, the

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<sup>159</sup> Cf. Alf Håkon Hoel, Geir Runar Karlsen and Andreas Breivik, "Resources, Development and Environment in the Arctic," in *Arctic Challenges*, Reykjavik Conference 1993, and Terry Fenge, "Achieving Sustainable Development in the Arctic Region," paper for the Yellowknife Conference, 1996.

<sup>160</sup> Terry Fenge, "Towards Sustainable Development in the Circumpolar North," p. 4. See also his testimony before the Committee, Meeting No. 10, 23 April 1996.

report recognizes an important role for non-traditional wage employment and a realistic role for future public-sector support.

The Commission's approach is worth citing at length:

We favour a policy response rooted in sustaining viable communities and promoting a diversified economy that encompasses both wage employment and harvesting renewable resources. Through comprehensive land claims settlements and emerging systems of self-government, Aboriginal peoples in the North have an opportunity to re-establish the traditional-mixed economy in a land where direct use of natural resources is a vital dimension of making a living.

Northerners may well break new ground in coping with common problems of industrialized countries today: increased pressure on public expenditures, global competition creating downward pressures on incomes, and the reduced capacity of states to regulate or borrow to create full employment. . . . Demographic and economic realities highlight the need for concerted efforts to expand the number and kind of opportunities available to Aboriginal young people and adults to earn a living. It is clear that an important tool of northern economic development will continue to be public expenditures, whether through direct employment or promoting the development of other sectors. We believe that the safest and most promising direction for such expenditures, as well as for regulation of land use, is one that strengthens the traditional mixed economy of areas of the North where Aboriginal people predominate. There is scope to support both the older, more traditional sources of cash and employment and new ventures in areas as yet to be fully exploited. **In all cases, development must be undertaken in the context of environmental stewardship.**<sup>161</sup>

Internationally, the Inuit were early leaders in setting forth a comprehensive and holistic approach to circumpolar sustainable economic development, asserting their transboundary rights to preserve traditional livelihoods based on the harvesting of renewable resources, to the co-management of those resources, and to determine guidelines for transnational trade and investment in the Arctic.<sup>162</sup> ICC President Rosemarie Kuptana highlighted for the Committee as areas for cooperation with the Canadian Government: exploring "new mechanisms for managing whaling in the circumpolar Arctic; removal of trade barriers affecting trade products from the circumpolar region and development of a program to promote trade in marine mammal products; promotion of international wildlife co-management agreements . . ." She added that:

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<sup>161</sup> *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* (1996), Vol. 4, Chapter 6 "The North," p. 471 and 487-88, emphasis added.

<sup>162</sup> A landmark statement was the ICC's *Principles and Elements for a Comprehensive Arctic Policy*, Centre for Northern Studies and Research, McGill University, Montreal, 1992, especially Part VI "Economic Issues." The development and publication of this document was supported by the Gordon Foundation and also assisted by the Quebec government's Ministry of International Affairs. See also the subsequent manifesto published by the ICC itself, *Agenda 21 from an Inuit Perspective*, Ottawa 1996, and its 1994 publication *Circumpolar Sustainable Development*.



“The ICC is also carrying out ground-breaking work in the area of indigenous-to-indigenous trade development through some initial exploratory projects in Central America and the South Pacific. Principles of sustainable development and local capacity building are guiding principles in this work” [Submission of 2 May 1996, p. 5].

The Committee was impressed by the forward-looking internationalist approaches in subsequent presentations by spokespersons for growing aboriginal enterprises from the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation in the far west of the Arctic to the Makivik Corporation in the East. We see leaders emerging from within Arctic communities with the skills to develop market opportunities and confront the external forces referred to above. In turn, they want to see Government exercise a Canadian circumpolar economic diplomacy that includes them as active participants and demonstrates that it really understands and supports their goals. A number of witnesses addressed the issues of building effective alliances in that regard, for example to overcome the drastic effects of animal rights groups’ anti-harvesting campaigns on incomes in many Arctic communities. We will return to this issue in the section on circumpolar trade.

The Committee also heard from several groups (e.g. the Porcupine Caribou Management Board and Gwich’in Renewable Resource Board) which are wrestling with our American neighbour over serious transboundary disputes stemming from proposals to open part of the Alaskan Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil and gas development (see the section of Chapter Nine on Canada-U.S. Arctic cooperation for details). Tellingly, American policies came in for criticisms both for being too pro-development and for being too conservationist. For example, Leif Halonen, President of the Saami Council, told Committee members in Tromsø, Norway, that U.S. proposals to guide sustainable development activities within the Arctic Council were protectionist and contrary to the attitude of indigenous peoples to a wisely managed sustainable **utilization** of renewable resources.

This illustrates the challenge of accommodating diverse economic interests and groups of stakeholders. Oran Young argued for sustainable economic development principles based on: preference for subsistence users of natural resources; co-management and subsidiarity (i.e. participation in decision-making and political “self-determination”); diversified sources of income; cultural integrity; and protection from external threats. The fundamental aim should be “stable, culturally intact, and prosperous communities rather than assimilation into global systems emphasizing material welfare” [Submission of 1 October, p. 6]. But it is questionable whether the Arctic can prosper by exempting itself from international market trends or whether most of its people — especially the non-aboriginal majorities in some regions — would necessarily want to do so.

Beyond sustaining the indigenous economies, there are also large questions about how to reduce the excessive northern dependence on external government subsidies, in

part by stimulating private sector development that emphasizes local benefits. The Committee heard from territorial, municipal, and business leaders in the Canadian Arctic who are pursuing promising commercial opportunities, and indeed have often been *de facto* “ambassadors” for Canadian interests in building ties with other northern regions. Yet, the fact remains that the Arctic economy, apart from the government-supported sector, rests on a very narrow, resource-dependent base typified by boom and bust cycles (from whales and the Klondike gold rush in the nineteenth century to diamonds and nickel at the close of this century) and vulnerability to external shocks (such as the threatened European fur ban). Because its internal market is so small, the Arctic must expand its potential for export earnings at the very least through fostering circumpolar commerce and must attract significant inflows of investment capital. There will therefore always be a danger that the promotion of Arctic development will be determined more by southern appetites and systems of power than by northern needs decided locally.

Sanjay Chaturvedi has argued that the increased economic pressures on the circumpolar environment and populations, reinforced by a regionalization and globalization of market forces, require movement towards a “legally binding Arctic Treaty on Sustainable Development.”<sup>163</sup> We think such a regime is a very long way off, if realizable at all, although we did note earlier the comments by the Northern Forum’s Stephen Cowper to the effect that using the Arctic Council to encourage adherence to multilateral environmental standards would promote fair business and trade practices among circumpolar regions. Much can also be done to increase the sustainability and retained value of particular economic activities already taking place or projected for the Arctic, and we will shortly turn to this. We believe that Canada can help here by working with other circumpolar countries and their Arctic populations to arrive at a commonly agreed framework for supporting sustainable economic development based on established principles. This should be a primary goal of the sustainable development conference that Canada, as Arctic Council chair, has called for later in 1997.

To that end:

#### **Recommendation 25**

**The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada work closely with northern Canadians and its Arctic Council partners to build consensus on a circumpolar framework for sustainable economic development, incorporating such principles and objectives as:**

- **preservation of the viability and cultural integrity of indigenous economies;**
- **diversification of income- and revenue-producing activities that do not harm the environment;**

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<sup>163</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 232 and 264ff.



- participation of local peoples in development and resource utilization decisions;
- maximum retention of benefits from economic growth at the community level; and
- application of sustainability criteria to all development activities as a condition for Government approval and/or financial support.

Canada should take the lead by integrating these into its own international Arctic-region strategy recommended in Chapter Two. The conference on sustainable development proposed by Canada should lay out a process for negotiating this agreed framework multilaterally, as a prelude to considering the priority programs or project activities that should be undertaken on a circumpolar basis with the aim of approving a substantive joint economic initiative at the Council's first ministerial conference in 1998.

### ***Coping with Large-Scale Capital-Intensive Development***

The most controversial issue in sustainable economic development in the Arctic is the role of large-scale development, usually based on non-renewable resource extraction and mainly externally financed. For one thing, such development has not been a stable or reliable source of income for northern communities; even the richest resource discoveries will eventually be depleted. We can add high development costs, increasing resistance to public subsidization, and speculative markets; a downturn in international market factors may cause investors to pull up stakes and move elsewhere. As the former NWT premier and current chair of the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, Nellie Cournoyea, told us in Inuvik:

The oil industry, once the backbone of a prosperous economy in the western Arctic is no longer significant. New industries are slow to develop and none have assumed the importance once occupied by oil and gas. Tourism holds promise for the future but there is much work to be done to develop the infrastructure necessary to take full advantage of the opportunities in that industry. The reduced economy of the Western Arctic has heightened the importance of traditional parts of the economy. [Submission of 28 May 1996]

Notwithstanding the decline of exploration activity in the Beaufort Sea area, tremendous interest has been stirred over diamond finds in the central Arctic and massive nickel deposits in northern Quebec and at Voisey's Bay in Labrador. During the first Ottawa panel, Terry Fenge of CARC observed: "It's possible, perhaps likely that within five to ten years the number one export by value from the Northwest Territories will be diamonds" [10:10]. Returning from Inuvik, Committee members briefly visited the Lac de Gras site 300 kilometres northeast from Yellowknife, where, in preparing the site for a proposed mine a consortium led by a Canadian subsidiary of the Australian multinational Broken Hill

Proprietary Ltd., (BHP) had already invested \$170 million. While members were told that the multi-billion dollar project would create over 800 long-term jobs, with a hiring preference for northerners, aboriginals and women, a number of questions raised during extensive local public hearings were brought to the Committee's attention in Yellowknife. In particular, concerns focussed on the adequacy of environmental review procedures, the settlement of outstanding native land claims, and the determination of how royalties from the mine's output would be shared.<sup>164</sup> Since similar rich discoveries have been made in Euro-Arctic areas occupied by the Saami and in the Russian Arctic (notably the far east Sakha republic, which has developed close relations with the NWT), there is considerable scope here for learning from sharing circumpolar experiences.<sup>165</sup>

Among concerned NGOs and aboriginal groups taking part in the public hearings process, spokespersons for CARC were not convinced about the sufficiency of the environmental standards for the BHP project, and suggested creation of a stakeholders' monitoring agency. As well, they argued that if land claims cannot be fully resolved before development proceeds, at a minimum impact/benefits agreements should be signed with the affected aboriginal groups, and the traditional ecological knowledge of indigenous peoples should be taken into greater account when making assessments and designing appropriate arrangements. Low royalty structures should also be revised upwards; perhaps a "heritage fund" could be established from BHP contributions.

The diamond mine received final federal and NWT government approval on 1 November 1996, but stringent conditions were attached. While not fully satisfying the aboriginal organizations and public-interest and environmental NGOs who intervened, the result was better than many expected. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF), which had filed a legal action in the Federal Court (led by one of its directors, former Prime Minister John Turner) to press for parallel commitments for setting aside a network of protected areas, concluded that enough progress had been made to suspend that action early in 1997.<sup>166</sup> Even months earlier, Terry Fenge had told the Committee that CARC did not take the position "that mining development in the North will inevitably create massive environmental destruction. We are of the view that mining development can, and should, go ahead, with appropriate rules and regulations . . . [BHP] is by and large environmentally conscious and environmentally aware, more so than perhaps many of the small to medium-sized Canadian companies" [10:25].

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<sup>164</sup> For critical reviews of the issues at stake in Arctic mining mega-projects and the BHP proposal specifically, see "Mining in Aboriginal Homelands," *Northern Perspectives*, Vol. 23, Nos. 3-4, Fall/Winter 1995-96, and Kevin O'Reilly, "Diamond Mining and the Demise of Environmental Assessment in the North," *Northern Perspectives*, Vol. 24, Nos. 1-4, Fall/Winter 1996.

<sup>165</sup> On the problems common to resource rushes (such as over diamonds in other parts of the Arctic), see Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 239ff. See also Chapter Nine for the relevance to issues of bilateral Arctic cooperation with Canada. As for international market implications, a recent article contends that: "The Canadian mine will add to the uncertainty in the diamond world" (*The Economist*, 25 January 1997, p. 60).

<sup>166</sup> "Update: Central Arctic Diamond Mine," *WWF Working for Wildlife Quarterly Action Report*, Winter 1996/97, p. 3; "Environmental Group Drops Court Action," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 14 January 1997.



What has understandably provoked so much suspicion is that past major project development has paid scant attention to issues of sustainability, aboriginal and environmental stewardship, and long-term benefits for local communities. We are anxious that past mistakes not be repeated. Jeffrey Simpson wrote in the *Globe and Mail* of the current byzantine negotiations among governments, investors, and native groups over the fate of the huge Voisey's Bay nickel/cobalt development in Labrador: "Whose land is it anyway, and who should profit from the bounty of the land? These are issues of money, morality and law written across the Canadian landscape in the struggle of native people to lay claim to territories they once used."<sup>167</sup> Our meetings in May 1996 with Inuit leaders in Kuujuaq, the administrative centre for the adjacent region of Nunavik in northern Quebec, revealed other apprehensions over environmental clean-up and health and the balance between human costs and benefits from development. While these leaders still had many problems with the *James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement* governing resource exploitation in this territory, at least it had provided an established framework for negotiating on behalf of aboriginal beneficiaries. Officials of the Kativik regional government and the Makivik Corporation also referred positively to partnership agreements reached on such matters as Inuit hiring preferences, training, and small business development with the Falconbridge subsidiary that is developing a large nickel mine near Katinniq.

In short, the economic potential of major resource discoveries cannot be ignored, but nor can the large capital expenditures required to upgrade transportation and communications infrastructures across the North. The revenues, income and employment from private-sector investment are indeed needed, as was noted by the position of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. Its November 1996 *Final Report* discusses efforts to address the fact that, although mining is "the single largest private sector, goods-producing, export dollar activity in the North . . . [it has not been] a major source of employment for northern Aboriginal people." It draws the conclusion: "There are a number of ways Aboriginal people could benefit from mining developments, provided appropriate arrangements are made and environmental protection standards are maintained. In no situation has mining been a panacea, but it may be that enough has been learned so that regulated mineral development can be undertaken in a manner that does not damage and perhaps even enhances the traditional mixed economy."<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>167</sup> Jeffrey Simpson, "The Inuit and Innu Should Benefit from the Mine at Voisey's Bay," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 31 January 1997.

<sup>168</sup> *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Affairs* (1996), p. 482-85. Another, more sceptical analysis, which argues that better and stronger environmental assessment than the present must be done first, poses the central issue more broadly: "Can mining activity make a contribution to the longer-term health and sustainability of communities? This is a question for all Canadians, not just the northern aboriginal peoples who see themselves as stewards of their traditional territories. Aboriginal or not, all Canadians want to live their lives in healthy, sustainable communities. Common sense says that, anywhere in Canada, economic activities should be constructed in ways that move communities toward, rather than away from, health and sustainability. (Susan Wismer, "The Nasty Game": How Environmental Assessment Is Failing Aboriginal Communities in Canada's North," *Alternatives Journal*, 22:4, October/November 1996, p. 16.)

The Committee would like to share that optimism. We do so, however, with the strong proviso that the international sustainable development principles we have recommended must be fully respected, the knowledge and concerns of indigenous Arctic communities heard, and the learning referred to above increasingly shared and promoted on a circumpolar basis.

Accordingly:

### **Recommendation 26**

**The Committee recommends that, within the framework of international sustainable development principles applied to the Arctic, Canada should support the sharing of learning about best practices in the circumpolar countries. This should contribute to the implementation of rigorous sustainability assessments prior to any approval of major resource and capital-intensive projects and, in particular, ensure that in all phases of development the rights to participate in decision-making processes, and the priorities of the affected indigenous communities, are fully respected.**

### ***Investing in Community-Based Development***

A number of witnesses before the Committee argued that the most desirable, if not the most lucrative, forms of Arctic development are small-scale and directly focussed on nurturing an economic base to build sustainable communities, rather than being driven by external economic factors and having to mitigate the community impacts afterwards. The objectives of community-based economic development in the Arctic have been described as (i) to operate within the limits of the biosphere and local ecosystems; (ii) to address basic local needs, strengthen shared commitments to the common well-being and encourage local initiative and self-reliance; (iii) to benefit indigenous and other northern peoples and improve their quality of life consistent with obligations to future generations; and (iv) to encourage use of local technologies and indigenous knowledge for promoting culturally appropriate development.<sup>169</sup>

In regard to technological applications generally, DIAND Deputy Minister Jack Stagg, testifying before the Committee, observed that most past investments, public and private, have “not been oriented towards adapting southern technologies for northern use, or establishing the infrastructure required to support economic diversification.”<sup>170</sup> Clearly these should be areas of priority. Innovative firms that are investing in technological development that serves northern community needs — e.g. Ferguson, Simek, Clark in

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<sup>169</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 233.

<sup>170</sup> Cited in *ibid.*, p. 235.



Yellowknife in cold-climate housing construction, and NorthwestTel in Iqaluit in telecommunications facilities linking distant high Arctic communities in Nunavut — told us that there are also potential export spinoffs from the transfer of such Canadian technologies to other circumpolar communities. As well, new information technologies could be utilized to promote indigenous knowledge networks and cultural exchanges. In Iqaluit, the Committee learned about the first Inuktitut Internet site at the Nunavut Arctic College and Research Institute, and about the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation's capabilities in producing native-language programming with an international audience.

With respect to maintaining the viability of indigenous communities as development proceeds, a recent Canadian study suggests that the following northern-based policy principles could be applied on a circumpolar basis: (1) culturally sustainable planning development; (2) support of subsistence economies; (3) recognition and use of traditional ecological knowledge; (4) co-management of land and resources; (5) building and strengthening of indigenous social institutions; (6) recognition of communal property rights of indigenous groups; (7) assessment of the cumulative impact of development projects.<sup>171</sup>

Work being undertaken by the Social and Economic Development Division of Cambridge University's prestigious Scott Polar Research Institute builds on practical experience from Alaska applied to achieving sustainable economic recovery for remote regions of Russia's North and East. This provides a very promising concrete illustration of how sustainable development approaches can be successfully adapted for productive use in even some of the most economically troubled areas of the circumpolar world. We will refer to specific project examples in Chapter Nine, on cooperation with Russia. At this stage, what is notable, according to documentation provided by Piers Vitebsky, head of Social Sciences and Russian Studies at the Institute<sup>172</sup> is how the application of such approaches includes

supporting the traditional activities of local populations engaged in pastoral or subsistence activity, through the clarification of land rights, resource management regimes and economic methods such as the creation of local corporations.

Targeted support of the "traditional" sectors provides an avenue to avoid the destruction of traditional cultural activities and helps to revive them. We find that the traditional sectors usually need only a small amount of redirected resources to allow the economy's "disconnected" pieces to create vital sustainable linkages.

Moreover, the Cambridge Institute continues to elaborate a sophisticated methodology for assessing and encouraging sustainability that "links the traditional economic sector

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<sup>171</sup> Fikret Berkes and Helen Fast, "Aboriginal Peoples: The Basis for Policy-Making toward Sustainable Development," in Ann Dale and John B. Robinson, eds., *Achieving Sustainable Development*, Sustainable Development Research Institute and UBC Press, Vancouver, 1996, p. 254-55.

<sup>172</sup> Meeting with Committee research director Gerald Schmitz at Cambridge University, 15 February 1997.

with regional primary non-renewable resource development and economic recovery in a complementary, rather than confrontational, manner. Furthermore, information about the traditional sector becomes “useful” to industry and economically minded funding agencies, while the economic rents from primary (mineral) development are utilized efficiently and effectively for local needs.”

We believe that a variety of viable economic activities can be encouraged within a community-based sustainable development approach. Some of these activities, however, such as the traditional harvesting of species like whales and seals, and transboundary exchanges of traditional products among indigenous peoples, require specific foreign policy attention; this was underlined to the Committee by Nellie Cournoyea and other aboriginal witnesses in Canada and the Nordic countries. She argued that U.S. protectionist legislation in particular (notably the *Marine Mammal Protection Act*, to which Canada was unable to obtain an aboriginal exemption under the *Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement*) places undue legal restrictions on indigenous peoples’ rights to practise sustainable resource use and cultural development. This is an area where Canada could work through international forums to achieve more acceptable circumpolar agreements.

Possibilities could also be explored for safeguarding indigenous “country-food” sources and developing small agri-food and marine-product industries (e.g. the shrimp fishery in eastern Arctic waters) which have international potential. While Gérard Duhaime of Laval University cautioned against the marketing of wild game [47:14-15], Makivik representatives in Kuujuaq, where Committee members visited its research facility, saw export potential in the regions’s abundant caribou resource.<sup>173</sup> That interest was combined, however, with strong concerns about the growing problem of contaminants in country foods (relating back to the critical international issue of long-range transboundary pollutants that we addressed in the previous chapter). Hence the prior need to address food safety and health issues in the context of developing external markets for northern food products.<sup>174</sup> Here again is an obvious area for circumpolar policy research and coordination.

Less controversially, perhaps, we see opportunities to expand alternative employment and income sources through developing cottage-based industries —

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<sup>173</sup> The *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* (1996) notes that: “The Inuit of Labrador operate a commercial caribou hunt using a modern packing plant in Nain. They marketed meat in Europe when the reindeer herds were affected by the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Inuvialuit in the western Arctic operate a commercial muskox harvest in the winter months and sell their products in Japanese markets” (Vol. 4, p. 486).

<sup>174</sup> As Canadian Polar Commission Chairman, Whit Fraser testified to the Committee on 18 February 1997: “Food products from Canada’s Arctic have slowly been gaining entry into specialty markets the world over and it would appear that there may be some tremendous prospects for the future. That this has been accomplished is due in no small measure to images of pure, healthy products derived from natural unspoiled wilderness. Now, I’m afraid that the contaminants issue represents a threat to the full development of that market potential” [66:5].



notably in the arts and cultural products sector, which has earned an international reputation and important market niche thanks to the pioneering efforts of Canadians such as James Houston. Toronto will host a Northern Encounter Festival in June 1997 featuring cultural activity from the eight circumpolar countries, with substantial financial support from the four Nordic states. Connections with Arctic-based initiatives such as the Great Northern Arts Festival, from which the Committee heard in Inuvik, should be encouraged. Committee members who visited the West Baffin Eskimo Cooperative in Cape Dorset were also impressed by the need to encourage infrastructure and diversified development to support this sector. The mayor of Cape Dorset referred to the lack of action in the construction of a combined community centre and cultural complex for displaying showcase arts activities and attracting tourism. She also saw potential for exporting superior traditional clothing made by Cape Dorset women and thereby encouraging local skills and marketing to other circumpolar countries. While a recent discovery of a large alabaster deposit in the Canadian Arctic is being celebrated as a boon to Inuit carvers, the cultural products sector can be precarious and still deserves close attention and support from governments to ensure its long-term sustainability.<sup>175</sup>

One of the most promising areas at which Arctic communities are looking is the expansion of sustainable or ecotourism; which is increasingly combining wilderness travel with an appreciation of local indigenous cultures.<sup>176</sup> It can be argued that Canada holds a great, if underdeveloped, comparative advantage in this area as the holder of approximately one-fifth of the globe's remaining wilderness, most of which is in the North. Ecotourism, especially when it involves participation by aboriginal enterprises (the Committee notes, for example, the Makivik Corporation's strong interest), could offer a long-term source of income for many remote communities and, operated with strict controls, could also act as a powerful incentive to protect native cultures, species and ecosystems. Groups such as the World Wildlife Fund have already been active in developing guidelines for sustainable Arctic tourism,<sup>177</sup> but circumpolar governments too need to take a lead.

Several witnesses argued that Canada is in danger of falling behind by not taking the same advantage of tourism potential as the Scandinavian countries, especially northern

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<sup>175</sup> On the mixed prospects for the development of these Arctic cultural industries see, for example, "A Motherlode for Inuit Carvers" and "Decline of Printmaking Worries Artistic Community," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 5 and 6 January 1997.

<sup>176</sup> See, for example, Peter Jacobs, "The True North Strong and Free," *Ecodecision*, Spring 1996, p. 70-72. According to another survey, the mainly foreign visitors "are bringing money and jobs to a region that desperately needs more of both... tourism promoters believe that they have only begun to exploit the fascination with the Canadian North that exists in many parts of the world. One emerging market is Japan. From a handful of visitors less than a decade ago, about 1,700 Japanese travelled to the Northwest Territories in the past year" (Brian Bergman, "Arctic Thrills," *Maclean's*, 17 June 1996, p. 44-5).

<sup>177</sup> See "Guidelines for Arctic Tourism on the Way," *WWF Arctic Bulletin*, No. 1.96, p. 12-13, which reports on a January 1996 workshop held in Svalbard and hosted by the WWF Arctic Programme and the Norwegian Polar Institute, which some Committee members visited in Tromsø in November 1996.

Norway. Professor Branko Ladanyi argued that Svalbard is not so different from Kuujjuaq in northern Quebec; yet, while little is being done in Kuujjuaq to attract tourists, the Svalbard region is succeeding in drawing them from a wide range of countries. He asked: "Why not provide the necessary services, access and infrastructure to develop the tourism industry?" [47:11]. Kevin Knight, of Unaaq International, an Inuit company operating in Nunavik and the Baffin region, described another problem which seems all too typical of an uncoordinated Canadian approach: "at Industry Canada we have a Canadian tourism strategy aimed at attracting ecotourism to Canada and to the North. The strategy was developed without the full involvement of northerners who have succeeded in this business of ecotourism and therefore without adequate attention to northern realities or to the need, perhaps, to attend to niche markets—not mass markets—for the North" [20:10].

More generally, in terms of community and small-enterprise development in the Arctic, coordinated policies and programs are required that address the practical needs of local people for acquiring employment and business skills, and accessing sources of investment capital, as well as professional and managerial expertise. Branko Ladanyi made the point that: "if Aboriginals are to become self-sufficient, they need tradespeople . . . they need specialists of every kind. So I am wondering who is supporting the training of Aboriginals in this area, who is teaching them these trades. You cannot have a northern community without people who know how to repair snowmobiles, houses, heating systems, etc." [47:10]. The Committee heard about some vocational education activities through the staff of colleges with whom we met in the Arctic, but obviously this area calls for more attention.<sup>178</sup> As well, Oran Young described concrete sustainable development projects related to these needs, which in his view would require quite modest financial resources, and put them on his priority list for early action on the circumpolar cooperation agenda of the Arctic Council countries:

We could consider such things as establishing an Arctic technical assistance program, a program through which engineering and business and other kinds of applied knowledge could be made available to Arctic communities throughout the circumpolar region.

We could initiate an Arctic capacity-building program to upgrade or improve the skills dealing with these kinds of administrative issues of local people, especially indigenous people, in the Arctic.

We could start an Arctic development bank to provide small-scale capital resources to communities that want to initiate community action or community development programs. . . .

One of our great tasks over the next several decades will be to try to develop more self-sufficient ways of operating for these communities . . . their circumstances are somewhat unusual compared with, for example, the rest of Canada. Certainly this is the

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<sup>178</sup> Chapter Eight will address a broader range of issues related to circumpolar cooperation in education.



case in Russia today, in an even more dramatic sense. So I think there are reasons to provide some special assistance to these communities. [40:5-8]

In light of the above:

### **Recommendation 27**

**The Committee recommends that Canada accord an early high priority in circumpolar cooperation to providing an enabling environment for sustainable community-based economic development, by exploring practical ways to implement established sustainability principles, and giving particular attention to the following:**

- **coordinating federal Government efforts, in close cooperation with northern development initiatives by provincial, territorial and local governments;**
- **supporting the sustainable utilization of non-renewable resources, especially by indigenous peoples;**
- **promoting cultural and other cottage industries;**
- **encouraging ecotourism development;**
- **increasing vocational training and business skills development;**
- **improving access to micro-credit resources.**

### ***Promoting Circumpolar Trade and Facilitating Commercial Linkages among Circumpolar Economies***

In an era where trade liberalization and systems of transport and communications are increasingly global, it is important that the circumpolar region not be left out or left behind. A remaining problem is the historical pattern of predominant North-South economic flows — between dependent peripheries of nation-states and their southern metropolises — and barriers limiting development of East-West, North-North exchanges. In Canada, we now commonly think of ourselves as integral players within North America, trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific economic areas. There has been, in contrast, hardly any strategic consciousness of an emerging circumpolar area in trade and economic development terms. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, of course, has separate trade development activities in all of the Arctic Council countries, but there is no circumpolar-region orientation or focus.

Indeed, circumpolar trade issues have received only occasional attention. The Canadian Polar Commission in its early years sponsored a conference on the subject which recommended developing “in cooperation with northerners . . . an urgently

needed circumpolar trade policy for Canada” and identified a number of problem areas, including: a “fragmented” knowledge base; a “lack of international codes and standards for cold-climate technologies”; weak Canadian investment in exploiting competitive advantages from these technologies; an undeveloped local business environment and northern enterprises that were not yet “export-ready”; barriers to international trade in renewable resource sectors; and lack of marketing associations to strengthen export activity in these sectors. Conference participants recommended establishing a “Canadian Polar information System [incorporating] a trade services and opportunities database that lists companies and services”; a national research and development program for cold-climate technologies; and joint federal, provincial, and territorial action to harmonize regulations, coordinate programs, and generally collaborate more effectively to address deficiencies in trade development. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade was requested to “devise a strategy and cooperative marketing plan that involves representatives of all northern stakeholder groups that are proposing global trading initiatives.”<sup>179</sup>

A few steps have been taken since then. The Canadian International Business Strategy for 1997-98 will, for the second year, have a chapter on “aboriginal products, services and technologies,” and within that context a “North of 60” team is being contemplated that would address trade development for Inuit arts, indigenous food products and fisheries and promote technology transfer within circumpolar regions for the communications, transport and mining, and resource industries. In regard to aboriginal-initiated developments Don Axford of the Canadian Inuit Business Development Council, told the Committee how “the Inuit are clearly reaching out to the circumpolar world and beyond. They are setting up businesses at a remarkable rate. The CIBDC does provide one way for the Inuit in a pan-Arctic way to gain an understanding of where businesses are being set up and what services or products are being provided in the North. It’s also for these businesses to reach out to see where the barriers might be to trade and development” [20:14]. Yet, as Kevin Knight, of Unaaq International, underscored in the same panel, there is no overall Canadian policy that works through the implications of global and regional trade regimes (GATT/WTO, NAFTA, EU) for Arctic development and the sustainability of northern-specific approaches:

For sustainable development to occur in the North and be supported in the South there needs to be a fuller understanding of the nature of economic development and the areas in which it can be supported rather than just the simple application of approaches specific to the south. . . .

Without understanding in the North, without having an appreciation for which businesses are ready for which kind of trade activity, and without knowing more about the match between size and scope of products and relevant markets, some of the trade activities are doubted and then fast drive away interests in the North in outward trade

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<sup>179</sup> *Circumpolar Trade: The Canadian Agenda*, Report of a Conference held in Edmonton, 5-6 March 1993, Canadian Polar Commission, *Polaris Papers*, Vol. 1, No. 3, March 1994. A CPC program that aimed to develop a Canadian Polar Information System (CPIS) was subsequently abandoned when it lost federal funding. For more on that issue see Chapter Eight.



linkages and development. Support then must be provided for northern businesses in understanding and readying themselves for trade beyond the northern Canadian level. [20:10-11]

On the same point, Gerald Lock reiterated to the Committee some of the themes he had emphasized as chair of the economic development and trade workshop at the 1994 northern foreign policy conference. He had observed then that maximizing benefits to Canada from cold-region technologies, many of which could also be environmentally protective, would require substantial investments, accompanied by “aggressive” trade policies marking a new forward-looking mindset:

Our attitude towards circumpolar trade still lives in the nineteenth century . . . [yet] within a few years we will have the technology of the twenty-first century. Telecommunications now permits us to do the “paperwork” of circumpolar business in a much reduced time period; and transportation technology offers us efficient air routes together with the promise of new sea routes in the foreseeable future. Arctic transportation of goods, and in support of tourism, should thus become a key element in a Canadian circumpolar trade policy.<sup>180</sup>

In Gerald Lock’s view, Canada should be establishing such a comprehensive policy on the cornerstones of: “capitalizing on our record in international diplomacy and commitment to environmental protection; promoting our natural comparative advantages in renewable resources, non-renewable resources, telecommunications and transportation; developing new and current markets for Canadian products and services; mitigating the effects of adverse foreign measures such as boycotts and trade barriers.”<sup>181</sup> Moreover, the advent of the Arctic Council should be seen, not only as a useful forum for general discussion of trade issues, but in terms of exploring the Arctic implications of international trade agreements and rules, looking towards circumpolar arrangements and perhaps, as he suggested to the Committee, an “Arctic free-trade agreement” [20:5].

There are also a number of more immediate ways, however, in which Canada could move to realize the unfulfilled potential of stronger circumpolar trading relationships with other Arctic Council members and interested countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom and France. A compelling statement to that effect was made by Professor Robert Williamson, chair of the University of Saskatchewan’s International Committee and a former Inuktitut-speaking member of the NWT legislature during the 1994 foreign policy review public hearings.

We have shared interests and trade interests in the circumpolar context. We also, as a country, have very extensive expertise, much valued by other circumpolar nations . . . we are in competition with very sophisticated economies. For example, we have an enormous seaboard requiring ice navigation technology, but Finland and Sweden, and even Denmark, are competing in building icebreakers and doing at least as well, if not better than us.

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<sup>180</sup> G.S.H. Lock, “Towards a Canadian Circumpolar Trade Policy,” in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 83-84.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84-85.

We have internationally-recognized expertise in northern environmental mining, in hydro-carbon product exploration and production, pipeline building, and permafrost environment construction . . . in northern aviation and northern road and railroad operations, northern building construction, and hinterland communications . . . we have expertise that could be exported more effectively. We already are active in Siberia, but nowhere near to the extent of the U.S.A. or Germany or the Japanese initiatives in Siberia since the end of the U.S.S.R.

Siberia . . . has enormous forest resources. Again we're in competition with the Swedes and the Finns in the development of well-conserved forest reduction technology in marginal settings. . . . in western Canada we have developed a great deal of trade potential in agricultural science knowledge and technology, very applicable to the tremendous needs of the huge agricultural tracts of Siberia and northern Russia where we can be profitably involved to a greater extent than we already are.<sup>182</sup>

Professor Williamson also pointed to the success of Canada's northern indigenous peoples in creating cooperative and regional development enterprises which are examples of "successful corporate models that could be made available in terms of Canadian expertise elsewhere in the circumpolar world." Overall, as a nation we are "capable of exerting a great deal more influence on the Arctic environment for the sake of the health and thus the trade effectiveness of the whole of Canada and the circumpolar world."<sup>183</sup>

This potential was brought home to Committee members in meetings with aboriginal business leaders in the Arctic. For example, in Kuujuaq, Makivik Corporation Treasurer Peter Adams outlined its ambitious expansion plans and international ventures, from Greenland to Russia and beyond the circumpolar area, including the plans of its First Air subsidiary, of which he is president. In Iqaluit, members were impressed by the vision in which municipal and Nunavut spokespersons are working with the local private sector to make this Baffin community and future territorial capital, into a hub for circumpolar commercial activity. In Inuvik, Nellie Cournoyea, chairperson of the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, submitted that: "We in the North are excited about the opportunities which world trade can bring. As Inuvialuit we have a special interest of kinship in promoting international relations with countries in the circumpolar region. As Canadians we wish to see the export of our products grow and our participation in international trade expand." At the same time, she cautioned that Government action must "be cognizant of the interests, traditions and way of life of northern peoples" [Submission of 28 May 1996]. We would add

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<sup>182</sup> Special Joint Committee, *Proceedings*, Issue No. 13, 30 May 1994, p. 55. Dr. Williamson explained that he had been associate director of the University's Institute for Northern Studies and head of the Arctic Research and Training Centre "before they lost their funding," indicating that the circumpolar inspiration of individual Canadians may not be backed up and sustained institutionally.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55-56.



that this includes adhering fully to the overarching principles of sustainable development recommended earlier.

During the 1994 foreign policy review, Ms. Cournoyea, then NWT Government Leader, testified about numerous initiatives that could be undertaken to exercise circumpolar trade options and contribute to Canadian trade diversification. Nicholas Poushinsky had also called for “more northern focussed trade missions . . . [and] more balanced northern representation on trade missions.”<sup>184</sup> The Committee heard from several other witnesses, including officials responsible for territorial and municipal economic development in Yellowknife and Whitehorse, who expanded on their testimony from 1994. Stephen Simek of Ferguson, Simek, Clark Consulting Engineers, a leader among a number of Yellowknife-based firms involved in construction and management projects in the Russian Federation’s Sakha republic, elaborated on the range of elements (e.g. consular services, export financing and insurance instruments, and improved transportation links) that require attention if Canada is to take advantage of areas of real comparative advantage and potential niche markets. He suggested that a “Team-Canada” trade mission might help to boost trade momentum, which has sometimes flagged in recent years. Witnesses have argued that the federal Government could be helpful in other ways, such as through establishing an industry clearing-house for information and product data on cold-climate technologies and by expanding diplomatic and trade representation in the circumpolar area, especially the vast Russian north and far east. Although in Chapter Nine we will look in more detail at promoting circumpolar economic ties through Canada’s relations with other Arctic countries, we want to underline this theme which emerged in our Ottawa panels and our visits to the Canadian Arctic and overseas.

Before turning to more future-oriented trade and transport connections, we must mention an outstanding area of traditional exports — namely, wild fur and fur products — that has been crucial to the indigenous economy of many small Canadian Arctic communities, and that was described repeatedly during our study as requiring continued vigilant action by the Canadian Government.<sup>185</sup> The wild fur trade represents appropriate sustainable utilization of renewable resources, but the controversy over alleged “inhumane” trapping methods, fuelled by animal rights groups and supporters in the European Parliament, led the European Union to adopt an import embargo in 1991; this measure was strongly challenged by Canada and other principal fur exporters, the U.S. and Russia, under international trade rules. The ban has yet to take effect as the EU’s Commission has postponed implementation several times during lengthy multilateral negotiations to try to come up with an internationally satisfactory trapping standard.

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<sup>184</sup> Special Joint Committee, *Proceedings*, Issue No. 20, 1 June 1994, p. 125.

<sup>185</sup> For over 40,000 aboriginal Canadians, trapping provides income and an opportunity to pass on traditional values and skills. About 40% of Canada’s wild fur exports go to European consumers; interruption of this trade would cost Canada over \$25 million annually.

Canada and Russia reached a tentative draft agreement with the European Commission late in 1996; however, it has not yet achieved enough acceptance among European governments and ministers, so the overhanging threat remains.<sup>186</sup>

The Committee believes this is an important area of unfinished business in which Canada needs to craft an effective circumpolar foreign policy strategy. Witnesses in the Canadian Arctic argued for stronger direct involvement by aboriginal peoples in devising overseas trade strategies and for utilizing Arctic Council channels. In his submission, Gary Bohnet of the Metis Nation declared that:

The evolution of circumpolar relations and international cooperation requires that Aboriginal trappers and commercial wildlife harvesters have free markets to support their traditional livelihoods, and by that, maintain Aboriginal cultural survival and obtain economic independence. The Arctic Council can promote the environmental importance of trapping as well as free international trade with other circumpolar countries. [Submission of 30 May 1996, p. 7]

However, the Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec was notably critical of the Government's approach to date. Advisor Brian Craik contended that "Canada has involved native people only in the publicity aspect, not in working out the trap standards process. . . . The concrete thing Canada should do now is to work with aboriginal peoples to set up programs in Canada for trapper training, for trap replacement and for the development of new forms of traps. That should be done with aboriginal peoples" [41:18-19].

We note as well that the Speaker of the Finnish Parliament told the Committee that the wild fur issue was not very significant for the Saami population of that country, and that Finland would tend to abide by the EU consensus [Meeting No. 48, 29 October 1996]. Denmark, although a more established EU member, offers more potential for strategic collaboration with Canada because this issue is important to Greenland. This was confirmed to Committee members by Finn Linge, Greenland's representative in Brussels and a noted expert on the subject,<sup>187</sup> during meetings at the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat in Copenhagen. Nonetheless, Canada must show creativity and energy in evolving circumpolar trade strategies that support sustainable resource utilization principles of special importance to aboriginal peoples. In that regard, Milton Freeman of Edmonton's Circumpolar Institute urged that more be done generally to advance

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<sup>186</sup> "European Officials at Odds over Fur Ban," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 18 December 1996. EU environment ministers will not be easily persuaded to go along with a deal during the current Dutch presidency through June 1997. As diplomatic and internal EU manoeuvres continue (EU foreign ministers meeting on 24 February 1997 also called for improvements to be renegotiated in the December agreement), that is when the next decision deadline looms, according to the latest information available as of February 1997.

<sup>187</sup> Cf. Finn Linge, *Arctic Wars, Animal Rights, Endangered Peoples*, University Press of New England, Hanover and London, 1992.



Canadian objectives through joint circumpolar action against various international arrangements that may be injurious to sustainable circumpolar trade development:

Development of the northern resource economy requires working to overcome artificial barriers to international trade such as, e.g. the MMPA and EU directives banning trade in sealskins and wild furs, actions of the IWC opposing the commercial utilization of non-endangered whales, and unjustified CITES' sanctions against trade of various abundant, non-endangered species. Canada, Greenland, Norway and Iceland should work closely and resolutely together on overcoming these negative impacts; these countries are all non-EU nations, and all are adversely affected by EU and U.S. actions. [Submission of 3 June 1996, p. 6]

Moving beyond the traditional export sector, new technologies are opening up promising possibilities in circumpolar commerce, transport and communications, and creating concomitant requirements for Arctic standards and environmental safeguards. As the evidence of Gerald Lock and others indicates, there is a lot still to be done in all of these areas. Confirming the testimony of Professor Robert Williamson on icebreaker technology, former Canadian Coast Guard captain Patrick Toomey told the Committee: "The combined Swedish and Finnish Baltic Sea icebreaker fleet, which has nothing to do with Arctic ice, is better equipped and more powerful than ours. We should not miss the opportunity to take control of the situation. If Canada is going to opt out of ice-breaking, I'm sure the Russians, the Scandinavians, and even commercial interests might be interested in building ships capable of looking after Arctic Ocean navigation" [20:2].

However, as Patrick Toomey hastened to add: "Polar navigation left purely to commercial interests to exploit, without government supervision and regulation, to my mind is a recipe for ecological disaster, and human disaster too" [20:3]. Oran Young suggested to the Committee that a circumpolar institution like the Arctic Council could be used to initiate "some Arctic adaptations of more general institutional arrangements or regimes. For example, we could consider whether we should develop the idea of MARPOL, a marine pollution special area, [i.e. designating a special zone for anti-pollution measures] or several such areas, for the Arctic. We could see whether it would be interesting to follow up on the Law of the Sea Convention, article 234 — a very well-known article in Canadian circles — dealing with ice-covered areas, to see whether or not we might want to devise a circumpolar, Arctic set of rules and regulations to deal with navigation in ice-covered areas" [40:6].

On the subject of future Canadian interests in circumpolar shipping, applied technologies and commercial spinoffs, the Committee benefited greatly from the testimony of Martin Luce, President of Canarctic Shipping, a company created as a joint venture by the federal Government and private industry. Using its expertise developed in the Canadian Arctic, Canarctic has created a technical services subsidiary Enfotec, which is currently engaged in a major project with Russian partners — the Integrated Arctic

Resources Information System (“Intaris”) — designed to support resource development in Russian Arctic offshore areas. Intaris has the potential to create a marketable system of circumpolar applications for project planning, environmental monitoring, and ice forecasting. Members were able to appreciate those merits in meetings with both the Canadian and Russian associates at the Arctic and Antarctic Institute in St. Petersburg; and we will have considerably more to say about the technical cooperation side of this activity in Chapter Nine.

In an earlier Ottawa panel, Mr. Luce had emphasized commercial opportunities and technological innovations (e.g. Canarctic has pioneered the use of remote sensing, satellite communications and electronic on-board systems for ice navigation), and also awareness of advancing leading-edge technologies in a context of environmental stewardship. As he put it:

Canarctic has closely monitored the environmental impact of its operation on northern residents and their traditional lifestyle. The company works in cooperation with local groups to document and minimize the effects of vessel operations on the physical Arctic environment. We, in our way, have made a small contribution to Canada’s very significant expertise in environmental impact assessment, which is one area in which Canada can certainly take the lead in circumpolar cooperation. [20:8]

This brings us back appropriately to the essential underlying theme of practising **sustainability** in circumpolar economic initiatives in order to preserve the regions’ ecosystems and benefit its human communities. Despite the optimism reflected in much of the foregoing in regard to trade, technological and transportation developments, there are still many gaps and concerns to be attended to. As an example, a major project such as the “Northern Sea Route,” which was discussed during our meetings in Europe, could open up Euro-Arctic and Russian waters to greatly increased year-round polar commercial transit, and thereby raise serious reservations about the adequacy of circumpolar arrangements for ensuring that sustainable development principles are respected.<sup>188</sup>

For Canada, therefore, the challenge is to improve our international policy instruments so as to be able to act vigorously on a circumpolar basis to realize economic gains through liberalizing exchanges and development of profitable linkages; within a multilateral framework of sound sustainable development principles. The overarching aim of Canadian policy should be to enhance the security and build the economic capacity of the regions’ indigenous communities, which all too often in the past, have borne the brunt of powerful forces outside their control. The next chapter accordingly elaborates further on the need for indigenous rights and democratic accountability to be part of a circumpolar sustainable development policy framework.

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<sup>188</sup> See, for example, Sanjay Chaturvedi, “Development and Management of Circumpolar Transportation/Communications Networks,” *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 253-57.



Concluding our survey of economic development priorities within such a framework:

#### **Recommendation 28**

The Committee recommends that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade create, within the Circumpolar Affairs Division (see Recommendation 3), a unit for circumpolar trade development with responsibilities for:

- developing, and referring to this Committee for comment, a comprehensive circumpolar trade policy that includes giving direction to work by the Circumpolar Ambassador and within the Arctic Council on trade and sustainable development issues;
- promoting aboriginal and other northern-based products;
- advising, in collaboration with other parts of government, international allies and aboriginal peoples' organizations, on strategies for free trade in such products;
- consider the legal aspects of the restrictive trade practices adopted by other countries and which have a negative impact on aboriginal populations;
- analyzing the long-term implications of international trade agreements for Arctic sustainable development; and
- supporting northern Canadian trade initiatives in other Arctic countries.

#### **Recommendation 29**

The Committee also recommends that the Government pursue negotiations with its Arctic Council partners to liberalize trade in Arctic products, and ultimately eliminate the tariff and non-tariff barriers in respect thereto.

#### **Recommendation 30**

The Committee recommends further that the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division be given responsibility for encouraging and facilitating Canadian, especially Arctic-based, activities in circumpolar transportation, communications and technological development. A high priority should be accorded to those areas of Canadian expertise and potential strength that are environmentally protective as well as commercially sound. The Government should strive to ensure that in all cases Canadian initiatives in Arctic-region development adhere fully to applied sustainability principles, thereby promoting circumpolar progress in this regard. To this end, the Canadian government and the Arctic Council should undertake a rigorous assessment of the risks inherent in opening northern sea lanes, in particular to tankers.





## CHAPTER 7 — PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC APPROACHES TO CIRCUMPOLAR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, NORTHERN REGIONS, AND PUBLIC-INTEREST ROLES

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### *Supporting Participation by Aboriginal Communities as Circumpolar Actors*

The main ingredient for successful Canadian policies is a simple one: understanding that the Arctic is peopled.

Peter Jull<sup>189</sup>

Arctic indigenous peoples, with a long history of colonization, economic and political marginalization and deprivation of legitimate rights to their lands and resources, are now demanding effective participation in the sustainable development of their homelands and in the making of decisions that affect their political rights as citizens and their status as human beings with a distinct cultural identity.

Sanjay Chaturvedi<sup>190</sup>

In the course of the Committee's year-long inquiry, we have repeatedly observed that the human aspirations of the diverse and culturally distinctive peoples of the circumpolar region are now a principal driving force behind the evolving policy agendas and growing public manifestations of an emerging circumpolar political consciousness. In other words, the frayed stratagems of sovereign states — e.g. regarding the Arctic as a strategic "theatre" of military operations or as a reserve asset of national wealth — are gradually having to give way to non-state actors with different concerns and expectations from circumpolar cooperation. These concerns include not only environment, health, and sustainable community economic development but, just as important, political "self-determination" and cultural survival.

A forward-looking Canadian circumpolar foreign policy must take this into account. State interests are not withdrawing from a field crowded with Arctic "stakeholders"; indeed, such interests remain dominant in some areas and are indispensable to setting international policy objectives. Rather, the governments representing Arctic states are increasingly being challenged to work together to achieve useful sustainable human development goals, and to do so in ways that respect and support both indigenous peoples' specific rights and broader democratic rights. Getting Canada's circumpolar policies "right" cannot be accomplished in isolation from the efforts of the governments of other nations or of the peoples, citizens and communities across the Arctic region.

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<sup>189</sup> "Canada, Arctic Peoples, and International Affairs", *Behind the Headlines*, Vol. 45, No. 6, July/August 1988, p. 2.

<sup>190</sup> *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 143.

In a joint appearance during the 1994 foreign policy review process, two of the most notable aboriginal witnesses before this Committee — Mary Simon, prior to being named Canada's Circumpolar Ambassador, and Rosemarie Kuptana, then Inuit Tapirisat and current ICC President — expressed to parliamentarians a conviction we heard expressed often and in various contexts:

Inuit firmly believe that Arctic policy issues are increasingly transnational in scope and regional cooperation and coordination are essential to effective Arctic policies. We also believe that there must be formal mechanisms for ensuring the meaningful involvement of Inuit in the development of other foreign policies affecting the rights and interests of Inuit.<sup>191</sup>

It is clear both that Arctic indigenous peoples want “in” to the processes of circumpolar policy development, as a matter of right and not of grudging privilege or convenience, and that they want the Arctic states to give international recognition to this right. It is not surprising, therefore, that the granting of “permanent participant” status to three, and probably more, circumpolar indigenous organizations within the Arctic Council has taken on such a particular significance. As well, Canadian aboriginal leaders who appeared before the Committee, notably Ms. Kuptana, Chief Bill Erasmus of the Dene Nation, and Chief Matthew Coon-Come and Ambassador Ted Moses of the Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec, spoke of the importance of having Canada support indigenous peoples’ rights internationally within the circumpolar context.

Earlier, in Part I, we cited Ambassador Simon’s reference to the quite remarkable changes transforming the human and political face of Canada’s northern territories. It is true that native populations in the Canadian Arctic are small and scattered, especially compared with the more sizeable indigenous minorities and urban concentrations in the far north and east of the Russian Federation (see Box 11 “Profile of Circumpolar Indigenous Peoples and Organizations”). Fewer than one-third of 1% of Canadians live north of the sixtieth parallel. The report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples defines the “Far North” more widely, to include the provincial far northern areas; even in this case, however, aboriginal people comprise fewer than half (42%) of a total population of only 152,000. As we observed in the previous chapter, 90% of aboriginal people in Canada live in its less northern parts. Yet, as witnesses told the Committee, and as our visits to Arctic communities attested, these permanent residents are determined to move forward to take charge of their destiny in areas of governance, human and environmental security, sustainable economic development, and shared learning — both within Canada and, increasingly, within a consciously circumpolar context.

Already years ago, Peter Jull noted that “northern peoples have consistently preferred autonomy to assimilation.” He added that: “Completing the infrastructure of nationhood

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<sup>191</sup> Special Joint Committee, *Proceedings*, Issue No. 36, 9 June 1994, p. 28. See also the similar appeal made by John Amagoalik (current head of the Nunavut Implementation Commission and sometimes referred to as the “father” of Nunavut) — “Northern Peoples and the Formulation of Foreign Policy in the Arctic,” Lamb ed., *Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 184-86.



### **Box 11 — “Profile of Circumpolar Indigenous Peoples and Organizations”**

The circumpolar North region north of 60° is home to only about 9 million people, obviously a tiny fraction of the present world population. Of these inhabitants, approximately 1.5 million, or one-sixth, can be regarded as indigenous peoples for whom the Arctic is their traditional native homeland. Concentrations and other characteristics vary greatly from one part of the Arctic to another. Natives constitute a very small minority in the few large cities (e.g. Anchorage in Alaska, Novosibirsk in Siberia). But in a growing number of northern regions they are playing a much more visible and determined political role than ever before. And in a few places — principally, Canada’s eastern Arctic, northern Quebec and Labrador, and Greenland — indigenous majorities (in this case the Inuit constituting over 80% of the population) have already obtained, or are in the process of consolidating, self-governing structures within the territories which they have traditionally claimed.

Within the North American Arctic, the percentage of native people generally rises as one moves West to East. Alaska’s diverse native groups (about 20 languages are spoken) make up only 15% of the state’s population — about 85,000 people. In the huge Canadian Arctic, where less than one-third of 1% of Canadians live, there are fewer than 60,000 aboriginal people in total. Yukon has the lowest percentage of indigenous people at about 25%. About half the population of the present Northwest Territories is native: a mix of Indian, Metis and Inuvialuit ancestries in the western part, but a high majority of Inuit in the eastern part that is to become the new territory of Nunavut in 1999. In northern Quebec and Labrador, the approximately 8,000 Inuit constitute a similar majority within their region of Nunavik, while several thousand Innu live in the adjacent area of Labrador. About 9,000 Cree occupy traditional lands in the James Bay area, and there are a few thousand members of other Indian tribes (the Naskapi and Montagnais) spread across the northern half of Quebec and Labrador. In neighbouring Greenland, the world’s largest island, the 45,000 Inuit who live there (accounting for over 80% of the population, as noted above) have strong ties to Canada’s Inuit.

In the Nordic Euro-Arctic, the indigenous Saami people of this northernmost part of the continent, known as Lapland, number about 60,000 in total: 40,000 in Norway, 15,000 in Sweden, 4,000 in Finland, and less than 2,000 in the Russian part of the Kola peninsula. While the Scandinavian Saami have developed their own forms of representation through Saami “parliaments” (which are consultative rather than legislative), and within regional organizations like the Nordic and Barents councils, they lack the territorial claims status of aboriginal counterparts in North America. The Saami are best known for their traditional occupation of reindeer herding; however, this is probably more of a mainstay in parts of the more remote Russian Arctic than in modern-day Lapland.

Russia’s situation is the most complex by far, with over one million indigenous people inhabiting a vast northern expanse that covers nearly three-fifths of the present Russian

Federation. Two indigenous ethnic minorities, the Komi and the Yakut, which have their own "autonomous republics" (of Russia's 89 regional entities, these are among the most independent from Moscow), account for about three-quarters of that total. In terms of cultural and socio-economic survival, a more challenging condition confronts the approximately 200,000 so-called "small peoples" of the Russian north and far east, of which 26 are officially recognized by the state. The prospects for some of these northern minorities are extremely precarious, even if, as in the case of the Russian Saami and Inuit, they are now better able to establish supportive links with "cousins" in the West. Canadian Inuit, through the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, have been working with Inuit experiencing harsh conditions in the remote far eastern Chukotka region. However, as the head of the Russian association of northern minorities, Yeremei Aipin, mentioned in his statement at the inauguration of the Arctic Council, the Inuit represented by this association number fewer than 200 people.

This brings up the issue of international representation of Arctic indigenous peoples' interests through circumpolar organizations. The key bodies in this regard, which have accordingly been granted the standing of permanent participants within the Arctic Council, were briefly introduced in Chapter Three and Box 3. The Committee was able to meet separately with the heads of the three principal indigenous associations — in Ottawa, with Rosemarie Kuptana representing the ICC; in Moscow, with Yeremei Aipin; and in Tromsø, with Leif Halonen representing the Saami Council. The oldest body is the Saami Council, established in the 1950s and based in Kautokeino in northern Norway. Its membership is exclusively Scandinavian, with the exception of the recent addition of the small number of Russian Kola Saami. The ICC, established two decades later and based in Ottawa, represents about 130,000 North American Inuit (including in Greenland, which is also part of Norden), and a few Russian Inuit as well. Both the Saami Council and the ICC have consultative NGO status with the United Nations. The newest, all-Russian, body, representing the "small peoples" and based in Moscow, is a post-1989 creation which changed its name in 1993 to become the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation. In 1994 it became an officially incorporated body recognized by the Russian Ministry of Justice.

The above three circumpolar indigenous organizations first came together in an Aboriginal Leaders' Summit in 1991 to create a continuing channel for pan-Arctic aboriginal cooperation at the nongovernmental level. The three also began working multilaterally with Arctic states through the AEPS process, assisted since 1993 by the Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat that continues within the framework of the Arctic Council. Notwithstanding the progress made by these permanent participant bodies, there are, as indicated in Chapter Three, significant arguments for additional aboriginal representation which remain to be resolved as part of the evolving agenda of circumpolar cooperation.



within our own territory by extending political institutions to aboriginal Canadians is surely as important a sovereignty issue as defending lines on Arctic maps with fleets and lawyers.”<sup>192</sup> The progress of devolution and development of appropriate democratic government structures in Canada north of 60° is therefore a crucial domestic element shaping the future of a distinctive Canadian role among Arctic nations.<sup>193</sup> There is still a very complex, sometimes contested, unfinished agenda of constitutional and practical governance issues — including the scope of aboriginal “self-government” and the future of broader “public government” following division of the NWT, as well as innovations such as the proposed gender-equity provisions in a new Nunavut legislature.<sup>194</sup> It is clear, however, as confirmed during our hearings, that Canada’s northern aboriginal peoples have found their voice and are asserting their demands for inclusion in decision-making processes at home and abroad. It is therefore essential for this to be taken into account at all levels in developing circumpolar policies.<sup>195</sup>

What is true in Canada is also true in other circumpolar countries with indigenous minority populations.<sup>196</sup> As we heard, the remarkable and uncertain transformations taking place across Russia seem especially important and worthy of international attention and assistance. Russia’s vast northern regions are home to a complex mosaic of indigenous peoples — the 1989 census identified 26 ethnic groups known collectively as

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<sup>192</sup> Peter Jull, “Canada, Arctic Peoples and International Affairs” (1988), p. 3 and 10.

<sup>193</sup> This was beginning to be recognized already a decade ago: Cf. Gordon Robertson, “Nunavut and the International Arctic,” *Northern Perspectives*, Fall 1987.

<sup>194</sup> Rudy Platiel, “Inuit Endorse Gender-Equal Legislature,” *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), December 1996; “Equal Seats for Women, Men Eyed for Arctic Legislature,” *The Toronto Star*, 18 February 1997. However, a plebiscite may be held to determine if there is majority public support for this proposal. On the larger issues of territorial government restructuring, in discussions surrounding the division of the NWT the federal Government has indicated that it would like to see the “inherent right of [aboriginal] self-government . . . find expression primarily through the public government and be implemented in partnership with the federal and territorial governments” (Address of Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, Ron Irwin, to the NWT Western Arctic Constitutional Development Steering Committee Conference, January 1995, cited in Kirk Cameron and Graham White, *Northern Governments in Transition*, The Institute for Research on Public Policy, Montreal, 1995, p. 81.). The division of the NWT, spurred by the desire of the Eastern Arctic Inuit for their own self-governing political unit of “Nunavut” was originally approved by a 56% majority in a 1982 plebiscite, but a new boundary was only agreed in 1992 after being approved in another plebiscite (this time with a 54% majority). Late that year the Inuit reached a political accord and final settlement of their comprehensive land claim with the federal Government. In June 1993, with all-party support, Parliament passed the Act providing for the establishment of Nunavut by 1999. A December 1995 plebiscite then chose Iqaluit to be the future capital by a 60% majority vote. The Committee visited the headquarters of the Nunavut implementation process during meetings in Iqaluit in May 1996.

<sup>195</sup> As the eminent Quebec social geographer Louis-Edmond Hamelin has recently written: “Questions may well then be raised about original, large-scale proposals, such as *Nunavik* in Quebec, or *Nunavut*, *Inuvialuit* and *Denendeh* in the Northwest Territories. Northern studies are intimately linked to autochtony . . .”. Already in 1965 Edmond had advised that “southerners can no longer contemplate policies for the North without really consulting the indigenous peoples.” (*L’Écho des pays froids*, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, Sainte-Foy, 1996, p. 212.)

<sup>196</sup> A useful survey of northern native peoples and their stages of political development is Jens Dahl, “Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic,” in *Arctic Challenges* (1993), p. 103-27. More in-depth profiles are contained in the Minority Rights Group Report, *Polar Peoples: Self-Determination and Development* (1994). See also Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), Chapter 6 “Indigenous Peoples: Consciousness, Assertion of Identity and Geopolitical Ferment.” Among the eight Arctic Council states, Iceland is the only one with no significant aboriginal population.

the “Small Peoples of the North and the Far East” — totalling under 200,000 people. This does not include the larger recognized ethnic and political entities of the Komi and the Yakuts, each with a population above 300,000, although they too are still minorities within their respective autonomous republics. The situation of the “small peoples” is especially vulnerable, as they are far outnumbered on their own territories by Russian settlers, many brought into these remote regions during periods of Soviet military-industrial ambition and forced development, which wreaked havoc on the local environment, human and wildlife populations. These besieged indigenous minorities must now struggle to find their way through the traumatic transitions of the post-Soviet period.<sup>197</sup>

Piers Vitebsky, Head of Social Sciences and Russian Studies at Cambridge University’s Scott Polar Research Institute, which possesses the world’s largest archive of information on the Russian Arctic, has written that: “From the 1930s to the mid-1980s, a succession of policies and developments had an almost unremittingly negative impact on the Northern Minorities.”<sup>198</sup> So, for example, when the world’s largest reserves of oil and gas were discovered in western Siberia in the 1960s, the regions’s minority peoples, rather than benefiting in a way that could sustain indigenous community life, suffered even more exposure to the environmental, health and socio-cultural consequences of accelerated externally driven development. Fortunately, the Gorbachev reforms of the late 1980s exposed the issues of environmental degradation linked to the plight of northern indigenous minorities and galvanized, at least for a time, Russian public consciousness. An early leader in this fight for recognition of native rights, and for a sustainable, self-governing future for the traditional cultural communities of the Russian North, was the Khant writer Yeremei Aipin, with whom the Committee met as one of a panel of indigenous leaders in Moscow, on the same day as we met with Mikhail Gorbachev himself. Mr. Aipin is now the official representative in the Arctic Council for the “permanent participant” association of Russia’s indigenous northern and far eastern minorities, which was first formed in 1990.<sup>199</sup>

Many of the challenges facing these peoples are similar to, if more acute than, those in other circumpolar regions: negotiation of indigenous land claims, ownership rights and resource management; reshaping of power relations between regional authorities and the

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<sup>197</sup> An excellent succinct analysis of the historic challenges faced by Russia’s northern native peoples is Piers Vitebsky, “The Northern Minorities,” Chapter 5 in Graham Smith ed., *The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States*, 2nd edition, Longman, London and New York, 1996. See also, Yuri Slezkine, *Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North*, Cornell University Press, Ithica N.Y., 1994.

<sup>198</sup> Piers Vitebsky, *The Northern Minorities* (1996), p. 97.

<sup>199</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev, then still President of the Soviet Union, attended the inaugural meeting of this association, which was held inside the Moscow Kremlin. The Committee’s meetings in November 1996 included the work of the Gorbachev Foundation, which has been engaged with Canadian partners in projects directed at northern sustainable development and improving the situation of Arctic indigenous people, notably the Saami of the Kola peninsula. See the discussion of Canadian technical cooperation with Russia in Chapter Nine.



central government; preservation of traditional economies and ways of life (communities and cultures based mainly on reindeer-herding, hunting and fishing); regulation of major non-renewable resource development (oil and gas, diamonds, other minerals); and new questions of economic privatization and how to stimulate native entrepreneurial activity in the wake of sharply diminished state support. Despite the democratic opening since 1989, the particular severity of Russia conditions is troubling. As Piers Vitebsky observes:

Native people face the daunting task of sustaining viable communities with high transport costs and overheads. This is a widespread problem throughout the native Arctic and it afflicts large areas of Greenland, Alaska and Canada. In these countries, whatever natural resources are taken out of the northern regions, native communities are sustained in return by a high level of subsidies and provision of social services. The Northern Minorities in Russia, however, find themselves on the outer edge of an industrial state that either wants the land for other purposes or perhaps is coming to abandon the area altogether. . . . Though the ecological situation is probably getting worse . . . there is a widespread feeling that good environmental management is an expensive luxury. In many places, people are reduced to an overriding concern with the need to survive each winter as it comes.<sup>200</sup>

Our meetings in Russia, including that with Minister Vladimir Kuramin, Chairman of GOSKOMSEVER, the state committee responsible for northern development and native peoples, and in Finland with respect to the situation in the Kola peninsula, certainly confirmed chronic problems in supplying basic needs.<sup>201</sup> Valery Shustov, General Secretary of the Russian Association of Indigenous Minorities, also spoke about the tremendous amount of work still to be done to establish an adequate framework of legal rights and democratic structures from the federal to the regional levels. Notwithstanding the obstacles, Association President Aipin expressed some optimism that a five-year mutual cooperation agreement recently reached with GOSKOMSEVER, and set to begin in January 1997, could be a domestic breakthrough. Coming after the international breakthrough of aboriginal participation in the Arctic Council inauguration, he was encouraged by its promise of at last giving aboriginal peoples a "control function" and real

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<sup>200</sup> Piers Vitebsky, "The Northern Minorities" (1996), p. 103. See also Valery Shustov, "Problems of the Indigenous Minorities of the Russian North Stemming from Industrial Development of the Arctic," translation of text of address in Russian to the Third Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Yellowknife, 4 March 1996.

<sup>201</sup> Grave shortages of food and energy supplies were reported. Vladimir Goman, chair of the Duma Committee on Northern Affairs (with whom the Committee was unfortunately unable to meet due to his illness) was quoted in one intelligence report describing the situation as "catastrophic" ("Arctic Exodus," *Foreign Report*, Jane's Information Group Ltd., 17 October 1996, p. 7). Although bad weather prevented the Committee from meeting aboriginal and local government representatives in Murmansk, Finnish experts on the Barents region, who met with the Committee in Helsinki, gave further direct evidence of extreme hardships, and the need to deal with such basic issues as a matter of urgency. If people are preoccupied with sheer survival, it will be difficult to see progress towards sustainable development and democratic stability.

partnership with the Russian government.<sup>202</sup> At the same time, he stressed as critical immediate circumpolar priorities both preservation of the natural environment that sustains native peoples' traditional livelihoods and "creation of a sustainable economic base to allow people to survive" as they try to cope with the uncertainties of market-oriented transition.

Great Russian interest was expressed to the Committee on all sides in the opportunity to draw on Canadian experience and benefit from cooperative endeavours. A notable example cited was a major project on institution-building for northern aboriginal peoples being executed by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference — one among a number of bilateral technical cooperation initiatives we will discuss further in Chapter Nine. It is important to signal at this point that the emergence of circumpolar indigenous organizations has added an important dimension of international political advocacy to local and national-level democratic activism, as well as providing an independent channel for sharing knowledge about such innovative Canadian developments as setting up native-controlled corporations, operating land and resource-based "co-management" regimes, or establishing the new Nunavut territory.<sup>203</sup> ICC president Rosemarie Kuptana spoke to the Committee in Ottawa as well about specific needs for official support to strengthen ties with Russian Inuit and Siberian indigenous peoples, including sending humanitarian aid to such depressed regions as Chukotka. In Moscow, Maiya Ettirintina, a former member of the Federation Council from this far eastern region, expressed appreciation of close ties with Canadian aboriginal leaders and of Canada's support for international minority rights. As she put it: "Canadians are people who keep their word, just like traditional minority peoples." Representatives from the republic of Sakha (Yakutia) praised ties built up with Canada's northern territories and saw opportunities for further aboriginal involvement.

Minister Kuramin underlined to the Committee in Moscow that Russia wants to learn from Canada's experiences in evolving relationships with aboriginal peoples in all areas, including legal rights and regulations, as well as co-management, governance and constitutional issues. Some legislation is currently before the Russian parliament (State Duma) that addresses the status and special needs of the northern "small peoples," though the fundamental question of land rights remains unresolved. As well, the Soviet

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<sup>202</sup> Some caution may be advisable, however, in terms of expectations from such agreements. Piers Vitebsky actually sees the Association of Indigenous Minorities as being in decline from a highpoint in the early 1990s and therefore puts more store in local level associations. That seems to accord with Oran Young's comments to the Committee about the difficulty of leaders of larger aboriginal organizations staying in touch with grassroots views. At the federal governmental level, it might also be noted that the Northern Affairs Ministry, with an almost impossibly vast mandate but only 300 employees, has also had difficult times during the turbulent 1990s. As Kuramin told the Committee in Moscow, at one point GOSKOMSEVER was merged into the ministry for nationalities. It was only in 1995 that a Yeltsin decree recreated the state committee, recognizing critical deficiencies to be addressed in developing a proper framework for northern development policy.

<sup>203</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi points out that Nunavut is of interest to Russians studying regional government in the North and "provides practical inspiration for other indigenous peoples at least as a precedent" (*The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 156). The experiences of northern Alaskan natives in local governance and managing resource development have also been utilized in the Scott Polar Research Institute's impressive Russian program which is developing projects on sustainable social and economic development for remote regions. See Chapter Nine for further details.



system had enforced a state of over-dependence, so its sudden collapse left a vacuum. Introducing market relations is therefore a big leap posing special difficulties for remote northern regions, which is aggravated by Russia's deep budget problems. Kuramin left little doubt that more financial assistance is required to support Russia's northern peoples' transition to life in self-sustaining and self-governing communities.

The situation of the Russian Saami population in the Murmansk region has been of particular concern, though, like the Russian Inuit, this impoverished minority is at least fortunate to have kinship ties beyond Russia's borders — in this case, with the larger Saami populations of the adjacent Fenno-Scandinavian region.<sup>204</sup> In 1992, Russian Saami were able to join the Nordic Saami Council, which was established as one of the first international indigenous organizations in 1956, received NGO status within the United Nations in 1988, and is now one of the three aboriginal "permanent participants" in the Arctic Council. In the fall of 1996, Murmansk also hosted the Saami Assembly for the first time.

Committee members who visited Tromsø in northern Norway and the Nordic capitals heard from leading representatives of the Saami Council (including its president, Leif Halonen), and members of national Saami parliaments and other Saami organizations. Members were also briefed about the work of Norway's Saami Rights Commission. Many of the concerns expressed about environmental and social impacts, struggles for legal recognition of land, resource and political rights, have parallels with those of indigenous peoples in Canada's North. However, in general, Canada was seen as ahead of the Nordic countries with respect to recognition of aboriginal claims (with Russia having the most catching up to do). The Saami parliaments remain rather weak consultative organs, and assimilationist policies, notably in Sweden, have made it more difficult to obtain legal and political recognition of distinctive status. Saami representatives therefore see the benefits of increased international collaboration as including the opportunity to learn from the experiences and advances of Canadian indigenous peoples.

A critical note on furthering international cooperation was nevertheless injected during the Committee's visit to the Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat in Copenhagen, ironically by the Secretariat's Canadian executive secretary, Chester Reimer. The

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<sup>204</sup> Although Committee members were unable to get to scheduled meetings with representatives of the Kola Saami Association in Murmansk, we did hear firsthand testimony in Helsinki from experts who had recently visited the region. Professor Leif Rantala of the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi, a former general secretary of the Saami Council, warned that the shortages are such that "the situation is explosive . . . anything could happen." He made a plea to "please remember ordinary citizens when talking about the Arctic Council," Lieutenant Col. Arto Nokkola of the Tampere University Peace Research Institute, concurred on the difficulties facing Kola communities (about 10% of the population has left the region in recent years as a result), but also observed that people are getting more organized locally "trying to create a sort of northern strategy in order to survive." (For additional background see Nina Afanasjeva and Leif Rantala, "Programme of Aid to the Russian Saami," Saami Council, Utsjoki, Finland, 1993; Rantala, "The Russian Saami of Today," in *The Barents Region*, University of Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway, 1995, p. 56-62; Odd Mathis Haetta, *The Saami — an Indigenous People of the Arctic*, Davvi Girji o.s., Karasjok, Finland, 1996.)

Secretariat, funded by Denmark since it was established under the AEPS in 1993, faces an unclear future as it becomes absorbed into the new Arctic Council structure. Mr. Reimer worried that Canada might not sustain the leadership it had shown in establishing the Council, now that there were more rumoured cutbacks in Canadian funding for Arctic programs. In effect, just at the point when the institutional vehicles for circumpolar cooperation have been put in place, there is a risk that the resources will not be forthcoming to produce on the real dividends for which northern indigenous peoples, especially, are looking after their long participation in negotiations with officials of the Arctic states. Indigenous organizations do not want to come away from the process with few concrete benefits to show their people in the many small communities across the Arctic.

In Chapter Three, the Committee recommended that broader representation would be desirable for Canadian aboriginal peoples' organizations within the Arctic Council. While that formal standing is important, it is perhaps more important that indigenous peoples' representatives have opportunities to exert influence at the early stages of policy development — i.e. within the domestic milieu — which may then lead to the international discussion table. It is also important that Canadian indigenous groups be supported in establishing more intensive and local-level alliances with other circumpolar indigenous peoples, on such issues as sustainable community-based development, so that the democratic voices of the Arctic's original inhabitants are increasingly heard at every level where decisions are taken that affect the region's future.

Accordingly:

### **Recommendation 31**

**The Committee recommends that the Government take steps to deepen the democratic involvement of representatives from all of Canada's northern indigenous peoples in the elaboration of policies on circumpolar sustainable development. To that end, we recommend that an aboriginal contact group be established to provide regular advice to the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs on issues pertaining to her mandate and that of the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division in the Department of Foreign Affairs. To promote indigenous peoples' participation in the development of international sustainable development policies for the Arctic, the Government should support expanded international linkages through existing Canadian-based aboriginal organizations, and should also pledge stable, long-term material support for the Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat within the Arctic Council.**



## ***Involving Northern Regions and Representing Public Interests***

At the very least, it is necessary to ensure that northern leaders participate fully in consultative, cooperative and strategic decisions which control their economy.

Gerald Lock<sup>205</sup>

The South must let go of its desire for control of the North and learn to be partners with northerners in managing northern affairs.

Franklyn Griffiths<sup>206</sup>

The Arctic is not only the concern of aboriginal peoples; it is our concern as well, firstly because this is a global issue, and secondly, because Arctic issues are just as important to us here, in what is called the South, as they are to the people living in the Arctic. . . . If you really want a foreign policy for the Arctic, all Canadians will have to consider that part of the world as one of strategic importance to Canada. [47:25]

Paul Painchaud

The primary thrust of this chapter has been to advance the role, so often suppressed or ignored in the past, of indigenous peoples, as part of the future agenda of circumpolar sustainable development cooperation. There are, however, several other very important democratic elements that must be taken into account in building policy approaches that are fully participatory, public-interested and accountable.

First, the contribution of non-aboriginal residents of northern regions to circumpolar initiatives also needs to be recognized and affirmed, with northern communities being encouraged to work together as a whole to play a larger role in developing policy alternatives that can best meet their needs. In that sense, a more democratic Arctic foreign policy cannot be delivered from the outside, but must grow out of the increased capacity of these communities to exert political control over future development.<sup>207</sup> Flowing from that, the Committee is encouraged by a circumpolar movement of “decolonization” that seems to be taking place, accentuated by, but not limited, to the political awakening of aboriginal

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<sup>205</sup> In Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 82.

<sup>206</sup> “The Formulation of a Northern Foreign Policy for Canada: A Southern Perspective,” in *ibid.*, p. 187.

<sup>207</sup> The promotion of a democratic approach is integrally linked to the ability of people to make development choices for themselves. Moreover, as Chaturvedi’s analysis of Arctic sustainable development shows: “among alternative models of development, the community-based, citizen-driven approach has the greatest potential for realizing fundamental changes in the socio-economic, ecological and cultural survival strategies for the circumpolar Arctic . . . [emphasizing] localized, participatory economic planning as the most effective alternative to the insecurity, dependency and vulnerability typically inflicted by large-scale, remote, socially detached and politically non-accountable economic development.” (*The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 257.)

peoples. Based on what we have heard and observed, this new northern consciousness, as former Yukon premier Tony Penikett described it to us, is transforming both the process and the content of international activity and policy formation. Nongovernmental organizations, some with transnational memberships and operations, are also increasingly engaged at the circumpolar level, notably around issues of the environment and sustainable human development.

Already in 1994, Nicholas Poushinsky had told the parliamentary foreign policy review committee that “the notion of independence and self-determination needs to be built in if we’re going to understand and develop a realistic foreign policy. . . . northern initiatives in circumpolar foreign policy have happened irrespective of the disinterest of federal Foreign Affairs. . . there are circumpolar health initiatives, circumpolar education and the Northern Forum that have been developing.”<sup>208</sup> Northern communities have themselves been pursuing international links through an expanding range of functional and subnational channels — the East/West Air Routes Consortium, the International Association of Mayors of Northern Cities, and the Winter Cities Association International are among examples. At a higher level, territories and provinces have been making connections abroad related to their significant polar interests — for example, the NWT government’s establishment of a liaison office in Russia’s Sakha republic (Yakutia); Manitoba’s concern for the future of Churchill as an Arctic port and for the preservation of Hudson Bay polar bear habitat; and Quebec’s interest in relations with the Nordic countries and Siberia. In developing a responsive, democratic approach to circumpolar foreign policy development, the federal Government should be acknowledging and encouraging these existing interests and initiatives by other actors and levels of government, and taking care to avoid any duplication or perception of asserting control.

As we noted in Chapter Three, in connection with its bid to be included within the Arctic Council, only Alberta and the Yukon are at present members of the Northern Forum. The NWT, which has its own substantial relations with other circumpolar regions, is considering the value of joining.<sup>209</sup> We observed a keen Russian and Nordic interest in developing more links of this sort with Canada. The Northern Forum will next meet in Yakutsk, in Russia’s far northeast, where the NWT firm of Ferguson, Simek, Clark has earned a circumpolar reputation for its construction of a model “northern village.” In Helsinki, Committee members also met Dr. Ekaterina Balaganskaya of the Northern Forum Academy, an arm of the forum located at the University of Lapland Arctic Centre in Rovaniemi, who was eager to expand Canadian contacts. Whatever the specific vehicle or sector of activity, the goal should be to create increased opportunities for people in Arctic communities and regions to connect with each other around mutual circumpolar interests,

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<sup>208</sup> Special Joint Committee, *Proceedings*, Issue No. 20, 2 June 1994, p. 120f.

<sup>209</sup> The regular annual membership fee is US\$10,000, but drops to half that amount for regions with fewer than 100,000 population.



using both private-sector contacts and the appropriate political channels that are closest and most accessible to the people.

In his submission, the Forum's Alaskan executive director, Stephen Cowper, also stated that the participation of political entities below the nation-state level may be critical to the implementation of eventual circumpolar agreements in such areas as environmental protection and sustainable development. He added that:

Our interpretation of current events is that in most nations, political power is migrating away from the center and towards regional and local governments. For obvious historic reasons, many of our members react strongly to any hint of a return to the days of northern colonialism, when our territories were for all intents and purposes ruled from the national capitals. (. . .)

A true Arctic policy cannot be made without the participation of entities which represent all of the people who live in the Arctic. Participation by all Arctic regional governments being impractical, the Northern Forum provides a direct link to each of its governments, which in turn provide a link with the people. [Submission of 3 December 1996, p. 4-5]

Beyond maximizing northern-based involvement, whether official or nongovernmental, in circumpolar policy development, the Canadian public interest as a whole must be affirmed, as was pointedly raised with the Committee, by, among others, Paul Painchaud, quoted at the beginning of this section. We believe that the most democratic and efficient way to do this is through optimum utilization of existing parliamentary channels, whose explicit purpose is public agenda-setting and accountability. Indeed, the serious attention shown by this Committee, and also by the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, attests to the role that Canadian parliamentary representatives can and should play in furthering circumpolar cooperation objectives that are in the interests of all Canadians. The Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador and other parts of government working on international Arctic issues should look to Parliament as an ongoing national forum that can both generate public awareness of the stakes for Canada and broaden the process of public policy deliberation.

At the international interparliamentary level, a specific vehicle which deserves recognition and strengthened support is the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, to which we have already referred in regard to both strengthening Arctic Council representation and encouraging action by circumpolar governments on the important resolutions from SCPAR's second conference held in Yellowknife just over one year ago. The first Parliamentary Conference on Arctic cooperation was arranged through the efforts of the Nordic Council, the regional organization of the five Nordic countries, and took place, with Canadian participation, in Reykjavik, Iceland in 1993. That produced a recommendation to establish a standing committee of Arctic parliamentarians, for which

the Nordic Council would accept responsibility and support the work of its secretariat. SCPAR began activities in September 1994.

Currently, the Arctic Committee's membership consists of: three representatives from the Nordic Council (two of whom, Birgitta Dahl, Speaker of the Swedish Parliament, and Jan Syse, member of the Norwegian Storting, met with Committee members in Stockholm and Oslo respectively, while the third is SCPAR's chairman, Geir Haarde of Iceland); two members of the Russian Duma; one member of the European Parliament; one U.S. representative (Senator Murkowski of Alaska); one Canadian representative (The Hon. Clifford Lincoln, MP, who testified to the Committee on the results of the Yellowknife conference and who spoke on behalf of SCPAR at the inauguration of the Arctic Council); and one representative each from the Saami Council and from the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. SCPAR's secretary is Guy Lindstrom, who is also secretary general of the Finnish delegation to the Nordic Council, and who persuaded the Committee during meetings at the Finnish Parliament in Helsinki of the seriousness with which our European counterparts take the parliamentary dimensions of circumpolar policy formulation and implementation.

SCPAR has shown how even a small group of engaged parliamentarians can provide a good deal of creative spark and impetus around a circumpolar public-interest agenda — by advocating multilateral cooperation and institution-building (e.g. through the Arctic Council); by keeping a watching brief on Arctic environmental security and sustainable development concerns; by spurring governments to respond more vigorously; by acting as agents of political accountability; and by facilitating policy-oriented exchanges among officials, aboriginal peoples' representatives, NGOs, and interested publics. As SCPAR's next conference after Yellowknife will be held in Russia, Canada's parliamentary representative, Clifford Lincoln, attended a preparatory planning meeting in Moscow in March 1997. However, Canada's participation to date has remained somewhat ad hoc, and kept going in the above case through a very small amount of interim support from the Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association. We would therefore like to see a more stable and substantial arrangement put in place to promote increased, regular involvement by Canadian parliamentarians in the continued development of important circumpolar parliamentary channels, which have so far had to rely on Nordic Council leadership and support.

In sum, Canada should be out in front on issues of circumpolar public interest, as much through stimulating indigenous, interregional, nongovernmental, and interparliamentary connections, as through the efforts, which we fully acknowledge, of a few senior Arctic officials responsible for intergovernmental negotiations. These are, of course, necessary, and often sensitive, and hence confidential. But that diplomatic thrust needs to be accompanied by a growing, democratically responsive public dimension in circumpolar foreign policy development and cooperation.



Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 32**

**The Committee recommends that an explicit goal of federal Government circumpolar affairs policy should be to facilitate community-based, local and regional-level contacts, in close cooperation with provincial and territorial governments and their Arctic constituencies, as well as in ongoing consultation with indigenous peoples' organizations, the private sector, and NGOs working on circumpolar sustainable development issues. A concerted effort should be made to avoid duplication of initiatives, while at the same time assisting coordination among the various Canadian actors working towards common circumpolar objectives.**

#### **Recommendation 33**

**The Committee recommends that the Minister of Foreign Affairs table in Parliament an annual statement by the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs briefly outlining the Government's circumpolar sustainable development initiatives, and stating results achieved and expected. The statement should be referred to this Committee and should also be scrutinized by any other standing committee with an interest in circumpolar issues, notably those related to the environment and sustainable development and aboriginal affairs.**

#### **Recommendation 34**

**As a means of increasing public feedback and accountability with respect to Arctic sustainable development issues, the Committee recommends that the Government support stronger Canadian participation in the continued development of circumpolar interparliamentary channels, in particular through the important work of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region.**





## CHAPTER 8 — SUPPORTING SCIENTIFIC, EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL COOPERATION IN THE ARCTIC

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In my opinion, no northern or circumpolar foreign policy in Canada will have tangible success if it's not based on the continuity of Canadian research in the North. But that research must heretofore also offer opportunities and possibilities for development; development in training, education, economic development and business opportunities for our northern populations. This twofold perspective which advocates that we continue our research and create conditions favourable to northern populations means that we must continue to support research and training in the North if we want Canada to maintain its important place; we must at the same time renew ourselves and the way we do things in order to adapt to. . . new internal realities. [47:2]

Michel Allard, Director of the Centre d'études  
nordiques, Laval University

Given the rapid changes in Arctic realities described in preceding chapters, important challenges arise in the gathering and use of knowledge for the benefit of Arctic peoples and the wider world community. Among key issues are future trends in publicly supported Arctic scientific research and education, which the changes underway and the region's increasing integration into the global picture make more necessary than ever. In addition, important foreign policy commitments such as the Arctic Council and the AEPS undertaken by Canada and the other Arctic states demand first-rate scientific expertise. This does not mean simply continuing the multi-million dollar "big science" of past decades, however, but focussing research on the changing needs of the region as defined by its residents, building their capacity to carry out such research and combining traditional indigenous and modern scientific knowledge. Most Arctic states have reduced their domestic funding for science in recent years, which places an even higher premium on international cooperation to increase efficiency and reduce cost. As Gérard Duhaime of Laval University argued at a NATO-sponsored seminar in 1995, given their common interests and challenges, states interested in Arctic research must address the problems at several levels: ensuring that their domestic arrangements are adequate as well as reviewing existing international cooperative arrangements, and creating new ones where necessary.<sup>210</sup>

Canada's capability to contribute effectively to international scientific cooperation in the Arctic begins with its domestic commitment to polar science but it has had difficulty in

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<sup>210</sup> Gérard Duhaime, "Don't Steer Without a Map: Ideas Toward International Scientific Cooperation in the Arctic," in L. Lyck and V.I. Boyko eds. *Management, Technology and Human Resources Policy in the Arctic (the North)*, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, p. 61-71.

articulating its vision in this area. At the same time, the Committee has taken to heart Paul Painchaud's warning to focus on the international policy dimension of these issues:

Your role is not to look at the whole issue of polar research. Your only focus, as foreign policy experts, should be to define the specific instruments that are needed to implement foreign policy, rather than trying to solve the problems of the North. It is those instruments that you must set out to identify. If science — and this is certainly the case — is an instrument of foreign policy, you must include it in your recommendations. [47:21]

Basic education is a domestic responsibility, but successful models being developed in Canada and internationally can help improve it throughout the region. International cooperation will also be vital in training the next generation of Arctic researchers to carry out cutting-edge physical and social science research. An important factor is the proliferation of satellite communications and new information technologies, which will allow greater development in the circumpolar world of what Maurice Strong and his colleagues have called "knowledge-based networks." While these new technologies are not a panacea and cannot replace national funding for core activities, they have already made a real contribution in the Canadian Arctic, and can promote both education and the strengthening of northern indigenous cultures on a national and circumpolar basis.

### ***The Changing Nature of Arctic Science: Towards a Holistic Knowledge Perspective***

Northern science is science that is connected to a territory and a people living there.

Gilles Breton<sup>211</sup>  
Circumpolar Affairs Liaison  
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern  
Development

As John Heap of the Scott Polar Research Institute at Cambridge University, told Committee members, improved access and understanding have in the past century changed the southern perspective view of the Arctic from a frontier to be explored to a site of scientific inquiry. During the Cold War, the science carried out in the region was often dictated by military-strategic considerations, and its value tied to military and commercial interests and the practical application of new knowledge. The presence of indigenous peoples in the North, however, must moderate the "science for science's sake" practised in the Antarctic in favour of what Milton Freeman referred to in a submission to the Committee as more "socially-aware science."<sup>212</sup>

As Fred Roots pointed out in 1995, the major developments discussed in this report — the fact that the North is coming into its own psychologically, physically and

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<sup>211</sup> Gilles Breton, "The International Arctic Science Committee," in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 127.

<sup>212</sup> Milton R. Freeman, Submission of 3 June 1996, p. 6.



economically, and that it is increasingly integrated into global concerns — are already having a significant impact on Arctic science, and will continue to do so. This will mean changes in what is studied in the Arctic and why, who carries out the research and who pays for it. According to Dr. Roots, “All this means that scientific research in high latitudes will be even more important in the years to come than it has been in the past. But to be effective, its results have to be desired by, and understood and used by, a new crop of decision-makers in the North, in non-northern areas, and internationally.”<sup>213</sup>

On the national level, the Arctic states have evolved different approaches to polar science, with the Nordic countries being most consistent in terms of policies and budgets. As Fred Roots put it in 1995:

All northern countries have severe economic problems. Most have reacted to their financial stress by cutting their total national budgets for scientific research and introducing strict new criteria for the justification of money spent on research. Some countries have maintained or increased their Arctic science budgets even while their national science budgets decline, because they have recognised the importance of knowledge of the Arctic to the national priorities of the country as a whole. Other northern countries have drastically reduced their Arctic research as an “expendable” or less important part of their national science effort. . . . Some countries will henceforth become increasingly dependent on their neighbour countries for their northern scientific information and expertise. Canada, I am sorry to report, is one of those countries that has reduced its budget for Arctic and northern science and thus will be increasingly dependent on the new knowledge obtained by other countries.<sup>214</sup>

The scale of the financial challenge to Arctic science may be new, but shortage of funds for science is not. When he met Committee members at Cambridge University, David MacDonald, of the Cambridge Arctic Shelf Program, quoted Lord Rutherford’s comparison of European and American approaches to physics: “We have no money, so we have to think.” Given its growing importance, the Arctic (and other interested) states must continue their commitment to basic research in the North, even as that research evolves to better reflect modern needs and realities.

While the basic nature of research in the Arctic remains the organized pursuit of knowledge, important changes in approach are taking place. A natural tension has long existed between science and politics; politics demands national benefits and a degree of certainty that science is rarely able to supply, while science often seems to be divorced from a broader policy setting. As Chaturvedi concluded, “A balance ought to be achieved between enlightened national interest and the imperative of promoting science in the best interests of humanity within innovative national, regional and global frameworks.”<sup>215</sup> In

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<sup>213</sup> Fred Roots, *Northern Science: Where Is It Today, and Where Is It Headed?*, Northern Science Award—Comments (1995).

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7-8.

<sup>215</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 176.

fact, the creation of the Arctic Council provides an opportunity to link science and politics in the Arctic for the benefit of all. As Oran Young told the Committee:

Let me also say that with respect to opportunities, I think we need to think carefully about fostering a dialogue between the world of research and the world of policy, the world of science and the world of practice. I think we need to think carefully, within the context of the Arctic Council, about how to make mutually beneficial links and relationships between the scientific or the research community, including those who are concerned with traditional ecological knowledge, and the world of policy. I think there are very interesting opportunities. The time, in many ways, is ripe to do this. [40:6]

Long-term research must continue, but Arctic science is already becoming more grassroots-oriented. This is partly the result of funding cuts since, as Fred Roots has pointed out, an immediate result of smaller budgets is that issues are studied more for their immediate than their long-term benefits. While driven by reductions in Government funding, partnerships between researchers and private industry are also becoming increasingly common. As Mark Nuttall of Aberdeen University told Committee members at Cambridge University, that a further important step is to link physical and social science research in the Arctic more closely.

A particularly welcome change is the increasing appreciation of traditional indigenous knowledge as a complement to mainstream Arctic science. As Gerald Lock put it to the Committee:

I don't want to get too philosophical, but how do we know whatever it is we know? How does mankind ever know anything? There are only three ways we know. We know by rational knowledge, we know through empirical knowledge, and we know through metaphorical knowledge. Science is almost exclusively confined to the rational knowledge — not entirely, but it focusses there — whereas traditional knowledge takes part of empirical knowledge and part of metaphorical knowledge to do its thing. So if we do both, we have the total picture of human knowledge, which is what we ought to have. If we allow science to dominate and relegate traditional knowledge to an inferior position, I think that's philosophically wrong and socially unacceptable. [20:4-5]

As noted in Chapter Five, Canada was one of the first Arctic states to recognize the value of indigenous knowledge, and is a world leader in co-management regimes. In addition to providing invaluable information on the North, the linking of southern and northern perspectives is also helping to close the gap between northern peoples and Arctic research. As the Committee heard during its encounters in the Canadian Arctic, many aboriginal people continue to view southern researchers with suspicion. While progress is being made in this area, as we saw in the Chapter Five, discussion of contaminants in the northern food chain, more attention must be paid both to the cooperative development of research with northern communities and to the communication of scientific results to northern populations. As David Malcolm of the



Aurora Research Institute put it in a submission to the Committee, "Plain language reports must be produced as a necessary part of any northern research."<sup>216</sup>

Canada has led in incorporating traditional ecological knowledge into scientific studies such as the Mackenzie Basin Impact Study, and social or human perspectives in its contribution to international scientific programs such as the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme. Canadian Polar Commission Chairman Whit Fraser concluded several years ago that: "Much remains to be done in this regard; however, there are encouraging signs that traditional knowledge is at last gaining a measure of respect commensurate with its value as a learning tool. Canada's success at promoting traditional knowledge beyond its own borders will depend largely upon the responsiveness of international organizations."<sup>217</sup> As Oran Young argues, the Arctic Council has the potential to further this trend:

It is worth noting as well that the permanent residents of the Arctic have made it clear that they are not only potential sources of TEK (traditional ecological knowledge) but that they also have developed a strong interest in the conduct of western scientific research. The creation of bodies like the Alaska Native Science Commission is a particularly striking occurrence in this connection. All this suggests that the Arctic Council should act as a matter of priority to endorse and where necessary to initiate focussed programs of research on issues relating to sustainable development in the Arctic. Such programs should integrate the efforts of western scientists and the permanent residents of the region as well as the efforts of natural scientists and social scientists interested in the coupled systems of the Arctic.<sup>218</sup>

Overall, the Committee agrees with Professor Duhaime that the demands for more and better research in the Arctic mean that each state must ensure that its own science apparatus functions well and is coordinated to the greatest extent possible. As the Arctic science experts at the 1994 conference "A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada" concluded:

The consensus of the workshop was that the lack of leadership and focus on the international level is a reflection of the domestic situation in this country. The Canadian commitment to science is vague at best. Canada must resolve its commitment to the North and promote concern for Arctic affairs internationally. Only after Canada has set its own, specific agenda, can it contribute effectively to the international community.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> David Malcolm, *Western Arctic Circumpolar Cooperation*, Briefing Note, 28 May 1996, p. 4.

<sup>217</sup> Whit Fraser, "Arctic Science, Technology and Traditional Knowledge: Enhancing Cooperation in the Circumpolar North," in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy For Canada* (1994), p. 122.

<sup>218</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 67. For details of the U.S. federal and Alaskan approaches see the "Prepared Statement" presented to the Committee by the Hon. George B. Newton, Jr., Chair of the United States Arctic Research Commission, 12 December 1996.

<sup>219</sup> Douglas Heyland, "Report of the Workshop on Arctic Science and Technology," in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 129.

The Committee does not presume to set the domestic agenda for Canadian Arctic science, but agrees that, in order to contribute effectively to this changing and increasingly important area of circumpolar cooperation, Canada must take action. Fortunately, the realization that science cannot be divorced from policy is increasingly accepted among the Arctic states, and can be emphasized through the Arctic Council. As the first chair of the Council, Canada must ensure that it advocates a research agenda in the Arctic that places a premium on sustainable development and the needs of northern residents. As Gerald Lock argued before the Committee,

Canada should insist that traditional knowledge complements scientific knowledge for any issue affecting Arctic residents. That seems an obvious statement in the Canadian context, but it's not a view that's shared by all Arctic countries, and it's certainly not a view that's shared by non-Arctic countries, which, as I say, may well control the agenda. [20:4] . . . I would suggest that Canada insist that Arctic science be directed primarily towards the benefit of Arctic residents. Again, that seems obvious in an Arctic context, but again I say it's not a view shared by all Arctic countries and certainly not by non-Arctic countries. [20:5]

Accordingly:

### **Recommendation 35**

**The Committee recommends that the Government commit to maintain, and seek to increase, support for basic Arctic science and research as an important element of circumpolar cooperation. Given the changing realities in the Arctic, such research must be based on the needs of Arctic communities and include a significant traditional knowledge component. These principles should be stressed in the work on sustainable development and other issues carried out under the auspices of the Arctic Council.**

### ***Canada, Arctic Science and the Role of the Canadian Polar Commission***

What the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources has referred to as “Canada’s new scientific exploration policy in the Arctic” took shape in the late 1950s as the result of a combination of challenges: military — the Soviet launching of its Sputnik satellite in 1957; sovereignty — the first under-ice crossing of the Arctic Ocean by the U.S. nuclear submarine *Nautilus*; and global — the first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. While the cost of Canada’s research was never high in comparison with the amounts spent by other Arctic states, its benefits were significant. As Michel Allard of Laval University told the Committee, “Carried out by departments and academics, Canadian scientific research in the North produced, especially from 1950 to 1989, i.e. during the Cold War, spectacular results with investments that were in fact far inferior to those made by the major powers. . .”



[47:2]. While southern Canadian priorities dominated northern research over the next 20 years, beginning in the late 1970s the Northern Scientific Training Program, financed by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to facilitate northern research in Canadian universities, began to focus publicly more on social, human and environmental sciences and research involving northern indigenous peoples.

Canada still has a significant Arctic science capability, and, as we saw in Chapter Five, its Arctic Environmental Strategy has made it a world leader in such areas as contaminants research. Yet, as Fred Roots told a 1994 conference, as a result of reductions in funding, "The total volume of polar science activities in Canada is, however, undoubtedly less than it was a decade ago."<sup>220</sup> It is difficult to quantify the reductions, since, as Whit Fraser has put it, "The fact remains today, as it has for many years, that as a country we still do not know what we are spending in northern research: as a result, we are still unable to assess the true value of what we are getting for our investment."<sup>221</sup> In fact, according to informed estimates, the reductions have probably been in the order of 30% over the last decade.

There is no magic sum Canada must spend in funding its Arctic science, but obviously reductions of this magnitude weaken its ability to carry out research, and thereby contribute to international scientific cooperation in the region. Aside from core funding for Arctic science, the most important thing Canada can do domestically is to renew its base of scientists working in the North and encourage a new generation of such scientists. Since it is becoming more difficult to encourage new researchers, ongoing work is more and more left to the same individuals. As Nigel Bankes of the University of Calgary put it in a submission to the Committee:

A frighteningly large part of Canada's international profile and reputation in Arctic policy and science, and Antarctic matters, rests upon the shoulders of one individual: Dr. Fred Roots, the Emeritus Advisor to the Minister of Environment. Is this a true indication of Canada's commitment to these matters? If it is not, we need a strategy to assist Dr. Roots, and to ensure smooth transitions in the future.<sup>222</sup>

While the coordination of polar science in Canada remains a problem, this does not mean that public money is being wasted. As Fred Roots told the Committee:

I don't think there's any gross inconsistency in what actions are going on scientifically or from the point of view of collecting information in the North. What is very true is that there is no connection in what is happening. There is really very little money being wasted. You couldn't do what work is being done much more effectively than it is being

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<sup>220</sup> Fred Roots, "Looking Ahead," in John Stager, ed. *Canada and Polar Science*, the Canadian Polar Commission, Ottawa, December 1994, p. 88.

<sup>221</sup> Whit Fraser "Chairman's Message," *1995-1996 Annual Report*, the Canadian Polar Commission, Ottawa, 1996, p. 12.

<sup>222</sup> Nigel Bankes, Submission of 31 May 1996, p. 2.

done at present. But what is being done is not fitted into any overall scheme or plan. It's as if a bunch of people, instead of building a house, were putting in doors and windows and floors and wires, but were doing so without a plan for the house. [10:21]

The symbol of Canada's scientific research in the Arctic is the Polar Continental Shelf Project (PCSP), established in 1958 to provide research support (but not funding) to scientists working in the North and to help exercise Canadian sovereignty over the continental shelf, the Arctic Islands and the northern mainland. According to Professor Allard:

The . . . Polar Shelf project, which has been in existence since the 1950s, is at the very origin of Canada's excellent scientific reputation in northern and Arctic studies. It is a model which is truly the envy of research organisations in all of the countries of the Arctic rim. Whether you go to the former Soviet Union, to the United States, Alaska, China or the Scandinavian countries, nowhere will you find another program that functions as well, that provides such integrated logistics to its national research as does the Polar Continental Plateau Study. [47:4]

George Newton of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission agreed, telling members that:

The Polar Continental Shelf Project is very positively viewed because the research dollar you appropriate for research in Canada goes for research. It doesn't go for a dog team, a snowmobile or an aircraft to get the researcher out so many miles onto the ice. It makes every research dollar more effective to that researcher. . . I want you to know that this is certainly an admired aspect of Canadian Arctic research. [62:9-10]

Committee members were fortunate to be able to visit the Polar Shelf Project's High Arctic base camp in Resolute. The PCSP, we were told, is a very "flat" organization with little bureaucracy, and is increasingly involved in such important areas of research as contaminants and global climate change. Federal funding cuts have been substantial, amounting to some 48% over three years (from \$7.5 million to \$3.5 million) and in nearby Resolute Bay the Committee was also told that lack of funds was limiting the hiring of Inuit hunters to accompany scientific research teams, thereby reducing cooperation between southern researchers and northern residents. Some 600 scientists and researchers still use the facility every year, however. Members also came to appreciate the long-term nature of scientific research carried out both for "pure science" purposes and technological application; Olga Kukal explained that after 15 years her research was finally paying off, and was being applied in a successful biotechnology venture in Nova Scotia.

While a facility such as the Polar Continental Shelf Project requires core public funding, the changing nature of Arctic science means that it must also look to recover costs and identify alternative sources of revenue where possible. Some cost recovery does take place, with the PCSP having recovered over 30% of its expenditure on logistical support in 1995. The Japanese recognize the value of its basic research, and have invested \$1 million. There is also the possibility of a large-scale investment from the Stanford Research



Institute. Another example of ways to generate alternative revenue can be found at the Arctic Institute of North America at the University of Calgary; Executive Director Michael Robinson told the Committee that core funding cuts of 20% over the past five years have led the Institute to place much more emphasis on selling its professional services. In discussions at the Polar Shelf Project, members also suggested exploring the possibility of using funds from the Nunavut land claims settlement for future investment in the Polar Shelf project. This would be a type of equity participation by the Nunavut Inuit and over time could replace some of the diminishing federal funding. Another suggestion was the development of a mechanism to ensure that those whose research resulted in successful commercial applications would contribute to the continued operation of the Project.

Stressing the need for partnerships in all Arctic scientific endeavours, Professor Allard made two recommendations to the Committee. The first was for a new program with a modest budget that could be administered by federal departments and granting agencies and encourage partnerships between Canadian and foreign academics, private industry and northern communities. The second was for strengthening and expanding two existing programs that support logistics and training in the Canadian North — the Polar Continental Shelf Project and the Northern Scientific Training Program. According to Professor Allard, the latter provides about \$2,500 per year to individual Canadian university students who go North to do research work, essentially for their Master's and doctoral degrees. While he argued that the budget of the PCSP should be restored, Professor Allard also argued that the project should broaden its mandate and cooperate more with partners in Quebec and elsewhere, rather than focussing on the Arctic islands and the area around the Beaufort Sea.

In his testimony before the Committee, Branko Ladanyi of the University of Montreal compared Canada's lack of coordination in its approach to Arctic science unfavourably with the much better situation in the United States. As George Newton of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission explained to the Committee, the U.S. had previously "generally an uncoordinated, fragmented and often duplicative approach to Arctic research" [62:11-12], but this had changed for the better with the passage of the *Arctic Research and Policy Act* in 1984. The underlying themes of this Act are communications, sharing and cooperation; in addition to coordination of government activities there is close cooperation between the various government agencies involved and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. He added that, while the U.S. system is not perfect, "It is a model. I do think it works" [62:21]. His colleague Garrett Brass agreed, but added that since it was designed for the U.S. government, that U.S. model could probably not be simply copied in Canada without modifications.

Progress is finally being made on the coordination of Canada's approach to Arctic science, with a federal Interdepartmental Committee established in May 1996 now looking at the issue. The Canadian Polar Commission is participating in this exercise, which in its

view “is a good beginning, but it needs to proceed as a major policy initiative with the direction, support and accountability of the government as a whole.”<sup>223</sup> The Committee agrees that, in order to contribute to international cooperation in the Arctic, Canada must ensure that its domestic approach to polar science, including the operation of the Canadian Polar Commission, improves.

The Canadian Polar Commission (CPC) was established by an Act of Parliament in 1991 (see Box 12 “The Canadian Polar Commission”) to “monitor and assess the state of polar scientific knowledge in Canada and circumpolar regions and to foster development of knowledge about the polar regions in Canada.” During meetings in the Canadian Arctic and elsewhere, the Committee heard a number of criticisms of the Polar Commission, mainly of the fact that it is an Ottawa-based institution which spends too much of its budget on travel and accommodation while grassroots organizations in the North are starved of funds. David Malcolm of the Aurora Research Institute argued that:

We observe that the Yellowknife office of CPC is working hard to improve stakeholder/CPC relations in the western Arctic, but is sometimes hampered when key CPC activities are coordinated from the Ottawa headquarters. We see the need for increasing the effectiveness of CPC partnerships with Arctic business, with research institutions, and with Aboriginal Joint Secretariats responsible for renewable resources sustainability. Here at ARI, we hope to capitalise on closer partnering with CPC, in order to carry out joint activities that promote Arctic science and Traditional knowledge to the best advantage.<sup>224</sup>

Nellie Cournoyea, Chairperson of the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, was more direct, arguing that “existing organisations in the North could have made far more effective use of these funds,” and recommending “that the funds allocated to the Canadian Polar Commission be redirected through the Arctic Council to research in the North.”<sup>225</sup> Testifying before the Committee in October 1996, Dr. Jacques Grondin of the “Centre de la santé publique du Québec” added that:

. . . up until now the Canadian Polar Commission seems to have been having trouble defining its mandate. . . There is an apparent lack of coordination, and one notes some unfortunate duplication in the activities undertaken in all good faith by the Canadian Polar Commission. Similar activities are already underway in other organizations. Ethics is one such example. . .

Health reports on contaminants are another. People who do not have the proper training are wasting their time preparing health reports, when such reports are already available. Those are just a couple of examples.

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<sup>223</sup> Whit Fraser “Chairman’s Message,” *1995-1996 Annual Report*, p. 13.

<sup>224</sup> David Malcolm, Submission of 28 May 1996, p. 3.

<sup>225</sup> Nellie Cournoyea, Submission of 28 May 1996.



Their last conference on environmental contamination, held in Iqaluit at the beginning of the month, is a blatant example of that. People in the different areas were notified only as the last preparations for the conference were being finalised, and as a result they had no chance to provide their input with respect to the conference's content or even the usefulness of such a conference. Furthermore, this eminently political meeting harmed efforts currently underway in the regions to manage environmental risks. . . . So the decision was made to organise a conference, supposedly for the benefit of the regions, but virtually ignoring everything that is currently being done there. [47:17]

The Polar Commission also seems to have lost a good deal of its credibility with the Canadian scientific community as a result of the 1995 cancellation of the long-discussed Canadian Polar Information System (CPIS) advocated by the Commission since 1991. The Polar Commission has criticized the lack of federal funding and support which led to its abandonment of the system in favour of its Web pages and on-line resources; it argues that "the lack of a central directory for polar information in Canada is embarrassing. The Commission's board believes that the objectives it set out remain important. In due course, it will become obvious that the long-term value of such a system to Canada's research community would far outweigh any short-term savings."<sup>226</sup> In fact, many researchers seem to feel that the Polar Commission itself did not properly coordinate the development of the CPIS, the need for which still exists. In Calgary the Committee was briefed at the Arctic Institute of North America on a low-cost alternative to the CPIS, based on the Institute's existing Arctic Science and Technology Information System (ASTIS) for an expenditure of perhaps \$100,000 per year, and which could be made available as a Canadian contribution to the circumpolar research community.

It also appeared during the Committee's international travel that the Polar Commission has yet to make significant inroads in establishing a profile in international Arctic science circles. Commission Chairman Whit Fraser appeared before the Committee on two occasions. On the latter he gave a spirited defence of the work of the Commission, pointing out that high travel costs are unavoidable since the Commission was established by mandate in Ottawa but must do much of its work in the North. Even if the Commission was located in the Canadian North, frequent travel to Ottawa would still be necessary, so costs would be unlikely to decrease.

The creation of the Arctic Council should help focus Canadian attention on the pursuit of knowledge in the North, and this can only help the work of the Canadian Polar Commission. At the same time, given that such issues as location and cost seem unlikely to change, the Polar Commission must make it a priority to build relationships with the groups it represents and convince them that it is performing a useful and necessary service without wasting money.

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<sup>226</sup> "New Directions for Polar Information," *Meridian*, the Canadian Polar Commission, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 10.

## Box 12 — “The Canadian Polar Commission”

In 1985 a study group was appointed by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to investigate the state of polar science in Canada. In its 1987 report *Canada and Polar Science*, the study group recommended the creation of “a national body. . . to provide ongoing contact, at a senior level, between the federal Government and those concerned with Canadian polar science and research.” A feasibility study commissioned in 1988 set out a draft framework and terms of reference for a national polar commission, whose establishment was announced by Prime Minister Mulroney in Leningrad in November 1989 — the same visit during which he officially proposed the establishment of the Arctic Council. The Canadian Polar Commission was established by an Act of Parliament in 1991. According to the *Canadian Polar Commission Act*, the purpose of the Commission is to promote the development and dissemination of knowledge in respect of the polar regions by:

- (a) monitoring the state of knowledge, in Canada and elsewhere, in respect of the polar regions and reporting regularly and publicly thereon;
- (b) promoting the development of knowledge in respect of the polar regions in Canada by cooperating with organizations, institutions and associations, in Canada and elsewhere, in the determination of scientific and other priorities;
- (c) encouraging Canadian organizations, institutions and associations to support the development and dissemination of knowledge in respect of the polar regions;
- (d) advising the Minister, when requested, on any matter relating to the polar regions;
- (e) providing information about research in respect of the polar regions to Canadians and Canadian organizations, institutions and associations;
- (f) enhancing Canada’s international profile as a circumpolar nation by fostering international cooperation in the advancement of knowledge in respect of the polar regions; and
- (g) undertaking any other activities in the furtherance of its purpose.

As Chairman Whit Fraser summarized the Commission’s mandate for the Committee in February 1997, “We serve as Canada’s national advisory agency on polar affairs. We were not established as a research institution or a funding organization. Our role is to monitor the state of research and knowledge in Canada, to promote the development of polar research and to help determine scientific and other priorities” [66:1].

In the years since its creation, the Canadian Polar Commission has worked to fulfil its mandate in a number of ways, ranging from “regular, face-to-face meetings with northerners and . . . dialogue with northern communities on polar science and related issues,” to workshops and conferences (and publication of their proceedings) and representation of Canada on such international bodies as the International Arctic Science Committee. The Commission has held or co-sponsored major conferences on a number of issues, including: science (“Canada and Polar Science,” May 1994), foreign policy (“A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada,” April 1994), environment and health (“For Generations to Come,” October 1996) and circumpolar trade (“Circumpolar Trade: The Canadian Agenda,” March 1993). As noted, while an “early priority” of the Commission was the development of a Canadian Polar Information System, following the decision that this could not be accomplished without federal funding, the Commission has concentrated on further developing its Web pages (<http://www.polarcom.gc.ca>) and on-line resources.

The Commission currently has employees in Ottawa and Yellowknife, having decided to close its office in Kuujuaq, Quebec, in the fall of 1996 as a result of rising costs for office space and accommodation; ideally, the Commission hopes to establish offices in Nunavut and Yukon. The Commission’s budget has remained relatively steady in the years since its creation at about \$1-1.1 million per year, although it has been reduced to \$900,000 per year as of 1997-98. In 1996 the amount the Commission spent on “travel and relocation” was some \$202,381, about 19% of its total budget of \$1.053 million.



Ultimately, the value of the Canadian Polar Commission rests on the extent to which its work is useful to and accepted by the Government of Canada. As Whit Fraser put it to the Committee in February 1997:

I come back to the fact that you spoke to the Norwegian Polar Institute and others who are telling their country — and their country is listening — that the resources and the potential of the Arctic are their future. They are also recognizing that the future has to be protected with long-term, clearly-defined scientific programs on the protection of the environment, the development of the resources and protection of the people. These are the arguments that the Polar Commission has been trying to address to the federal Government. I might as well say quite bluntly that if the Government of Canada and the departments of Canada are not going to listen to recommendations and take seriously what agencies like this say, well, then, by all means shut it down. I think that is the issue". [66:10-11]

The Committee agrees that if the Government sees a continuing role for the Canadian Polar Commission, it must make use of its work. A first step in this direction must be for the Polar Commission to be perceived as a legitimate voice of those interested in northern research. Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 36**

**The Committee, recognizing the continuing need for stronger representation of Arctic research interests, recommends that the Government reevaluate the future of the Canadian Polar Commission in light of the criticisms that have been made, and taking into account the role of the Circumpolar Ambassador and the organizational changes proposed in this Report. If the Commission is to continue, the Committee recommends that the Government adopt a systematic and transparent process for appointing its Commissioners that includes soliciting suggestions from northern groups, academic organizations such as the Association of Canadian Universities for Northern Studies (ACUNS), and government departments involved in northern research.**

#### **Recommendation 37**

**Given the substantial reductions to the budget for the Polar Continental Shelf Project, the Committee recommends that the Government provide the Project with sufficient funding to carry out its mandate effectively. The Project must also ensure that it is providing support to researchers in all regions of Canada, and should enter into new and creative partnership arrangements where possible.**

## ***International Cooperation in Arctic Research***

The importance of international cooperation and coordination of scientific research in the Arctic can hardly be exaggerated.

Sanjay Chaturvedi<sup>227</sup>

International cooperation in Arctic scientific research began over a century ago with the International Polar Year of 1882-83. A second International Polar Year followed 50 years later (1932-33), and 25 years after that came an International Geophysical Year (1957-58), which placed special emphasis on the polar regions. International scientific cooperation in the Arctic was stalled throughout the Cold War, and states resorted where possible to bilateral arrangements. The UN established a UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Programme following the Biosphere Conference of 1968, but a related Northern Sciences Network was not formally established until the 1980s. With the end of the Cold War, international scientific cooperation in the Arctic began again, this time in the form of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), composed of the national science organizations of the eight Arctic and others states interested in Arctic research (see Box 13 “The International Arctic Science Committee). Given the increasing understanding of the global nature of Arctic issues and the desire to reduce costs, future Arctic research must be increasingly international in order to be relevant and effective.

As the Cold War was ending, three eminent Arctic scientists prepared a paper on Arctic cooperation which in many respects “set the ball of pan-Arctic cooperation rolling,” according to David Scrivener, not only in terms of science, but also environmentally (the AEPS) and politically (the Arctic Council).<sup>228</sup> In fact, there is also evidence that this initiative influenced Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech, in which he offered to host a conference of Arctic countries on the coordination of Arctic science research. Difficult negotiations ensued, with the United States raising many of the same objections it raised later in connection with the Arctic Council. As Fred Roots later put it, the key challenge was

to search for an international mechanism that would not displace or discredit the various bilateral and specialised arrangements for Arctic cooperation that exist, that would truly represent varied national and international interests and could be supportive of national policies, and that would still meet the need for effective coordination of important science and keep it at arm’s length from political interference.<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 174.

<sup>228</sup> David Scrivener, *Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic* (1996), p. 26.

<sup>229</sup> Quoted in Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 175.



## Box — 13 “The International Arctic Science Committee”

In the early-to-mid 1980s, informal discussions began on reviving international scientific cooperation in the Arctic. Gorbachev's 1987 Murmansk speech signalled the willingness of the Soviet Union to enter into such cooperation; yet the negotiations that followed were difficult, as the United States hesitated to respond favourably to a Soviet initiative and the U.S.S.R. hesitated to open such cooperation to non-Arctic states. A compromise was eventually reached, and the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) was founded by the national science organizations of the eight Arctic states in August 1990; other states undertaking substantial research in the Arctic joined shortly afterwards. As of 1996, IASC had 16 members: the Arctic eight and China, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

According to IASC, its mission is to: “Encourage, facilitate and promote basic and applied research in or concerned with the Arctic at a circumarctic or international level, and to provide scientific advice on Arctic issues.”<sup>1</sup> The main activity of IASC is to develop research projects — particularly those that are interdisciplinary — for which circumarctic or international cooperation is required. Once a majority of IASC members agree to proceed with a project idea or proposal, the planning process continues through a scoping report to science and implementation plans. The current priority projects for which IASC expects to achieve research output within an agreed period of time are referred to as the IASC Science Agenda. As of 1996, this included: Impacts of Global Changes in the Arctic; Arctic Processes of Relevance to Global Systems; Processes within the Arctic; and Sustainable Development in the Arctic.

Apart from its priority projects, IASC is engaged in other activities, including: the International Science Initiative in the Russian Arctic (ISIRA); the establishment of a user-friendly International Arctic Environmental Data Directory; the Cooperative Arctic Seismological Project; the Working Group for Geophysical Compilation and Mapping; and conferences, such as the International Conference for Arctic Research Planning, attended by about 300 scientists and others to develop the IASC Science Agenda Projects.

The IASC is composed of: a Council, which has one representative from each member country and is the policy and decision-making body for all IASC activities (an Executive Committee of the Council is responsible for IASC matters between Council meetings); a Regional Board, which has one representative from each of the Arctic states and considers general regional problems and other questions that might affect the interests of the Arctic countries; working groups, established by the Council, which provide the main venue for developing IASC scientific projects and programmes; the Arctic Science Conference, an interdisciplinary scientific meeting convened periodically to identify key scientific questions and issues; and the IASC Secretariat, located in Oslo and funded by Norway. Other secretariats can be established to serve special needs, and an IASC Global Change Programme Office established in Rovaniemi in 1994 is funded by Finland. IASC activities are basically funded by national sources, although an *IASC General Fund* has been established by annual contributions to meet general expenses.

Since it focusses on interdisciplinary research, IASC favours cooperation with more disciplinary oriented science organizations. The International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA) and the International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH) are Standing Advisory Bodies to IASC. Other organizations with links to IASC are: the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR); the System for Analysis, Research and Training (START); the International Permafrost Association (IPA); and the United Nations Man and the Biosphere-Northern Sciences Network (MAB/NSN).

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<sup>1</sup> *International Arctic Science Committee, draft brochure, 27 August 1996.*

The major question was whether IASC should be a nongovernmental forum open to all states interested in Arctic research, or an intergovernmental body made up of the eight Arctic states. In the end it was decided to create a hybrid organization, allowing non-Arctic states to join IASC, but balancing this with a regional board composed of the Arctic eight. Even the location for IASC's founding conference resulted in disagreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and, as a compromise, IASC was officially established at Resolute, Northwest Territories, on 28 August 1990. While its mandate is to "encourage, facilitate and promote" planning and eventually assessment of scientific activity in the Arctic, IASC does not perform any scientific work itself, and its resources are limited to those committed by its member states.

Since its founding, IASC has made significant strides in advancing a common understanding of circumpolar scientific issues. Oran Young has pointed out that IASC has also "adopted sustainable development in the Arctic as a priority theme and has initiated regular contact with bodies like the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy to ensure that scientific research in this area yields results that are helpful to those responsible for administering an Arctic regime."<sup>230</sup> As Garrett Brass of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission added, "In my opinion — and I think the Commission agrees generally — the great advantage to IASC is that it's a forum where we can get together to discuss our common intentions of effort and try to leverage each other's money" [62:9].

Yet while IASC's work has been valuable, its operation has at times been difficult. Testifying before the Committee, Gerald Lock, who chaired IASC's regional board before resigning to highlight its problems in late 1996, gave a sobering assessment of its operation: "First, in my opinion, circumarctic cooperation is fundamentally compromised by Eurocentrism, and I come to that conclusion through my work with IASC" [20:3]. He continued:

You might say "Well, this is science. What does this have to do with us?" But in fact you can't do science in a vacuum. Science applied presumably has to be for the benefit of the people who sponsor the science, and therefore it should be geared to the socio-economic objectives of that society. It's clear that European socio-economic objectives will not always be congruent with our own, but if they dominate the agenda, then we have an obvious problem. [20:4]

According to Gerald Lock, the fundamental issue with respect to IASC is the presence of a large number of European and other states who do not always share Canada's point of view on such issues as incorporating traditional knowledge and designing Arctic research for the benefit of northerners. As well, the five Nordic countries are closely linked to Europe and tend to vote as a bloc, with the result that, even on the regional board, Canada's concerns are often overruled. As he explained to members:

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<sup>230</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 66.



There is a regional board consisting only of the eight Arctic countries. I represent Canada and happen to chair this board. Its function is very different from the Council's. This is an important point. Its function is to ensure that IASC activities are consistent with the interests of the eight Arctic nations. That to me is a very important function. I'd like to say it discharges it well. I'm not able to do that, and I don't think that bodes particularly well for Canada. [20:4]

In the opinion of this witness, Canada must insist on the priorities discussed above, and, as noted earlier, the Arctic Council must treat the three sectors of the Arctic equally. Some progress has been recently made in addressing these issues. IASC established a Review Group in December 1995 to examine its activities and, in response to continued criticism from Canada and others, decided to reappoint its regional board to represent more fully the northern populations of the eight Arctic states.

The broader question focusses on the implications for IASC of the establishment of the Arctic Council since, as Olav Orheim of the Norwegian Polar Institute told Committee members in Oslo in November 1996, these are not yet clear. On the one hand, some have argued that the improvement of relations between the Arctic states that allowed the establishment of the Arctic Council means that "the exchange of knowledge and identification of opportunities envisioned in the organization's founding articles can often be achieved through other means."<sup>231</sup> Iceland's Foreign Minister argued the opposite case at the inauguration of the Arctic Council, however, stressing the importance of science to the future of the Arctic, and advocating a formal link between the Arctic Council and IASC. In his words:

To bring about favourable development of the Arctic regions we need to advance scientific research not only by scientists of our own countries, but in a wider international framework. But science alone will not solve the problems we are faced with in the Arctic. There is a dire need for strong political cooperation in order to put scientific knowledge to the best possible use. To this effect Iceland would have chosen to see the International Arctic Science Committee incorporated into the Declaration.<sup>232</sup>

Given the substantive work carried out by IASC, it is in the best interest of all that this body continue to exist, although not necessarily in its present form. Some have argued that the creation of the Arctic Council as a high-level political forum for Arctic states has made IASC's regional board redundant so that it can simply be abolished, leaving the IASC as a purely scientific body. Others disagree, with Olav Orheim arguing in Oslo that in fact the IASC regional board can act as the scientific arm of the Arctic Council. This has an obvious attraction, given that a key element of the Arctic Council process has been to learn lessons from and build upon existing structures where possible, in order to reduce cost and duplication. As IASC is an existing mechanism for furthering scientific cooperation in the Arctic, it is in the interest of Canada and all states to attempt to improve its functioning and

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<sup>231</sup> Whit Fraser, "Arctic Science, Technology and Traditional Knowledge: Enhancing Cooperation in the Circumpolar North", in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 122.

<sup>232</sup> His Excellency Mr. Halldór Ásgrímsson, *Arctic Council Inauguration Statement*, Ottawa, 19 September 1996.

make it compatible with the policies pursued by the Arctic Council. As Canadian experts concluded at the 1994 conference referred to earlier:

Essentially, the international community lacks direction and leadership in the area of Arctic science and research. IASC has been compared to an orphan. It is an organisation with no connections to any government or . . . international agency. IASC does not report to any political body outside of itself and receives little international commitment. There is a need for an international conscience aware of northern issues and their importance. Canada should assume a leadership role and promote IASC in an attempt to create this international conscience.<sup>233</sup>

Apart from its general work, a key IASC program is the International Science Initiative in the Russian Arctic (ISIRA). As an IASC publication put it:

Political reorganisation of the former Soviet Union, and the ensuing economic problems, has led to severe handicaps for Russian Arctic scientists and science institutions, a community that could contribute significantly to solving some of the vast environmental and other challenges in the Russian Arctic. There is a large Arctic science community in Russia (scientists, institutions), with an impressive amount of scientific knowledge and literature having been accumulated over the years. This community has many potential, sound cooperative partners for foreign scientists.<sup>234</sup>

Following its creation in 1993, ISIRA got off to a promising start by organizing conferences and making existing Russian research available in useable form to western scientists. The past two years have been less successful, however, with Russian scientists more eager to secure funding for their own rather than joint projects. IASC member states were hesitant to continue funding the Initiative and in the fall of 1996 decided to simply put it on hold. As we have seen in previous chapters, many of the most serious environmental and others problems in the Arctic are in the Russian North, and mobilizing Russian expertise to address them must be one of the most important goals of scientific cooperation in the region. Since the necessary structure to do this already exists in the ISIRA program, the Committee believes the rejuvenation of that program must be an IASC and international priority.

Accordingly:

### **Recommendation 38**

**The Committee recommends that the Government make the rejuvenation of the IASC International Science Initiative in the Russian Arctic a priority, and support and complement this where possible through the work of the Arctic Council.**

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<sup>233</sup> Douglas Heyland, "Report of the Workshop on Arctic Science and Technology," in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 129.

<sup>234</sup> International Science Initiative in the Russian Arctic (ISIRA), IASC brochure, p. 1.



Apart from IASC, there are other opportunities for furthering Arctic scientific cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels. In general, Lars Walloe, Chairman of the Norwegian Research Council, told Committee members in Oslo that, while Arctic scientific cooperation is good, it could be improved by having more cooperation among working scientists at the grassroots, rather than the bureaucratic, level. As noted in Chapter Four, George Newton explained that under its five-year submarine Arctic science program the U.S. Navy has for the past two years made available a nuclear submarine to support civilian scientific work in the Arctic. Canadians have been involved in each of the cruises so far, and John Smith of the Bedford Institute of Oceanography in Nova Scotia is currently participating in planning the third of five voyages that will take place between August and October 1997 and will use Canadian technology to trace radioactive contaminants.<sup>235</sup>

In Stockholm, Professor Anders Karlqvist, of the Swedish Polar Research Institute, explained that recent Swedish scientific work in the Arctic has concentrated on using icebreakers (particularly the *Oden*) as platforms on Arctic voyages, such as one in the Russian Eastern Arctic in 1994. Sweden is currently planning a Tundra Ecology Expedition in the North American Arctic in 1999 using the *Oden*; ideally Canadian and other scientists would participate and there would be stops at strategically important stations in Greenland, Canada and the United States. The scientific benefits of the voyage will no doubt be substantial and, since the funding for the expedition has already been secured, it would not constitute an undue drain on already tight budgets. In Copenhagen, representatives of the Danish Polar Centre told members that significant potential also exists for increased scientific cooperation between Greenland and Canada.

Once again, rather than simply participating in more initiatives, the key need is to coordinate them on a circumpolar level. At the Scott Polar Research Institute, Librarian William Mills explained the need for a Circumpolar Arctic database, since Arctic databases like ASTIS in Calgary are increasingly becoming more specialized and scientific journal literature is not being adequately covered. Once again, while research needs first to be catalogued, the problem seems to be largely one of coordination. When asked by Committee members if there was a shortage of Arctic databases, Garrett Brass of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission responded that, in fact:

There are more databases than there were tribbles on the starship *Enterprise*, if any of you remember that particular episode, and they pop up every day. The question of coordinating these databases is the important one we have to face. . . .As the Internet grows, we're seeing a greater ability to get hold of this data and to query the data. . . .Whether or not we have a single international Arctic database is not the question. Whether we have the necessary links to get to all the useful databases is the real question, and I think that system is in fact growing. [62:17]

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<sup>235</sup> Stephen Thorne, "Canadians Help U.S. Track Environmental Contamination in the Arctic," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 6 February 1997, A11B.

## ***Promoting Education and Culture Exchange through Circumpolar Communication***

While the problems are less acute in the smaller Nordic countries, because of their relative inaccessibility and small populations dispersed in isolated settlements, all the Arctic states share the problem of providing their northern populations with basic education that is relevant to their needs and will reduce their isolation from the rest of the country. Each Arctic state has approached these issues in its own way, and international cooperation in "distance education" and other areas is now beginning. Northern Canada provides useful lessons both for domestic education in the North and circumpolar initiatives. According to one expert familiar with the work carried out in northern education by McGill University: "The crucial element in the McGill experience is that it has been founded on partnerships between the university and northern institutions and communities, and that strong attention has been paid to the aboriginal component of the latter."<sup>236</sup>

The Committee was fortunate to be able to hear about these challenges at all levels: it saw basic education needs and visited research institutes in Canada's Eastern and Western Arctic; learned of the impressive programs in Saami and others studies underway at the University of Tromsø, the northernmost university in the world, which was established in the late 1960s to give local residents a first-class education and stop the braindrain from the region; and met the Acting Director of the Northern Forum Academy in Helsinki. In all cases the message was clear: while significant problems remain, the combination of new technologies and circumpolar cooperation make the prospects for northern education much better than they were a decade ago.

Traditional education in the circumpolar North was delivered by parents in a family setting. The establishment of schools by governments and groups from outside the region meant that parents lost control of their children's education, which had been previously based on different values and carried out in their own language; generation gaps resulted. Northern teacher trainees faced the same problems as they were removed from their communities and brought South for their training. As Professors Peter Burpee and Brenda Wilson of McGill University told the Committee in Montreal, it is important to realize that southern approaches to education are often not appropriate in the North; required are educational methods geared to Arctic indigenous realities and needs, such as experiential shared learning and traditional consensus approaches. The key is to empower northerners to be their own teachers and trainers.

In the 1970s, a few Canadian universities began to develop curricula jointly with northern residents. Partnerships between northern and southern institutions followed, which allowed the former to pinpoint the areas where they needed specialized expertise. Today many northerners have an important voice in the operation of schools that respect local culture and often operate in both their own and the state language. An example of the

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<sup>236</sup> John Wolforth, "A Policy for Circumpolar Education," in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 143.



excellent circumpolar teaching materials becoming available is the textbook *The Northern Circumpolar World*, graphics from which were included in the material available at the inauguration ceremony of the Arctic Council; this book was developed in association with the government of the Northwest Territories and published by Reidmore Books in Edmonton in 1996.<sup>237</sup> While these are positive developments, gaps remain in terms of funding, access to materials and lack of specialized staff.

Canada has also pioneered the use of such communications technologies as satellites, television, and now the Internet. While such technologies are not a magic solution to these complicated problems, they have played an important role in northern Canada, and this model is applicable elsewhere. As Oran Young told the Committee, "I see a lot of opportunities to use rather sophisticated technologies in the interest of some rather simple capacity-building objectives" [40:16]. Writing in 1994, one Canadian expert put it this way:

Recent technological innovations have created new opportunities for North-South partnerships. Distance education, using a variety of technologies which are more suited to northern conditions than old-fashioned print materials, provide opportunities for northern students to tap into the full range of southern educational resources. What is lacking at present are the structures which allow them to do so in a way that respects their own cultural styles of learning, especially in learning cooperatively. Computer technologies may provide this critical element by enabling northern students many kilometres away to communicate with each other and with a southern instructor, to access databases wherever they may be located and in whatever form they may be accessible, and in expressing themselves in forms which are more culturally appropriate than those acceptable in established southern programs.<sup>238</sup>

David Malcolm of the Aurora Research Institute agreed, arguing in a submission to the Committee that "More emphasis is necessary in the area of satellite-based distance education, so that students can learn in an interactive format without leaving their own communities. Distance education may be looked upon as expensive, but it is inexpensive compared to the travel costs over the vast Arctic distances."<sup>239</sup>

One example of the popularity of such new technology in the Canadian Arctic can be seen in Rankin Inlet in the Northwest Territories, where one in five of the 2,000 residents now has an e-mail account, and a free 17-terminal computer centre named Iglaaaq ("window") allows students and other residents to surf the Internet. Students there have recently had on-line conferences with students in Australia and Hawaii, discussing and explaining to the students in other continents such culturally important issues as subsistence whaling. This type of education is not meant to replace more traditional elements — as the local school principal put it, "A computer isn't going to keep you warm

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<sup>237</sup> Bob MacQuarrie, *The Northern Circumpolar World*, Reidmore Books, Edmonton, 1996.

<sup>238</sup> Wolforth in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 144.

<sup>239</sup> David Malcolm, Submission of 28 May 1996, p. 4.

on the land”<sup>240</sup> — yet it is a promising way of reducing the distances between the Arctic and centres of information in the South, and reinforcing the increasing confidence of young Arctic residents. The success in this case resulted from the extraordinary efforts of computer teacher Bill Belsey, and the cooperation of Sakku Investments, the business development arm of the regional Inuit association and the federal Department of Industry. The situation in Rankin Inlet, though not yet typical, is likely to be replicated in other areas.

While Canada is a leader in the use of communications technologies in the North, Professors Burpee and Wilson reminded the Committee in testimony and a submission, that a number of other Arctic countries have also developed specialized expertise which can be shared to improve circumpolar education for the benefit of all. For example, Alaska has an open-access educational system based upon television and other technologies, Greenland has for many decades provided excellent teaching materials and an educational radio service, and the four Scandinavian countries, particularly Norway, have extensive distance education programs at all levels of education.<sup>241</sup> As Oran Young told the Committee:

I don't think there are any complete models that we could simply identify and take over lock, stock and barrel. I think there are experiences that we should identify and draw on. . . . I think a very interesting initiative, in a sense, would be to do an inventory, a survey or an assessment of what is going on with respect to these educational issues around the Arctic to try to identify the most successful initiatives, which could then be used in other settings. [40:15-16]

There is also a major need to support university-level research in the North and foster the development there of an indigenous scholarly capability. In Canada, as Professor Allard and others pointed out to the Committee, the reductions in funding for such important programs as the Northern Scientific Training Program (NSTP) mean that it is very difficult to encourage a new generation of scholars to work in the North. In fact, according to Allard, the NSTP is as important to Canada's capability to do research in the North as the Polar Continental Shelf Project (PCSP). In his words, “The importance of these two programs in assuring a university presence in Canada's North can be summed up as follows: Without the PCSP and the NSTP, university research and training in the North would for all practical purposes cease to exist in Canada.”<sup>242</sup>

Science funding cuts have reduced the number of scientists working in the Canadian North, so Canada must ensure that it makes the best use of such centres of Arctic excellence as Laval University, the Arctic Institute of North America and the Canadian Circumpolar Institute, all of which contributed to the Committee's work and are part of the Association of Canadian Universities for Northern Studies (ACUNS). This Association is composed of over 30 Canadian universities and northern colleges with northern programs

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<sup>240</sup> Ken MacQueen, “Surfing the World from the Frozen North,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, 23 February 1997, p. A1.

<sup>241</sup> Peter Burpee and Brenda Wilson, “Education in the Nordic Countries,” Submission of 31 May 1996.

<sup>242</sup> Michel Allard, “Scientific Research and Manpower Training: Canada's Main Strength in a Global Context,” Submission of 24 October 1996.



and interests, which vary from full-fledged institutes to informal groups of scholars with common interests. It was established in 1977 “in order to link these scholars with each other, with northern communities, with governments, and with other agencies concerned with northern science and development through education, training, and research.” In a submission to the Committee, ACUNS argued that Canada’s foreign policy priorities in this area should be policies to support and promote international cooperation for research and education in the circumpolar region and for northerners, particularly indigenous northerners, to become leaders in these fields.<sup>243</sup>

The next generation of Arctic researchers must include residents of the region, and the Arctic Council can help bring this about by encouraging and facilitating the knowledge-based networks that are being established in the circumpolar world. As Maurice Strong told the Committee in February 1996, “the experience we have had in developing and protecting our Arctic regions is a very major part of the Canadian knowledge base, and linking it with other Arctic powers I think in a knowledge network would be an extremely important use of Canadian experience. . .” Professor Janice Stein of the University of Toronto agreed, adding:

I think it’s important also to think about the way the new knowledge is produced, the way it’s transmitted, and the way it’s shared. Canada brings to this, and that’s why I am so optimistic about Canada’s leadership role, a commitment to share knowledge, to broaden the base, and to use knowledge for certain kinds of purposes. To the extent that we get in early, shape the norms that govern it, and are active players, we then have a disproportionate impact...[65:11]

In the Canadian Arctic, the Committee met with Aaron Senkpiel of Yukon College, who explained that the goal of the College was to train a stable workforce committed to northern development. As David Malcolm at the Aurora Research Institute in Inuvik had done, Bruce Rigby of the Nunavut Research Institute in Iqaluit explained the need to change the dynamics of research to include indigenous knowledge and develop applications with local benefits. The related Nunavut Arctic College is currently offering expanded professional training as a result of the requirement for at least 50% of employees of the new Nunavut government to be Inuit. In a submission to the Committee, Nunavut Arctic College stressed the importance of partnerships, and explained its links with colleges in Alaska and its participation in a consortium of four Canadian and four European institutions under the Canada-European Community Programme for Cooperation in Higher Education and Training.<sup>244</sup> Nevertheless, as Gérard Duhaime of Laval University argued, an exchange mechanism such as the European Union’s ERASMUS program is unfortunately lacking in the circumpolar world. He explained to the Committee that:

The social sciences field is also grappling with a serious problem which is inversely proportional to our research budgets. I am talking about the problems of student exchanges which I brought on at an earlier meeting of the Committee last spring. In

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<sup>243</sup> Association of Canadian Universities for Northern Studies, Submission of 10 May 1996.

<sup>244</sup> Nunavut Arctic College, *Cooperation among Northern Colleges and Universities*, Submission of 28 May 1996.

francophone countries, programs have been developed to make university student exchanges possible. The European Union has created the Erasmus program which allows students from one country to pursue their studies in another. In circumpolar countries, no such institution exists and our research centres feel the impact of this on an almost daily basis. . . One concrete proposal that I would like to make. . . is that the Arctic Council, or at least Canadian foreign policy, promote the creation of a researcher, professor and student mobility program in circumpolar regions. [47:13-14]

The Committee agrees that this would be a valuable and cost-effective way of furthering the development of a circumpolar scholarly capability in the Arctic. Accordingly:

### **Recommendation 39**

**The Committee recommends that the Government increase funding for the Northern Scientific Training Program. The Committee also recommends that the Government urge the Arctic states through the Arctic Council to undertake an inventory of educational approaches in the region, and establish a program similar to that of the European Union for fostering academic cooperation in the circumpolar North.**

A further important way in which the building of circumpolar information networks and communications systems can assist northerners is by strengthening and promoting sharing of indigenous cultures. As we have seen, indigenous peoples in northern Canada have had great success in the culturally related field of art, which helps strengthen their culture and enable them to communicate it to others. Inuit carvings have become famous around the world. Members were able to discuss the promotion of arts and culture in Cape Dorset and with representatives of the Great Northern Arts Festival in Inuvik. In Toronto, in June 1997, Canada will host the Northern Encounter Festival, which will showcase art, films and dance and other performances from the eight Arctic countries. For almost two decades, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference and the Saami Council have built formal links between indigenous cultures in the circumpolar North, and indigenous peoples have developed informal cultural links, such as the Arctic Winter Games, or performances in larger cities in the region by the Greenlandic National Theatre Company. With the establishment of the Indigenous People's Secretariat in Copenhagen, this process of cooperation has now become more formalized, and common cultural elements are being included in the work of the Arctic Council.

According to Professor Marianne Stenbaek of McGill University, "One of the best ways to protect cultural values is by using to its fullest extent the information super highway and television."<sup>245</sup> In the early 1970s, Canada became the first country to employ satellites for domestic communications, giving the Anik series of satellites an Inuktitut name and promoting such investments largely as a means of improving communications with the North. In Iqaluit, the Committee visited the offices of the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation

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<sup>245</sup> Marianne Stenbaek "The Protection of Cultural Values," in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 146.



(IBC), which was established as a non-profit corporation in 1982. Staff at IBC explained the uniqueness and international success of their cultural programming, particularly that for children. In the past, Ottawa provided 65% of IBC's funding, but budget cuts had already reduced the federal subsidy from \$2.5 million in 1990 to \$1.6 million in 1995. IBC has already met with European broadcasters to discuss the possibility of exporting its programs, but it remains to be seen how much potential exists for such international sales. Another northern television success is Zacharias Kunuk's popular 13-part epic *Nunavut*, which employs local residents as actors and emphasizes scenery rather than dialogue; *Nunavut* has been shown in Japan, Taiwan and Turkey.

The success of communications technologies in the North means that indigenous residents can record and preserve their cultures more easily, and communicate directly with one another. As Zacharias Kunuk explained, "When you videotape elders and then, after five years, they're dead and you still hear them talking, that's when I got it. It's very important to record now, because what they're saying is going to become very important later."<sup>246</sup> Once again, new technologies are not a panacea, but the familiar debate that accompanied the opening of the Greenland Cultural Centre in Nuuk in February 1997, over the choice of spending public money on culture or other activities, finds a happy solution in these technologies, whereby both educational and cultural benefits result from a single investment. As Marianne Stenbaek has pointed out, the first live television transmission from Alaska over Canada to Greenland took place only in the early 1980s, and "now with the new technologies, not just computers but the endless interconnection of satellites, video, audio, telephone lines and computers — many new and exciting combinations are possible."<sup>247</sup> Once again, Russia will have the most difficulty in benefiting immediately from these technologies. As Professor Stenbaek pointed out:

Almost everywhere except in many aboriginal and northern villages in Russia and Siberia, the terrestrial infrastructure is in place (i.e. local TV and radio production facilities, computers, etc.). If this Russian "link" can be implemented, then we now have all the facilities for a circumpolar computer and television network.

If one uses the Canadian model of aboriginal broadcasting and the immense impact it has had on political and social change in the North. . . then one may come to the conclusion that a circumpolar television network and a circumpolar computer network would have an immense impact and importance. Such networks would give a voice to all circumpolar peoples and would focus on their many common concerns on issues such as the environment, contaminants, economic development, etc. That voice could become a common forum, would help shape foreign policy and would secure the world's awareness of circumpolar issues.<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> Jane George, "Inuit-Made TV Docudramas as Popular as Soaps in North," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 26 February 1997.

<sup>247</sup> Marianne Stenbaek in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 147.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 147.

The Committee agrees. Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 40**

**The Committee recommends that the Government continue its support for new information technologies in the Canadian North, and ensure that the Arctic Council pursues the use of such technologies to promote cultural understanding and exchange in a circumpolar context. The Government should also ensure stable funding for such important cultural services as the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation, and seek to assist it and other services in selling their programming in Arctic and other markets.**



# **PART III**

## **MEETING FUTURE CHALLENGES IN CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL ARCTIC RELATIONS**





## CHAPTER 9 — STRENGTHENING BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH ARCTIC NEIGHBOURS

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### BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE CIRCUMPOLAR ARCTIC

While Canada has been a leader in developing cooperation among the Arctic states, it also has specific bilateral interests of its own in terms of Arctic cooperation with other countries (See Chart 1 for a comparative profile of the Arctic Eight). Though multilateralism remains a hallmark of Canadian foreign policy, it is not well-suited to all international issues, some of which are better addressed through bilateral foreign policy channels. Asked about the utility of the Arctic Council for addressing specific bilateral issues, Oran Young responded that, “I’m very sceptical about that. When it comes to things that are more substantive projects or are issue-specific like that, I think there is a very real danger that a process of politicisation will take place if you move these things into the arena of the Arctic Council, and that is not constructive” [40:21].

#### A. CANADA-U.S. ARCTIC RELATIONS

The Canada-U.S. relationship is one of the closest and most complex in the world. As Ambassador Raymond Chrétien told the Committee: “There are 230 agreements, from the one on the co-management of the caribou herds between the Yukon and Alaska to NAFTA, and everything in between” [35:19]. While Arctic issues are a small part of the much larger relationship, they are increasingly important and, as we have seen, sometimes high-profile and controversial. In the case of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, the 1969 voyage of the U.S. tanker *Manhattan* resulted in Canada’s adoption of its *Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act*, while the 1985 voyage of the U.S. Coast Guard vessel *Polar Sea* resulted in a number of Canadian actions, culminating in the 1988 Canada-U.S. “Icebreaker Agreement.” As we saw in Chapter Four, defence cooperation in the North has continued between the two countries for decades. Outstanding bilateral Arctic issues, such as the continued protection of the Porcupine Caribou herd and its critical calving grounds in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska, and sovereignty questions will require continued attention. The broader question for the Arctic region, however, and the one to which Canada may be uniquely able to contribute, is how to deepen the American commitment to circumpolar cooperation.

During World War II and after, the U.S. proposed some international cooperative arrangements in the Arctic which were not accepted by the other Arctic states. In recent years, however, it has been the most hesitant to participate in such circumpolar mechanisms as the International Arctic Science Committee, the Arctic Environmental

**CHART 1 – COMPARATIVE PROFILE OF THE ARCTIC EIGHT**

COUNTRY	% TERRITORY ABOVE 60°	NORTHERN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (est.)	MERCHANDISE TRADE WITH CANADA (\$C millions)	SENIOR ARCTIC OFFICIALS
Canada	30	52,000/ 30,000,000	—	Ambassador Mary Simon
Denmark/ Greenland	100 (Greenland)	45,000/ 55,000 (Greenland)	Cdn. exports to: 117.5 (1996) 143.8 (1995) imports from: 354.2 (1996) 335 (1995)	Denmark: Ole Peterson  Greenland: Marianne Lykke Thomsen
Finland	99	4,000/ 5,120,000	Cdn. exports to: 200.2 (1996) 221.5 (1995) imports from: 417.6 (1996) 455 (1995)	Ambassador Heikki Puurunen
Iceland	100	0/ 265,000	Cdn. exports to: 21.4 (1996) 17.1 (1995) imports from: 129.8 (1996) 59.9 (1995)	Ambassador Ólafur Egilsson
Norway	82	40,000/ 4,250,000	Cdn. exports to: 842.6 (1996) 773.7 (1995) imports from: 2,777 (1996) 2,314 (1995)	Ambassador Jon Bech
Russian Federation	45	1,000,000/ 12,000,000 (Northern pop.)	Cdn. exports to: 319.1 (1996) 208.5 (1995) imports from: 448.7 (1996) 498.1 (1995)	Ambassador Nikolai Uspensky
Sweden	70	15,000/ 8,820,000	Cdn. exports to: 274.5 (1996) 343.2 (1995) imports from: 1,201 (1996) 1,305 (1995)	Ambassador Wanja Tornberg
United States (Alaska)	15 (Alaska)	85,000/ 550,000 (Alaska)	Cdn. exports to: 224,438 (1996) 209,888 (1995) imports from: 157,344 (1996) 150,873 (1995)	Robert Senseney Polar Affairs Chief U.S. State Department



Protection Strategy and the Arctic Council. A joint statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Chrétien during their Ottawa summit in February 1995 endorsed the establishment of the Council as soon as possible and allowed the initiative to proceed, but the depth of the American commitment to circumpolar cooperation remains open to question. Substantial differences remain between the U.S. and Canada and other Arctic states over such issues as sustainable development and the utilization of the living resources of the Arctic. This is not surprising, and indeed it is the precise function of the Arctic Council to allow the states and peoples of the region to discuss such issues of common interest and arrive at common understandings. First, however, Arctic issues must achieve and maintain a higher profile in all the states, but particularly in the U.S., where, lacking domestic political interest or high-level attention, they receive low priority.

### ***The U.S. as an Arctic State***

From a global perspective, perhaps the most unknown and interesting challenge of the Arctic is that it is basically collective and must be managed for the total. This concept is foreign to the American mind, but in Alaska we address collective ownership and collective responsibility on a daily basis. Government, either state or federal, owns nearly all the lands and resources. So the challenge to the government of Alaska, as it is in most of the Arctic, is how to work for the total. It's the time-honored way of the Eskimo. Commitment to community is the key to survival. When hunters kill a moose, a caribou, a walrus or a whale, it is distributed to the families in the village. And when oil is developed on our North Slope, the benefits are distributed to all Alaskans.

Former Governor of Alaska Walter Hickel<sup>1</sup>

As Terry Fenge has noted, "The United States became an Arctic nation with the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867 and has viewed its Arctic region as strategically important first for economic reasons, later for national security reasons, and more recently, for global environmental reasons."<sup>2</sup> Thus the U.S. has been an Arctic state for as long as Canada, but the Arctic has not been a major element of either U.S. policy or national psyche. As Elizabeth Leighton, a former U.S. State Department Arctic policy specialist, noted in 1994:

Despite renewed interest in Arctic research and increased involvement and awareness of indigenous peoples and environmental groups, the Arctic tends to fall behind other major international initiatives and the pressing concerns of the 'lower 48'. Americans

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<sup>1</sup> Walter J. Hickel, "An Agenda for the Arctic World," in *The Changing Role of the United States in the Circumpolar North: A Conference on U.S. Arctic Policy*, 12-14 August 1992, University of Alaska in Fairbanks, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Terry Fenge, "The Evolving U.S. Policy toward the Arctic," in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 150.

generally do not feel a historical or cultural attachment to the Arctic, and thus there is little domestic pressure to promote programs in the North.<sup>3</sup>

Alaska represents approximately 15% of the total area of the United States, and, while it is much smaller than the Arctic territory of either Russia or Canada, Oran Young has pointed out that “the United States is generally treated as one of the big three Arctic states by virtue of its superpower status in global terms.”<sup>4</sup> Prompted by the likelihood of oil development in Alaska’s North Slope, the first U.S. presidential statement on Arctic policy appeared in 1971. The Reagan administration reaffirmed and updated that statement in its 1983 Arctic policy, which focussed on four pillars: the protection of essential security interests; the support of rational development; the promotion of scientific research; and the promotion of international cooperation.<sup>5</sup> Responsibility for Arctic matters, except those that were strictly domestic, was given to a federal interagency working group chaired by the State Department.

Following his election, President Clinton ordered a broad review of international environmental policy. As U.S. Under Secretary for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth told delegates at the inauguration of the Arctic Council, “One of the top items on our agenda at the time was Arctic policy.” The new “comprehensive” policy made public in September 1994 included significant changes in the U.S. approach to Arctic issues. Most notably, “meeting post-Cold War national security and defense needs” was the last of its six principal objectives, following protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological resources; assuring that natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable; strengthening institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations; involving the Arctic’s indigenous people in decisions that affect them; and enhancing scientific monitoring and research on local, regional, and global environmental issues. As Terry Fenge told the Committee, “The new Arctic policy is only six pages in length, but its probably the best little policy paper I’ve read on the North. It builds a variety of policy themes around the central core of sustainability and aboriginal peoples”[10:8].<sup>6</sup> U.S. Under Secretary Wirth explained in Ottawa in September 1996 that:

In our view, the Arctic Council we are establishing today is not only consistent with these objectives, but in fact a reflection of that policy and a major new opportunity for pursuing these goals. As an Arctic nation, we welcome this declaration, and we pledge

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<sup>3</sup> Elizabeth Leighton, “U.S. Arctic Policy Undergoes Reassessment,” *Northern Perspectives*, Winter 93-94, p. 28.

<sup>4</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> Elizabeth Leighton (Winter 93-94), p. 27.

<sup>6</sup> The version referred to is probably a draft, since the only public version of the policy is a two-page summary. See “U.S. National Arctic Policy Statement,” Appendix G in *Arctic Research of the United States*, Vol. 9, Spring 1995, Washington, Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee, p. 63-64.



in partnership with the other nations of the region to continue according the Arctic the attention that it merits.<sup>7</sup>

While the Arctic Council will help engage the U.S. more fully in the broader issue of circumpolar cooperation, a number of long-standing Arctic issues remain on the bilateral agenda, and will continue to demand attention.

### ***The Case of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge***

The cross-pressures in the U.S. with respect to Arctic environmental and other issues are perhaps best illustrated in the case of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska, which contains the principal calving grounds (the so-called “1002 lands”) of the Porcupine Caribou herd. As we saw in Chapter Five, the herd migrates annually between northern Canada and Alaska, with its critical calving grounds located in the “1002 lands” of Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.

Alaska remained a territory until the passage of *the Alaska Statehood Act* in 1958, but, unlike most northern territories in the world, it has not been financially dependent on the South since the discovery of oil. Alaska now accounts for about 25% of U.S. oil production; royalties and taxes have given the state a \$20-billion Permanent Fund, which distributes annual dividend cheques to state residents. Former Governor of Alaska Stephen Cowper explained to the Committee that the federal Government owns 60% of the land in Alaska, including the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. He added, “It stands to reason that the Alaskan congressional delegation seeks to have a major voice in those decisions. Nevertheless, they are made in Washington” [58:13].

Attempts to open up sections of ANWR to oil and gas development have been rebuffed by subsequent U.S. administrations, thanks largely to a vocal environmental constituency in the country, and a powerful environmental lobby in Washington, which has referred to ANWR as “America’s Serengeti.” President Clinton campaigned against opening up ANWR in 1992, and his administration (with its strongly pro-environment Vice-President) has been strong in its protection of the Refuge, vetoing in December 1995 legislation that would have allowed development. Yet the fact that Alaska’s congressional delegation is disproportionately powerful means that the administration must keep expending political capital to veto their efforts to open ANWR to development. As well, Alaska’s Democratic Governor has now joined the Republicans in a bipartisan consensus on the issue, which means that the protection afforded ANWR is always subject to domestic political pressure. As Governor Tony Knowles told a gathering of oil company executives in November 1995, “There’s no issue facing Alaska into which I’ve placed more

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<sup>7</sup> Under Secretary For Global Affairs Timothy E. Wirth, Statement on the occasion of the signing of the Arctic Council Declaration, Ottawa, Canada, 19 September 1996, p. 3.

energy than trying to convince Congress to open the Alaska Refuge. . . Unfortunately, ANWR has become a national symbol, an environmental Custer's last stand."<sup>8</sup>

Proponents of opening ANWR to development argue that such development will not necessarily have a negative impact on the Porcupine Caribou herd, largely because development will take place only in a small part of the Refuge and be carried out with new less intrusive technology. As Stephen Cowper told the Committee, while as Governor he favoured opening ANWR to development, he was criticized by the Alaskan congressional delegation for his "soft-line" position on the issue, which included "strong governmental oversight of any exploration and development in that area. I also said that I believe there ought to be a part of that — I won't call it delicate, that's not right — critical calving area that ought to be off-limits, but not the whole coastal plain. I think that's overkill" [58:6-7]. He continued:

My view is that exploration and development of that area can be done in a way that doesn't disturb the calving of the caribou herd. The caribou herd is an enormously important resource. It was there on the surface long before the oil companies arrived. There is technology available today that makes it possible to explore and develop that particular area without having much of an impact on the herd itself. [58:6]

Seen from an American perspective, the ANWR debate is mainly an environmental one. While Canada agrees with the need to protect the herd and its habitat for environmental reasons, its strong position on the issue also reflects the fact that the Porcupine Caribou herd is of critical importance to aboriginal peoples, whose culture and livelihood are based on the herd. As one Canadian expert has pointed out, the area should in fact be thought of as a "bio-cultural zone."<sup>9</sup> While in Whitehorse, the Committee met with Joe Tetlich, the Chair of the Porcupine Caribou Management Board, established by Canadian indigenous groups and governments to jointly manage the herd. He told members that the Porcupine Caribou herd is the foundation of the culture of the Inuvialuit, Gwich'in and Inupiat (of Alaska) peoples. Canada has a standing offer to twin ANWR with protected areas in Canada, and Mr. Tetlich believes the only sure way to protect the herd is for the U.S. congress to grant full wilderness designation to the '1002 lands' of ANWR. Education is key to this issue, and Canada should continue to press for the protection of the Refuge at all levels and opportunities, including indigenous peoples' continued lobbying in the U.S. (Aboriginal peoples have been very successful in lobbying on fur and other issues over the years. Stephen Cowper told the Committee that he once saw a Canadian aboriginal activist call British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from a telephone booth in Arctic Village, Alaska, and successfully enlist her support on the fur issue [58:11].)

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<sup>8</sup> Remarks by Governor of Alaska Tony Knowles to Kerrville, Texas Oil Conference, 17 November 1995.

<sup>9</sup> John Stager, "Report of the Workshop on Canadian-American Relations," in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 163.



According to former Yukon Premier Tony Penikett, local input remains of critical importance in resolving these types of issues, and the case of the Porcupine Caribou herd is one where indigenous peoples and governments at all levels in Canada have worked well together toward a common goal. As he put it,

Often these issues have been handled directly between Ottawa and Washington without much local knowledge. I think that has changed a bit on this issue for the better in the last few years because External Affairs has facilitated heavy involvement by aboriginal and regional politicians in the debate, particularly in the lobby in Washington. [10:23-24]

While there was some development there in 1970s, the less-critical Canadian side of the herd's range is now protected in two national parks. Canada's position on ANWR has been consistent over the years, with Canadian parliamentary committees having looked at the issue of the Porcupine Caribou herd several times. On the last occasion, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development concluded in 1994 that, "In order to truly protect the herd, legislative action is needed in the United States to ensure that restrictions on oil and gas exploration in the '1002 lands' are not merely temporary measures. Protection of such a vital resource should no longer be subject to the discretion of a particular administration."<sup>10</sup> In response to the recommendations of this Committee, Cabinet reaffirmed the Canadian policy of protection of the calving grounds of the Porcupine Caribou herd on the coastal plain of ANWR in Alaska.

While Canada and the Clinton administration have been strong in their defence of ANWR and the Porcupine Caribou herd, the administration is under continued political pressure. This raises fears that ANWR development may eventually be "bundled" with other issues in a larger deal, such as an omnibus budget agreement. As Tony Penikett explained, this fear that northern issues might be summarily dealt with in southern capitals is not limited to ANWR:

From a northern point of view, I think there has always been some fear that someday the big people in Washington and Ottawa would get together and bundle some of these issues, and there would be trade-offs that would not be done with much sensitivity to northern concerns. Evidence of this might be the case of the Pacific Salmon Treaty . . . I doubt there's any solution, though, to that particular issue, the caribou herd issue, that would not involve, first, the aboriginal people; second, the regional governments in Alaska, the Yukon and the Northwest Territories; and third, the nations. [10:24]

In addition to continuing lobbying efforts in the U.S., both Terry Fenge and Nigel Bankes suggested as a complementary strategy attempting to have this area protected under the UNESCO World Heritage Convention. As Terry Fenge explained:

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<sup>10</sup> House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, *Second Report*, 9 June 1994, p. 9:5-6.

The Canadian Government has been very forthright on this issue and I think has done a good job in the last year. So we are not criticising Canadian policy on this. However, we would suggest a longer-term objective would be to apply an international designation, perhaps under the World Heritage Convention, to this transboundary area to give it another layer of protection and management, and indeed to have this area recognized as the international resource it is. [10:9-10]

This proposal is consistent with our suggestion in Chapter Five that existing international conventions be employed in ways that are most useful for the Arctic region. Given the overwhelming support expressed during our travels and hearings for the further protection of this critical resource, we think this step would be of great value. Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 41**

**The Committee recommends that the Canadian Government continue its current efforts to protect the calving grounds of the Porcupine Caribou herd, particularly by assisting Canadian and Alaskan aboriginals to educate U.S. opinion on the issue. The Government should also take the necessary steps to have the entire area jointly designated as a World Heritage Site under the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, if such an approach is supported in consultations with indigenous groups.**

While Canada's interests seem directly in conflict with those of Alaska on the ANWR issue, the Committee learned in Whitehorse that cooperation between the Yukon and Alaska is very close in a number of other areas. As Tony Penikett explained:

It's not well known in Ottawa, but for example the Yukon has with its closest neighbour, Alaska, probably more intergovernmental agreements than it has with any other jurisdiction except with Ottawa . . . I would point out that none of these agreements have been sanctioned or blessed by Foreign Affairs. In fact, I suspect most of them are not even known about here. I don't think anybody in Juneau or Whitehorse ever thought to inquire for permission of either Ottawa or Washington. [10:11]

For example, Alaska agrees with Canadian positions on such issues as the fur trade and the need to revise the U.S. *Marine Mammal Protection Act* (MMPA). In fact, as Milton Freeman pointed out to the Committee in a submission written before the U.S. elections in November 1996, "The current congress appears sympathetic to such sustainable use initiatives (due in large part to the resources committee leadership of Congressman Don Young of Alaska.) . . . Extremism in respect to animal protectionist lobbying, appears to have waned significantly."<sup>11</sup>

#### **Marine Mammals**

First passed in 1972 and amended on several occasions, the *Marine Mammal Protection Act* places a moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mammals and

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<sup>11</sup> Submission of Milton R. Freeman, 3 June 1996, p. 2.



marine mammal products into the United States. The legislation exempts aboriginal citizens of Alaska, who may take marine mammals for subsistence and handicrafts. Canada contends that certain provisions of the Act are an unfair and unwarranted restriction on Canadian exports, particularly since the exemption applies to Alaskan aboriginals but not Canadian. Canada also argues that the prohibitions cannot be justified on conservation grounds, since the Act applies to species that are not endangered, while the U.S. is already a party to international agreements for the management of endangered species. Lobbying by U.S. interest groups and Canada resulted in some liberalization of the MMPA in 1994, but the issue remains.

As Milton Freeman pointed out in a submission to the Committee, given the success in 1994, "The best approach at this time may arguably be through congressional action . . . ." On the other hand, Congress could always tighten the Act again. Moreover, as Milton Freeman added, the U.S. has been found in violation of international law in relation to similar MMPA activities, and "under NAFTA, WTO/GATT there should be avenues to seek redress concerning the unfair trade-restrictive aspects of MMPA (as it relates to import bans of northern Canadian products)."<sup>12</sup> Stephen Cowper agreed that the Alaska congressional delegation supported the liberalization of the MMPA, as did the Northern Forum. As he told the Committee:

I know that the Northern Forum would support you on that. It is, by the way, a subject that has been brought up in Northern Forum meetings . . . I think it's a subject that the Alaska congressional delegation intends to bring rather forcefully to the attention of the current administration. We understand that difficulty, and we'd like to do what we can to ameliorate it, at least to the extent of being able to trade back and forth among Arctic territories and Arctic regions.[58:11]

Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 42**

**While as a matter of policy it is preferable to settle cross-border disagreements without resorting to dispute settlement panels under international trade treaties (NAFTA/WTO), the Committee recommends that, unless current strategies prove successful in a reasonable amount of time, the Government pursue the option of seeking redress through such panels in case of the discriminatory and trade-restrictive provisions of the *Marine Mammal Protection Act*.**

A related issue that has become very controversial in the past year is whaling. Oran Young has pointed out that political pressure on environmental issues is most often

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

generated in the urbanized metropolises of the Arctic states, “which are generally insensitive to the concerns of Arctic communities.”<sup>13</sup> As he put it, “A striking example is the international regime for whales and whaling during the period since the shift from conservationism to preservationism in the late 1970s, a development that has forced Arctic residents to expend much time and energy protecting their right to continue the harvesting of whales.”<sup>14</sup> While multilateral channels exist for addressing these issues, Oran Young points out that these channels too are often dominated by non-Arctic interests (the International Whaling Commission has some 40 member states), and northerners often see it as preferable for them to be addressed bilaterally.

Canadian aboriginal peoples have a constitutional right to take whales at subsistence levels; in 1996 Canada issued permits to allow aboriginal peoples in the Eastern and Western Arctic to harvest one bowhead whale each, which they did. Claiming that even this minimal harvest diminished the effectiveness of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), the U.S. government “certified” Canada under the “Pelly Amendment” in late 1996 and threatened to restrict Canadian imports in retaliation. In fact, the Inupiat of Alaska are permitted to harvest 204 bowheads over four years; thus, the question is not one of numbers, but the fact that the U.S. is a member of the IWC, while Canada is not. The IWC was created to ensure the orderly development of commercial whaling, which Canada banned in 1972. Canada continues to attend IWC meetings as a formal observer and to contribute to the work of its Scientific Committee, but it concluded there was no further reason to remain a member and left the IWC in 1982.

According to press reports, the U.S. is concerned that unless Canada rejoins the IWC the organization may collapse; in return for Canada’s rejoining, the U.S. has offered to help amend IWC rules to allow the subsistence taking of bowhead in Canada to continue.<sup>15</sup> In February 1997, President Clinton announced that he would not ban Canadian imports over the issue, but added that the U.S. would not discuss the issue of marine mammals or trade in marine mammal products in the Arctic Council, and that Canada could not apply to waive the existing moratorium on the importation of seals or related products into the U.S. Canada’s position has long been that it will not rejoin the IWC, but, as we shall see in the next section, an alternative is the possibility of joining the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO).

A final set of bilateral issues in the Arctic — perhaps the most intractable — are those related to sovereignty. Canada and the United States continue to dispute the sovereignty of the Northwest Passage but, as we saw in Chapter Four, Donald McRae argues that

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<sup>13</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 41.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>15</sup> Peter Morton, “Whaling and Forestry Top Chrétien, Clinton Talks,” *The Financial Post* (Toronto), 15 February 1997.



Canada has done all it can to strengthen its position, short of installing a Sub-surface Surveillance System. Tony Penikett described the other long-standing issue as “the disputed area in oil-rich seas offshore between Yukon and Alaska” [10:24]. Canada maintains that the international boundary on both land and sea was established along the 141st meridian by the treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and Russia, by which both Canada and the United States are bound. The U.S. argues that the boundary line should be drawn perpendicular to the coastline at the point where the boundary meets the sea.<sup>16</sup> While somewhat simpler than the Northwest Passage dispute, this issue is also unlikely to be resolved quickly.

### ***Deepening Circumpolar Cooperation***

I think one of the virtues of the Arctic Council . . . might be not that the Arctic Council would be resolving these bilateral issues but that the level of knowledge and sensitivity and awareness and understanding of these issues which would develop institutionally . . . by participation in these fora, or this kind of body, would be very helpful in making the diplomats who are dealing with them sensitive to the changes and expectations and aspirations of people in the region. [10:24]

Tony Penikett

President Clinton’s State of the Union Address in February 1997 placed renewed emphasis on foreign policy, calling the United States the “indispensable nation.” Unfortunately, while U.S. agreement is necessary in a forum like the Arctic Council, which will work by consensus, the U.S. perception that it is indispensable in the Arctic context as well has ruffled some feathers among the Arctic states. U.S. hesitation in joining the International Arctic Science Committee and its grudging support of the AEPS were capped by its reluctance to support an Arctic Council on grounds of duplication and cost. As Garrett Brass explained to the Committee:

I can tell you there was some reluctance on the U.S. side for two reasons. First, it was not entirely clear, when the decision was made to join the Council, what was wrong with the AEPS that we needed the Council to fix. Second, we had already been doing what, in our own self-criticism, we considered to be a rather inferior job in AEPS because of the budget reductions we’re all going through. We didn’t want to do a worse job in the Council than we had already been doing in the AEPS if its responsibilities were larger. I think the latter is still a concern. [62:13]

Even after the political decision to participate in the Council had been taken in early 1995, negotiating the details took time. As Leif Halonen of the Saami Council told Committee members in Tromsø, the other Arctic states “gave in” to U.S. pressure in order to

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<sup>16</sup> Sanjay Chaturvedi, *The Polar Regions* (1996), p. 183.

inaugurate the Arctic Council in 1996. Representatives of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, involved in the negotiations as Permanent Participants, described the “extraordinary turn of events” in the final stage of the negotiations:

By April 1996, all eight Arctic governments, ICC, the Saami Council and the association representing aboriginal peoples in Russia had agreed to a draft declaration with minor reservations. In June 1996, the United States sent a new head of delegation to the Arctic Council negotiations, who was armed with a position at odds with key provisions of the April draft declaration. Changes sought — and there were many — focussed in particular on the status of aboriginal peoples in the Council . . . In negotiations over the summer, the American view, supported to varying degrees by other states, was incorporated in the final version of the declaration.<sup>17</sup>

David Scrivener agreed, telling Committee members at Cambridge University that, faced with a U.S. position of “take it or leave it,” Canada and the other states had decided to go ahead and try to shape the agenda later. Even after the signing of the declaration, the United States seems opposed to the other Arctic states in terms of the broad outlines of the Council’s work. It favours a model focussed on a ministerial meeting every two years, while the other states favour an AEPS-type model whereby substantial work would continue between ministerial meetings. It may be that the U.S., now committed to the Council, simply wants to ensure that the organizational details are handled properly at the beginning; however, critics suggest that in fact the U.S. is simply attempting to delay the work of the Council until 1998, when it hopes to take the chair.

Another possibility is that the traditionally low U.S. priority on Arctic matters and lack of public or high-level policy interest are leading circumpolar cooperation in general and the Arctic Council in particular to be defined in an ever more minimalist way by its mid-level foreign policy bureaucracy. This situation may be reinforced by a lack of resources. Responding to a question about the resources devoted by the various Arctic states to circumpolar issues, Mary Simon told the Committee that, “In terms of the United States, the representatives we deal with are from the State Department. It seems to us they don’t have a lot of resources to put into their Arctic work in relation to the Arctic Council. When you look at the pattern in which they funded the AEPS . . . It depends on what they’re really interested in” [15:29-30].

George Newton agreed that Arctic issues have traditionally had a low profile in the United States, suggesting that, without an overwhelming threat from the Arctic backed by media attention, the U.S. public and politicians simply see no reason to focus on such issues. As he put it:

My feeling is that we apply our interest in the country where people feel there is a real concern. The Soviet Union is no longer a threat because it doesn’t exist anymore. I am

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<sup>17</sup> Shelia Watt-Cloutier, Joe Kunuk and Terry Fenge, “The Arctic Council, Sustainable Development and Inuit,” *WWF Arctic Bulletin*, No. 4.96, p. 8.



telling it the way it is, or the way it is perceived. Therefore, because there is not the concern that something in the Arctic is going to be of grave and immediate danger to our country or the world, and because we have constrained resources, we must apply those resources where there is indeed a very real concern. [62:19]

On the Arctic Council, he added that “I think it’s a mechanism that’s there. It will work if the people who are participating in it want it to work, and the same goes for sustainable development. I think we have to expand the understanding — certainly in the United States — of the participating organizations” [62:21].

Stephen Cowper agreed that the Arctic Council could have a major role in improving cooperation in the region, and expressed the hope that even the Alaskan congressional delegation will support it. In his words:

Alaska, as you might imagine, seldom speaks with one voice. We’re about as contentious as most northern people are. But I think there was a feeling in Alaska — and certainly among the three members of the congressional delegation — that they basically didn’t want the national governments negotiating away matters that they thought should be properly in the purview of the state government here. To put it a little more bluntly, they were kind of suspicious of the State Department.

In any event, they now understand that there is an Arctic Council — that it will be ongoing, and that the United States has an appropriate role in those proceedings. I think we now have a situation that will lead to cooperation from the Alaskan congressional delegation. By the way, all three are major committee chairmen, so people have to pay attention to them. [58:11-12]

Even with the support of the Alaskan congressional delegation, the Arctic Council will not resolve all outstanding issues, for example, the utilization of marine mammals. Yet it can still help advance the process of reaching solutions. As Oran Young told the Committee:

Sometimes international institutions succeed not just because they’ve taken specific actions, but because they’ve helped to put issues or issue areas on the public agenda. This increases the visibility in the policy community of a set of issues that had not been well defined or visible before, and maybe provides a way of talking about these issues — a way of framing not so much the answers to the questions but the way of articulating what some of the principal policy concerns are, could be or should be. [40:10]

Canada played a key role in convincing the United States to accept the creation of an Arctic Council; it can perhaps play a more important one in attempting to ensure that Arctic issues achieve and retain a higher profile at both the political and policy levels in the U.S. At the political level, joint declarations from Summit meetings, such as that issued in 1995, are very helpful, as are the annual meetings of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group. Political attention is spread over many issues, however, and mechanisms must be

created to ensure that Arctic issues remain a priority at the bureaucratic level as well. Rather than simply leaving such issues to be handled within the context of either the broad circumpolar or general bilateral levels, we now have the opportunity to initiate an additional mechanism for ongoing consultations between the two countries to discuss broad Arctic issues.

While the Arctic Council must not degenerate into regional blocs, the Nordic states have already developed mechanisms for consultation on Arctic issues outside the Council, and a similar Canada-U.S. mechanism for discussing North American Arctic issues would be valuable. By ensuring that Arctic issues remained the object of attention in the bureaucracy and forcing each side to prepare continually for regular meetings, this mechanism could also help the development of common understandings and perhaps even solutions to long-standing disputes. Although Denmark is already represented in the Nordic Council, consideration could also be given to including representatives of Greenland, which is part of the North American Arctic, in these meetings.

Since the Committee has already recommended the strengthening of the capacity of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to deal with circumpolar issues, these regular bilateral meetings would best be handled through the office of the Circumpolar Ambassador and the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division. Co-responsibility for bilateral Arctic issues will also ensure continued recognition of their importance. Accordingly:

### **Recommendation 43**

**The Committee recommends that the Government propose to the United States the establishment of a mechanism to ensure regular meetings of officials to discuss Arctic issues, including, but not restricted to, those that are bilateral. These meetings should be undertaken on the Canadian side through the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division and the Office of the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs.**

## **B. CANADA-NORDIC ARCTIC RELATIONS**

If we make the geopolitical choice of putting the Arctic in a central position — not the only region of concern, but in a central position — in our thinking on our foreign policy, that will mean that we will concentrate a whole series of problems that we are dealing with separately, such as, to begin with, the management of our relations with all of the countries of the circumpolar region.

I am very surprised to note, in analysing Canada's foreign policy, that countries such as Scandinavian countries, that were what we used to call like-minded countries, have not received much attention in our foreign policy even though we have affinities and considerable similarities with them. [47:7]

Paul Painchaud



Canada enjoys excellent relations with all of the Nordic states: Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland. As Marianne Stenbaek of McGill University told the Committee, "Canada is an Arctic country and a northern country — and, one could be tempted to add, a Nordic country, for the similarities between the six countries far outweigh the differences" [18:30-31]. There are very few serious bilateral disputes between countries; consequently, as the participants at the 1994 conference A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada warned, perhaps the main danger is that the countries may tend to take their relations for granted. The Committee's meetings in four of the five Nordic countries (it was unable to visit Iceland) played a key role in forming its opinions on the Arctic Council and circumpolar cooperation, but also convinced it that bilateral relations between the states must not be taken for granted or ignored.

Marianne Stenbaek pointed out to the Committee the extensive similarities between Canada and the Nordic countries:

Canada/Greenland/Faroe Islands/Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland have the same geography, to a large extent, and in many places a similar Arctic/subArctic climate; therefore many of the key economic activities and the environmental concerns are the same. On a more subjective level, it can be said that the population in these six countries seem to share a similar mentality/temperament and attitude/value system characterised by tolerance, hard work and fundamental respect for others.

The six countries also share a system of parliamentary democracies and political philosophies which, in general terms, may be described as a unique northern mixture of capitalism, social democracy and some versions of the welfare state. All six countries have a well developed social security system including universal health care, affordable or free higher/university education as well as systems of old age pensions . . . Many of the main industries and businesses in Canada and the Nordic countries are quite similar: fisheries, agriculture, oil and gas development, mining industries, high-skill manufacturing and tourism. . . . So in other words, there are solid and extensive common grounds on which to build future cooperation.<sup>18</sup>

The states face many of the same challenges, from environmental and economic problems, such as the collapse of important fish stocks to the difficulties of existing as smaller states next to more dominant ones and dealing with the emergence of large trading blocs. Canada and the Nordic states share a belief in the centrality of environmental protection and sustainable development and, as Marianne Stenbaek argued before the Committee, many of these issues can be addressed by a comprehensive sustainable development focus under the Arctic Council, supplemented by cooperation in such areas as Arctic science and the development and use of new information technologies.<sup>19</sup> As we saw in Chapter Eight, Peter Burpee and Brenda Wilson of McGill University suggested that the increased use of such technologies and the sharing

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<sup>18</sup> Marianne A. Stenbaek, "Canada and the Nordic Countries," Submission to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, May 1996, p. 1.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

of related experiences could do much to advance cooperation in areas such as distance education, where Canada and the Nordic states have different expertise.

As we saw in earlier chapters, witnesses argued that to have a viable foreign policy for the Arctic, Canada must first develop its domestic approach to the region. We were struck in Scandinavia by the degree to which the Nordic states have identified and consistently pursued their objectives in the Arctic. Particularly impressive from the international point of view is the cooperation the states have developed over the decades through such mechanisms as the Nordic Council, about which the Committee learned in detail in Copenhagen and Helsinki.

As former Yukon premier Tony Penikett pointed out to the Committee, “it is not heavily populated anywhere in the circumpolar North. There is emerging a kind of international northern community, a northern community consciousness” [10:13]. As a result of this, “. . . as long as ten years ago both the Yukon and the Northwest Territories were doing sustainable development trade missions to Scandinavia” [10:11]. Links across national boundaries are not always formal, however, and, according to Mr. Penikett, the Department of Foreign Affairs has sometimes been slow to recognize this. As he told the Committee:

Some years ago I was in Scandinavia for negotiations with mining and smelter companies. Before I left I called External Affairs to see if it would be possible for me to arrange a courtesy call with an old friend of mine, with whom I’d worked on a committee on behalf of my party and his in Europe for a number of years. This old friend had now become a foreign minister in a Scandinavian country, and I thought I might pay a courtesy call. My staff was told by External Affairs that someone from a territorial government really wasn’t important enough to pay a visit to a foreign minister from a real country, so we shouldn’t even try.

However, when I got to the capital of this nation I thought, what the hell, I’ll make a phone call. I picked up the phone and called and the foreign minister answered. He asked what I was doing there and why I hadn’t called? I told him I had tried to call. He told me parliament was in a crisis and the government might fall that night, but could I come around for breakfast in the morning. I agreed, he gave me a couple of messages to pass on to our Minister of External Affairs about matters that were irritating them, and we had breakfast. [10:11-12]

In the international arena, Canada and the Nordic countries share similar perspectives on such important matters as human rights, development assistance and peacekeeping. They have also been strong supporters of the United Nations, and have worked together on its reform. Being on different continents, Canada and the Nordic states have naturally entered into trading arrangements with their neighbours; even so, Canada’s combined trade with the Nordic states in 1995 (\$6 billion) was still about 90% of that with Mexico (\$6.5 billion). The broader question is whether the membership of four of the Nordic states in the European Union and Canada’s membership in NAFTA will reduce Canadian-Nordic cooperation.



While economic links are important, the establishment of the Arctic Council will focus attention on circumpolar cooperation. This can only benefit Canada-Nordic relations, particularly if, as we have recommended, special attention is given to increasing the parliamentary element in the Council. As we learned during our travel in Scandinavia, while supporting the concept of an Arctic Council, the Nordic countries were generally worried that the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy might be weakened within the Council's broader mandate. The Committee also accepted the advice that stressing the circumpolar nature of the Arctic Council is the way to ensure that it does not become the subject of national or regional rivalries.

### ***Canada-Norway Relations***

The Committee's meetings in Oslo and Tromsø in Norway were highlights of its study, giving members an opportunity to learn about key issues of Norwegian concern such as the nuclear situation in the Russian North, the evaluation and continuation of the AEPS process and the successful attempt by the Saami people of northern Norway to create at the University of Tromsø a Centre for Saami Studies that will help them both to retain their identity and prosper in the modern world.

Both David Scrivener at Cambridge University and Richard Langlais in Stockholm noted that Canada and Norway are in a sense natural rivals for the leadership of the Arctic states. Both advised the Committee to ensure that Canada was not heavy-handed in its work in the Arctic Council and other areas of circumpolar cooperation. Canada and Norway have a long history of cooperation in the region. The link between the two countries can be said to have begun one thousand years ago as Vikings attempted to settle in what is now Newfoundland. Norwegian explorers were among the earliest to explore the Canadian Arctic; a special pleasure during the Committee's visit to Oslo was an exhibition at the Maritime Museum commemorating the centuries of Norwegian and other exploration of the Northwest Passage. This shared history should be commemorated whenever possible. For example, in the proposed Otto Sverdrup Centennial Expedition in June 1998, a small Canadian-Norwegian party will recreate Sverdrup's 1898 voyage from Norway to chart, explore and study the Canadian North.<sup>20</sup>

Norway is Canada's largest trading partner among the Nordic states, accounting for half of all Canada-Nordic trade, and is a significant investor in such projects as the Terra Nova and Hibernia oil field, off Newfoundland. As Canadian Ambassador François Mathys admitted to the Committee in Oslo, however, the bilateral relationship is excellent, but underdeveloped. Norway's Arctic focus in recent years has been on its relations with Russia and Russia's nuclear problems. Norway led the formation of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region process in 1992, and, as we saw in Chapter Four, has been instrumental in placing the issue of nuclear pollution in the Russian North on the international agenda. We have already recommended that Canada participate in the new

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<sup>20</sup> See Graeme Magor, "Otto Sverdrup Centennial Expedition," Factsheet, November 1996.

Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) agreement Norway initiated with Russia and the United States; we feel that this will both help address one of the most serious issues facing the region and increase cooperation between Canada and Norway.

Another serious issue faced by both Canada and Norway is the management and utilization of marine mammals. Despite loud criticism and pressure from the EU, the U.S. Congress and the International Whaling Commission, Norway resumed whaling in 1993 after a five-year moratorium, arguing that harvesting 425 of the 110,000 Minke whales estimated to exist in 1996 would not endanger the species. Since the whaling industry in Norway is not particularly important economically, observers have speculated that Oslo's willingness to expend such significant political capital on this battle is for sovereignty and regional reasons. The reluctance to give up full control of fisheries policy was one of the major reasons why Norwegians voted against EU membership in 1994; the government wishes to exercise complete sovereignty over the resources in its coastal waters. As well, Norway's regional policy is to work against the centralization of its population and the government wishes to ensure the basis for livelihood, which includes fishing and whaling, in even the most remote communities.

As a result of its whaling activities, Norway, too, has been certified by the United States government as diminishing the effectiveness of the International Whaling Commission. While Canada's minimal aboriginal whale hunt is not comparable to the scope of Norway's activities, the broader question, what is the most appropriate mechanism for addressing these issues remaining. As we saw in the previous section, despite American pressure, Canada has traditionally refused to rejoin the IWC. While in Oslo, the Committee was briefed on the activities of the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), created in 1992 by Norway, Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands to "contribute through regional consultation and cooperation to the conservation, rational management and study of marine mammals in the North Atlantic."<sup>21</sup> Oran Young explained, "The creation of the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, which joins together Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway and appeals to the concept of sustainable use, owes much to the sense that the International Whaling Commission is a lost cause as far as the interests of consumptive users are concerned."<sup>22</sup>

Canada and the Nordic states have supported a strong sustainable use component in the Arctic Council; from this perspective, for Canada to rejoin the IWC seems doubly inappropriate. In Oslo, Halvard Johansen, the Chairman of NAMMCO, explained to the Committee the work of the organization, which, he and other Norwegian officials argued,

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<sup>21</sup> *Agreement on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the North Atlantic*, Article 2.

<sup>22</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 20.



would benefit from having Canada as a full member. Milton Freeman agreed, arguing in his submission to the Committee that:

Canadian scientists at the present time contribute significantly to the work of NAMMCO, and Canadian Inuit regularly attend NAMMCO meetings as observers and have urged that Canada join this Nordic body. Canada is presently an observer nation (together with Russia). It would be a very positive step for Canada to become a full member, an action that would be especially welcome by each of the NAMMCO members, and especially by Greenland (our nearest Nordic neighbour and a nation feeling very strong affinity with Canada, with whom it shares Inuit culture and identity).

If Canada believes there is a need for science-based management of marine mammals and fin-fisheries, including the rehabilitation of depleted fish stocks in northern waters, then it should provide support and leadership in a responsible and credible regional resource management body that an important group of Canadian stakeholders (i.e. Canadian Inuit) are urging it to do.<sup>23</sup>

Canada has been hesitant to join NAMMCO, probably because it has not wanted to become more deeply involved in the whaling controversy, and because northern indigenous groups — who have a right to formal consultation on such decisions under land claims agreements — have not been unanimous on the question. The U.S. decision to certify Canada under the Pelly Amendment makes academic the question of avoiding controversy. We recommended in the last section that Canada consider taking stronger measures in response to unilateral U.S. actions, and, as Milton Freeman has pointed out, Norway already has done so in the case of whaling:

I suggest that one important reason that the Clinton administration has ignored Commerce Department certification of Norway (calling for Presidential imposition of import bans under the Pelly Amendment) is because Norway has made it very clear they will bring the U.S. before the appropriate WTO panel (where, in relation to similar MMPA actions, the U.S. has been found in violation of international law).<sup>24</sup>

Overall, the arguments for joining NAMMCO, both in terms of the management of marine mammals and the benefits to our relations with the NAMMCO member states, seem to outweigh those against.

Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 44**

**The Committee recommends that Canada cooperate closely with Norway on issues of sustainable utilization of renewable Arctic marine resources. Specifically, the Government should move to become a full member of the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, if such a move is supported in formal consultations with northern indigenous groups.**

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<sup>23</sup> Submission of Milton R. Freeman, 3 June 1996, p. 3.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

## **Canada-Denmark/Greenland Relations**

Since joining the European Union in 1973, Denmark has become the most Europe-oriented of the Nordic countries, although it has obtained exemptions from EU policy in a number of areas. Canada's relations with Denmark are good, and the countries share an interest in environmental protection, NATO membership and support for peacekeeping activities. The most important shared interest is in Greenland, for whose foreign affairs Denmark remains responsible. The geographic proximity of Canada and Greenland led to a joint agreement on Marine Environmental Cooperation in 1983, but it was the close cultural links between the peoples in Greenland and the Eastern Canadian Arctic and their political development that resulted in the recent surge of mutual interest.

Greenland attained home rule status within the Danish realm with the passage of the *Greenland Home Rule Act* in 1979, and powers — except for national defence and security, the judicial system, currency, and foreign affairs — were transferred to the Home Rule Government between 1979 and 1992. Greenland has long looked to Canada as a natural partner and, in view of the forthcoming creation of Nunavut in the Eastern Arctic in 1999, the Canadian Government has come to realize that much can be learned from the Greenland Home Rule experience. The two jurisdictions will face common demographic, economic and other problems, and both sides are interested in learning from the experiences of the other and in arriving jointly at new solutions. As a study commissioned by the Circumpolar Liaison Directorate of DIAND explained in February 1997:

The most immediate concern of the Home Rule Government in Greenland is economic. Fishing, which was the mainstay of the Greenland economy, no longer provides the sources of revenue it once did. Tourism is strongly touted as a new source of revenue as are the non-renewable resources of oil, gas, hydroelectric power, and mineral wealth.

Nunavut could draw on the Greenland government's policies for encouraging economic development especially in the non-renewable resources sector of mining, oil and gas development.

The development of tourism as an economic venture is certainly an area of importance to the government of Greenland and the future leaders of Nunavut Territory.<sup>25</sup>

During its visit to Copenhagen, the Committee spent much of its time discussing Greenland issues with representatives of the Greenland Home Rule Government, Danish parliamentarians (including those representing Greenland), Danish government officials, and representatives of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. Members learned that the Home Rule Government operates within the Constitution of Denmark. Greenland still depends on Denmark for block funding of up to 60% of its budget, with most of the balance still coming from fisheries. As Milton Freeman pointed out, given Greenland's dependence on marine

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<sup>25</sup> Jette Elsebeth Ashlee, *Greenland 1996: Notes on Selected Issues of Interest to Canada*, Working Papers Series 97-01, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, February 1997, p. 51.



resources and interest in cooperation with Canada, it would particularly welcome a Canadian decision to join NAMMCO, as we have recommended. Such a decision would also probably result in some savings, since the existing Canada-Greenland Joint Commission on the Conservation and Management of Narwhal and Beluga could come, in whole or part, under NAMMCO.

The scale of Greenland's dependence on Danish government funding may change in the next decade, since many feel Greenland is on the verge of significant mineral and other resource discoveries. Jurisdiction over non-renewable resources remains shared between the Home Rule and Danish governments, but all look forward to such discoveries, provided the resources can be developed without harming the environment. The last active mine in Greenland was closed by its Canadian operator in 1990, but Canadian companies are currently carrying out exploration in the country. Members were told that Greenland hopes to profit from Canadian expertise and would welcome greater cooperation in such areas as environmental assessments, mining in the North and royalty regimes.

As Jørgen Waever Johanssen, President of the Inuit Circumpolar Youth Council (and a former Carleton University student), told the Committee in Copenhagen, attention should be paid to the youth dimension of circumpolar cooperation, since education, training and employment opportunities would go far to address the common challenges facing the North. He also argued that the focus within the Arctic Council should be on the sustainable utilization and development of resources. Significant potential exists for joint enterprises between Canada and Greenland. While Greenland withdrew from the European Union following a referendum in 1982, it retains an EU link through Denmark; he argued that perhaps products produced by such joint ventures could even be exported to the EU tariff-free. Many other examples of potential for cooperation exist; Jorgen Taagholt of the Danish Polar Centre explained the potential for cooperation in the generation of a significant amount of clean hydroelectric power in Greenland, which could then be carried by cable to North America for use or sale.

In addition to existing agreements on the conservation of narwhals, belugas and polar bears, Canada and Greenland could also benefit from greater cooperation on the management and harvesting of shared stocks and renewable resources. Though Greenland has long been noted for its pristine nature and sustainable use of wildlife, the increase in its population from fewer than 5,000 a century ago to 55,000 today makes the sustainable management of natural resources a priority.<sup>26</sup> These issues have an international dimension; Finn Linge, Greenland's representative to the European Union, told the Committee that Canada and Greenland have cooperated closely over the EU fur ban, as well as in with the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) over fish stocks. As Milton Freeman argued:

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<sup>26</sup> Anne-Marie Mikkelsen, "Conservation and Resource Management in Greenland: A Challenge for the Future," *WWF Arctic Bulletin*, No. 4.96, p. 15.

The well-being of northerners (in Canada and Greenland more especially) continues to depend on a strong renewable resource-based economic sector . . . Development of the northern resource economy requires working to overcome artificial barriers to international trade such as, e.g. the MMPA and EU directives banning trade in sealskins and wild furs, actions of the IWC opposing the commercial utilisation of non-endangered whales, and unjustified CITES (*Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species*) sanctions against trade of various abundant, non-endangered species.

Canada, Greenland, Norway and Iceland should work closely and resolutely together on overcoming these negative impacts; these countries are all non-EU nations, and all are adversely affected by EU and U.S. actions . . . Canadian leadership, in support of rational and sustainable economic development, is likely to encourage other nations . . . to support sustainable use of abundant, non-endangered wildlife stocks.<sup>27</sup>

Significant progress has been made in increasing links between Canada and Greenland in recent years. In late 1996, a Canadian delegation led by Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Ron Irwin visited Greenland. Following meetings with Premier Lars Emil Johansen and his Greenland Home Rule cabinet and government, the two sides agreed to a number of general and specific understandings. These included the need to work towards the establishment of increased trade and cultural arrangements, the exchange of information on the Home Rule experience and the planning of Nunavut, and increasing the volume of cargo transported between Canada, Greenland and Denmark. While these agreements reflected the largely domestic nature of the Canada-Greenland relationship, the two sides also agreed on “enhanced collaboration on circumpolar affairs and in particular on the environment and wild fur issue.”<sup>28</sup>

### **Canada-Sweden Relations**

Long considered the “big brother” of the Nordic states, Canada also enjoys good bilateral relations with Sweden, and high-level visits between the two countries have increased substantially since 1994. Trade figures are not particularly high, but there is significant investment in the Montreal area and elsewhere by Swedish multinational firms, which perhaps see Canada as a natural entry point into the NAFTA market. Though Sweden was initially reluctant to support the establishment of an Arctic Council because of the proliferation of regional forums, it is now a strong supporter of the Council. As Canadian Ambassador William Clarke explained to the Committee in Stockholm, Sweden’s “overriding priority” in the Arctic remains the protection of the environment.

Sweden’s Circumpolar Ambassador, Wanja Tornberg, warned members that, while the Arctic Council was a useful platform, it must cooperate with other organizations. She

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<sup>27</sup> Submission of Milton R. Freeman, 3 June 1996, p. 6-7.

<sup>28</sup> “Premier Lars Emil Johansen, Greenland and Ronald A. Irwin, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Canada Promote Circumpolar Cooperation,” *News Release* 1-9653, Ottawa, 3 December 1996.



also agreed with a Committee member's observation that Sweden's interest seems more regional than circumpolar at the moment; she explained that, since Sweden had just taken over the chair of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) Council from Russia, it would probably be somewhat inward-looking over the next year.

Of particular importance to the Committee was Sweden's emphasis on the importance of "soft" security, which includes environmental and other issues rather than traditional military ones. As Ambassadors Tornberg and Clarke explained, Sweden has long argued that modern security goes beyond military issues, and that the type of work under way in the *Baltic 2000* initiative to create a sustainable development plan for the Baltic region will in fact be much more important to future security than a preoccupation with military issues. Further cooperation in developing these ideas would be of much use to the circumpolar region as a whole.

The Committee also had the chance to discuss circumpolar cooperation and Saami rights issues with the Speaker of the Swedish parliament, Birgitta Dahl, a former Minister of the Environment who participated in the Second Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region in Yellowknife in March 1996. The Speaker and several of her parliamentary colleagues argued strongly for the inclusion of a parliamentary component in the Arctic Council, and, further, that an independent Arctic parliamentary body should be established, perhaps on the model of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

### ***Canada-Finland Relations***

Locked into the Soviet orbit during the Cold War, Finland has moved in the past several years to begin redefining its international role, joining the European Union in January 1995. Like Sweden, Finland opposed the EU Commission's decision to postpone the implementation of its fur import regulation and, given the impact this regulation would have on many northern communities, this remains an issue.

At the circumpolar level, Finland's interest in environmental protection prompted it to launch the "Rovaniemi process," which led to the creation of the AEPS, and Arctic environmental issues remain a key Finnish priority. While Finland was an early supporter of Canada's proposal to create an Arctic Council, it was obviously concerned with its impact on Arctic environmental protection. As Finland's Environment Minister noted at the inauguration of the Council, "As the initiator of the Rovaniemi process, Finland pays particular attention to the necessity of safeguarding progress on the well-trodden path."<sup>29</sup>

According to a former Finnish Ambassador to the United Nations, given their country's proximity to and history with Russia, "Finns may have developed an inner ear for

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<sup>29</sup> Mr. Pekka Haavisto, Minister of the Environment of Finland, Statement at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Arctic Council, Ottawa on 19 September 1996, p. 2.

the obscure and conflicting signals that emanate from the East.”<sup>30</sup> Apart from the Finnish perspective on circumpolar cooperation, the Committee found its discussions in Helsinki very useful for understanding the current situation in Russia. Finland has urged EU and other action to build confidence in Russia and stability in the region, and has placed emphasis on the BEAR process. As noted in earlier chapters, the Committee also benefited from meetings with Finnish parliamentarians, who welcomed Canadian interest in Nordic-Russian cooperation, in which they have an obvious stake. They also encouraged active Canadian involvement in political channels linking European and North American perspectives, notably the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region.

### ***Canada-Iceland Relations***

The Committee regrets that it was unable to visit Iceland during its study, but it has noted the strong support Iceland has given the Arctic Council and circumpolar cooperation in general. Iceland’s Foreign Minister Halldór Ásgrímsson, in an informal meeting with Members on 15 May 1996 during a visit to Ottawa, referred to his country’s position as helping to build transatlantic bridges, and confirmed a desire for closer ties with Canada, including through direct air links. Some have argued that the support of most Arctic states for sustainable development and utilization agendas has been driven by their indigenous populations, but the fact that Iceland supports these agendas, even though it has no indigenous population shows that other principles are involved. As Iceland’s Foreign Minister argued at the inauguration of the Arctic Council:

Proximity to the ocean resources coupled with such vital dependence on them has taught Icelanders to treat them with care. We see it as a priority and a duty to cooperate with other nations in developing the Arctic Council as a framework for protecting the Arctic environment and securing sustainable development for the benefit of the indigenous peoples, other Arctic residents and for that matter the world as a whole. . . . as important as the environmental challenges are we must give full attention to the need to secure the sustainable development and utilisation of the natural resources of the Arctic . . . The indigenous people of the Arctic have the right to improve their livelihood and enhance their cultures. Utilisation of marine resources [is] in my opinion especially important in this respect.<sup>31</sup>

Our recommendation to join NAMMCO will improve cooperation between Canada and Iceland in this area.

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<sup>30</sup> Max Jakobson, “Finland: A Nation that Dwells Alone,” *the Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, p. 50.

<sup>31</sup> His Excellency Mr. Halldór Ásgrímsson, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Statement at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Arctic Council, Ottawa, 19 September 1996, p. 2.



## **Conclusion: Nordic Relations within Canadian Foreign Policy**

In summary, it is apparent that there are still opportunities to be explored for utilizing the strong bilateral affinities and ties between the Nordic states and Canada to further circumpolar cooperation. To that end:

### **Recommendation 45**

**The Committee recommends that the Government task the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade with developing a more strategic approach to Canada's relations with the Nordic countries. In particular, emphasis should be placed on fostering cooperative alliances with the Nordic states with respect to key circumpolar issues such as sustainable development.**

## **C. BUILDING CANADA-RUSSIA CIRCUMPOLAR PARTNERSHIPS**

### ***Approaching Russia Today***

The Russia that is emerging from the discontented winter of 1997 is a giant jigsaw puzzle of paradoxes, contradictions, ambiguities and uncertainties. Committee members who visited Moscow and St. Petersburg at the time of President Yeltsin's heart operation last November, had a palpable sense of this "transitional" turmoil that reinforced information learned from briefing documents, news sources and face-to-face encounters. Yet, notwithstanding a continuing atmosphere of mounting political, socio-economic, environmental and overall crisis, the past decade since the first Gorbachev-initiated reforms has brought about enormous positive changes in Russia. Indeed it is possible to forecast great things ahead. According to the *Washington Post's* former Moscow correspondent David Remnick: "Although daily life in Russia suffers from a painful economic, and social transition, the prospect over the coming years and decades is more promising than ever before."<sup>32</sup> A recent book recording a series of remarkable achievements also observes that there is already more private property in Russia's emerging market economy than anywhere else in Eastern Europe.<sup>33</sup> The London-based European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), established in 1991 to assist post-Communist transitions to democratic market economies, is generally bullish

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<sup>32</sup> David Remnick, "Can Russia Change?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, January/February 1997, p. 43. Remnick readily acknowledges that: "Power in Russia is now adrift, unpredictable, and corrupt... In the new Russia, freedom has led to disappointment. . . . Development and progress are wildly different in the country's 89 regions, and much depends on the local political map." Yet at the same time: "Russia is an increasingly urban nation with a literacy rate of 99 percent. Nearly 80 percent of the Russian economy is in private hands. . . . Russia's natural resources are unparalleled," (p. 35, 46, 48).

<sup>33</sup> Richard Layard and John Parker, *The Coming Russian Boom: A Guide to New Markets and Politics*, The Free Press, New York, 1996, p. 2.

on Russia's longer-term prospects, and is rapidly expanding operations there, especially in financial institution-building and services, including those for small business development.<sup>34</sup> At the same time, after more than five consecutive years of sharply declining real output, penurious state finances, collapsing public services, and with more than a quarter of the population living below the official poverty line, there are many who have lost from reform, to the consternation of outside observers, even if overt signs of unrest have been remarkably contained to this point.<sup>35</sup>

Canada and Russia have both clearly expressed a mutual interest in doing more business together across a variety of fronts. In mid-October 1996, just a few weeks before the Committee's visits to Moscow and St. Petersburg, International Trade Minister Art Eggleton led a delegation of 57 companies, the largest business mission since 1992, to these cities, where they participated in the second meeting of the Canada-Russia Intergovernmental Economic Commission (IEC). Canada's Export Development Corporation (EDC) announced in September 1996 that it would now consider providing financing for commercial sales to Russia (up to US\$250 million available on its corporate account), and Mr. Eggleton indicated that Canada account support could also be forthcoming. Bilateral trade volumes fell sharply after 1993 though Canadian exports posted significant growth in 1996 (see Chart 1). Direct investment is still only about \$300 million, principally in mining (gold) and oil and gas.<sup>36</sup> Canada's competitors in the Russian market are generally seen as being more aggressive and committed. The potential for improving Canada-Russia trade and investment performance, contrasted with the frustrating and quite often disappointing short-term realities, was a theme that emerged from our meetings with Canada's ambassador Anne Leahy and her small but efficient and hard-working Moscow staff, as well as from exchanges with resident members of the

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<sup>34</sup> Canada, the EBRD's eighth largest shareholder, holding 3.4% of the Bank's capital, has ratified the doubling of those resources to ECU (European Currency Units) 20 billion — approximately C\$32 billion — approved by the Bank's board in April 1996. By the year 2000 nearly one-third of the Bank's total portfolio will be in Russia, already the largest recipient of technical cooperation funds provided by member-country donors (totalling US\$162 million in 1995). With regard to the latter, of particular note is the rapidly expanding Russian Small Business Fund, to which Canada has committed C\$10 million. The EBRD's office in Moscow is also headed by a Canadian, Lou Naumovski. Further details on bilaterally-sponsored programs through the Bank are in the later section on technical assistance. For an overall assessment of Russia's progress on reforms cf. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Transition Report 1996*, London, November 1996, especially, p. 169-72.

<sup>35</sup> According to Sergei Markhov of the Carnegie Institute for International Peace: "Russian people are former Soviet people. They're tired of struggle. The majority of the population is disaffected and see few prospects for themselves, it's true, but they don't want to fight anymore. This works well for the authorities." But which authorities? By most accounts, the central government's power is waning in relation to Russia's increasingly restive 89 subnational entities (republics, okrugs and oblasts) represented in its elected upper house of Parliament (the Federation Council, with which the Committee met in Moscow). Senior political adviser Andrei Federov contends that: "With Mr. Yeltsin sick, the country is on auto-pilot and the regions have become much more sovereign than they were before" (quoted in Mike Trickey, "Russia Is Heading for Economic Collapse, Critics Say," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 30 January 1997, p. A9).

<sup>36</sup> However, Marie-Lucie Morin, head of commercial relations at the Canadian embassy, told the Committee that there is a rising services trade (e.g. legal firms, often in conjunction with resource investment transactions) of a similar magnitude that is not adequately captured in the official statistics.



Canadian private sector who are in Russia for the long haul. Given the immensity of the diplomatic and commercial challenge, we are pleased that ways have been found to avoid the scheduled closing of Canada's consulate in St. Petersburg, where the Committee appreciated the energetic efforts of Consul General Ann Collins and the perspectives of local Canadian business representatives. At the same time, we recognize that substantially increasing the present Canadian stake is probably unlikely until a lot more questions are answered, and as long as so much remains in flux.<sup>37</sup>

The Russian federation has yet to sort out relations between central and regional authorities, which have led to legal contradictions, if not actual chaos,<sup>38</sup> or to put in place adequate systems of market rules and regulations, for example governing taxation and safeguarding foreign investment, which are important to key sectors of Canadian interest in oil and gas and mineral resources. Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov, who expressed disappointment to the Committee about the fact that western investor interest was lower in Russia than in China, in spite of his country's democratic reforms, shifted some blame for legislative deficiencies and delays to the Duma, in which opposition parties, chief among them the "new" Communist party, have a majority. The Committee was nevertheless encouraged in its meetings with senior Russian parliamentarians by their genuine affinity for Canadians and their repeatedly expressed desire to cooperate in expanding both economic and political ties. Vladimir Lukin, chair of the Duma's foreign affairs committee, assured members that they would deal with the necessary legislation concerning double taxation and foreign investment, as well as new rules on production- and revenue-sharing that will have their greatest impact in northern areas and on resource projects of interest to Canadian companies. He added at the same time that Russia wants to encourage long-term equity investments rather than volatile short-term capital inflows.

We are only too aware that there remains much to make would-be investors nervous. A recent risk assessment, while giving some positives to overcome the understandable caution, offers a litany of more arresting observations:

Russian democracy is a particularly distinctive and fragile example of the species. . . . It is impossible to overstate the importance of the need to consider regional as well as national politics. . . . Russia's economy is in a peculiar state, half way between reform and collapse. . . . Organised crime is Russia's greatest growth industry. . . .

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<sup>37</sup> As stated by Franco Boule, chairman of Vancouver-based Archangel Diamond Corp. which has invested US\$11 million in Russia since 1993: "Country risk is a real factor. ...We would benefit enormously if the Russian government would send some clear signals to the international community to allay the concerns people have." (Fred Weir, "Canadians Wary of Investing in Diamond Project in Russia," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 8 March 1997, p. E4.)

<sup>38</sup> Former Yeltsin security advisor and presidential aspirant Alexander Lebed is quoted as saying that: "Russia is no longer a federation, but a confederation of regions." Russia's minister of justice has stated that all of Russia's 21 autonomous "ethnic" republics (although ethnic Russians are a majority in all but six) have laws contravening the federal law, and that 19 have adopted constitutions that directly contradict the 1993 federal constitution. Mike Trickey, "Regions Battle Moscow as Russian Federation Frays," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 26 February 1997, p. A7).

Ecologically, Russia is a disaster. . . . the dangers to public health have increased for a variety of reasons. . . . Russia (like most of the former U.S.S.R.) is suffering a demographic crisis and the resurgence of diseases like tuberculosis, epidemic flu and dysentery.<sup>39</sup>

Tax collection, particularly for foreign firms, has been described by the vice-president of the U.S.-Russia Business Council as “frightening because it’s so random and so capricious.”<sup>40</sup> Contradictions seem to be everywhere. Despite numerous bank failures, Russia now has several of the strongest banks in Eastern Europe, and one, the former Industrial Bank for the Soviet Union, recently opened a New York office. Despite the investor anxieties, the chief investment strategist with the U.S. investment bank, Morgan Stanley, sees Russia as “the most exciting, biggest potential play in the world.” Some predict the size of its stock market could eclipse that of all of Latin America by the end of the decade.<sup>41</sup> The contrast could hardly be sharper between such booming visions and the desperate real economic plight of most Russians, or the precarious state of public-sector finances, with many employees (including disgruntled members of the much demoralized military) going unpaid for months.

Moreover, even as the situation in major centres like Moscow continues to be “far from normal,”<sup>42</sup> of particular concern in terms of this report is the especially acute and complicated situation in Russia’s vast northern and far eastern regions; here, as already noted in earlier chapters, environmental devastation is the worst, indigenous peoples face the greatest challenges, and large amounts of external assistance will be essential for some time.<sup>43</sup> Although Russia’s “North” is the most populated and “developed” of all the Arctic states, the imposed militarization and industrialization of the Cold War has left behind urban concentrations with serious environmental and other problems, at a time when the central government can no longer afford to subsidize them. In Moscow, Vladimir Kuramin, Chairman of the State Committee on Northern Development (GOSKOMSEVER), which was reconstituted by presidential decree in November 1995, drew a striking portrait

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<sup>39</sup> Mark Galeotti, “The Pros and Cons of Investing in the Bear,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, January 1997, p. 5-6. On the issue of criminal activity, see also *Mafiya: Organized crime in Russia*, Jane’s Intelligence Review Special Report No. 10, June 1996. The pessimism of the Russian population is reflected in a birth rate which has dropped almost in half from 1985 to 1995. Demographers predict the population could decline by as much as 25 million over the next three decades, an almost unprecedented peacetime trend.

<sup>40</sup> Quoted by Fred Hiatt of the *Washington Post*, “Russia Defies Economic Rules,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, 16 December 1996.

<sup>41</sup> John Thornhill, “Hunt for the Siberian Tiger,” *Financial Times of London*, 19 February 1997, p. 23.

<sup>42</sup> See the essay by Ken Kalfus, “Far from Normal: Scenes from the New Moscow,” *Harper’s Magazine*, December 1996, p. 53-62.

<sup>43</sup> Piers Vitebsky of Cambridge University told Committee researcher Gerald Schmitz in February 1997 that a colleague has adapted a famous phrase from Tolstoy’s *Anna Karenina* to describe the present extremes of diversity in adversity: “All of the regions are miserable, but all are miserable in different ways.”



for Committee members. The Russian North as an administrative area covers two-thirds of the federation territory (including sub-Arctic agricultural areas especially in the far east), comprising 29 regional entities extending across 12 time zones. Although home to only 12 million of Russia's approximately 150 million citizens (with the indigenous "small peoples" accounting for barely 200,000 souls), the breakdown of Soviet support systems means that even some of this population is "superfluous" and cannot be sustained. Out-migration creates other problems for those who stay. At the same time, federal funding for the North has dropped by 40% because of the budget crisis.

As in Canada, northern regions do receive some special considerations. And, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, a new program is being undertaken to work in cooperation with indigenous peoples. GOSKOMSEVER, which has benefited from a good relationship with its Canadian counterpart, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), is trying, with limited resources and staff (only 300 federal employees) to construct a better framework for approaching development in northern regions. Mr. Kuramin admitted that some federal policymakers tend to see the northern and far eastern regions as a big, expensive headache. But this circumpolar zone, with 92% of Russia's gas reserves, 75% of its oil, 60% of its coal, 50% of its forests and fish stocks, could become a great source of wealth rather than a perennial drain on the treasury. Moreover, Russia's remote and increasingly independent-minded Siberian northeast, if it can overcome its tortured past, has been identified as a region of low commercial risk and enormous potential.<sup>44</sup> Looking to the Asia-Pacific more than to Moscow, the largest republic of Sakha (Yakutia), covering one-fifth of the federation's territory (six times the size of France) and containing the coldest populated areas on earth, already accounts for 99% of Russia's diamond output (25% of world production). Sakha has also managed to negotiate a unique federal agreement giving it greater control over taxation and resource revenues. As we elaborate in the next sections, the Sakha republic is significant, too, in having developed an extensive relationship with Canada's northern territories.

The overwhelming nature of the Russian situation, not only in size, scope and complexity, but also in terms of opportunities and risks for overall Canadian foreign policy interests, including of course circumpolar cooperation, makes a compelling case for expanding Canadian diplomatic and commercial representation to beyond the capital, Moscow, rather than cutting back. Although the Committee appreciates the need for budgetary prudence, we believe the allocation of departmental resources should reflect that this is a critical time to demonstrate a clear Canadian commitment to an intensive future partnership with the Russian Federation, including its diverse regions. There is no substitute for an enlarged on-the-ground presence that would be capable of serving a growing breadth of Canadian interests. At the very least, an additional Canadian consular

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<sup>44</sup> The transition in turn creates new dilemmas, summarized in a recent report: "An epic landscape steeped in tragedy, Siberia suffered grievously under communism. Now the world's capitalists covet its vast riches." ("The Tortured Land," *Time Magazine*, 4 September 1995, p. 36-47.)

presence should be established to facilitate contacts with northern and eastern regions which are far distant and increasingly autonomous from Moscow.

Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 46**

**The Committee recommends that, in view of Russia's unique circumstances and regional diversity, as well as its importance to Canadian foreign policy, including future circumpolar cooperation, the Government explore the most practical and economical means to expand Canadian diplomatic and commercial representation, particularly with the aim of improving access to consular services for distant northern and eastern areas of the Russian Federation.**

#### ***The State of Canada-Russia Relations and Northern Cooperation: Retrospect and Prospect***

Over the past few years, the Government of Canada's overall cooperative agenda with Russia, including northern relations, has lost momentum.

Camil Simard, Circumpolar Liaison Directorate,  
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern  
Development, April 1994<sup>45</sup>

At the threshold of the 21st century new global communities are formed in the world, going beyond national borders and interests. . . . The North of our planet will play an exceptionally unique role in this new community. The North means a unique biosphere, countless natural treasures, yet unused lands. The North means a cradle of one of the most viable civilizations, entirely adapted to the severe environment and created by [the] will, mind, talent and labour of indigenous people. . . . The North is beautiful and marvellous. Its hour of triumph is yet to come.

Mikhail Nikolayev, President of the Sakha  
Republic (Yakutia), June 1995<sup>46</sup>

We share a lot. . . you Canadians are the least problematic country of the G-7.

Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister of  
the Russian Federation, November 1996<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> "Canada's Northern Relationship with Russia: A DIAND Perspective," in Lamb ed., *A Northern Foreign Policy for Canada* (1994), p. 170.

<sup>46</sup> "The Arctic Role in a Global Community," in Lyck and Boyko, eds., *Management, Technology and Human Resources Policy in the Arctic (The North)*, Kluwer Academic Publishers in cooperation with NATO Scientific Affairs Division, Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 1996, p. 3-4 and 9.

<sup>47</sup> Meeting with the Committee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 4 November 1996.



Relations between Canada and Russia might be described in general terms as good if unremarkable. For many who believe the relationship could and should be more dynamic, there is a sense in which it has underachieved, in spite of the oft-cited “natural partnership” of geography and climate and the tireless efforts of individual Canadian veterans of cooperative contacts.<sup>48</sup> Some of the high-profile flurry of diplomatic activity and enthusiasm of the early 1990s has noticeably worn off in the face of the difficulties of overcoming the legacy of seven decades of Communism. At the same time, Canada has developed a substantial assistance program in Russia (which we examine in detail in the next section), and the recent business delegation led by Minister Eggleton should give a boost to a flagging commercial relationship. Significant territorial, provincial, and aboriginal contacts have also helped to sustain momentum, notably at the interregional and circumpolar level. Nevertheless, it would be wise to keep current expectations reasonably modest and to direct Canadian bilateral efforts as strategically as possible to already identified areas of strong mutual interest (e.g. cold-climate technologies, institution-building and specialized training, environmental rehabilitation and regulation, resource development and management systems, sustaining indigenous communities).

The modern post-war history of Canada-Russia relations has been extensively surveyed elsewhere, and astutely analyzed with a special focus on the northern cooperation by several practitioners who gave their views to the Committee.<sup>49</sup> Some highlights of that period, leading up to the 1992 bilateral accord (see Box 14 “The 1992 Canada-Russia Agreement on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North”) that is due to be renewed in June 1997, may be useful in setting the context. The first and most obvious observation is that, despite geographic proximity and wartime alliance, the Cold War dominated relations between Canada and the U.S.S.R. for over four decades. As a result, the world’s two largest countries, sharing between them 85% of the Arctic ocean coastline, came to be described as, at best, “nearly neighbours.” Diplomatic contacts were cool if correct, largely determined by developments in the broader international system, particularly by each country’s respective relations with the United States. Canada was firmly in the western (and American) camp throughout the Cold War, yet it was clearly *not* the United States, and benefited from this in the eyes of the Soviets. Indeed, in 1955 Lester Pearson became the first NATO foreign minister to visit the U.S.S.R..

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<sup>48</sup> A number of these have been at the scientific and academic level. However, we would like in particular to cite the role of Walter Slipchenko, for three decades a leading consultant to the federal and territorial governments, to Canadians doing business in Russia, and recently to the Arctic Council secretariat. Mr. Slipchenko graciously helped to brief the Committee prior to its travel to Russia, and his contribution was raised several times by Russians with whom we met. While his enthusiasm for the Russian North remains undimmed, he expressed some frustration at slow and diffident responses of Ottawa’s official circles, indicating that more could be done from the Canadian side, including on such practical matters as quick processing of visa applications, to encourage instead of retard Canada-Russia activity.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. John Hannigan, “Canada’s Northern Cooperation with the Soviet Union and Russia: A Natural Partnership?,” *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 9, Spring 1994, p. 53-70; Robert Doherty, “Social, Economic and Technical Links Between Northern Regions of Canada and Russia,” in Lyck and Boyko (1996), p. 19-30. Mr. Hannigan testified before the Committee on 2 May, 1996. Mr. Doherty, Deputy Minister in the NWT Government Department of Public Works and Services, sent additional information to Committee staff (from Vladivostok while on a business trip to the Sakha republic) prior to the Committee’s travel to Russia.

## Box 14 — “The 1992 Canada-Russia Agreement on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North”

The main provisions of the Agreement signed during President Yeltsin’s June 1992 visit to Canada are as follows:

- **The preamble** states both countries’ desire to develop a new mutually beneficial partnership for the benefit of the inhabitants of their Arctic and northern regions. It also recognizes the importance of the participation of northerners to our bilateral cooperation.
- **Section 1** stipulates that both countries will promote mutually beneficial cooperation on matters relating to the Arctic and the North. A list of priority areas of cooperation to develop, including such items as economic development, construction, Arctic contaminants, situation of aboriginal peoples, development of renewable and non-renewable resources, geology, tourism, and health, is annexed to the Agreement.
- **Section 3** stipulates that both sides will promote, facilitate and support the establishment of direct contact and exchanges between regional and local governments, as well as aboriginal organizations, of the Arctic and northern regions of Canada and Russia. It also stipulates that both sides will promote, facilitate and encourage the development of cooperative contacts between governmental and nongovernmental organizations, scientific and other institutions, and business associations and firms of the two countries.
- **Section 4** identifies the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) and the State Committee for Socio-Economic Development of the North (GOSKOMSEVER) as responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Agreement. A Canada-Russia mixed commission is to be co-chaired by the Minister of DIAND and the Head of GOSKOMSEVER.
- **Section 5** states that in the carrying out of work programs, exchange of delegations will be on a “receiving side pays” basis.
- **Section 7** stipulates that the Agreement remains in force for a period of five years, subject to automatic renewal, unless either Party gives notice of termination not less than six months prior to its expiration. The Agreement may be amended at any time by mutual agreement of the Parties in writing.

A total 35 projects and activities have taken place under the auspices of the Agreement, in such areas as geoscience, construction, health, aboriginal issues, social development, environmental issues, economic development, and mining.

These activities provided for the participation of federal departments (Agriculture Canada, Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Natural Resources Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada), the Government of the Northwest Territories, aboriginal organizations and corporations (Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, Unaaq Inc.), universities (Laval University, University of Northern British Columbia), and other organizations (Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, NWT Chamber of Commerce, Canadian Society of Circumpolar Health, Canadian Museum of Civilization, Circumpolar Agricultural Conference).

Projects and activities involved on the Russian side, in addition to Moscow-based governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the following regions: Republic of Sakha (Yakutia); Megadan Oblast; Irkutsk Oblast; Chukotka Okrug; and Nebets Okrug.

While DIAND has provided some funding support for the Agreement and its projects (e.g. interpretation, travel costs) many Canadian participants have funded their involvement in the projects. On the Russian side, however, GOSKOMSEVER has not provided any funding in support of Russian participation.



It was not for another 15 years, however, that bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union on a number of still quite narrowly defined fronts began to take on a more substantive and formal dimension. Prime Minister Trudeau, who had first visited Moscow privately in 1952, made a high-profile eleven-day trip to the U.S.S.R. in 1971 which resulted in several agreements, including a Protocol aimed at putting contacts on a more systematic basis and providing for “consultation on important international problems of mutual interest and on questions of bilateral relations.” The visit also excited interest in the Soviet press, and Premier Alexi Kosygin reciprocated with a visit to Canada within six months. “Détente” also continued in the bilateral relationship longer than it did between the superpowers, until interrupted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Arctic had traditionally been an important element of the bilateral relationship, and in fact throughout the Cold War the U.S.S.R. cooperated on Arctic issues solely on a bilateral basis. Most of the early contacts — for example, a 1965 visit to the Soviet North by Northern Affairs Minister Arthur Laing — while centred on science issues, also included shared interests in infrastructure technologies and wildlife conservation. After a brief suspension following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, northern exchanges resumed in the early 1970s. Of particular importance was the 1971 visit of the current Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, then Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to the northern regions of Siberia.

As John Hannigan points out, this visit also signalled an important divergence between the Canadian and Soviet approaches to northern development — “Although scientific matters and natural resource development remained important components of potential bilateral collaboration, Mr. Chrétien also stressed cultural development and education for northern peoples. . . .”<sup>50</sup> From the 1970s on, increasing Canadian domestic concerns over environmental and social issues, combined with the movement for aboriginal peoples’ rights and northern political devolution, strongly influenced Canada’s approaches to Soviet cooperation, and provoked resistance from the Soviet side which stuck to its centrally planned scientific-industrial model. Nonetheless, discussions were renewed in the early 1980s, prompted during the 1982 visit of a Quebec delegation to Siberia, and led to the signing of the first extensive bilateral protocols in 1984 on scientific and technical cooperation in the Arctic and the North. Although referred to as the Arctic Science Exchange Program, Canada was able to have included important environmental and social science (“ethnography and education”) components. As well, this broader bilateral framework provided a significant boost to subnational initiatives, with the Government of the Northwest Territories playing a leading role in the social dimension, both for issues related to indigenous peoples and for northern construction.

Over the course of the 1980s, bilateral cooperation along these lines continued to deepen (helped by the fact that leading Soviet reform figures, Alexandr Yakolev and

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<sup>50</sup> John Hannigan (1994), p. 58.

Mikhail Gorbachev himself, were familiar with Canada). Prime Minister Mulroney's November 1989 state visit, where he sought Soviet support for the Canadian idea for an Arctic-region council, produced an Agreement on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North which added a northern economic development program and the facilitation of exchanges among northern indigenous peoples. Moving into the 1990s, there was increasing emphasis on both multilateral-level channels (with Canada and the U.S.S.R./Russia involved in negotiations leading to new Arctic and circumpolar organizations, as we have seen in previous chapters) and, very important as well, on subnational and nongovernmental activities. For example, before the Soviet Union disintegrated, Quebec had entered into a cooperation agreement with the Russian federal republic, and the NWT had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Sakha republic (Yakutia). The Committee during its northern travels heard encouraging testimony about enterprising territorial-led activities with Russian Arctic regions, with government working closely with private-sector joint ventures — including on such priority areas as housing construction adapted to northern needs, and technical and management training for native people — which continue to evolve in directions that seek practical benefits for northerners.<sup>51</sup> Arctic-based aboriginal organizations such as the Western Arctic Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, and Nunavut (eastern Arctic) and Nunavik (Quebec/Labrador) bodies through the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, have also been involved in pursuing working relationships with indigenous groups in Russia.

The breakup of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, although traumatic and still unsettling, fortunately did not disrupt this promising evolution, much of which was now taking place below the federal state level, and instead cleared the way for a new comprehensive Canada-Russia bilateral agreement on northern cooperation to be put in place in June 1992. An earlier "Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation" signed by President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Mulroney affirmed the promotion of "direct contacts between local and regional governments and aboriginal peoples of Northern Canada and Russia, on the basis of their working arrangements." Given that trend, the role of the national governments was shifting, as John Hannigan has pointed out, towards "facilitation and coordination of collaborative projects rather than as direct players. . . [the exception being] the areas of science and the environment, where much of the research falls within the realm of the federal governments." At the same time, as he observed already several years ago:

In Canada, funding is increasingly being directed toward technical assistance programs rather than scientific or cultural cooperation. In Russia, there is simply a

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<sup>51</sup> Robert Doherty gives a wealth of detail on the range of contacts and programs undertaken to date. Some, which have been supported by Canadian technical cooperation funds, show considerable commercial potential. According to information supplied by Doherty in October 1996, recent discussions have expanded into consideration of polar air routes, and he is also currently involved in efforts to establish a technical centre in the Russian far east to further promote Canadian construction services in these regions.



shortage of government funds to meet many of the basic demands of the Russian population, let alone conduct a program of international cooperation. . . . the fate of Canadian-Russian northern cooperation is no longer dependent on the presence of common approaches to northern development, or the clearing of foreign policy and security concerns. Ironically, ten years into the program on Arctic exchanges, the predominant inhibiting factor is funding.<sup>52</sup>

Before turning to current and future realistic expectations for a Canada-Russia bilateral circumpolar partnership, given these resource rather than high policy or structural constraints, it is important to go back a bit to underline just how much the Cold War's demise and aftermath has truly transformed the overall foreign policy context for considering such relationships. Like most western governments, Canada had been slow to understand and accept the revolutionary nature of the Gorbachev reforms, repeatedly taking a cautious line on Soviet initiatives, including Gorbachev's 1987 Murmansk initiative, which called, among other things, for greater civilian cooperation in the Arctic. (Gorbachev, as noted earlier, was nonetheless personally well-disposed toward Canada, having led a parliamentary delegation here in 1983 on one of his first trips outside the Soviet Union. Moreover, his mentor, Alexandr Yakovlev, had spent ten years "in exile" as Soviet ambassador in Ottawa, and had developed a good personal relationship with Prime Minister Trudeau.) With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, Canada and other countries finally accepted the transformation of the Soviet Union as the effects of *perestroika* and *glasnost* were extended to Central and Eastern Europe. By that time, the benefits of the foreign policy "new thinking" with the goal of demilitarizing the Arctic region were also increasingly apparent, both bilaterally and on a circumpolar basis, in the Soviet endorsement of further progressive northern cooperation initiatives.

There followed a flurry of activity in Canada-U.S.S.R. relations, beginning with a successful high-level November 1989 visit to Russia led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney accompanied by a large entourage of Canadian business people. In addition to a joint political Declaration, the visit resulted in some 14 agreements to expand bilateral cooperation in areas including the Arctic and the environment, as well as air links, investment protection, and "wide-ranging discussions" on a range of issues. This visit was followed by at least four more in the next four years: Gorbachev to Ottawa in 1990, Mulroney to Moscow in 1992, Yeltsin to Ottawa in 1992, and Yeltsin to Vancouver to meet with U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1993. The high point of the new relationship was probably the signing by Prime Minister Mulroney in Moscow in 1992 of a large number of further bilateral agreements, which often involved the creation of "Mixed Commissions" of Canadian and Russian officials to pursue various issues.

Russia's subsequent movement towards a democratic market system, albeit hesitant and contested, has also allowed more diversified and business-oriented economic relations to develop. However, as noted in the preceding section, given the severity of Russia's transition process, with steep declines in real output and high commercial risk

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<sup>52</sup> John Hannigan (1994), p. 66-67.

factors, bilateral trade and investment volumes have remained unsatisfactory. There may be far more profitable opportunities than ever before and most agree the future holds great promise, but short-term crises and continued legal-political uncertainties have resulted in a troubled business climate that still deters many. It is a situation which seems to require strong nerves as well as a long-term commitment to staying in the Russian market. Some Canadian businesses that were among the first to penetrate the Russian market have had notable success (e.g. McDonald's Canada, which opened a flagship restaurant in Moscow in 1988, and has continued to expand, recently into St. Petersburg). Russians we met welcomed this involvement, not only in strict investment terms, but also as contributing to the transfer of business management skills, the raising of marketplace standards and the spread of better business practices generally. Some ventures have gone sour, with discouragement sometimes followed by disinvestment (e.g. Gulf Canada's withdrawal from KomiArcticOil consortium in the fall of 1994, in the wake of the major oil spill from a highly publicized pipeline break and other problems, on the grounds that operations were not profitable). But others are taking their place — for example, Alberta-based Bitech Petroleum Corp. expects to more than treble its oil production over the next year in the northern semi-autonomous Komi Republic.<sup>53</sup> And in Moscow, Calgary's Southern Alberta Institute of Technology is helping to set up a Russia-Canada Fuel and Energy Training Centre financed by a \$2.2 million CIDA contribution announced in December 1996.

Past setbacks and present anxieties have to be taken in stride. We see tremendous potential for the Canadian private sector to play a larger role, not by waiting on the sidelines while competitors in Europe and the U.S. move ahead aggressively, but by contributing, as some firms are already doing, to making improvements in Russia's still struggling economy and business climate during this critical formative period. Certainly that is one of the positive messages the Committee heard. We note that it was during Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's first visit to Canada in October 1995 that the Canada-Russia Intergovernmental Economic Commission (IEC) was established to include private sector participation and to provide a mechanism for addressing trade and investment issues affecting Canadian and Russian business interests. Four working groups have been operating in the areas of fuel and energy, agriculture and agri-food, advanced technology, construction and housing. Under the 1995 initiative, Canada and Russia resolved to work towards a doubling of bilateral trade by the year 2000. International Trade Minister Art Eggleton, co-chairing the IEC's second meeting in Moscow in October 1996, indicated Canada's commitment to this goal.

The Committee is particularly interested in encouraging attention to the part that northern-based enterprise can play in contributing to sustainable economic cooperation objectives. For example, in Yellowknife we were impressed by the successful experiences of Stefan Simek, President of Ferguson, Simek, Clark, in doing business in some of Russia's remotest regions over the past several years (e.g. the building of the model "Canadian village" in Yakutsk in northeastern Siberia). He made several useful

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<sup>53</sup> Reed Landberg, "Canadian Oil Producer Finds Rich Harvest in Russia," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 12 March 1997.



suggestions for invigorating Canada's bilateral ties with Russia: *inter alia*, improving air links, establishing a joint Canada-Russia Contract Dispute Settlement Panel, and sending a Team Canada-type trade mission to Russia. His field-tested advice was for Canadian firms not to be passive but to search out niche markets in Russia where we can be strongly competitive. Many of these areas will be where Canada has been an acknowledged leader in developing knowledge and expertise (e.g. cold-climate research, technological development and infrastructure; resource management systems incorporating aboriginal participation as well as environmental protection and remediation elements) that is especially suited to being applied to meeting the tremendous sustainable human development needs of Russia's northern regions and indigenous Arctic communities.

With respect to the overall state of Canada-Russia northern cooperation at the official level, we think there is much still to be done, despite a diverse range of activities — involving provinces and territories, aboriginal groups, and research, educational, health, cultural and other organizations, in addition to activities of federal departments and agencies — which have been taking place under the aegis of the 1992 agreement.<sup>54</sup> Indeed Harald Finkler, Director of DIAND's Circumpolar Liaison Directorate (CLD), which was given responsibility for implementing the bilateral agreement, acknowledged during his appearance before the Committee in May 1996 that it had come with no resources attached [18:25]. Russia has not been able to provide any funding to support Russian participation and both sides have been unsuccessful in proceeding with a ministerial-level meeting of the Mixed Commissions created by the agreement, although regular meetings between officials of DIAND and its counterpart Russian State Committee (GOSKOMSEVER) have taken place. Given that the agreement will be up for renewal in a few months, John Hannigan's ambivalent assessment gave the Committee several points to consider:

Canada-Russia Arctic cooperation has lost momentum in the past three or so years largely because of financial constraints in both countries, and uncertainties and change in Russia. The government-to-government bilateral relationship is therefore at a point where it should be closely examined with regard to its benefits and its relationship with multilateral forums, such as the Arctic environmental strategy and the Arctic Council.

With all of the changes in Russia over the past four years, combined with the move toward multilateral cooperation and joint northern-related projects outside of the formal bilateral agreement. . . . is it time to . . . concentrate efforts instead on multilateral Arctic initiatives? To answer that question, one would have to weigh carefully the consequences of a decision to end the [formal federal government-to-federal government bilateral Arctic cooperation] relationship. It would require input from many of the people who have participated in the program and who are still deriving concrete benefits from the cooperation. [18: 22-23]

Perhaps the most promising aspect of the formal intergovernmental framework has been its distinct emphasis on fostering direct contacts among regions and among

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<sup>54</sup> These are indicated in some detail in a July 1996 "Summary Report of Activities: April 1995 — March 1996," prepared by DIAND, which was tabled with the Committee prior to its travel to Russia.

aboriginal peoples themselves, even if raising the necessary supporting funds has been ad hoc and problematic. Moreover, although the Russian side is especially fiscally challenged, it has shown great intellectual and policy interest in pursuing whatever avenues may be opened by the agreement. CLD officials have been as responsive as funds allow, and have facilitated participation by Canadians with noted expertise in major international meetings hosted by Russia on northern cooperation issues, including one in Archangel in September 1995 that was cited by GOSKOMSEVER Chairman Kurmin during his forceful presentation to the Committee in Moscow. Canadians also made their mark in contributing to an earlier NATO-sponsored Advanced Research Workshop on Management, Technology and Human Resources Policy in the Arctic held in Novosibirsk which involved Russia's federal ministry for nationalities and regional policy and the Siberian republic of Sakha (Yakutia). Several of the Canadian presentations focussed on aboriginal self-determination and sustainable development issues.<sup>55</sup> The NWT's Robert Doherty explained the growing territorial activities with Russia's northeast which we have already noted above. Clifford Hickey of the University of Alberta's Canadian Circumpolar Institute, who, along with colleagues, met with the Committee on its return from the western Arctic, outlined a number of suggestions to assist northern Russia's transition to a market economy; these included: a circumpolar trade and tourism strategy, emphasizing renewable resources and the extension of the region's traditional economies; increased circumpolar use of developing telecommunications technologies; and capitalizing on Russia's noted science base to create and market electronic databases.<sup>56</sup> (The CIDA-supported "Intaris" project, which the Committee visited in St. Petersburg, as described in the next section, is a model illustration of the latter potential.) Also at the Novosibirsk conference, Gérard Duhaime of Laval University, twice a witness before the Committee, elaborated on growing Quebec-Russia research collaboration in recent years. Among his forward-looking suggestions, referred to earlier in Chapter Eight, were to establish a Northern Educational Exchange Program under the Arctic Council, to be modelled on the ERASMUS program of the European Union.<sup>57</sup> The participants in this NATO-sponsored gathering, coming from all eight circumpolar countries, endorsed a declaration calling for new multilateral approaches to Arctic development based on principles of sustainability, aboriginal involvement, and support for knowledge-based cooperation, within what the Russian participants referred to as an emerging interregional as well as interstate "Arctic and Northern Community."

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<sup>55</sup> Greg Poelzer, "Prospects for Aboriginal Self-Government in Russia" and Barry Bartmann, "Footprints in the Snow — Nunavut: Self-Determination and the Inuit Quest for Dignity," in Lyck and Boyko (1996), p. 141-64; also in the same volume, Finkler, "Modernization and Adaptation among Indigenous Peoples in Chukotka (Russia)," and Hannigan, "National Villages in Chukotka: Marginalized and Forgotten, or New Prospects for Economic Well-Being?," p. 399-412.

<sup>56</sup> Clifford Hickey, "Avenues Toward a Successful Transition to a Market Economy in Northern Russia," in Lyck and Boyko (1996), p. 289-96.

<sup>57</sup> Gérard Duhaime, "Don't Steer Without a Map", in Lyck and Boyko (1996), p. 61-71. See also in the same volume, Charles Bélanger, "Southern Strategic Thinking and Research Policy for the North (Arctic)," p. 51-59.



From DIAND's perspective, Harald Finkler outlined in a submission to the Committee a number of reasons why the bilateral channel administered by his Circumpolar Liaison Directorate remains important to developing a program of Arctic cooperation with Russia. The acute needs of Russia's northern regions, in particular those of northern indigenous peoples, and the complexity of their situation, notably in regard to environmental and economic recovery, are a strong argument in favour of utilizing Canada's extensive experience and expertise to help build up Russia's institutional and managerial capacities in these areas. As our Circumpolar Ambassador Mary Simon has stated with respect to the abrupt termination of state subsidies to hundreds of communities across northern Russia:

Clearly, it is in no one's interest to see northern Russia left to stagger and fall by the wayside like this. Apart from the terrible impact on individuals, families and communities, the economic and social collapse there threatens to obstruct efforts to stem the flow of contaminants out of Russia into the Arctic Ocean and skies and onto our northern shorelines.<sup>58</sup>

Certainly the Russians with whom we met are eager to explore opportunities for mutual benefit. At the same time, the content of this Canada-Russia cooperation is increasingly oriented towards initiatives being delivered at the subnational or nongovernmental levels — e.g. territorial government programs, linkages among aboriginal organizations — or in support of multilateral cooperation through the AEPS/Arctic Council. As well, other Canadian and Russian federal ministries besides DIAND and GOSKOMSEVER are also concerned with issues heavily impacting the North, such as nuclear safety and environmental security which we discussed in Chapter Four. Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov pointedly acknowledged to the Committee that demilitarization and the decommissioning of reactors are a "matter of survival," but the "major problem is money." Russia is therefore interested in a range of partnership proposals to help it cope.<sup>59</sup> We were told that environmental projects in the Arctic have been put on hold because of the budget crisis. Again, this is an area where Russia is welcoming more Canadian involvement.

Since the 1992 framework agreement on Canada-Russian northern cooperation was signed, much has happened that needs to be factored into the consideration of the relationship beyond June 1997. Canada continues to develop an extensive program of bilateral assistance to Russia which is now managed by the Canadian International

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<sup>58</sup> Mary Simon, "Building Partnerships" (1996), p. 4.

<sup>59</sup> One of these, promoted to us by Russian officials though it remains controversial within Canada, would see the conversion of plutonium from Russian military stockpiles into a mixed (plutonium plus uranium) oxide fuel that could be used in Canadian CANDU reactors. At the April 1996 Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security, Prime Minister Chrétien agreed to consider the concept in principle. While CIDA is contributing \$1.5 million towards a feasibility study of the MOX initiative with Russia, it must still pass a number of tests. Canada has also indicated that any eventual supply of MOX fuels from Russia would not be subsidized and must therefore demonstrate its viability as a commercial proposition.

Development Agency (CIDA), and to which we turn in the next section. The appointment of an Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs and the creation of the Arctic Council also make it important, as we argued in the early chapters, for Canada to develop a comprehensive and coherent Arctic policy framework as a basis for exerting international leadership. A vigorous multi-faceted Canada-Russia relationship is clearly an integral component of developing a Canadian circumpolar foreign policy that will be up to this task. Agreements on bilateral Arctic cooperation, such as that of 1992, which came without specific resources attached and without strong linkages to foreign policy objectives, should therefore be reviewed and renewed in a new light. While programs in various sectors of activity can continue to be carried out through different departments and agencies, the coordination of Canada-Russia relations must take place within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, thereby reinforcing that overall circumpolar cooperation objectives are a priority of Canada's foreign policy.

Accordingly:

#### **Recommendation 47**

**The Committee recommends that the current bilateral agreement on Arctic cooperation with Russia be extended, but within a foreign policy context that is capable of coordinating all aspects of Canada-Russia relations with an Arctic and northern dimension — including promotion of trade and investment relations as well as delivery of technical assistance — with the overall objectives of a comprehensive circumpolar foreign policy. We recommend that the Circumpolar Affairs Division, proposed to be established within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to support the work of the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, should be given responsibility for effecting this coordination among Canadian federal Government initiatives in the Russian North, and for facilitating provincial, territorial, aboriginal and nongovernmental activities to support cooperation objectives as jointly agreed between Canada and Russia.**

#### ***The Future of Canada's Technical Cooperation Assistance to the Russian North***

The U.S.S.R. was for many years an important aid donor within its sphere of superpower influence. When the Soviet regime rapidly unravelled after 1989, there was therefore no experience of, or indeed preparation for, receiving "aid" from foreign governments, especially not help of an explicitly democratic capitalist nature. To meet the unprecedented challenges of post-Cold War, post-Communist transition, much had to be done that was new and experimental in terms of providing temporary assistance in support of reform processes. The ensuing fracturing of the U.S.S.R. into diverse groupings of independent states — despite the residual loose association of most within a



“Commonwealth of Independent States” (CIS) — added to the already daunting complexity of programming aid to the “former Soviet Union.” Russia itself was an immensely complicated federation of regions increasingly assertive (in several cases violently so) vis-à-vis the central state. Moreover, as a major power still, possessing a highly educated population, Russia could obviously not be approached on the basis of any traditional donor-recipient relationship.

The focus of international aid has been on supporting market and democratic reforms to permit the new Russia to move as quickly and, it is hoped, as smoothly as possible towards integration into the global economy and establishment of normal commercial and political relations with democratic capitalist countries. The intentions of this transitional assistance, in short, have been markedly different from long-term aid programs for developing countries, which emphasize basic needs and poverty alleviation. Accordingly, the EBRD, the new multilateral bank established for the region in 1991, was explicitly given a unique market/democratic reform and private-sector orientation, rather than the more familiar “development” mandate. The overall record of bilateral western assistance to Russia has, however, been criticized on a variety of grounds — that it was more easily promised than actually delivered, and when delivered was often ad hoc and poorly organized. The continuing turmoil in Russia, from the centre out through the regions, indicates another critical element that has sometimes been missing — finding reliable Russian partners capable of implementing sustainable projects. The importance of developing in-depth knowledge on the ground of Russian conditions, of sound personal as well as organizational relationships, and of establishing rigorous, results-oriented selection and evaluation procedures, were among further related points raised with the Committee by the Office of the Auditor General and confirmed in overseas meetings. With regard to circumpolar assistance partnerships, Piers Vitebsky of Cambridge University, emphasized building human and community-level contacts, drawing on his own intimate knowledge of indigenous life in Russia’s northern regions.

It is understandable that Canadian technical assistance to the Soviet Union and successor states had to be set up quickly in 1991. The targeted amounts also rose quickly, from an initial \$5 million per year announced at the 1991 G-7 summit, to the \$30 million per year over five years announced in 1993. This was in addition to some \$23 million in humanitarian assistance and \$30 million over three years for the Canadian Nuclear Safety Initiative established in 1992.<sup>60</sup> Indeed, Prime Minister Mulroney claimed in a July 1992 speech at Johns Hopkins University that Canada had already disbursed over \$1.6 billion in credits and aid to the former Soviet Union, the second highest per capita assistance of the G-7, exceeded only by Germany. Most technical assistance in these early years — through a bureau for that purpose created within the Foreign Affairs Department, as well as a “Renaissance Eastern Europe” facility designed to foster Canadian private

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<sup>60</sup> The Canadian initiative included a \$7.5-million contribution to the multilateral Nuclear Safety Account managed by the EBRD. Atomic Energy Canada Ltd. AECL has been the principal executing agency for bilateral activities undertaken under this fund. With the completion of this project work, AECL’s CIDA-sponsored Moscow office is due to close in the spring of 1997.

sector activity<sup>61</sup> — focussed on such familiar sectors as oil and gas and agriculture, both areas of known Canadian expertise and key to Russia's plans to increase oil exports and reduce agricultural imports. In 1994-95, some discussions were held on a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Canada and Russia on technical cooperation, but these reached a stalemate over tax treatment issues. The Government is since pursuing instead joint G-7 efforts to achieve appropriate Russian tax legislation governing foreign assistance transactions. In 1995, following the foreign policy review and publication of *Canada in the World*, an important reorganization in Canada transferred and consolidated responsibility for delivering the Canadian assistance program to the "countries in transition," including Russia, to CIDA in order to take advantage of that department's organizational and field experience in project implementation. However, overall responsibility for setting policy direction remains with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

To the end of 1996, Canada had committed over \$130 million and disbursed more than \$115 million in support of over 200 technical cooperation projects in Russia. The budget for the 1996/97 fiscal year was \$23 million, and according to official sources, interest has been such that the bulk of available funding is already committed for the next two fiscal years. (Russia has accounted for just under one-quarter of total "Countries in Transition" assistance, which according to the Government's 1997-98 *Main Estimates* documents is to be reduced by about 8% in the current fiscal year and a further 8% in 1998-99.) Under CIDA's management, the technical cooperation program with Russia continues to have a strong reform and private-sector orientation.<sup>62</sup> The Auditor General's office, which, as well as CIDA officials, briefed Committee members prior to their travelling to Russia, noted in a November 1996 follow-up audit that some systemic improvements were being introduced.<sup>63</sup> At the same time, especially given the program's reactive nature as it has evolved within a volatile and fluid set of circumstances, it is apparent that many challenges remain in giving this bilateral cooperation a solid, stable foundation, and increasing confidence that the activities being funded are those that best meet both Russian and Canadian partnership objectives. An ultimate indicator of success will be whether committed sustainable relationships that are not simply dependent on

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<sup>61</sup> The REE program, still managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, to the end of 1996 had committed some \$6.4 million to over 120 projects in Russia.

<sup>62</sup> As one analysis put it: "The programs are meant to provide nuts-and-bolts help to Russia to transform into a market economy, to democratize the political system, to establish commercial links with Canadians and to support Canadian investments. . . . the lion's share of the \$23 million allocated for Russia is spent in Canada or on Canadians" (Juliet O'Neill, "Canadians Have a Lot Riding on Russian Election," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 30 June 1996, p. A4). This article also addressed prospects for Canada-Russia cooperation within the Arctic Council, but did not link it with the bilateral technical cooperation activity, an indication of how the two have evolved on separate tracks. An implication of our analysis further on is that these dimensions of Canada-Russia policy should be brought together more explicitly in support of specific shared circumpolar interests.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons*, Chapter 29, "Canadian International Development Agency: Follow-up of the Auditor General's 1994 Report on Technical Assistance Contributions to Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union," Ottawa, November 1996, p. 41-47.



continuous government funding from the Canadian side are generated. At a minimum, in an admittedly high-risk environment with limited resources and means of influence, CIDA needs to proceed from a basis of clearly targeted goals, with strong corporate procedures for managing risk and monitoring performance, and to demonstrate an ability to apply lessons learned and work closely with partners with expert knowledge of local Russian conditions.

The Committee notes that a more explicit framework for technical cooperation is being put in place as CIDA moves through the process of applying a more focussed and results-driven programming strategy for Russia. CIDA has recently finalized a country strategy document for Russia which acknowledges the first lesson that CIDA has learned about what makes for successful projects:

Project proposals must be developed through close collaboration between the Canadian and Russian partners. The relevant institutions in Russia must be fully committed to the project's goal and to its sustainability into the future. The Canadian partner must have established its capacity and credibility to work successfully in Russia.<sup>64</sup>

Within the strategy's guiding principles, projects must address one or more of the principal program objectives of promoting transition to a market-based economy, supporting democratic development, and increasing Canadian trade and investment.<sup>65</sup> Of particular interest to the Committee in the context of this report are the further "special considerations" that are then to be taken into account in making programming decisions. In addition to environmental, nuclear safety, and gender equity factors, CIDA has rightly identified "northern and aboriginal issues" as an important element of bilateral cooperation where Canadian strengths can develop niches of comparative advantage. A priority aim is also to strengthen the role of Russia's indigenous peoples in planning and managing development for their benefit. However, as part of a circumpolar foreign policy for Canada, we believe that development of Arctic and northern cooperation should become a central objective of CIDA's Russia program, rather than being included only as an added consideration.

In light of that, there are several priority sectors of bilateral activity that we see as deserving particular attention and as contributing to overall Canadian foreign policy interests in advancing the circumpolar cooperation goals that are the *raison d'être* of this report. As well, given the severity of Russia's economic crisis, which has dramatically affected northern and remote regions, along with the usual pressures for short-term

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<sup>64</sup> Canadian International Development Agency, Central and Eastern Europe Branch, *CIDA's Programming Strategy, for Russia*, Hull, Quebec, January 1997, Annex A "Program Delivery," p. 1.

<sup>65</sup> A detailed elaboration of assistance criteria is given in Annex A and an explanation of results sought in Annex B. For information on individual projects see CIDA, Former Soviet Union Division, Central and Eastern Europe Branch, *Canadian Cooperation with Russia*, "Project Listing as of 15 October 1996."

benefits to Canada, there is a danger that policymakers will shy away from the more challenging, problematic aspects of the northern dimension. Yet it is precisely because these problems are not easy to solve that the Committee is concerned to see the long-term Arctic environmental and sustainable human development elements of bilateral cooperation in a foremost place in intergovernmental calculations. These are among areas where the need for external public assistance is greatest, and accordingly where directed Canadian contributions can do the most good to benefit people at the grassroots community level in Russia.

In our discussions with Russian aboriginal representatives, it was evident that they look to Canada as a key ally in supporting the efforts of indigenous minority communities during the difficult transition process. (According to additional information received in February 1997, the Russian government is seeking international partners in establishing a new "International Development Fund to assist Indigenous Peoples of the Russian North.") The major Canadian technical assistance project in this area aims to address institution-building for these northern aboriginal peoples in order to strengthen their capacities to act on their own behalf both within Russia and internationally. The project, which began in the fall of 1996 and will continue over four years, is being managed for CIDA by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, working directly with its Russian counterpart organization on the Arctic Council, the AKMNSSDV, R.F. It is also collaborating with DIAND's Circumpolar Liaison Directorate and its Russian federal government counterpart GOSKOMSEVER to advance overall Russian policy towards northern development and indigenous peoples. In addition, given the importance of grassroots communication and participation in policy development, as stressed by many witnesses, the Committee hopes that this project, while understandably directed in its execution by aboriginal leaders at the national level working with federal officials in both countries, will make a concerted effort to reach down to the local community base so that its benefits can be spread widely within Russia's northern regions.

The Committee was also impressed by the accent put on these issues during our meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, whose Foundation is actively working on a number of promising joint projects with the University of Calgary. The former Soviet leader acknowledged that past northern development had left multiple ecological and human crises in its wake. Some areas near Murmansk have been so devastated that they look as if a nuclear explosion had taken place. Besides radioactive contamination (a major problem in far northeast regions as well), major damage has been inflicted by pipelines and mining developments. Disturbingly, these problems could intensify as some companies are now extracting rich profits from northern resources without helping native populations to deal with the social and local impacts of this activity. In Mr. Gorbachev's view, aboriginal peoples need an adequate land base that goes beyond any system of "reserves" which could become an "open prison." Consideration should be given to setting aside specially protected areas in which indigenous peoples can exercise control and co-management responsibilities. In this regard, he highlighted the importance of the Canadian-sponsored land-use mapping project, with which his foundation has been involved in cooperation



with the University of Calgary's Arctic Institute of North America, and which aims to establish a co-management regime for the impoverished Saami people of the Kola peninsula. Although Committee members were prevented by bad weather from meeting with Saami representatives in Murmansk, through contacts with Michael Robinson of the Calgary Institute we were able to gain a fuller appreciation of the merits of this project's approach. Reinforcing that, and observing the rather chaotic and unfinished state of land reform across Russia, social scientist Piers Vitebsky, of the Cambridge Polar Institute, underlined the value of assisting policy-oriented research on indigenous land ownership issues at the regional level. During discussions at Cambridge, visiting geosciences Professor Peter Williams, of Carleton University, also appealed to the contribution that knowledge developed in Canada (e.g. on soil remediation following pipeline breaks) could make to the rehabilitation of permafrost areas damaged through resource developments.

The Committee's discussions in Russia, including those with senior environment ministry officials, drew attention to the scope for cooperation in environmental protection and rehabilitation. Given the Russian government's chronic fiscal crisis, there was great interest in encouraging more Canadian involvement along with the already strong presence of the neighbouring Nordic countries, notably in northwestern Russia. Several major CIDA-supported projects are currently proceeding for strengthening Russian capacities in Arctic environmental monitoring (in the context of Russia's participation in the circumpolar Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program of the AEPS) and environmental impact assessment related to offshore hydrocarbon development. In such cases, as with the technical cooperation program generally, CIDA contracts out actual aid delivery to both public and private entities who must find appropriate Russian partners with which to work through the phases of project design and implementation. In the environmental initiatives cited above, the respective Canadian executing agencies are Toronto-based Bovar-Concord Environmental and Vancouver Island-based Axys Environmental Consulting Ltd. As part of the latter project, a Russian-Canadian Centre for Environmental Impact Assessment was opened in Moscow in June 1996. The Committee's discussions with Russian officials and CIDA staff based in Moscow indicated that, while problems have occasionally arisen in the course of such contracting-partnership relationships, so far these have been able to be smoothed over. The larger issue at stake is maintaining a strong joint commitment to environmental sustainability objectives. The Secretary General of Finland's Environment Ministry, Sirkka Hautajarvi, who subsequently met with Committee members in Helsinki, worried that the environment was not a high priority within the Russian government overall and was perhaps losing influence. She reported that it has been a difficult period in which to undertake joint projects because often the Russian partner agencies are themselves trying to cope with a very insecure, and budget-strapped, institutional environment. However, Russia's needs and interest in further cooperation are not in question. A multi-million dollar project currently in development could see a Canada-Russia Centre for Environmental Excellence established at a Moscow university in which Environment Canada would be working with experienced Canadian firms including Quebec-based SNC Lavalin. We have no doubt that enhancing Russia's capacity to manage its environmental problems, especially in the worst-affected Arctic

regions, must continue to be a principal thrust of Canadian circumpolar assistance activities.

Another area deserving of strong continued support involves knowledge-based transfers in areas of Canadian expertise, and commercially exportable success, at the interregional level. An excellent example is the Northern Management Program (NMP) being carried out by the Northwest Territories government and growing out of its close relations with the northeast Siberian republic of Sakha (Yakutia). The model village constructed by the firm of Ferguson, Simek, Clark, with whom the Committee met in Yellowknife, and an associated Arctic trades training program were among early spinoffs from this project, which continues to evolve. Alberta-based companies are also benefiting from opportunities being generated within the Siberian region to apply cold-weather construction technologies developed in Canada. At the same time, bright young people from Sakha are acquiring practical management skills and positive relationships are being formed with Canada which will be of long-term value in more than bureaucratic or commercial terms. What is noteworthy indeed is the emphasis put on direct northern-based contacts and developing the North's human-resource potential. The message to the Committee of NWT Deputy Minister Robert Doherty, Canadian supervisor for the NMP, is that its key elements include "transferring knowledge and assistance to the community level [which] empowers people to solve their problems." He added pointedly that "Far too much of our effort goes to working at senior levels of the Russian bureaucracy and mega-projects. The thousands of rural communities are important."<sup>66</sup>

Taking that theme further, the Scott Polar Research Institute at Cambridge University, which hosted Committee members and staff on several occasions, has been in the forefront of developing some extremely interesting technical training projects, also in the Sakha republic. It applies its expertise in methodologies of sustainable economic recovery for remote Arctic indigenous communities, to which we referred in Chapters Six and Seven. According to Piers Vitebsky, head of the Institute's Russian program, the "main resource is not money but skilled people," though of course some funding is required to train people at the local level through circumpolar human-resource development initiatives.<sup>67</sup> For its part, the Institute has been building long-term relationships with local Sakha institutions and also working closely with the University of Alaska to utilize its knowledge of the Alaskan native experience in managing development for northern benefit. The Institute's ongoing project for rural economic development — and specifically reindeer meat marketing (although Sakha has 300,000 reindeer most of the population has been dependent on expensive imported meat products) — has obtained some funding through U.S. AID and been cited as one of its most successful projects in

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<sup>66</sup> Robert Doherty, personal memorandum of 25 October 1996. A very brief profile is contained in CIDA's project overview document *Canadian Cooperation with Russia*, p. 32. For the details of the NWT's involvement with the Sakha republic, refer back to Doherty, "Social Economic and Technical Links Between Northern Regions of Canada and Russia," (1996).

<sup>67</sup> Piers Vitebsky, meeting with Committee research director Gerald Schmitz, Cambridge University, 15 February 1997.



Russia. The Institute is also looking to generate interest from international partners in the areas of oil and gas capital markets training (despite Sakha's large undeveloped oil reserves it remains entirely dependent on imported fuels) and in projects aimed at improving environmental quality in a region. Although Russia's far northeast has some of the world's most pristine natural areas and largest supplies of renewable and non-renewable resources, it was among the hardest hit by the effects of Soviet-era military-industrial activities, including atmospheric nuclear fallout from the high Arctic Novaya Zemlya testing site.<sup>68</sup> The sectors mentioned above should clearly be of Canadian interest; we would therefore encourage the Government to explore the potential within them for bilateral cooperation, drawing upon comparative circumpolar project experience.

Mention must also be made of the very significant Arctic ice project which the Committee had the opportunity to visit at the Arctic and Antarctic Institute in St. Petersburg — symbolically, in the very building where, seven years earlier in November 1989, Prime Minister Mulroney had first spoken internationally of Canada's proposal for an Arctic Council to promote circumpolar cooperation. Bringing together several priority themes of environmentally sustainable Arctic resource development, and knowledge transfers with the prospect of commercial spinoffs benefiting both countries, the Intaris (Integrated Arctic Resources Information System) Project is one of the most promising examples of a forward-looking public and private sector collaboration through a CIDA-supported bilateral joint venture partnership. Developed over several years and begun in 1995, this project is being implemented by a subsidiary company (Intaari) created by the Russian Institute working with a technical services subsidiary (Enfotec) established by the Canarctic Shipping Co. in 1996 to market its expertise gained in the Canadian Arctic. As explained to the Committee by Russian director Alexander Tchernychov (himself a distinguished veteran of Russian polar science expeditions), and Canadian counterparts Martin Luce and Brian Eddy, the objectives are to provide a range of information and environmental data to support Russian offshore petroleum resources development, as well as to generate further commercial applications from associated technologies.<sup>69</sup>

Among this project's practical strengths are its utilization of advances in Canadian-based technologies and employment and training of Russian researchers at a time when the state institutions increasingly need to innovate and to find enterprising outside partners. Intaris will also contribute to creating a central digitalized database on Arctic ice and climatological and other environmental conditions. Eventually the goal is to be able to provide on-line customized information services on a commercial basis to

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<sup>68</sup> Information provided by Piers Vitebsky. According to the project documentation: "Local NGOs and small business are making an effort to address these environmental problems, but need assistance and training in creating a system to assess environmental quality. Local NGO leaders are non-scientists and are novice politicians who are trying to coordinate their desires of maintaining environmental quality with the political and economic framework [of a transitional economy]."

<sup>69</sup> Presentation of 7 November 1996, St. Petersburg, Russia. The Committee was also provided with a detailed prospectus of the project's scope and planned stages of development.

clients — e.g. monitoring the effects of ice conditions for polar navigation or offshore exploration. While the partners' analysis of market demand is positive, and they are actively pursuing business interests within Russia and internationally, further Canadian subsidization of the substantial front-end development costs of such a system remains necessary to reach the stage where payback from commercial applications will become feasible. Such projects, understanding that a long-term commitment by all parties is required to achieve their objectives, offer useful lessons for future Canada-Russia joint ventures. Moreover, as they become more developed, they are also of more than just bilateral interest. Intaris is an excellent illustration since it was described to us as an "open architecture concept" that could attract other international (e.g. Nordic) partners, and indeed be a prototype for creating economic spinoffs from collaborative circumpolar research and development activities. Moreover, the knowledge gained could complement Canadian efforts within international maritime bodies to harmonize standards for ice navigation and minimize environmental risks from an expansion of commercial shipping and development activity in polar regions.<sup>70</sup> Given the troubling historical record in the Canadian as well as the Russian Arctic, the Committee is particularly concerned that all Canadian technical cooperation, especially that supporting needed economic development, adhere strictly to sustainability principles with respect to both environmental and human impacts that were emphasized in Part II of this report.

A final area we wish to raise briefly is that of financial resources for small-scale enterprises and community-based development; these are critical for Russian economic reform and recovery generally, and have a particular importance for remote and hard-pressed northern regions. We note that CIDA's contribution to the innovative Russia Small Business Fund (a cumulative \$10 million since the Fund, totalling US\$300 million, was first established at the 1993 G-7 Summit) is the largest single item in the Canadian technical cooperation program. This Fund is managed by the EBRD and disbursed through local Russian banks, which also benefit through technical assistance partnerships. In full implementation since 1995, the Fund includes a growing micro-credit — with loans as small as US\$100 — and small loans facility, along with a small enterprise equity fund component. Disbursements are now growing rapidly (posting a 600% increase in 1996), while maintaining an impressive repayment performance (arrears below 3% on the micro-credit component). According to Elizabeth Wallace, the EBRD's principal banker for the project, "demand has increased so dramatically that it has

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<sup>70</sup> These issues have taken on added importance in the light of the opening of the Nordic-Russian "northern sea route" across the Arctic ocean to commercial foreign traffic in 1992, and huge offshore oil and gas ventures such as Exxon's proposed Sakhalin island project (in which Enfotec is bidding for services contracts). In regard to increased shipping prospects, views are clearly divided. As one commentary on Siberian development put it: "Market pressures and the demands of the Russian economy may eventually make the [polar sea] route financially viable. That is a moment many environmentalists dread. Tankers are likely to be the chief users of the route, and oil spills could do unimaginable harm to arctic ecosystems." ("The Tortured Land," *Time Magazine*, 4 September 1995, p. 44.)



become one of the most attractive initiatives that we have.”<sup>71</sup> The objective is to continue expansion to reach a level of US\$50 million in credit being made available every month. So far, however, little of this activity has extended into the more remote or rural northern regions, where needs for local access to small amounts of capital are great.<sup>72</sup> The Committee’s concern, therefore, is that the Russian Arctic, and notably indigenous communities, benefit as much as possible from small-business loan initiatives to which Canada is contributing.

Recalling Oran Young’s suggestion, referred to in Chapter Six, for circumpolar countries to consider creating an Arctic development bank to assist sustainable community development, it is obvious that northern Russia would be the primary beneficiary of such an initiative. In our view, it may be more practical at present for Canada to see how existing international financial instruments as described above can be utilized more to help regions and sectors as yet little served by private capital markets. In this regard, the EBRD’s regional venture funds for Russia should also be explored. Financed through voluntary bilateral contributions from Bank members (G-7 and European Union donor states), these funds consider equity investments in private-sector enterprises. Of eleven established to date, at least three are in the Russian North: the North-West Russia Regional Venture Fund (sponsored by Finland); the Daiwa Far East and Eastern Siberia Investment Fund (Japan); and the Foreign & Colonial West Siberia Venture Fund (UK).<sup>73</sup> While Canada has yet to become involved in this initiative, it may be an opportune time to consider some options. Such a hybrid bilateral/multilateral instrument could be employed to focus, for example, on the far northeast Russian region, the Sakha republic, where close working relationships already exist with Canadian territorial governments, northern-based firms and aboriginal organizations and regional corporations.

In sum, the Committee hopes that the Canadian Government and agencies like CIDA will be proactive and imaginative in using available bilateral means to meet Arctic sustainable development needs as a priority of Canada-Russia technical assistance programs. At the same time, in doing so, Canada should be prudent and strategic in seeking Russian partners, and should emphasize that its commitment is to building up sustainable long-term cooperative relationships.

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<sup>71</sup> Meeting with Gerald Schmitz at the headquarters of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London, England, 17 February 1997.

<sup>72</sup> Loan disbursements surpassed US\$8 million per month for the first time in December 1996, and this is expected to rise to \$20-25 million per month by the end of 1997. For a detailed analysis overall and by region cf. *Russia Small Business Fund Quarterly Operation Report*, EBRD, London, January 1997.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. the latest version of the EBRD publication, *Alternative Sources of Finance for Small and Medium-sized Projects in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, “Sources by country: Russian Federation.” (This is one of a number of EBRD documents that can now be accessed on the Internet at the EBRD Web site: <http://www.ebrd.com>.)

In light of such considerations:

#### **Recommendation 48**

**The Committee recommends that the shared circumpolar aims of preserving the Arctic environment and supporting sustainable human development for northern indigenous communities be made one of the principal objectives of Canada-Russia technical cooperation as carried out through CIDA's Country Programming Strategy, not added only as a "special consideration." Within such a bilateral assistance context, particular attention should be paid to the following:**

- **setting clear, realistic and results-oriented goals that focus on areas in which comparative Canadian strengths (e.g. cold-climate research and applied environmental technologies, aboriginal institution-building) have been identified;**
- **putting in place feedback/evaluation mechanisms whereby Parliament will be able to assess the degree to which targets are being met and learning improvements are taking place;**
- **involving Canadian aboriginal and nongovernmental organizations, territorial and provincial governments, private firms, and knowledge institutions which have developed expertise on, or have practical working experience of, the Russian Arctic in the ongoing design of the technical cooperation program, as well as in the delivery of its specific project components;**
- **ensuring that Canadian partner organizations are prepared to undertake a long-term commitment, and that the Russian partner organizations have the credibility to be able to sustain the cooperation activity in question;**
- **taking into account what has been learned in other countries about assistance activities in the Russian Arctic (e.g. Nordic and Alaskan experience and that of the Cambridge University Scott Polar Research Institute);**
- **utilizing bilateral contributions to the small-enterprise financing and investment facilities developed for Russia through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.**



## CHAPTER 10 — TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE MULTILATERAL COOPERATION REGIME FOR CIRCUMPOLAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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In this brief, final chapter, the Committee returns to several related underlying themes raised in the first chapter and running through the report. The first is that of the increasing importance of international Arctic cooperation across a broad spectrum of issues, with implications at all levels from the local to the global, and requiring concerted joint actions from Arctic countries in particular. The second is the development of a variety of organizational entities and policy instruments in order to do justice to the complexity and diversity of this agenda, accompanied by the growing demands of Arctic peoples and other actors for inclusion in international policy processes that can bring concrete benefits to the region. Whether the locus of activity is the domestic formulation of a Canadian circumpolar foreign policy, the conduct of bilateral northern cooperation with specific Arctic states, Canadian involvement in specialized Arctic initiatives, or Canada's future role within the Arctic Council as the primary institution of circumpolar internationalism, there needs to be some coherent overall framework that can help to coordinate these multiple channels and provide appropriate direction. It is not enough, in short, to add activities; the issue is how to collaborate effectively in order to realize the common aims of environmentally sustainable human development to which repeated reference has been made in the meetings and documents cited to this point.

Broad political declarations among Arctic states, that of 19 September 1996 being the most recent and important, are, while necessary, only a prelude to the long-term work that still lies ahead on comprehensive multi-level strategies for the implementation of circumpolar cooperation objectives. The Committee indicated in Recommendation 10 in Chapter Three that we believe this must be one of the explicit functions of the Arctic Council itself. However, we are under no illusions that this will be an easy task. Our discussions, especially with Nordic-country partners, were also a reminder that Canada must proceed carefully at each stage to build like-minded alliances with other circumpolar countries. The opportunity to chair an Arctic Council affords another means for such creative diplomacy; it does not automatically create a solution. The circumpolar level of international relations cannot proceed separately or alone, but must be able to connect both upwards to wider transnational and global processes, and downwards to subsidiary regional, national and subnational processes.

It is useful to recall the qualifications expressed in a Norwegian commentary on the original (and more ambitious) Arctic Council Panel proposals: "even when a regional problem proves difficult to handle on a bilateral basis it will not necessarily become more manageable if submitted to a body of full circumpolar participation." The commentary added that cooperation at this level should not be promoted "in competition with, or to the

displacement of,” other already working arrangements. Moreover, some issues may not be good candidates for Council determination since they are “functionally linked to important non-arctic contexts.”<sup>74</sup> Canada would be well advised to take into account the sophisticated work that has been done in the intervening years by the Nordic countries in particular to identify and connect all of the different elements within an evolving Arctic cooperation regime. The Committee was reminded of that contribution in meetings at the Nordic Council of Ministers secretariat in Copenhagen. A major report to the Council on Arctic cooperation, which was prepared following the first (1993) conference of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, had observed that from a Nordic perspective:

The current political and administrative structure in the Arctic region means that it will be complicated and time-consuming to include all of the countries and regions of the Arctic regions in any comprehensive cooperation structure. There is much to suggest that any such cooperation process must initially be based on cooperation structures which have already been established in the Nordic parts of the region and in the Barents region, and developed in the concrete policy areas which are already included in the extensive network of agreements concluded for the Arctic region.<sup>75</sup>

At the same time, this Nordic report was very favourable to the longer term linkage of Euro-Arctic initiatives to a broader circumpolar “solution in line with the existing Canadian proposal for an international “Arctic Council,” which can serve as a supplement to the existing sectoral, bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements which are currently being implemented in the region.”<sup>76</sup> The “Programme on Cooperation” subsequently adopted by Nordic Council ministers in early 1996 strongly endorsed the final push towards successful establishment of the Arctic Council as a means to that end.<sup>77</sup>

The role of supporting rather than replacing functional cooperation and advocacy mechanisms, by enabling more political collaboration on concerns shared across the entire Arctic region, goes in fact to the very heart of the Council’s *raison d’être*. As Ambassador Simon has rightly reflected on these explicitly international relations dimensions:

The Arctic Council will for the first time bring senior ministers of all eight Arctic countries and Indigenous Peoples’ representatives together on a regular basis to discuss specifically Arctic issues. The importance of this should not be underestimated. By

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<sup>74</sup> John Skogan, “International Arctic Cooperation: Scope and Limitations,” *Northern Perspectives*, Summer 1991, p. 19.

<sup>75</sup> *Cooperation in the Arctic Region*, Report Submitted to the Nordic Council of Ministers, Stockholm, 1995, p. 73. See also Appendix II which explains the acronyms to an “alphabet soup” of over 90 organizational and program entities referred to in the report, and Appendix III, “Matrix Survey of Institutions and Cooperation Bodies.”

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>77</sup> *Programme on Cooperation in the Arctic Region Adopted by the Nordic Council of Ministers (Cooperation Ministers)*, Copenhagen, February 1996.



means of this function, the Council will act as a means of getting the Arctic governments to focus on their own priorities for the region, and to discuss those with one another, with a view to identifying common objectives and drafting joint plans. This political role for the Council has the potential to help Arctic states arrive at longer-range planning for regional cooperation, a critical requirement for dealing with such threats as the long-range transport of contaminants, or sensitive proposals such as opening up the Northeast Passage to maritime shipping.

At another level still, the Council could, in time, have a role in conveying Arctic regional concerns to global bodies such as the United Nations, where it is felt that the regional interests are being infringed by activities elsewhere. It could bring its collective weight to bear in countering the anti-fur lobby in Europe. Or, the Council could have a part to play in initiatives to devise global standards, such as through agreements as the *Rio Declaration*, Agenda 21 or the Convention on Biological Diversity.<sup>78</sup>

In terms of issues such as the sustainable utilization of Arctic natural resources and the effects of long-range pollutants on health, indigenous peoples' organizations in the Council can be expected to be in the forefront, also working within broader alliances such as the Ottawa-based World Council on Indigenous Peoples, to convey Arctic concerns to a world public. Also at the level of global policy influence, Oran Young has argued that international environmental NGOs with growing Arctic interests, several of which appeared before the Committee, "may also be harnessed under some circumstances to raise the consciousness of southerners regarding the destructive consequences of their actions on Arctic systems." While that wider realm of interaction should not be allowed to detract from the immediate imperative of making the Arctic Council operational, creating any new organization "that diverts attention from these global connections is likely to be understood within a short time as little more than a Pyrrhic victory."<sup>79</sup> In short, it is essential to prevent the Arctic from becoming a policy "ghetto" that engages the attention of only a small constituency and a few specialists on the region. A crucial role for a circumpolar political organization will be to raise consciousness and pursue issues within the United Nations and other major international forums, including the "G7/P8" summit process (notably, for example, around Arctic nuclear safety concerns).

Combined with indigenous rights, environmental protection and human security goals, there are also very important questions of economic cooperation and development linking the global and regional levels. For example, as Oran Young points out: "the fact that Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States are dependent on outside sources of investment capital, including the World Bank, provides an opportunity to work toward a greater concern for environmental and socio-economic impacts in the Arctic as part of the process of reaching decisions about loans and other

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<sup>78</sup> Mary Simon, "Building Partnerships" (1996), p. 6-7.

<sup>79</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 34.

forms of financial support.”<sup>80</sup> More generally, Finland’s statement at the inauguration of the Arctic Council affirmed that: “Cooperation with International Financing Institutions, such as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Nordic Investment Bank, is important for the implementation of environmental, industrial and transportation projects in the region.”<sup>81</sup> In the previous chapter, we specifically addressed the role of the EBRD in supporting small business and sustainable community-level development within Russia. Clearly, it is that country that has the most to gain from a coordination of technical cooperation efforts. Commenting on the problem of limited financial resources for achieving multilateral purposes, Russia’s foreign minister drew a further pertinent lesson in his statement to the Barents Council meeting<sup>82</sup> that took place while the Committee was in Russia:

We are aware that in addition to our council other organizations have also taken an active stand in the North Arctic Region, among them the CBSS [Council of Baltic Sea States], the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Arctic Council, etc. With a view to avoiding possible duplication and scattering of funds we should take stock of the ongoing projects in the region to find out where they overlap and where they complement each other.<sup>83</sup>

In welcoming the establishment of the Arctic Council, the Joint Statement of the Barents conference also specifically recommended “cooperation and coordination of work in relevant areas, especially in the field of the environment, as identified by the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS).”<sup>84</sup>

With regard to linking the circumpolar and Euro-Arctic levels of multilateral cooperation, the Finnish statement at the signing of the *Arctic Council Declaration* again usefully pointed in the direction of a functional and flexible complementarity:

The two cooperation arrangements, the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, could be regarded as partly overlapping. However, the roles of the two bodies

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<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> “Statement by Mr. Pekka Haavisto, Minister of the Environment of Finland, at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Arctic Council in Ottawa on 19 September 1996, p. 3. Similar points on the salience of transnational institutions to regional development and environmental security were also stressed by the delegation accompanying the Speaker of the Finnish Parliament in an unrecorded briefing session with the Committee just prior to its travel to northern Europe (No. 48, 29 October 1996), and during the Committee’s meetings in Helsinki.

<sup>82</sup> For a description of the Council refer back to Box 3 in Chapter Three. In addition to the Nordic and Russian state members, the representative of the European Commission, and Barents regional council, Nordic Council of Ministers and regional indigenous peoples representatives, this ministerial conference of 5-6 November 1996 was attended by observers from Canada, the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Poland.

<sup>83</sup> Minister of Foreign Affairs Primakov, “Statement by the Chairman of the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region at the Fourth Session,” 6 November, 1996, Petrozavodsk, Russia, p. 4-5.

<sup>84</sup> Joint Statement of the Fourth Session of the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, 5-6 November 1996 (Petrozavodsk),” p. 2. Committee members were briefed on the results of the meeting on 7 November in St. Petersburg by Canada’s Consul General Ann Collins, who also referred to efforts within the region to create a Northwest Parliamentary Association.



can be coordinated: global arctic problems can only be addressed and solved by the Arctic community as a whole, whereas issues of regional significance in northern Europe can be tackled by the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. The linkage between these bodies will guarantee that we will draw on the experience gained by all.

The Arctic Council will be a new forum for regional cooperation in the space of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Regionalism plays an increasingly critical role in the management of change and in creating security in the broad sense. It is noticeable that the regional cooperation in the North has already brought about a great deal of knowledge and experience.

The Council of these eight governments will constitute yet another channel for political management and practical coordination in the dynamic scene for transnational and subregional initiatives and institutions existing in the Arctic region. By creating a common institution, we shall strengthen our common identity as countries and societies sharing the same attribute of being northerners.<sup>85</sup>

Obviously, the European members of the Arctic Council will take the lead in developing the Euro-Arctic contribution to this encompassing circumpolar multilateralism. With three of the five Nordic countries (Denmark/Greenland, Sweden, Finland) being members of the European Union as of January 1995, the scope and progress of European integration is also an increasingly important factor to be considered in assessing the future of institutional mechanisms for Arctic-region political cooperation. Not only do EU regional and foreign policies now include an Arctic component,<sup>86</sup> but the Nordic states are in some sense becoming a crossroads for that pan-Arctic cooperation. As a recent research study puts it: "Within the broader framework of European integration the Nordic countries are in a position where they may have the chance to assume the role of bridge-builder 'across the borders of the EC, to eastern and western neighbours in the Arctic region'. . . . In this way the Nordic countries could contribute to the development of small communities and nations in the Arctic region. . . . Of all the various challenges, the one presented by Russia is perhaps the most important."<sup>87</sup> The Nordic Council report cited earlier is still more explicit in arguing the salience of these linkage and policy implications for strengthening the North American as well as Russian dimensions of circumpolar cooperation.

The [Nordic] governments should consider the opportunities arising from the fact that three Nordic countries are now members of the EU. Inevitably, the EU will exert an influence, e.g. on environmental policy, regional policy, transport policy and certain areas of policy on resources. Further, all of the Nordic countries should give serious

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<sup>85</sup> Statement of Minister of the Environment Pekka Haavisto, Ottawa, 19 September 1996, p. 3-4.

<sup>86</sup> For example, under "Objective Six" of the regional policy directed by the Brussels Commission of the European Communities which applies to remote regions in Sweden and Finland. In terms of EU foreign policy, there are several programs under which northern regions of Russia can benefit, notably that of Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS).

<sup>87</sup> Lassi Heininen, Olli-Pekka Jalonon, and Jyrki Kakonen, *Expanding the Northern Dimension*, University of Tampere, Tampere Peace Research Institute Research Report No. 61, Tampere, Finland, 1995, p. 75.

consideration to the development of the Arctic links with Russia, the northern part of the USA and Canada. It will be especially important to establish links to the North American Arctic interests.

With regard to this issue, it is important to bear in mind that the Nordic Greenland forms — in geographical terms — part of the American continent and has to address a number of problems more closely related to the problems faced by Canada and Alaska than, for example, the Barents region. Greenland and Denmark assume a major role as the bridge linking the Euro-Asian areas and the Greenlandic/North American areas.<sup>88</sup>

While the Nordic countries appear to be doing their homework, if several of our witnesses are correct, Canadian policy on Arctic geopolitics and economics has some catching up to do. Inuit business representatives who appeared before us were keenly looking to explore opportunities internationally, yet felt they were still doing so in the absence of any coherent Canadian strategy for circumpolar trade or sustainable economic development. The role of organizations representing Arctic peoples, especially the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (see note 336) has been exemplary in putting a wide range of such issues on the international Arctic agenda. But it is national governments that must formulate public policy responses in the light of the emerging globalization and regional integration, and under the sometimes complicating conditions of binding regimes such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Community single market. In assessing future directions for the Arctic Council, Robert Huebert suggests that Canada has some hard thinking to do, including about how to work out a multilateral approach that draws in our closest American circumpolar neighbour.

In the debates regarding the Arctic Council, no consideration has been given to important developments in the international economic system. Seven out of eight state members of the Council are members of NAFTA or the EU. Will this affect large scale economic activity in the North? If so how? Will these agreements limit the Arctic Council's ability to promote northern development in a sustainable manner?

These are all important issues and the ability of the Arctic Council to respond to each will determine its ultimate success or failure. If it is unable to keep American support and/or if it is unable to transform its focus from environmental to economic — then the Council will have little long-term significance. On the other hand, if it is successful in creating a regime that keeps the Americans interested; if it is able to act as a coordinating body to encourage sustainable development — then it could be a tremendous success.<sup>89</sup>

We would hope that to help keep up the political pressure, the Government would support increased interparliamentary contacts as well as contacts between indigenous peoples. In

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<sup>88</sup> *Cooperation in the Arctic Region*, 1995, p. 72. We would also note, in terms of indigenous peoples' participation in fostering circumpolar internationalism, the major bridging role of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, and the close links which Canadian Inuit have developed with Inuit in Greenland, Alaska and northeastern Russia.

<sup>89</sup> Robert Huebert, "The Arctic Council: Global and Domestic Governance" (1996), p. 21.



addition to the stronger Canadian contribution to the ongoing work of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, which we recommended in Chapter Seven and which has depended on Nordic Council backing, we would encourage circumpolar cooperation issues to be raised regularly within both the Canada-U.S. and Canada-Europe Parliamentary Associations.

Finally, below the national level, there is great scope, as we have already seen, for governmental and nongovernmental initiatives on a circumpolar basis; this could involve regions, provinces and territories (e.g. through the Northern Forum — refer to Box 3), municipalities (e.g. through the Winter Cities Committee), joint ventures and private-sector enterprises, universities and other knowledge-based institutions. As was argued in Chapter Three invoking the “European” principle of subsidiarity, it would be completely counterproductive for some larger organization to move in as if it could “take over” any of these activities. At the same time, especially in regard to the potential transboundary effects from the growing number of Arctic resource management issues (for example, oil prospects versus caribou habitat in the Beaufort sea region), and the variety of institutional arrangements being developed to accommodate diverse stakeholder interests in many parts of the circumpolar North, Oran Young points to “the need to avoid a situation in which subregional and regionwide initiatives evolve along unrelated but potentially conflicting tracks.” He believes that an appropriately constructive role for the Arctic Council would be to “lend support to those subregional initiatives by facilitating communication among those working on such arrangements in different parts of the region, enhancing the legitimacy of specific arrangements as elements in a broader system of Arctic governance, and providing financial support in cases where the availability of material resources is a limiting factor.”<sup>90</sup>

In determining the roles of the distinctive organizational actors within an effective multilateral system for circumpolar cooperation, the Committee received some excellent advice from one of its last witnesses, former Alaskan Governor and current Northern Forum executive director Stephen Cowper. He related an experience following an address he gave in March 1996 at the Nunavut Trade Show; a number of participants asked whether the Northern Forum and the then still to be established Arctic Council would not duplicate functions. “The idea seemed to be that once the ‘big boys’ from the national governments took over, the Northern Forum would vanish from the scene.” Cowper’s detailed response is instructive and completely apt:

I told the people of Iqaluit that I thought the Arctic Council and the Northern Forum served very different, but potentially complementary, purposes. While the Arctic Council’s agenda is not yet clear, it does not seem likely that it will ever be involved in (for instance) introducing roadbed technology developed in Yukon to Yamalo-Nenets

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<sup>90</sup> Oran Young, *The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations* (1996), p. 31.

in the Russian North. Nor does it seem plausible for the Northern Forum to discuss, say, global Arctic environmental policy. The Governors who serve on our Board of Directors have neither the time nor the resources to pursue such visionary agendas. They are looking for more mundane things: solving persistent social problems like alcoholism, importing waste water treatment technology appropriate for small communities, finding reliable small generator sets, getting good training for commuter airline pilots, learning better reindeer management, and comparing inspection regimes designed to avoid oil spills.

The members of the Northern Forum believe the Arctic Council is vitally necessary. There is a need for a permanent organization through which Arctic nations can discuss the larger issues of the day, including how to control pollution which seeps across national boundaries, how to protect wildlife migrating from one nation to another, and how to resolve the various sovereignty claims of the indigenous groups throughout the Arctic. These important discussions can lead to a consensus from which binding treaties or other agreements may be negotiated by the participating nations.<sup>91</sup>

In sum, there is a place for both larger and smaller actors in the ongoing development and implementation of circumpolar cooperation policies. Achievement of success does not presuppose uniformity or even convergence, but it can only be helped by the pursuit of greater multilateral harmony, now that this has finally become possible as Cold War legacies are left behind. Among the watchwords should be: coordination, consensus-building, complementarity, and subsidiarity. The need for an Arctic Council has already been affirmed. What have yet to be determined are the next steps; however, we believe that the foregoing provides sufficient clues at least to begin the process of effecting multilateral collaboration on a circumpolar basis. Canada, perhaps more than any other country, has much at stake. It is time, therefore, for the Canadian interest in this work in progress to declare itself through the full engagement of a circumpolar foreign policy that is designed to meet not only the complex realities of the present but also the challenges of a fast approaching new century.

In light of the above considerations:

#### **Recommendation 49**

**The Committee recommends that the Government take advantage of the period of Canada's current chairmanship of the Arctic Council to work on the unfinished elements in building a stronger multilateral system for promoting circumpolar cooperation. In particular priority attention should be given to the following:**

- **pursuing global connections to Arctic concerns through other international forums, notably the United Nations, and around**

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<sup>91</sup> Written statement of testimony from Anchorage, Alaska, 3 December 1996, p. 3-4.



**international economic as well as environmental and indigenous rights issues;**

- **utilizing whatever intergovernmental channels — notably the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region and the Northern Forum — as well nongovernmental (especially aboriginal) and interparliamentary channels that are available, with the deliberate purpose of fostering bridge-building and common understandings among Nordic, Russian and North American perspectives;**
- **undertaking an in-depth study of the ramifications of regional integration regimes in Europe and North America (i.e. EU and NAFTA regulations and processes) for the implementation of the Arctic Council's sustainable development mandate;**
- **providing the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador and the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade with sufficient resources to coordinate the execution of the above tasks.**





# **PART IV**

## **CONCLUSION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: CIRCUMPOLAR COOPERATION AS A CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY VOCATION**





# CONCLUSION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: CIRCUMPOLAR COOPERATION AS A CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY VOCATION

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The experience of the Arctic regions is becoming more and more relevant to our international interests. . . . They have a very major bearing on our future, out of proportion to the number of people living there.

Maurice Strong [65:10]

Few Canadians are in a better position to assess the global significance of Canada's interests in Arctic cooperation than Maurice Strong, who has had a distinguished career of domestic and international public service following early years spent in the Canadian Arctic. During a meeting with the Committee as we were completing this study in February 1997, the Co-Chair of the 1992 "Earth Summit," currently advisor on reform to both the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the World Bank, observed that the Arctic represents "one of the most important pieces of the ecological structure of our world community." Canada, he affirmed, is "an Arctic power, and the experience we have had in developing and protecting our Arctic regions is a very major part of the Canadian knowledge base" [65:10]. Reinforcing an underlying message in much of the testimony we received, the Committee's Report shares the conviction that Canada has an opportunity to manage its unique Arctic assets wisely in ways that connect our own benefit with that of the wider world.

International interest in the Canadian Arctic — notably including by this century's great powers, Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R./Russia — has evolved through many stages from the earliest fascination with polar exploration to today's forward-looking debates over circumpolar sustainable development. At times it seems that foreigners have appreciated what is special about our Arctic more than many southern Canadians. Despite Canada's image as a northern country, we have been slow to develop a consciousness of ourselves as a polar-rim nation belonging to an international circumpolar region. The growing political self-confidence of Canadians living in the Arctic, and especially of indigenous peoples' organizations, has accelerated that process. In recent years, as well, the demise of Cold War rivalries has opened up unprecedented avenues for collaborative pan-Arctic endeavours. Yet, as Laval University's Paul Painchaud reminded the Committee, Canada has still to develop a circumpolar foreign policy orientation that is commensurate with such expanding challenges and opportunities.

Redressing this situation is, above all, the task that our Report refers to the Government of Canada. Not only does the Government retain particular responsibilities for northern

affairs, especially in the regions north of 60°, but, more important, the Arctic is increasingly significant to the long-term interests of **all** Canadians — economic, political, social, and environmental. There is a leading role to be played by Canada in forging closer ties with other Arctic states with similar interests, and in working collaboratively to develop better international regimes for preserving the Arctic's unique ecosystems and securing rights to sustainable human development under pressures of rapid change. At the same time, it is clear that the ad hoc, scattered or isolated federal approaches that have too often characterized Ottawa's past involvement in circumpolar affairs cannot do the job. The Government must not only coordinate its own actions in the Arctic, giving them overall strategic rationale and coherence, it must learn to work collaboratively with a number of key domestic and international partners, without whose participation the goals just cited are not achievable. In addition to engaging the Canadian interest as a whole, the development of an effective circumpolar foreign policy must enlist the creative energies of Arctic residents and aboriginal peoples, nongovernmental organizations, other levels of government within Canada and governments in other countries with Arctic concerns.

Accordingly, the First Part of the Committee's Report has addressed the building of circumpolar policy and institutional frameworks, both in the domestic and international arenas, that will be capable of supporting such Canadian foreign policy development. Projecting a vigorous presence internationally will first require Canada to get its own act together. As part of putting in place a Canadian Circumpolar Cooperation Framework, our recommendations call for governmental concertation combined with a participatory public process in order to set out key priorities for an Arctic Region 2000 Strategy integrating foreign policy aims and objectives. To carry out such a strategy requires strengthening the instruments of coordination and implementation. In particular, we argue that the recently created Office of Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade should be supported by an associated Division for Circumpolar Affairs, thereby giving a better-equipped and consolidated thrust to Canada's international Arctic activities. Given the importance of ensuring regular northern input into circumpolar foreign policy development, the outreach functions of the Ambassador's office should also be emphasized, and several liaison offices established in locations across the Arctic to facilitate more ongoing interaction and feedback.

At the international level, the immediate task is to secure an adequate institutional foundation for pursuing a broad agenda of circumpolar cooperation. With Cold War antagonisms no longer an obstacle, transnational initiatives and organizations have multiplied in the 1990s, some among indigenous peoples, some purely nongovernmental, others established on a subnational or subregional basis. But, apart from the limited arrangements introduced through the Nordic-led Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, lacking until 1996 was a high-level political cooperation organization linking the national governments of the eight Arctic countries and with a mandate to coordinate their



collective action on common problems. That was formally redressed by the inauguration last September in Ottawa of the Arctic Council, largely the result of Canada's instigation in the late 1980s and renewed persistent effort since 1995. Canada, furthermore, assumed the position of Council Chair and host of its secretariat for the first two formative years. Also, the inclusion of three prominent indigenous peoples' organizations as founding "permanent participants" in the Council indicates unusual promise for innovative partnerships between governments and the Arctic's traditional inhabitants.

Notwithstanding such progress, a number of critical questions remain — including the scope for additional aboriginal and other forms of democratic representation — if the Council is to be able to operate successfully as the overarching organizational vehicle for promoting circumpolar cooperation. As yet, much of the content is simply carried over from the pre-existing and still separate AEPS process. In terms of a comprehensive sustainable development initiative, there are large expectations but little in the way of concrete commitments. The Report therefore confronts the full range of unfinished business raised by Canada's role in entrenching circumpolar internationalism through the Council — from the breadth of its mandate to the adequacy of its funding and political support. The Report's recommendations are designed to ensure that the Arctic Council does not become just another Arctic body going through the motions, but proceeds quickly to demonstrate real benefits in important areas of policy interest.

Having dealt with these basic framework considerations, the Second Part of the Report delves into the common agenda of circumpolar cooperation, suggesting ways for Canada to contribute to advancing mutual interests in priority areas. Fortunately, the historical transition from the sovereignty and military security preoccupations of the Arctic powers during past decades, to their emerging focus on environmental matters and human-centred sustainable development has paved the way for new thinking and policy options. This transformed context extends notably to the security field itself, now redefined to encompass the security of Arctic peoples rather than just state boundaries; seeking as well to reduce threats to the Arctic environment from military activities, which still need to be taken into account. While maintaining Canada's sovereign rights within its own area of Arctic jurisdiction, the Report stresses progress towards long-term cooperative security and demilitarization of the circumpolar region. Specific attention is directed to the integration of Russia into such a system. For the explicit purposes of environmental security, the Report recommends that Canada join with the Nordic countries and the United States to further environmental, especially nuclear, safety cooperation initiatives for addressing the serious situation in northern Russia.

The centrepiece of circumpolar cooperation is the larger complex issue of sustainable development, the subject of the Report's middle chapters. We begin with the crucial challenges of environmental sustainability, and the immediate task of fulfilling the commitments already undertaken by Arctic governments through the AEPS process.

Beyond that there is much more to be accomplished in terms of: applying obligations under international agreements to the Arctic (including Agenda 21 and the Law of the Sea); developing common standards for assessment of environmental impacts; taking collective action on such issues as climate change, biodiversity, contaminants and long-range pollutants, and other dangers to public health. With respect to utilizing the indigenous knowledge of northerners in support of these efforts, the report endorses the approach to northern environmental stewardship recommended by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.

Protecting the Arctic environment is only the first step. The Report emphasizes the need for a people-centred view of future development in the region, with the aim of providing a sustainable economic base for Arctic communities that will foster social and cultural, as well as material, well-being. That means working towards common circumpolar approaches to economic development that will respect community sustainability principles, as well as seeking to avoid the historic patterns in which Arctic resources have too often been exploited carelessly for the primary benefit of outsiders while leaving the damages and costs behind. The Report accepts that large-scale development that meets appropriately stringent conditions can contribute to economic welfare. Circumpolar cooperation can assist through sharing learning about the best practices for managing and coping with such development processes. As well, Canada can benefit from taking a lead in the many practical aspects of economic cooperation: job training and small business development; access to micro-credit; promoting indigenous enterprises, ecotourism, cultural exports, commercial applications from research into cold-climate technologies; liberalizing trade in Arctic products; and improving transportation and communications networks. The Report sees the need for substantial upgrading of the policy coordination instruments within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade so that Canada can carry forward such a strategic approach to fostering circumpolar sustainable development.

Equally important is that indigenous northern voices be fully heard in the formulation of the Canadian approach, and that circumpolar policies be open to the widest democratic participation and benefit from regular parliamentary involvement. The Report recommends measures to strengthen the role of aboriginal peoples in policy development, both within Canadian foreign policy circles and through international mechanisms like the Arctic Council's Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat. While interstate coordination is important with respect to certain common circumpolar objectives, it is essential not to overlook the many international activities that can usefully take place below that level. The Government should be facilitating such "subsidiary" linkages as much as possible through regional (including provincial and territorial), community-level, private sector and nongovernmental contacts. The Report calls for the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs to make an annual accounting to Parliament through the Minister of Foreign Affairs on progress achieved. It also urges a strong parliamentary presence in



circumpolar deliberations, notably through the work of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region.

Another fundamental dimension of circumpolar cooperation consists of forward-looking investments in knowledge and in human capital. Referring back to the remarks of Maurice Strong cited earlier, Canada has precious assets that can be utilized to make a distinctive contribution to international well-being. The Report argues for a strong and adequately-funded Arctic science program, as well as recognition of the place of indigenous knowledge. It proposes a reevaluation of the Canadian Polar Commission and a rejuvenated initiative within the International Arctic Science Committee. The Committee also sees merit in increasing support for information-sharing technologies and educational and cultural exchanges across the circumpolar region. Again, Canada cannot only assist the wider aims of cooperation, but also profit directly by building on areas of comparative advantage and developing niche markets.

In addition to these policy themes and sectoral priorities, the rest of the Report looks at issues arising from Canada's relations with other Arctic countries. For example, given several important bilateral disputes with the United States (notably protection of the Porcupine Caribou herd, and trade restrictions under the *Marine Mammal Protection Act*), we propose a more regular official foreign policy mechanism for discussing North American approaches to Arctic issues. There is also scope to expand the bilateral cooperation already taking place with the Nordic countries, especially on issues such as the sustainable utilization of renewable resources (including wild fur and marine-based products). This can only benefit from a stronger, more strategic orientation of foreign policy.

Clearly, the greatest set of bilateral, and for that matter multilateral, challenges revolve around relations with the new Russia, and specifically the move to support peaceful democratic and market transitions across its immense northern regions. The Report calls for an increased Canadian diplomatic and commercial presence beyond Moscow commensurate with this task. It suggests renewing northern cooperation arrangements within a more coherent and effective circumpolar foreign policy at the federal level, while, at the same time, recognizing the important contributions to be made by provincial, territorial, aboriginal and private sector initiatives in Russia. In terms of technical assistance, mainly through the Canadian International Development Agency, circumpolar cooperation priorities (notably environmental clean-up and sustainable livelihoods for indigenous minority communities) should figure prominently in Canada's strategy. The Report reviews some exemplary technical cooperation projects that show the potential for mutual benefits and also looks at the experience of Cambridge University's Scott Polar Research Institute and the financing facilities for Russia developed through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It then suggests some explicit ways of increasing the chances for success.

The tenth and last Chapter returns to the big picture of situating Canada's role in international Arctic relations within the project of building a stronger multilateral system for advancing circumpolar cooperation. It is apparent that the mere fact of having an Arctic Council will accomplish little unless it is accompanied by a multi-dimensional effort by the Arctic states that addresses Arctic concerns globally, regionally and subregionally, and that complements rather than detracts from the activities of other Arctic bodies (for example, the Nordic and Barents Region councils and the Northern Forum) with more specialized or limited mandates. As well, circumpolar foreign policy development must come to terms with the long-term implications of ongoing European and North American regional integration processes, the Arctic impacts of which have barely begun to be recognized.

We think, in the final analysis, that Canada could be uniquely positioned to build bridges between the various polar perspectives — North American and Euro-Arctic (Nordic and Russian), aboriginal and non-native, state and nongovernmental, national and regional — which must be brought into a constructive dialogue if the challenges of the twenty-first century circumpolar world are to be met. None of this is automatic, however, even if post-Cold War geopolitics have opened up exciting opportunities for cooperative endeavours in the interests of all. Canada must first recognize the full range of its own interests in the Arctic as an emerging international region of global importance. From there, the Government, in order to serve those interests well, must have the will to develop a strategic vision backed up by genuinely circumpolar foreign policy capabilities. To sum up the Report's overriding message in a few words, only then will Canada's advantaged place as a circumpolar power begin to be appreciated as central to the realization of our distinctive foreign policy vocation.



# LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

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## Chapter 1 — The Importance of International Arctic Cooperation: A New Era and A Canadian Agenda

### Recommendation 1

The Committee recommends that the Government, in making a comprehensive response to this Report, elaborate an explicit international policy framework in which Canada's objectives in pursuing circumpolar cooperation and the proposed means for their achievement are systematically set out. In order to build public awareness and seek additional input, we further recommend that such a "Canadian Circumpolar Cooperation Framework" be considered by a national public forum, with representation from all regions, especially from northern Canada, and from interested provincial and territorial governments, to be held during the period of Canada's chairmanship of the Arctic Council.

## Chapter 2 — Realizing a 'Northern' Dimension in Canadian Foreign Policy

### Recommendation 2

The Committee recommends that the federal Government lead in devising an "Arctic Region 2000 Strategy" that would establish a coherent set of Canadian priorities for the next century, including pursuit of foreign policy objectives in the context of Recommendation 1 for a Canadian Circumpolar Cooperation Framework. The process for developing and carrying forward this strategy should fully involve provinces and territories whose interests are affected, but should also be more than just interdepartmental and intergovernmental. In particular, provision should be made for direct public and parliamentary input, participation by NGOs and, especially, northern-based and aboriginal groups. To that end, we recommend that a continuing consultative mechanism be attached to the Strategy which would promote consensus-building around long-term solutions and advise on policy evolution and implementation issues. As part of that mechanism, a circumpolar foreign policy working group should be established to focus on effective ways of achieving Canadian interests through international initiatives and through leadership in multilateral cooperation bodies, notably the Arctic Council.

### **Recommendation 3**

The Committee recommends that a Division for Circumpolar Affairs be established within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to support the work of the office of the Circumpolar Ambassador in spearheading and coordinating the Government's role. In addition to managing the external dimensions of circumpolar relations, the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador should also be enabled to increase outreach activities within Canada to ensure that all interested constituencies are kept abreast of circumpolar developments and are provided with opportunities to contribute to international Arctic policy processes. To this end, existing resources within the Government should be reallocated and consolidated, and increased as necessary. Northern governments, organizations and research institutes should be consulted first about the best ways to improve information networks and communications with the Ottawa office.

## **Chapter 3 — Entrenching Circumpolar Internationalism: Making the Arctic Council Work**

### **Recommendation 4**

The Committee recommends that the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador consult with northern governments and aboriginal organizations on cost-effective means to link Arctic communities with Canada's activity at the level of the Arctic Council. In addition to and independently from the office of the Secretariat serving Nunavut through Iqaluit, other permanent liaison offices could be established in the Yukon, NWT, and Nunavik in northern Quebec with continuing responsibility for channelling regular input from all of Canada's Arctic regions into the Ottawa-based structures. Consideration should also be given to having the Council's first ministerial conference in 1998 held in a Canadian Arctic community.

### **Recommendation 5**

The Committee recommends that Canada, as chair of the Arctic Council Secretariat, collaborate closely with Council partners to ensure that Canadian ideas to consolidate the Council are tested multilaterally as well as domestically, and are therefore capable of attracting broad circumpolar support beyond the period of Canada's initial chairmanship.

### **Recommendation 6**

The Committee recommends that Canada work closely with Arctic Council counterparts to ensure that the Council's formal mandate is carried out so as



to integrate environmental protection with sustainable human development goals, without thereby jeopardizing existing AEPS activities. Canada should also interpret the mandate sufficiently broadly that any important issue affecting Arctic quality of life can be brought on to its agenda, even if this entails a lengthy process of consensus-building. In particular, matters affecting human security and prospects for peaceful cooperation within the circumpolar region should not be excluded from consideration over the longer term.

#### **Recommendation 7**

The Committee recommends that, within Canada, the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador should lead in identifying concrete applications of the Arctic Council's sustainable development mandate, in order to advance Canadian Arctic interests. Furthermore, staff of this office and of the Arctic Council Secretariat should make it a priority to meet with residents of small northern communities to explore how the Council's mandate might be implemented most effectively to respond to their concerns.

#### **Recommendation 8**

The Committee recommends that the Government work to achieve inclusion, at the earliest possible date, of additional representation for Canadian aboriginal peoples' organizations based in the North, and for all northern residents through their regional governments (including that of Nunavik in Quebec) within the Arctic Council's formal structures. Interested aboriginal organizations that do not meet the current criteria for becoming permanent participants should in any event be granted early observer status. At a minimum, these groups and the subnational Arctic-region governments should be assured of some representation, in an official advisory capacity, in the development of Canada's positions on all Arctic Council matters.

#### **Recommendation 9**

The Committee recommends that the Northern Forum, and the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, (which should include a representative from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade), be granted permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. As such, they should have the right to intervene in its deliberations on matters of special interest with the agreement of the Council's members

and permanent participants. In addition, NGOs that have developed particular expertise in working on Arctic issues should be granted a consultative observer status with the Council.

#### **Recommendation 10**

The Committee recommends that the Arctic Council beyond the first stage of incorporation of the AEPS be encouraged to develop an overall plan for coordinating circumpolar initiatives at the intergovernmental level and consolidating them where possible for consideration by the Council's first ministerial conference in 1998. Careful attention should also be given to establishing mutually supportive subsidiary linkages between the Council and other more specialized organizations working on transboundary Arctic issues.

#### **Recommendation 11**

The Committee recommends that Canada use the two-year period of its initial chairmanship of the Arctic Council and hosting of its secretariat to build consensus on a manageable short-term work program, starting with the commitments already agreed to by the eight Arctic states in the Inuvik AEPS declaration of March 1996 (see Chapter Five). Following up the release of the AEPS state of the environment report in 1997, the Government should work closely within Canada with aboriginal peoples and other northern residents to establish the most urgent priorities for international environmental action (for example, the issue of contaminants affecting health). Canada should put forward concrete proposals in these areas to the Council's 1998 ministerial conference.

#### **Recommendation 12**

The Committee recommends that the Government use the proposed conference on Arctic sustainable development to further the integration of environmental and economic development objectives within the Arctic Council's mandate. Canadian officials should also work closely with northern constituencies to identify priority activities related to sustainable community economic development, and especially to create opportunities for a growing aboriginal population, where international action is required (e.g. dealing with trade barriers, improving transnational communications and transport links). During the remaining period of Canada's chairmanship and beyond, Canadian energies should be focussed on encouraging the Arctic Council to deal with such issues, which are of greatest practical concern to our northern citizens.



### **Recommendation 13**

The Committee recommends that the Government review existing resources for federal circumpolar initiatives at the national, bilateral and multilateral levels in order to identify any that might more effectively be consolidated under the aegis of the Circumpolar Ambassador and through Canada's participation in the Arctic Council. Canada should also take the early lead in exploring long-term funding and administrative support for the Council's operations with other Arctic governments, as well as with aboriginal participants and observer organizations. Finally, the Arctic Council secretariat should identify potential program areas for circumpolar cooperation (for example, encouraging utilization of environmentally superior technologies, trade promotion, training and business development) where the financial participation by private-sector partners might be appropriate within the Council's overall sustainable human development mandate.

## **Chapter 4 — Post-Cold War Cooperation in the Arctic: From Interstate Conflict to New Agendas for Security**

### **Recommendation 14**

The Committee recommends that the Government reaffirm its claim to sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago. In view of the financial and technical difficulties associated with the Arctic Sub-surface Surveillance System, the Committee recommends that the Government review the need for such a system, and explore alternative technical and diplomatic mechanisms for advancing Canada's sovereignty position.

### **Recommendation 15**

The Committee recommends that the Government pursue as a priority the elimination of nuclear weapons in the Arctic, as well as international agreement on the demilitarization of the region. Given that not all the Arctic states are interested in pursuing discussions of confidence-building or other regional arms control measures at the moment, the Government should also encourage and support the establishment of a "Track Two" process by which nongovernmental experts from the various states could consider such measures, and pay special attention to the integration of Russia into a broader cooperative security system for the region. The Government should raise these subjects as feasible with other Arctic states.

## **Recommendation 16**

The Committee recommends that the Government continue the cleanup of abandoned military sites in the Canadian North and pursue an equitable sharing of costs with the United States. Given Canadian expertise in the clean-up of Arctic military sites, the Committee recommends that the Government offer to participate in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) program. The Government should also convene with the United States and Norway an environmental security cooperation conference for the militaries and environmental agencies of the Arctic region.

## **Recommendation 17**

The Committee recommends that Canada continue to cooperate with the Russian Federation and the other Arctic states to address the serious nuclear problems in northern Russia. Despite financial constraints, Canada should also extend its cooperation to help address nuclear issues related to the Russian Northern Fleet (see Table 1, page 98).

## **Chapter 5 — Towards a Sustainable Development Agenda for Preserving the Arctic Environment**

## **Recommendation 18**

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada, as the first chair of the Arctic Council, restate its commitment to the continuation and strengthening of the environmental protection work of the AEPS under the Arctic Council. In addition, while the specific mechanisms may change, Canada should stress that the Tromsø Ministerial should adopt a significant plan for each of the AEPS working groups, to ensure that their work continues. Given the importance of the six years of work carried out by the AEPS, the procedural and other recommendations of the AEPS self-assessment currently being undertaken by Norway should be adopted for use by the Arctic Council.

## **Recommendation 19**

The Committee recommends that the Government initiate a systematic review of existing global environmental agreements to see which contain provisions authorizing special supplements for dealing with the needs of individual regions and determine which of these are particularly relevant to



the Arctic. Canada should also move quickly to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention, and, as recommended by the AEPS Ministers at Inuvik, the Government should encourage all Arctic states to ratify international agreements relevant to the Arctic.

#### **Recommendation 20**

The Government should increase efforts to develop common standards for Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic, and should ensure that the draft guidelines prepared through the AEPS are adopted for this purpose by the final AEPS Ministerial in Tromsø.

#### **Recommendation 21**

The Committee recommends that the Government renew its efforts, in cooperation with the other Arctic states, to work toward stronger international action on climate change. Given the importance of this issue to the Arctic and the need for an Arctic perspective, the Government should also appoint the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador as a co-chair of the nongovernment Stakeholders Advisory Group, to be backed up by appropriate environmental expertise within the Circumpolar Affairs Division recommended in Chapter Two.

#### **Recommendation 22**

The Committee recommends that, in cooperation with other Arctic Council states and aboriginal permanent participants, Canada redouble efforts to conclude LRTAP protocols on POPs and heavy metals and a legally binding protocol on POPs. In the meantime, the Committee recommends that Canada and the other Arctic states continue work to identify those states that are the major sources of pollutants in the Arctic, and to encourage and assist them to phase out the contaminant chemicals of greatest concern.

#### **Recommendation 23**

The Committee supports the recommendation of the Canadian Polar Commission that the Government broaden the replacement for the Northern Contaminants Program so as to focus more clearly on the links between contaminants and human health and to provide for more effective communication of research results.

#### **Recommendation 24**

In order to better protect northern species and habitats, and build on Canadian leadership in the integration of indigenous and non-indigenous

knowledge, the Committee recommends that the Government accept and implement fully the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples concerning Environmental Stewardship in the North.

## **Chapter 6 — Sustainable Development and Economic Opportunity for Arctic Communities**

### **Recommendation 25**

The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada work closely with northern Canadians and its Arctic Council partners to build consensus on a circumpolar framework for sustainable economic development, incorporating such principles and objectives as:

- **preservation of the viability and cultural integrity of indigenous economies;**
- **diversification of income- and revenue-producing activities that do not harm the environment;**
- **participation of local peoples in development and resource utilization decisions;**
- **maximum retention of benefits from economic growth at the community level;**
- **and application of sustainability criteria to all development activities as a condition for Government approval and/or financial support.**

Canada should take the lead by integrating these into its own international Arctic-region strategy recommended in Chapter Two. The conference on sustainable development proposed by Canada should lay out a process for negotiating this agreed framework multilaterally, as a prelude to considering the priority programs or project activities that should be undertaken on a circumpolar basis with the aim of approving a substantive joint economic initiative at the Council's first ministerial conference in 1998.

### **Recommendation 26**

The Committee recommends that, within the framework of international sustainable development principles applied to the Arctic, Canada should support the sharing of learning about best practices in the circumpolar countries. This should contribute to the implementation of rigorous sustainability assessments prior to any approval of major resource and



capital-intensive projects and, in particular, ensure that in all phases of development the rights to participate in decision-making processes, and the priorities of the affected indigenous communities, are fully respected.

The Committee recommends that Canada accord an early high priority in circumpolar cooperation to providing an enabling environment for sustainable community-based economic development, by exploring practical ways to implement established sustainability principles, and giving particular attention to the following:

- coordinating federal Government efforts, in close cooperation with northern development initiatives by provincial, territorial and local governments;
- supporting the sustainable utilization of non-renewable resources, especially by indigenous peoples;
- promoting cultural and other cottage industries;
- encouraging ecotourism development;
- increasing vocational training and business skills development;
- improving access to micro-credit resources.

#### **Recommendation 28**

The Committee recommends that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade create, within the Circumpolar Affairs Division (see Recommendation 3), a unit for circumpolar trade development with responsibilities for:

- developing, and referring to this Committee for comment, a comprehensive circumpolar trade policy that includes giving direction to work by the Circumpolar Ambassador and within the Arctic Council on trade and sustainable development issues;
- promoting aboriginal and other northern-based products;
- advising, in collaboration with other parts of government, international allies and aboriginal peoples' organizations, on strategies for free trade in such products;
- consider the legal aspects of the restrictive trade practices adopted by other countries and which have a negative impact on aboriginal populations;

- analyzing the long-term implications of international trade agreements for Arctic sustainable development;
- supporting northern Canadian trade initiatives in other Arctic countries.

#### **Recommendation 29**

The Committee also recommends that the Government pursue negotiations with its Arctic Council partners to liberalize trade in Arctic products, and ultimately eliminate the tariff and non-tariff barriers in respect thereto.

#### **Recommendation 30**

The Committee recommends further that the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division be given responsibility for encouraging and facilitating Canadian, especially Arctic-based, activities in circumpolar transportation, communications and technological development. A high priority should be accorded to those areas of Canadian expertise and potential strength that are environmentally protective as well as commercially sound. The Government should strive to ensure that in all cases Canadian initiatives in Arctic-region development adhere fully to applied sustainability principles, thereby promoting circumpolar progress in this regard. To this end, the Canadian government and the Arctic Council should undertake a rigorous assessment of the risks inherent in opening northern sea lanes, in particular to tankers.

### **Chapter 7 — Promoting Democratic Approaches to Circumpolar Sustainable Development: Indigenous Peoples, Northern Regions, and Public-Interest Roles**

#### **Recommendation 31**

The Committee recommends that the Government take steps to deepen the democratic involvement of representatives from all of Canada's northern indigenous peoples in the elaboration of policies on circumpolar sustainable development. To that end, we recommend that an aboriginal contact group be established to provide regular advice to the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs on issues pertaining to her mandate and that of the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division in the Department of Foreign Affairs. To promote indigenous peoples' participation in the development of international sustainable development policies for the Arctic, the Government should support expanded international linkages through existing Canadian-based aboriginal organizations, and should also pledge



**stable, long-term material support for the Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat within the Arctic Council.**

#### **Recommendation 32**

**The Committee recommends that an explicit goal of federal Government circumpolar affairs policy should be to facilitate community-based, local and regional-level contacts, in close cooperation with provincial and territorial governments and their Arctic constituencies, as well as in ongoing consultation with indigenous peoples' organizations, the private sector, and NGOs working on circumpolar sustainable development issues. A concerted effort should be made to avoid duplication of initiatives, while at the same time assisting coordination among the various Canadian actors working towards common circumpolar objectives.**

#### **Recommendation 33**

**The Committee recommends that the Minister of Foreign Affairs table in Parliament an annual statement by the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs briefly outlining the Government's circumpolar sustainable development initiatives, and stating results achieved and expected. The statement should be referred to this Committee and should also be scrutinized by any other standing committee with an interest in circumpolar issues, notably those related to the environment and sustainable development and aboriginal affairs.**

#### **Recommendation 34**

**As a means of increasing public feedback and accountability with respect to Arctic sustainable development issues, the Committee recommends that the Government support stronger Canadian participation in the continued development of circumpolar interparliamentary channels, in particular through the important work of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region.**

### **Chapter 8 — Supporting Scientific, Educational and Cultural Cooperation in the Arctic**

#### **Recommendation 35**

**The Committee recommends that the Government commit to maintain, and seek to increase, support for basic Arctic science and research as an**

important element of circumpolar cooperation. Given the changing realities in the Arctic, such research must be based on the needs of Arctic communities and include a significant traditional knowledge component. These principles should be stressed in the work on sustainable development and other issues carried out under the auspices of the Arctic Council.

#### **Recommendation 36**

The Committee, recognizing the continuing need for stronger representation of Arctic research interests, recommends that the Government reevaluate the future of the Canadian Polar Commission in light of the criticisms that have been made, and taking into account the role of the Circumpolar Ambassador and the organizational changes proposed in this Report. If the Commission is to continue, the Committee recommends that the Government adopt a systematic and transparent process for appointing its Commissioners that includes soliciting suggestions from northern groups, academic organizations such as the Association of Canadian Universities for Northern Studies (ACUNS), and government departments involved in northern research.

#### **Recommendation 37**

Given the substantial reductions to the budget for the Polar Continental Shelf Project, the Committee recommends that the Government provide the Project with sufficient funding to carry out its mandate effectively. The Project must also ensure that it is providing support to researchers in all regions of Canada, and should enter into new and creative partnership arrangements where possible.

#### **Recommendation 38**

The Committee recommends that the Government make the rejuvenation of the IASC International Science Initiative in the Russian Arctic a priority, and support and complement this where possible through the work of the Arctic Council.

#### **Recommendation 39**

The Committee recommends that the Government increase funding for the Northern Scientific Training Program. The Committee also recommends that the Government urge the Arctic states through the Arctic Council to



undertake an inventory of educational approaches in the region, and establish a program similar to that of the European Union for fostering academic cooperation in the circumpolar North.

#### **Recommendation 40**

The Committee recommends that the Government continue its support for new information technologies in the Canadian North, and ensure that the Arctic Council pursues the use of such technologies to promote cultural understanding and exchange in a circumpolar context. The Government should also ensure stable funding for such important cultural services as the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation, and seek to assist it and other services in selling their programming in Arctic and other markets.

### **Chapter 9 — Strengthening Bilateral Cooperation with Arctic Neighbours**

#### **Recommendation 41**

The Committee recommends that the Canadian Government continue its current efforts to protect the calving grounds of the Porcupine Caribou herd, particularly by assisting Canadian and Alaskan aboriginals to educate U.S. opinion on the issue. The Government should also take the necessary steps to have the entire area jointly designated as a World Heritage Site under the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, if such an approach is supported in consultations with indigenous groups.

#### **Recommendation 42**

While as a matter of policy it is preferable to settle cross-border disagreements without resorting to dispute settlement panels under international trade treaties (NAFTA/WTO), the Committee recommends that, unless current strategies prove successful in a reasonable amount of time, the Government pursue the option of seeking redress through such panels in case of the discriminatory and trade-restrictive provisions of the *Marine Mammal Protection Act*.

#### **Recommendation 43**

The Committee recommends that the Government propose to the United States the establishment of a mechanism to ensure regular meetings of officials to discuss Arctic issues, including, but not restricted to, those that are bilateral. These meetings should be undertaken on the Canadian side

through the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division and the Office of the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs.

#### **Recommendation 44**

The Committee recommends that Canada cooperate closely with Norway on issues of sustainable utilization of renewable Arctic marine resources. Specifically, the Government should move to become a full member of the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, if such a move is supported in formal consultations with northern indigenous groups.

#### **Recommendation 45**

The Committee recommends that the Government task the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade with developing a more strategic approach to Canada's relations with the Nordic countries. In particular, emphasis should be placed on fostering cooperative alliances with the Nordic states with respect to key circumpolar issues such as sustainable development.

#### **Recommendation 46**

The Committee recommends that, in view of Russia's unique circumstances and regional diversity, as well as its importance to Canadian foreign policy, including future circumpolar cooperation, the Government explore the most practical and economical means to expand Canadian diplomatic and commercial representation, particularly with the aim of improving access to consular services for distant northern and eastern areas of the Russian Federation.

#### **Recommendation 47**

The Committee recommends that the current bilateral agreement on Arctic cooperation with Russia be extended, but within a foreign policy context that is capable of coordinating all aspects of Canada-Russia relations with an Arctic and northern dimension — including promotion of trade and investment relations as well as delivery of technical assistance — with the overall objectives of a comprehensive circumpolar foreign policy. We recommend that the Circumpolar Affairs Division, proposed to be established within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to support the work of the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, should be given responsibility for effecting this coordination among Canadian federal



**Government initiatives in the Russian North, and for facilitating provincial, territorial, aboriginal and nongovernmental activities to support cooperation objectives as jointly agreed between Canada and Russia.**

#### **Recommendation 48**

**The Committee recommends that the shared circumpolar aims of preserving the Arctic environment and supporting sustainable human development for northern indigenous communities be made one of the principal objectives of Canada-Russia technical cooperation as carried out through CIDA's Country Programming Strategy, not added only as a "special consideration." Within such a bilateral assistance context, particular attention should be paid to the following:**

- setting clear, realistic and results-oriented goals that focus on areas in which comparative Canadian strengths (e.g. cold-climate research and applied environmental technologies, aboriginal institution-building) have been identified;**
- putting in place feedback/evaluation mechanisms whereby Parliament will be able to assess the degree to which targets are being met and learning improvements are taking place;**
- involving Canadian aboriginal and nongovernmental organizations, territorial and provincial governments, private firms, and knowledge institutions which have developed expertise on, or have practical working experience of, the Russian Arctic in the ongoing design of the technical cooperation program, as well as in the delivery of its specific project components;**
- ensuring that Canadian partner organizations are prepared to undertake a long-term commitment, and that the Russian partner organizations have the credibility to be able to sustain the cooperation activity in question;**
- taking into account what has been learned in other countries about assistance activities in the Russian Arctic (e.g. Nordic and Alaskan experience and that of the Cambridge University Scott Polar Research Institute);**
- utilizing bilateral contributions to the small-enterprise financing and investment facilities developed for Russia through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.**

## **Chapter 10 — Towards an Effective Multilateral Cooperation Regime for Circumpolar International Relations**

### **Recommendation 49**

**The Committee recommends that the Government take advantage of the period of Canada's current chairmanship of the Arctic Council to work on the unfinished elements in building a stronger multilateral system for promoting circumpolar cooperation. In particular priority attention should be given to the following:**

- pursuing global connections to Arctic concerns through other international forums, notably the United Nations, and around international economic as well as environmental and indigenous rights issues;**
- utilizing whatever intergovernmental channels — notably the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region and the Northern Forum — as well nongovernmental (especially aboriginal) and interparliamentary channels that are available, with the deliberate purpose of fostering bridge-building and common understandings among Nordic, Russian and North American perspectives;**
- undertaking an in-depth study of the ramifications of regional integration regimes in Europe and North America (i.e. EU and NAFTA regulations and processes) for the implementation of the Arctic Council's sustainable development mandate;**
- providing the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador and the proposed Circumpolar Affairs Division within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade with sufficient resources to coordinate the execution of the above tasks.**



# REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Committee requests that the Government provide a comprehensive response to this Report in accordance with Standing Order 109.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (*Issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12 and 13, which includes this report*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

Bill Graham  
*Chair*





# APPENDIX 1

## List of witnesses

Associations and Individuals	Meeting No.	Date
<b>Auditor General of Canada Office</b> David Rattray, Assistant Auditor General Vinod Sahgal, Principal, Foreign Affairs	45	October 22, 1996
<b>Canadian Arctic Resources Committee</b> Terry Fenge, Executive Director Tony Penikett, Director	10	April 23, 1996
<b>Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)</b> George Saibel, Director, Former Soviet Union Division	45	October 22, 1996
<b>Canadian Inuit Business Development Council</b> Don Axford, Coordinator	20	May 7, 1996
<b>Canadian Polar Commission</b> Whit Fraser, Chair	10, 66	April 23, 1996 and February 18, 1997
<b>Canarctic Shipping Company Limited</b> Martin Luce, President	20	May 7, 1996
<b>Environment Canada</b> Fred Roots, Science Advisor Emeritus	10	April 23, 1996
<b>Foreign Affairs and International Trade Department</b> Lorne Green, Director, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Implementation Agency Howard Isaac, Policy Analyst, European Union Division Patricia Low-Bédard, Senior Advisor to the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs Carl Schwenger, Chief, Public Affairs and Communications, Western Europe Division Mary Simon, Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs Steven Siqueira, Policy Analyst, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Implementation Act Jill Stirk, Deputy Director, Eastern Europe Division Mary Vandenhoff, Advisor to the Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs Dwayne Wright, Director, Northern Europe Division	50  5 50 15 50  5 48	October 31, 1996  March 28, 1996 October 31, 1996 April 30, 1996 October 31, 1996  March 28, 1996 October 29, 1996
<b>Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec</b> Matthew Coon Come, Grand Chief Brian Craik, Advisor Ted Moses, Ambassador to the United Nations	41	October 3, 1996
<b>Greenpeace Canada</b> Kevin Jardine, Energy and Atmosphere Program	27	June 4, 1996

Associations and Individuals	Meeting No.	Date
<b>Indian and Northern Affairs Department</b>		
Harald Finkler, Director, Circumpolar Liaison	15-18-48-50	April 30, May 2, October 29 and October 31, 1996
John Rayner, Assistant Deputy Minister, Northern Affairs Programs	5	March 28, 1996
Jack Stagg, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Strategic Direction	15	April 30, 1996
<b>Inuit Circumpolar Conference</b>	18	May 2, 1996
Rosemarie Kuptana, President		
<b>Natural Resources Department</b>	50	October 31, 1996
Carmel K, Létourneau, Scientific Advisor, Radioactive Waste and Radiation, Uranium and Nuclear Energy Branch		
Robert Morrison, Director General, Uranium and Nuclear Energy Branch		
<b>Northern Forum</b>	58	December 3, 1996
Stephen Cowper, Executive Director		
<b>Parliament of Finland</b>	48	October 29, 1996
The Honourable Riitta Uosukainen, Deputy, Speaker of the Parliament (Eduskunta) of Finland		
Asko Apukka, Deputy, Broad Left Coalition		
Anna Kaarina Piepponen, Special Advisor to the Speaker		
Katriina Kuusinen, Deputy Director of Parliament's Office for International Affairs		
Sirpa Pietikainen, Deputy, National Coalition Party		
Virpa Puisto, Deputy, Social Democrat Party		
Mauri Salo, Deputy, Centre Party		
Seppo Tiitinen, General Secretary of the Finnish Parliament		
Ulla-Maj Wideroos, Deputy, Swedish People's Party		
<b>Sierra Club of Canada</b>	27	June 4, 1996
Louise Comeau, Campaign Director, Atmosphere and Energy		
<b>Unaaq Inc.</b>	20	May 7, 1996
Kevin Knight, President		
<b>United States Arctic Research Commission</b>	62	December 12, 1996
Garrett W. Brass, Executive Director		
George B. Newton Jr., Chairman		
<b>World Wildlife Fund</b>	27	June 4, 1996
Sarah Climenhaga, Species Coordinator		



Associations and Individuals	Meeting No.	Date
<b>As Individuals</b>		
Michel Allard, Director, "Centre d'études nordiques" Laval University	47	October 24, 1996
Larry Black, Professor, Centre for Canada-Russia Relations, Carleton University	50	October 31, 1996
David Cox, Professor, Faculty of Political Issues, Queen's University	21	May 9, 1996
Gérard Duhaime, Director, Inuit and Circumpolar Study Group, Laval University	47	October 24, 1996
Franklyn Griffiths, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto	15	April 30, 1996
Jacques Grondin, "Centre de la santé publique du Québec"	47	October 24, 1996
John Hannigan, Consultant	18	May 2, 1996
Robert Huebert, Professor, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba	15	April 30, 1996
Karen Kraft Sloan, M.P. for York—Simcoe and Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of the Environment	18	May 2, 1996
Branko Ladanyi, Professor Emeritus, "École polytechnique de l'Université de Montréal"	47	October 24, 1996
Clifford Lincoln, M.P. for Lachine	18	May 2, 1996
Gerald Lock, Writer and Businessman	20	May 7, 1996
Donald McRae, Professor, Faculty of Common Law University of Ottawa	21	May 9, 1996
Joelle Martin, Student, Faculty of Common Law University of Ottawa	21	May 9, 1996
Paul Painchaud, Professor, Political Science, Laval University	47	October 24, 1996
Walter Slipchenko, Consultant	50	October 31, 1996
Marianne Stenbaek, Professor, Centre for Northern Studies and Research, McGill University	18	May 2, 1996
Patrick R. Toomey, (Retired Captain), Canadian Coast Guard	20	May 7, 1996
Oran Young, Professor, Department of Arctic Studies and Institute on International Environmental Governance, Dartmouth College	40	October 1, 1996





## APPENDIX 2

### List of witnesses

Meetings and site visits in Whitehorse, Inuvik, Tuktoyaktuk, Yellowknife,

Edmonton and Calgary—MAY 26-31, 1996

Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>WHITEHORSE, YUKON TERRITORIES</b>	
<b>City of Whitehorse</b>	May 27, 1996
Barb Harris, Councillor	
Bill Newall, City Manager	
<b>Nahanni River Adventures Ltd.</b>	May 27, 1996
Neil Hartling, Outfitter and Guide and President of the Yukon Association of Wilderness Tour Operators	
<b>Porcupine Caribou Management Board</b>	May 27, 1996
Joe Tetlich, Chair	
Linda Hoffman, Secretary Treasurer	
<b>Ta'an Kwach'an Council</b>	May 27, 1996
Glen Grady, Chief	
Gloria Adamson, Executive Director	
<b>Whitehorse Chamber of Commerce</b>	May 27, 1996
Leanne Brassard, Executive Director	
<b>Yukon Chamber of Commerce</b>	May 27, 1996
Archie Graham, President and Director, Alaska State Chamber of Commerce	
<b>Yukon College</b>	May 27, 1996
Aaron Senkpiel, Dean, Arts and Science	
Juergen Korn, Industrial Technology Advisor, Northern Research Institute	
<b>Yukon Territorial Government</b>	May 27, 1996
Honourable Doug Phillips, Minister of Tourism	
John Lawson, Cabinet Secretary and Deputy Minister of the Executive Council	
Bill Oppen, Deputy Minister, Economic Development	
Jim Connell, Acting Deputy Minister, Renewable Resources	
<b>As individual</b>	May 27, 1996
Nicholas Poushinsky, Consultant	

Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>INUUVIK, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES</b>	
<b>Aurora College</b>	May 28, 1996
David G. Malcolm, Director	
Alan Fehr, Manager, Aurora Research Institute	
Faculty Members	
<b>Great Northern Arts Festival</b>	May 28, 1996
Charlene Alexander	
Bev Lennie	
<b>Gwich'in Renewable Resource Board</b>	May 28, 1996
Robert Charlie, Chairperson	
Joe Benoit, Board Member	
Peter Clarkson, Executive Director	
<b>Inuvialuit Regional Corporation</b>	May 28, 1996
Nellie Cournoyea, Chairperson	
Norman Snow	
<b>Town of Inuvik</b>	May 28, 1996
His Worship Tom Zubko, Mayor	
<b>TUKTOYAKTUK, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES</b>	
<b>Hamlet of Tuktoyaktuk</b>	May 28, 1996
His Worship Patrick Gruben, Mayor and Councillors	
<b>CAMBRIDGE BAY, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES*</b>	
(*The Committee was unable to arrive in Cambridge Bay to meet with the following groups and individuals due to prohibitive weather condition)	
<b>Hamlet of Cambridge Bay</b>	May 28, 1996
His Worship Wilfrid Wilcox, Mayor and Hamlet councillors	
<b>Nanuvut Tunngavik Incorporated</b>	
<b>Kitikmeot Inuit Association</b>	
<b>Nunavut Implementation Commission</b>	
<b>Nunavut Impact Review Board</b>	
<b>YELLOWKNIFE, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES</b>	
<b>BHP Diamonds Inc.</b>	May 30, 1996
Karen Azinger, Manager for External Affairs	
<b>Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC)</b>	May 30, 1996
Marina Devine, Chairperson	
Kevin O'Reilly, Research Director	
<b>Dene Nation</b>	May 30, 1996
Bill Erasmus, National Chief	



<b>Associations and Individuals</b>	<b>Date</b>
<b>Denendeh Development Corporation</b> Chief Darryl Beaulieu	May 30, 1996
<b>Ferguson, Simek Clark Engineers and Architects</b> Stefan Simek, President	May 30, 1996
<b>Government of the Northwest Territories</b> Doug Doan, Acting Deputy Minister, Economic Development and Tourism Geoff Gilmour, Chairman, Workers' Compensation Board Kevin Lloyd, Assistant Deputy Minister, Economic Development and Tourism Graham Nicholls, Deputy Minister for Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources Bob Overvold, Deputy Minister, Intergovernmental and Aboriginal Affairs Conrad Pilon, Assistant Deputy Minister, Education, Culture and Employment	May 30, 1996
<b>Métis Nation of the Northwest Territories</b> Gary Bohnet, President Bill Carpenter, Environmental Director John Holman, Communications Officer	May 30, 1996
<b>Yellowknife Chamber of Commerce</b> David McCann	May 30, 1996

## **EDMONTON, ALBERTA**

<b>University of Alberta</b> Clifford Hickey, Director, Canadian Circumpolar Institute Gurston Dacks, Department of Political Science Milton Freeman, Department of Anthropology Michele Ivanitz, Department of Anthropology	May 31, 1996
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## **CALGARY, ALBERTA**

<b>University of Calgary</b> Michael Robinson, Director, Arctic Institute of North America Nigel Banks, Faculty of Law (former Chair of CARC) Ross Goodwin, Manager, Arctic System and Information Technology System, Arctic Institute of North America	May 31, 1996
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## APPENDIX 3

### List of witnesses

Meetings and site visits in Kuujjuaq, Iqaluit, Cape Dorset and

Resolute Bay and Montreal—May 26-31, 1996

Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>KUUJJUAQ, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES</b>	
<b>Jaanimmariik School</b>	May 27, 1996
Peter Bentley, Principal	
Beverley Makivik, Vice-Principal	
Ida Saunders, Administrator	
<b>Kativik Regional Government</b>	May 27, 1996
Louis Mercier, General Manager	
Mayors of the Region	
<b>Kuujjuaq Municipal Council</b>	May 27, 1996
His Worship Johnny Adams, Mayor	
<b>Makivik Corporation</b>	May 28, 1996
Peter Adams, Treasurer (and Chairman, First Air)	
<b>Nunavik Board of Health and Social Services</b>	May 27, 1996
Dr. Nathalie Boulanger	
Jean Dupuis, Chairman	
Minnie Grey, Executive Director—ICC Hospital	
Dr. Stephen Hodgins	
Francine Hudon	
Denis Tremblay	
<b>IQALUIT, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES</b>	
<b>Inuit Broadcasting Corporation</b>	May 28, 1996
Janice Epp, Training Director	
Leevede, Producer, Qaggiq, Current Affairs	
Rosie, Executive Producer	
<b>Iqaluit Chamber of Commerce</b>	May 28, 1996
Alain Carrière, President	
Douglas Lem, 2nd Vice-President	
<b>NorthwestTel</b>	May 28, 1996
Ken Todd, Manager, Strategic Alliances	
<b>Nunavut Arctic College</b>	May 28, 1996
John Clay, Director, Certificate and Diploma Services	
Bill Riddell, Student Services	
Ian Rose, Director Policy & Programs	
Greg Welch, President	
David Wilman, Director, Nunata Campus	

Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>Nunavut Implementation Commission</b> Ken Harper, Commissioner	May 28, 1996
<b>Nunavut Research Institute</b> Lynn Peplinski, Manager Bruce Rigby, Executive Director	May 28, 1996
<b>Nunavut Tourism</b> Paul Landry, President	May 28, 1996
<b>Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated</b> José Kusugak, President	May 28, 1996
<b>Town of Iqaluit</b> His Worship Joe Kunuk, Mayor and Councillors	May 28, 1996
<b>Traditional Ceremonies Lighting of the Qulliq</b> Ekaluk Juralak and granddaughter, Eva Graves David Serkoak and daughter, Drum dancing Phoebe Atagotaaluk and Madeleine Allakariallak, Throat singing	May 28, 1996
<b>CAPE DORSET, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES</b>	
<b>Municipality of Cape Dorset</b> Her Worship Akalayok Qavavau, Mayor Akesuk, Acting Director, Community Development Members of the Council Timoon Toronco, Senior Administration Officer	May 29, 1996
<b>West Baffin Eskimo Cooperative Ltd.</b> Kenoajak Ashevak, Artist Jimmy Manning, General Manager Throat Singers	May 29, 1996
<b>RESOLUTE BAY, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES</b>	
<b>Division of Frontec Services Ltd.</b> Merrill Currie, Representative, Narwhal Arctic Services	May 30, 1996
<b>Hamlet of Resolute Bay</b> His Worship, George Eckalook, Mayor Susan Salluviniq, Senior Administrator Members of the Council	May 30, 1996
<b>Polar Continental Shelf Project</b> Tom Allen, Researcher, Acadia University and President Atlantic Low Temperature Storage, Wolfville, N.S. Barry Hugh, Base Manager Olga Kukal, Researcher and Professor of Biology Acadia University David Maloley, Base Manager	May 30, 1996
<b>Qarmartalik School</b> Max van der Voet, Teacher	May 29, 1996
<b>Resolute Construction</b> Darryl Clarke, President	May 30, 1996



Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>MONTREAL, QUEBEC</b>	
<b>McGill University</b>	May 31, 1996
Peter Burpee, Professor, Distance Education in the North	
Gary Pekeles, Baffin Project	
Brenda Wilson, Professor, Educational Technology and Distance Education	
<b>Laval University</b>	May 31, 1996
Michel Allard, Director, "Centre d'études nordiques"	
Gérard Duhaime, Director, Groupe d'études inuit et circumpolaires	





## APPENDIX 4

### List of witnesses

#### Meetings in Moscow and St. Petersburg, The Russian Federation and Helsinki, Finland — November 3-9, 1996

Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>MOSCOW, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (November 3-6, 1996)</b>	
<b>Embassy of Canada in Moscow</b>	November 3-6, 1996
Anne Leahy, Ambassador	
John Di Gangi, Minister-Counsellor, Political Division	
Marie-Lucie Morin, Minister-Counsellor, Trade	
Fawad Quraishi, First Secretary and Consul, Political Division	
Olivia Nicoloff, First Secretary and Consul, Political Division	
Greg Alton, Second Secretary and Vice-Counsel Political Division	
Leigh Sarty, Third Secretary and Consul, Political Division	
Lorne Heuckroth, Canadian Cooperation Program	
Leeann McKechnie, Counsellor and Consul, Canadian Cooperation Program	
<b>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)</b>	November 3-4, 1996
Michael Bell, Special Representative for NATO Enlargement	
<b>Parliamentary Centre (Ottawa)</b>	November 3-4, 1996
Peter Dobell, Head, Canada-Russia Parliamentary Affairs Program	
Dominic Gualtieri, Canada-Russia Parliamentary Affairs Program	
<b>Foreign Affairs Ministry</b>	November 4, 1996
Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Federation Government	
Aleksander Mikhailovich Kramarenko, Head, Canada Division, North America Department	
<b>State Duma</b>	November 4, 1996
Aleksander Nikolayevich Shokhin, First Deputy Speaker State Duma	
Gennadiy Vladimirovich Kulik, Chairman Canada-Russia Friendship Group	
Edward L. Kuzmin, Ambassador, Head of the Division on Interparliamentary Relations	
Vladimir Petrovich Lukin, Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs	

Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>Environment Ministry</b>	November 4, 1996
Aleksey P. Poryadin, First Deputy Chairman, State Committee for Environmental Protection	
<b>Atomic Energy Ministry</b>	November 4, 1996
Viktor Mikhailov, Minister of Atomic Energy	
<b>Canadian Business Community in Moscow</b>	November 4, 1996
Joe Bisset, United Nations, Moscow Office	
Chris Shore, Moscow Representative, MEDA	
George MacDonald, Moscow Representative, EXXON	
Bill Galliland, Macleod Dixon, Moscow	
Marat Khabiboulov, Moscow Representative, Agra Earth and Environmental Ltd.	
Isabel Murray, Petroleum Advisory Forum, Moscow	
Monique Couture, Gowling, Strathy, Henderson Moscow	
<b>Association of Aboriginal Minorities in the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation</b>	November 5, 1996
Eremei Danilovich Aipin, Khanty, President of the Association	
Valery Borisovich Shustov, General Secretary of Association	
Arthur Ivanovich Gayulsky, Deputy Head of Administration, Chief of Agricultural Department Evenkiisky Autonomous Okrug (Evenk)	
Maiya Ivanovna Ettirintina, Member of Association Emikotsky Autonomous Okrug (Chukchanka)	
Dora Alekseevna Vinokurova, Member of Association Republic Sakha Yakutiya (Yukagirka)	
Vyacheslav Alekseevich Viucheisky, Chairman of Legislative Assembly of Nenetsky Autonomous Okrug (Nenets)	
<b>Republic Sakha Yakutiya</b>	November 5, 1996
Vassily Mokhanachevsky, Chief of Department of Sakhavneshtroi, Republic Sakha Yakutiya	
<b>Federation, Council Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation</b>	November 5, 1996
Deputy Speaker Likhachev	
Vladimir P. Kuramin, Chairman of the State Committee of the Russian Federation on Development of the North	
Maksim Anatolievich Danilov, Assistant to the Head of the Department of Northern Affairs and Indigenous People (Chikotka Region)	
<b>Gorbachev Foundation</b>	November 5, 1996
Mikhail Gorbachev, President	
<b>Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada (Moscow)</b>	November 5, 1996
Sergey Rogov, Director	



Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>MURMANSK, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (November 6, 1996)*</b>	
(*The Committee was unable to arrive in Murmansk to meet with the following individuals due to prohibitive weathers conditions)	
<b>Murmansk Regional Administration</b> Valentin Luntzevich, 1st Deputy Governor	November 6, 1996
<b>Murmansk City Administration</b> Yuri Yakivetz, 1st Deputy Head	
<b>Kola Saami Association</b> Representatives	
<b>Women's Congress of the Kola Peninsula</b> Representatives	
<b>Murmansk Congress of the Kola Peninsula</b> Representatives	
<b>Murmansk Regional Duma</b> Pavel Sazhinov, Chairman	
<b>Murmansk Shipping Company</b> Nikolai Matushenko, General Director	
<b>ST. PETERSBURG, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATON (November 7-8, 1996)</b>	
<b>Consulate General of Canada at St. Petersburg</b> Ann T. Collins, Consul General Margarita Sandal, Trade and Programs Officer	November 7-8, 1996
<b>Canadian Business People in St. Petersburg</b> Dwayne Weleschuk, Executive Administrator International Business Association of St. Petersburg Michael Blank, Senior Manager, KPMG, St. Petersburg	November 7, 1996
<b>St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly</b> Leonid Petrov, Chairman of the Ecology Committee Lev Karlin, Deputy	November 7, 1996
<b>Russian Foreign Ministry</b> Vladimir V. Zapevalov, First Secretary, Representative in St. Petersburg	November 7, 1996
<b>Intaari, Arctic and Antarctic Institute</b> Alexander F. Tchernychoy, General Director, Intaari Martin P. Luce, President, Enfotec Technical Services Inc. Brian Eddy, Project Officer, Intaari, Enfotec Technical Services Inc.	November 7, 1996

Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>FINLAND, HELSINKI (November 8, 1996)</b>	
<b>Embassy of Canada in Finland</b>	November 8, 1996
Isabelle Massip, Ambassador John Pearce, Counsellor Commercial Ralph Flannigan, Consul Peter Lonnberg, Counsul	
<b>Nordic Council Finnish Delegation</b>	November 8, 1996
Guy Lindstrom, Secretary General, Nordic Council Finnish Delegation and Secretary, Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region Kari Salo, Information Secretary	
<b>Finnish Parliament</b>	November 8, 1996
Hannes Manninen, Deputy Kimmo Kiljunen, Deputy	
<b>As individuals</b>	November 8, 1996
Leif Rantala, Saami Language Teacher, Faculty of Education, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Finland	
Ekaterina D. Balaganskaya, Acting Director of the Central Secretariat of the Northern Forum Academy Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi Finland	
Lt. Colonel Arto Nokkola, Researcher, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere, Finland	
<b>Ministry of the Environment</b>	November 8, 1996
Sirkka Hautajarvi, Secretary General	



## APPENDIX 5

### List of witnesses

Meetings in Cambridge, United Kingdom, Oslo, and  
Tromsø, Norway, Stockholm, Sweden and  
Copenhagen, Denmark — November 4-8, 1996

Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>CAMBRIDGE, UNITED KINGDOM (November 4, 1996)</b>	
<b>Scott Polar Research Institute (Cambridge University)</b>	November 4, 1996
John Heap, Director	
David MacDonald, Chief Geologist, Cambridge Arctic Shelf Programme	
Rab MacKenzie, Polar Regions Section, U.K., Foreign and Commonwealth Office	
Mark Nuttall, Aberdeen University	
Gareth Rhys, Scott Polar Research Institute, Remote sensing	
David Scrivener, Keele University	
Peter Williams, Carleton University	
<b>World Conservatory Monitoring Centre</b>	November 4, 1996
Jerry Harrison, Public Relations Officer	
Richard Luxmore, Head of Habitats Unit	
Jonathan Rhind, Technical Officer	
Christopher Zöckler, Arctic Research Fellow	
<b>OSLO, NORWAY (November 5, 1996)</b>	
<b>Canadian Embassy in Oslo</b>	November 5, 1996
François Mathys, Canadian Ambassador to Norway	
Catherine Dickson, Trade Program	
Gilles Gingras, Cultural Program	
Bjorn Petter Hernes, Information and Cultural Division	
Leslie White, Military attaché	
<b>The Bellona Foundation</b>	November 5, 1996
Nils Bøhmer, Nuclear Physicist, Russian Studies Group	
<b>Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs</b>	November 5, 1996
Ambassador Jon D. Bech, Special Advisor, Politisk - S5	
Siri Bjerke, sttssekrs	
Kåre Bryn, DG, Chairman on AEPS	
Age Grutle, Secretary, Standing Committee on Foreign Relations, Stortinget	
Leif Holger Larsen, Head of Division, Politisk - S4	

Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>Norwegian Polar Institute</b> Olav Orheim, Director	November 5, 1996
<b>Fridtjof Nansen Institute</b> Davor Vidas, Director, Polar Program	November 5, 1996
<b>Norwegian Research Council, University of Oslo</b> Lars Walloe, Chairman	November 5, 1996
<b>Norwegian Royal Ministry of Justice</b> John Gauslaa, Executive Secretary, Head of Saami Rights Commission Secretariat and Chair of Saami Rights Committee	November 5, 1996
<b>Norwegian Royal Ministry of Defence</b> Oddvin Horneland, Executive Officer, Arctic Military Environment Cooperation Agreement (AMEC) Department of Defence Resources Lars Otto Reiersen, Executive Secretary, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program	November 5, 1996
<b>Norwegian Parliament</b> Haakon Blankenberg, Member of Parliament	November 5, 1996
<b>FRAM Museum</b> Mr. Berg, Director	November 5, 1996
<b>Maritime Museum</b> Mr. Kolltveit, Director	November 5, 1996

### TROMSØ, NORWAY (November 6, 1996)

<b>Norwegian Saami Parliament</b> Ing Lill Pavall, Vice-President Lars Eira, Member and Leader, Saami Reindeer Herders Association of Norway	November 6, 1996
<b>Saami Council</b> Lars Anders Baer, Member Leif Halonen, Member and permanent participant at the Arctic Council	November 6, 1996
<b>University of Tromsø</b> Harald Overvåg, Director Ande Somby, Chairman of the Board, Centre for Saami Studies Alf Håkon Hoel, Associate Professor, Norwegian College of Fishery Sciences Harald Gaski, Associate Professor, Institute of Language and Literature Trond Thuen, Professor of Anthropology, Institute of Social Sciences Asgeir Brekke, Professor and Chairman of the Board Roald Amundsen Centre	November 6, 1996
<b>Tromsø Museum</b> Dikka Storm, Curator Per Kyrre Reymert, Head of Public Affairs	November 6, 1996



Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN (November 7, 1996)</b>	
<b>Canadian Embassy in Stockholm</b>	November 7, 1996
William F. Clarke, Canadian Ambassador to Sweden	
Gerald Skinner, chargé d'affaires, Riga	
Dan del Villano, Second Secretary	
<b>Parliament of Sweden</b>	November 7, 1996
Honourable Birgitta Dahl, Speaker	
<b>Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs</b>	November 7, 1996
Wanja Tornberg, Ambassador	
<b>Swedish Polar Research Secretariat</b>	November 7, 1996
Anders Karlquist, Head	
<b>University of Gottenburg</b>	November 7, 1996
Richard Langlais, Professor	
<b>Swedish Saami Parliament</b>	November 7, 1996
Ingvar Åhrén, Chairman	
<b>Saami Youth Organization</b>	November 7, 1996
Ylva Gustafsson, Member	
<b>Stockholm Environment Institute</b>	November 7, 1996
Nicholas Sonntag, Director General	
Arno Rosemarin, Member	
<b>COPENHAGEN, DENMARK (November 8, 1996)</b>	
<b>Canadian Embassy in Copenhagen</b>	November 8, 1996
Brian Baker, Canadian Ambassador to Denmark	
Mervyn Meadows, Counsellor	
Kirsten Trolle, Greenland Advisor, PMO	
<b>Greenland Home Rule Office</b>	November 8, 1996
Eina Lemche, Director	
<b>Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs</b>	November 8, 1996
Henrik Fischer, Greenland Specialist/Adviser	
<b>Nordic Council</b>	November 8, 1996
Knud Engaard, President and Chairman, Danish delegation to Nordic Council	
Henrik Hagemann, Leader, Danish delegation to Nordic Council	
<b>Parliament of Denmark</b>	November 8, 1996
Hans-Pavia Rosing, Member of Parliament for Greenland	
Finn Linge, Representative for Greenland in Brussels	
<b>Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC)</b>	November 8, 1996
Aqqaluk Lynge, Greenland Vice-President	
<b>ICC Youth Council</b>	November 8, 1996
Jørgen Waever Johanssen, President	

Associations and Individuals	Date
<b>Indigenous Peoples Secretariat</b>	November 8, 1996
Chester Reimer, Executive Secretary	
<b>Nordic Council of Ministers</b>	November 8, 1996
Thorvald Wettestad, Director	
Göran Lundberg, Secretary	
Susanna Kruise, Senior adviser to Secretary General on Arctic Affairs	
Reidar Hindrum, Senior advisor to Secretary General on Arctic Affairs	
Jørgen Taagholt, Greenland and the Arctic Region	
<b>Danish Polar Centre</b>	November 8, 1996
Morten Meldgaard, Director	



## **APPENDIX 6 — Additional Meetings with Committee Research Staff**

<b>Associations and Individuals</b>	<b>Date</b>
<b>LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM</b>	
<b>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</b>	
Mr. Stephen Millar Assistant for Policy to the Canadian Executive Director	November 2, 1996
Ms. Elizabeth Wallace Principal Banker, Financial Institutions Team	February 17, 1997
<b>CAMBRIDGE, UNITED KINGDOM</b>	
<b>Scott Polar Research Institute, Cambridge University</b>	
Paul Fryer Graduate Student, Social Sciences and Russian Studies	November 2, 1996
Ben Seligman Graduate Student, Social Sciences and Russian Studies	November 2, 1996
Tatiana Argounova Graduate Student, Social Studies and Russian Studies	November 2, 1996
Dr. Piers Vitebsky Head of Social Sciences and Russian Studies	February 15, 1997





## APPENDIX 7 — LIST OF SUBMISSIONS

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### Associations and Individuals

Nina Afanasjeva (Saami Council, Finland)

Michel Allard (Laval University)

Amiq Institute

Arctic Institute of North America (University of Calgary)

Association of Canadian Universities for Northern Studies

Auditor General of Canada Office

Aurora Research Institute, Aurora College (Inuvik, N.W.T.)

Nigel Bankes (University of Calgary)

The Bellona Foundation

Stanislav Belikov

BHP Diamonds Inc.

Peter Burpee (McGill University)

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation

Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC)

Canadian Circumpolar Institute (University of Alberta)

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

Canadian Inuit Business Development Council

Canadian Museum of Nature

Canadian Polar Commission

Canadian Society for Circumpolar Health

Canarctic Shipping Company Limited

R.J. Carney (University of Alberta)

Centre for Cold Ocean Resources Engineering (C-CORE) (Memorial University of Newfoundland)

Centre for Nutrition and the Environment of Indigenous Peoples (McGill University)  
 Centre for Northern Studies and Research  
 Defence Ministries of the Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America  
 Dene Nation  
 Robert Doherty (Government of the Northwest Territories)  
 Gérard Duhaime (Laval University)  
 Gwynne Dyer  
 Enfotec Technical Services Ltd.  
 Environment Canada  
 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Department  
 Ferguson, Simek, Clark  
 Bjorn Tore Godal  
 Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec  
 Greenpeace Canada  
 Franklyn Griffiths (University of Toronto)  
 Jacques Grondin, “Centre de la santé publique du Québec”  
 Gwich’in Renewable Resource Board  
 William Hamley (Loughborough University of Technology, England)  
 John Hannigan  
 Jean E. Havel  
 Robert Huebert (University of Manitoba)  
 Indian and Northern Affairs Department  
 International Union for Circumpolar Health  
 Inuit Broadcasting Corporation  
 Inuit Circumpolar Conference  
 Inuvialuit Regional Corporation



Robert F. Keith  
Helen Klengenberg  
Ted Lambert (Yukon College)  
Richard Langlais (Göteborg University, Sweden)  
Donald McRae (University of Ottawa)  
Joelle Martin (University of Ottawa)  
Métis Nation of the Northwest Territories  
Natural Resources Canada  
Nordic Council  
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMC)  
Northern Forum  
Northern Forum Academy (Finland)  
Nunasi Corporation  
Nunavut Implementation Commission  
Nunavut Arctic College (Iqaluit)  
Nunavut Research Institute (Iqaluit)  
Otto Sverdrup Centennial Expedition  
Polar Continental Shelf Project  
Porcupine Caribou Management Board  
Leif Rantala (Saami Council, Finland)  
Fred Roots  
Scott Polar Research Institute (England)  
D.E. Scriver  
David Scrivener (Keele University, Staffordshire, UK)  
Sierra Club of Canada  
Mary Simon, Circumpolar Ambassador  
Steven Smyth

Marianne A. Stenbaek (McGill University)

Trond Thuen (University of Tromsø)

Patrick R. Toomey

Nicholas Tremblay (McGill University)

Unaaq International

United States Arctic Research Commission

Alain F.A. Wattiez

Geoffrey R. Weller (University of Northern British Columbia)

Peter J. Williams (Carleton University)

Brenda Wilson (McGill University)

World Wildlife Fund

Oran R. Young (Dartmouth College, N.S.)



# MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1997 (Meeting No. 79)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met *in camera* at 9:19 o'clock a.m. this day, in Room 208, West Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Eleni Bakopanos, Hon. Michel Dupuy, John English, Jesse Flis, Bill Graham, Francis G. LeBlanc, Charlie Penson, Benoît Sauvageau and Bob Speller.

*Acting Members present:* Roy Cullen for Beryl Gaffney; and Maud Debien for Stéphane Bergeron.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Researchers.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed its examination of circumpolar cooperation. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, dated March 28, 1996, Issue No. 1, Meeting No. 5*).

The Committee proceeded to examine its draft report.

At 12:38 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned until later this day.

TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1997 (Meeting No. 80)

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met *in camera* at 3:38 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 208, West Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Sarkis Assadourian, Hon. Michel Dupuy, Jesse Flis, Bill Graham, Francis G. LeBlanc, Benoît Sauvageau and Bob Speller.

*Acting Member present:* Maud Debien for Stéphane Bergeron.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Researchers.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed its examination of circumpolar cooperation. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, dated March 28, 1996, Issue No. 1, Meeting No. 5*).

The Committee resumed its consideration of a draft report.

At 4:11 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1997 (Meeting No. 81)

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met *in camera* at 9:05 o'clock a.m. this day, in Room 269, West Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Hon. Michel Dupuy, Jesse Flis, Bill Graham, Francis G. LeBlanc, Charlie Penson and Benoît Sauvageau.

*Acting Members present:* Andy Scott for Eleni Bakopanos; Maud Debien for Stéphane Bergeron and John Godfrey for Sarkis Assadourian.

*Other Member present:* Dianne Brushett.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Researchers.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed its examination of circumpolar cooperation (*See Minutes of Proceedings, dated March 28, 1996, Issue No. 1, Meeting No. 5*).

The Committee resumed consideration of its draft report.

It was agreed,—That the draft report, as amended be adopted as the Seventh Report of the Committee and that the Chair present the report to the House on Tuesday, April 22, 1997.

It was agreed,—That pursuant to Standing Order 109, the Committee request that the Government table a comprehensive response to this report.

At 11:05 o'clock a.m., the sitting was suspended.

At 11:08 o'clock a.m., the sitting resumed.

It was agreed,—That the Chair, on behalf of the Committee, write a letter to the Minister of Veterans Affairs advising him of the hearings which the Committee has convened on the issue of compensation for Canadian Far East Prisoners of World War II and requesting that he examine this issue in recognition of the special circumstances of the case.

The Committee proceeded to review a draft resolution regarding the enlargement of NATO.

It was agreed,—That the Committee reconvene on Tuesday, April 22, 1997 in order to resume consideration of a draft resolution regarding the enlargement of NATO.

At 11:55 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Janice Hilchie

*Clerk of the Committee*









HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 14 (Meetings Nos. 82 to 84)

Tuesday, April 22, 1997

Wednesday, April 23, 1997

Thursday, April 24, 1997

Chair: Bill Graham

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 14 (Séances n°s 82 à 84)

Le mardi 22 avril 1997

Le mercredi 23 avril 1997

Le jeudi 24 avril 1997

Président: Bill Graham

*Minutes of Proceedings of the Standing Committee on*

## Foreign Affairs and International Trade

*Procès-verbaux du Comité permanent des*

## Affaires étrangères et du commerce international

### RESPECTING:

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), an examination of NATO enlargement

Main Estimates 1997–98: VOTES 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, L30, L35, 40, 45, 50 and 55 under FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), an examination of compensation for Canadian Far East Prisoners of War during World War II

Pursuant to Standing Orders 108(1)(b) and 108(2), an examination of the Report of the Sub-Committee on Trade Disputes relating to trade dispute resolution processes

### CONCERNANT:

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, un examen de l'élargissement de l'OTAN

Budget des dépenses principal 1997–1998: CRÉDITS 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, L30, L35, 40, 45, 50 et 55 sous la rubrique AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, un examen du dédommagement pour travail pour les prisonniers de guerre en Extrême-Orient au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale

Conformément aux articles 108(1)(b) et 108(2) du Règlement, un examen du rapport du Sous-comité sur les différends commerciaux au sujet des processus de résolution des différends commerciaux

### APPEARING:


The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs

### COMPARAÎT:

L'honorable Lloyd Axworthy, Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Second Session of the Thirty-fifth Parliament, 1997

Deuxième session de la trente-cinquième législature, 1997



STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND  
INTERNATIONAL TRADE

*Chair:* Bill Graham

*Vice-Chairmen:* Stéphane Bergeron  
John English

Members

Sarkis Assadourian  
Eleni Bakopanos  
Hon. Michel Dupuy  
Jesse Flis  
Beryl Gaffney  
Francis G. LeBlanc  
Bob Mills (Red Deer)  
Lee Morrison  
Philippe Paré  
Charlie Penson  
Benoît Sauvageau  
Bob Speller — (15)

Associate Members

Diane Ablonczy  
Colleen Beaumier  
Réginald Bélair  
Leon E. Benoit  
Jag Bhaduria  
Bill Blaikie  
Pierre Brien  
Roy Cullen  
Maud Debien  
Jack Frazer  
Christiane Gagnon  
John Godfrey  
Herb Grubel  
Jean H. Leroux  
Ron MacDonald  
Gurbax Singh Malhi  
Keith Martin  
Ted McWhinney  
Val Meredith  
Rey D. Pagtakhan  
Janko Peric  
George Proud  
Svend J. Robinson  
Andrew Telegdi  
Paddy Torsney — (24)

(Quorum 8)

Janice Hilchie

*Clerk of the Committee*

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET DU  
COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

*Président:* Bill Graham

*Vice-présidents:* Stéphane Bergeron  
John English

Membres

Sarkis Assadourian  
Eleni Bakopanos  
Hon. Michel Dupuy  
Jesse Flis  
Beryl Gaffney  
Francis G. LeBlanc  
Bob Mills (Red Deer)  
Lee Morrison  
Philippe Paré  
Charlie Penson  
Benoît Sauvageau  
Bob Speller — (15)

Membres associés

Diane Ablonczy  
Colleen Beaumier  
Réginald Bélair  
Leon E. Benoit  
Jag Bhaduria  
Bill Blaikie  
Pierre Brien  
Roy Cullen  
Maud Debien  
Jack Frazer  
Christiane Gagnon  
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Gurbax Singh Malhi  
Keith Martin  
Ted McWhinney  
Val Meredith  
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Janko Peric  
George Proud  
Svend J. Robinson  
Andrew Telegdi  
Paddy Torsney — (24)

(Quorum 8)

*La greffière du Comité*

Janice Hilchie



2nd Session/35th Parliament

2<sup>e</sup> Session/35<sup>e</sup> Législature**ORDER OF REFERENCE****ORDRE DE RENVOI**

*Extract from the Journals of the House of Commons of Friday, April 18, 1997*

*Extrait des Journaux de la Chambre des communes du vendredi 18 avril 1997*

By Mr. Martin (Minister of Finance), — Response of the government, pursuant to Standing Order 109, to the 6th Report of the Standing Committee on Finance and the 4th Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Special Import Measures Act” (Sessional Paper No. 8510–352–67), presented to the House on Wednesday, December 11, 1996. — Sessional Paper No. 8512–352–67.

Par M. Martin (ministre des finances) — Réponse du gouvernement, conformément à l’article 109 du Règlement, au 6<sup>e</sup> rapport du Comité permanent des finances et au 4<sup>e</sup> rapport du Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international, «Loi sur les mesures spéciales d’importation» (document parlementaire n<sup>o</sup> 8510–352–67), présenté à la Chambre le mercredi 11 décembre 1996. — Document parlementaire n<sup>o</sup> 8512–352–67.

**ATTEST****ATTESTÉ***Le Greffier de la Chambre des communes*

ROBERT MARLEAU

*Clerk of the House of Commons*





## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, APRIL 22, 1997  
(Meeting No. 82)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met *in camera* at 3:29 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 371, West Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Sarkis Assadourian, John English, Jesse Flis, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Bob Mills, Lee Morrison, Philippe Paré, Benoît Sauvageau and Bob Speller.

*Acting Members present:* John Loney for Eleni Bakopanos; George Proud for Francis LeBlanc.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Researchers.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed its examination of NATO enlargement (*See Minutes of Proceedings, dated Thursday, October 10, 1996, Issue No. 6, Meeting No. 44*).

The Committee resumed its examination of a draft resolution on the enlargement of NATO.

It was agreed, — That further to its resolution of Thursday, April 10, 1997, the Committee authorize the payment of an additional \$698.75 to Verena Ossent for the editing of the French version of the Report of the Committee on circumpolar cooperation.

At 4:20 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 23, 1997  
(Meeting No. 83)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met at 3:21 o'clock p.m. this day, in Room 269, West Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Sarkis Assadourian, Eleni Bakopanos, John English, Bill Graham, Francis G. LeBlanc, Bob Mills and Bob Speller.

*Acting Members present:* John Loney for Jesse Flis; George Proud for Hon. Michel Dupuy.

*Associate Member present:* Maud Debien.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Researchers.

*Appearing:* The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference from the House of Commons dated Thursday, February 20, 1997, relating to the Main Estimates for Foreign Affairs for the fiscal year ending Tuesday, March 31, 1998.

The Chair called Vote 1.

## PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE MARDI 22 AVRIL 1997  
(Séance n° 82)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui à huis clos, à 15 h 29, dans la pièce 371 de l'édifice de l'Ouest, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (*président*).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Sarkis Assadourian, John English, Jesse Flis, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Bob Mills, Lee Morrison, Philippe Paré, Benoît Sauvageau et Bob Speller.

*Membres suppléants présents:* John Loney pour Eleni Bakopanos; George Proud pour Francis LeBlanc.

*Aussi présents: Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement:* Gerald Schmitz et James Lee, attachés de recherche.

Conformément au mandat que lui confère l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité reprend son examen de la question de l'élargissement de l'OTAN (*Voir les Procès-verbaux du 10 octobre 1996, fascicule n° 6, séance n° 44*).

Le Comité reprend son examen d'une ébauche de résolution sur l'élargissement de l'OTAN.

Il est convenu, — Que, pour faire suite à sa résolution du jeudi 10 avril 1997, le Comité autorise le paiement d'un montant additionnel de 698,75\$ à Verena Ossent pour la révision de la version française du rapport du Comité sur la coopération circumpolaire.

À 16 h 20, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

LE MERCREDI 23 AVRIL 1997  
(Séance n° 83)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui à 15 h 21, dans la pièce 269 de l'édifice de l'Ouest, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (*président*).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Sarkis Assadourian, Eleni Bakopanos, John English, Bill Graham, Francis G. LeBlanc, Bob Mills et Bob Speller.

*Membres suppléants présents:* John Loney pour Jesse Flis; George Proud pour l'hon. Michel Dupuy.

*Membre associé présent:* Maud Debien.

*Aussi présents: Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement:* Gerald Schmitz et James Lee, attachés de recherche.

*Comparait:* L'honorable Lloyd Axworthy, ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Conformément au mandat reçu de la Chambre des communes le jeudi 20 février 1997, le Comité examine le Budget des dépenses principal des Affaires étrangères pour l'exercice se terminant le mardi 31 mars 1998.

Le président procède à la mise aux voix du crédit 1.

The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy made a statement and answered questions.

At 4:11 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 1997

(Meeting No. 84)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade met *in camera* at 9:55 o'clock a.m. this day, in Room 371, West Block, the Chair, Bill Graham, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Sarkis Assadourian, John English, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Francis G. LeBlanc, Bob Mills and Benoît Sauvageau.

*Acting Members present:* Maud Debien for Stéphane Bergeron; George Proud for Jesse Flis; and Glen McKinnon for Eleni Bakopanos.

*In attendance: From the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament:* Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Researchers.

In accordance with its mandate under Standing Order 108(1)(b) and 108(2), the Committee commenced its examination of the report of the Sub-Committee on Trade Disputes relating to trade dispute resolution processes.

It was agreed, — That the Committee recommend to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which will be struck in the next Parliament, that it deem referred to it the evidence from the study of the Sub-Committee on Trade Disputes regarding trade dispute resolution processes and further recommend that the new Committee continue the study to its completion.

At 10:08 o'clock a.m., the sitting was suspended.

At 10:20 o'clock a.m., the sitting resumed, the Vice-Chair, John English presiding.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed consideration of the enlargement of NATO (*See Minutes of Proceedings, dated Thursday, October 10, 1996, Issue No. 6, Meeting No. 44*).

It was moved, — That whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has proven itself to be an effective defensive alliance, having provided security in the North Atlantic region that permitted an unprecedented growth of prosperity and cooperation among the states of Western Europe and North America;

Whereas the changes that have occurred in Europe during the past several years have reduced the threat of global conflict, brought about a spread of democratic practice and economic reform, and opened new possibilities of partnership between NATO and the countries of central and eastern Europe;

Whereas a number of these countries have indicated their desire to join the Alliance and the Alliance has indicated its readiness to consider admitting new members;

L'honorable Lloyd Axworthy fait une déclaration et répond aux questions.

À 16 h 11, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

LE JEUDI 24 AVRIL 1997

(Séance n° 84)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international se réunit aujourd'hui à huis clos, à 9 h 55, dans la pièce 371 de l'édifice de l'Ouest, sous la présidence de Bill Graham (président).

*Membres du Comité présents:* Sarkis Assadourian, John English, Beryl Gaffney, Bill Graham, Francis G. LeBlanc, Bob Mills et Benoît Sauvageau.

*Membres suppléants présents:* Maud Debien pour Stéphane Bergeron; George Proud pour Jesse Flis et Glen McKinnon pour Eleni Bakopanos.

*Aussi présents:* Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement: Gerald Schmitz et James Lee, attachés de recherche.

Conformément au mandat que lui confère l'article 108(1)(b) et 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité entreprend l'étude du rapport du Sous-comité sur les différends commerciaux relativement au processus de règlement des différends.

Il est convenu, — Que le Comité recommande au Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international, qui sera constitué au cours de la prochaine législature, de retenir, comme s'il les avait entendus lui-même, les témoignages de l'étude du Sous-comité sur les différends commerciaux au sujet du processus de règlement des différends commerciaux et qu'il recommande de plus que le nouveau comité poursuive l'étude jusqu'à son achèvement.

À 10 h 08, la séance est suspendue.

À 10 h 20, la séance reprend, sous la présidence de John English (vice-président).

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité reprend l'étude de la question de l'élargissement de l'OTAN (*Voir le Procès-verbal, du jeudi 10 octobre 1996, fascicule n° 6, Séance n° 44*).

Il est proposé, — Que attendu que l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord s'est avérée une alliance défensive efficace puisqu'elle a assuré la sécurité dans la région de l'Atlantique Nord et permis ainsi une croissance sans précédent de la prospérité et de la coopération entre les États de l'Europe occidentale et de l'Amérique du Nord;

Attendu que les changements qui ont eu lieu en Europe ces dernières années ont réduit la menace d'un conflit mondial, entraîné la propagation des usages démocratiques et des réformes économiques et ouvert de nouvelles possibilités de partenariat entre l'OTAN et les pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale;

Attendu que plusieurs de ces pays manifestent le désir d'adhérer à l'Alliance et que l'Alliance se déclare disposée à envisager d'élargir ses rangs;



Whereas the Alliance has developed extensive cooperative programmes such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace to establish new forms of cooperation with all interested European States;

Whereas the evolution of the Organization for Security and Cooperation for Europe provides a forum in which all the States of Europe may meet and address their shared security concerns;

Whereas the success of the IFOR/SFOR missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrate the ability of NATO and non-NATO countries, and in particular Russia, to work together for peace;

Whereas the Secretary-General of NATO, on behalf of the Alliance, has been conducting negotiations with the Russian Foreign Minister with a view to creating a new Russia-NATO relationship which offers an historic opportunity to create a new and effective partnership;

Whereas the Alliance represents one of Canada's most important institutional links to Europe;

Whereas Canada has strong, unique links through trade, culture and family to many of the countries in central and eastern Europe, and noting that the government has acted constructively by designating a special representative for NATO enlargement to consult interested states and groups in Canada;

Whereas Canada has traditionally contributed its share of Alliance common costs;

It is resolved that,

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade strongly recommends:

1) that Canada continue to play an active part in the process of bringing new members into the NATO Alliance, with the aim of encouraging the broadest possible enlargement and the strengthening of the Transatlantic community, while ensuring that the value and effectiveness of the Alliance are in no way impaired as a result;

2) that Canada ensure that the objective process for determining which new members might be invited to join the Alliance, based on the considerations in the NATO Enlargement Study, continue, with a view to reaching a consensus on new members at an early date in advance of the NATO Summit of July 8-9, 1997;

3) that Canada support the Atlantic Partnership Council initiative in order to satisfactorily address the expectations of countries which remain outside the Alliance by enhancing partnership programmes, and provides a mechanism for addressing regional issues such as the concerns of the Baltic states in particular;

4) that Canada contribute to a successful outcome of the current negotiations between NATO Secretary-General Solana and the Russian Foreign Minister on a new NATO-Russia agreement;

5) that Canada contribute as well to the conclusion of a framework for relations with Ukraine, recognizing that country's unique role in European security; and

Attendu que l'Alliance a mis en oeuvre de grands programmes de collaboration comme le Conseil de coopération de l'Atlantique Nord et le Partenariat pour la paix en vue d'établir de nouvelles formes de coopération avec tous les États européens intéressés;

Attendu que l'Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe a ainsi évolué qu'elle permet à tous les États européens de se rencontrer et de discuter de leurs préoccupations communes en matière de sécurité;

Attendu que le succès des missions IFOR/SFOR en Bosnie-Herzégovine montre que les pays de l'OTAN peuvent travailler pour la paix avec d'autres pays, notamment la Russie;

Attendu que le Secrétaire général de l'OTAN mène, au nom de l'Alliance, des négociations avec le ministre des Affaires étrangères de Russie en vue de nouer une nouvelle relation Russie-OTAN qui offre une occasion historique de forger un partenariat nouveau et efficace;

Attendu que l'Alliance constitue un des liens institutionnels les plus importants du Canada avec l'Europe;

Attendu que le Canada a des liens commerciaux, culturels et familiaux solides et sans pareils avec beaucoup de pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale et que le gouvernement a désigné un représentant spécial pour l'élargissement de l'OTAN chargé de consulter les États et les groupes canadiens intéressés;

Attendu que le Canada a toujours payé sa part des coûts communs de l'Alliance;

Il est résolu que :

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international recommande fortement :

1) que le Canada continue de jouer un rôle actif dans l'élargissement de l'OTAN en vue d'encourager l'expansion la plus large possible et de renforcer la communauté transatlantique tout en veillant à ce que la valeur et l'efficacité de l'Alliance ne s'en trouvent nullement diminuées;

2) que le Canada veille à ce que le processus objectif visant à déterminer les pays susceptibles d'être invités à adhérer à l'Alliance en fonction des considérations de l'Étude sur l'élargissement de l'OTAN se poursuive en vue de dégager un consensus sur les nouveaux membres avant le Sommet de l'OTAN des 8 et 9 juillet 1997;

3) que le Canada appuie l'initiative du Conseil du partenariat de l'Atlantique en vue de répondre de façon satisfaisante aux attentes des pays qui restent en dehors de l'Alliance en améliorant les programmes de partenariat et de disposer d'un mécanisme de règlement des questions régionales comme les préoccupations des États baltes, en particulier;

4) que le Canada contribue au succès des négociations en cours entre le Secrétaire général de l'OTAN, Solana, et le ministre des Affaires étrangères de Russie sur une nouvelle entente entre l'OTAN et la Russie;

5) que le Canada contribue à l'établissement d'un dispositif d'encadrement des relations avec l'Ukraine compte tenu du rôle à nul autre pareil que joue ce pays dans la sécurité européenne;

6) that Canada seek a broad and meaningful reform of NATO structures with a view to ensuring that the Alliance has the flexibility to address new security challenges, permits the full integration of old and new member states into the Alliance's military structure and provides for more efficient use of resources.

And debate arising thereon.

It was agreed, — That the motion be amended by adding in the English version, following the words "to create a new and effective partnership;" the following:

"Whereas the North Atlantic Assembly as a forum for debate and discussion among the member states, fulfills an important role in ensuring a transparent, informed process toward final approval of new NATO membership in the participating parliaments;"

and adding in the French version, following the words "de forger un partenariat nouveau et efficace;" the following:

"Attendu que l'Assemblée de l'Atlantique Nord, en tant que lieu d'échange et de discussion entre les États membres, joue un rôle important en assurant l'application d'une procédure transparente et éclairée jusqu'à l'approbation définitive de l'adhésion de nouveaux États à l'OTAN par les parlements des pays membres;"

After debate, the question being put on the amendment, it was agreed to.

It was agreed, — That in the English version, in point 4, the word "relationship" be replaced with the word "agreement", and that in the French version in point 4, the word "relation" be replaced with the word "entente".

And the question being put on the motion, it was agreed to as amended.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the Committee resumed consideration of compensation for Canadian Far East Prisoners of War during World War II (*See Minutes of Proceedings, dated November 19, 1996, Issue No. 7, Meeting No. 52*).

It was moved — That whereas 2,100 Canadian military personnel were captured in Hong Kong and held by the Japanese for 44 months during World War II;

Whereas these prisoners suffered abuse and were forced into hard labour by the Japanese;

Whereas these Canadian veterans are well founded in fact and in law to claim the amount of \$18 per day for the work carried out for the Japanese during their detention;

Whereas no amount of money could really compensate for the years lost by our Hong Kong veterans and the suffering they endured in the service of Canada, our Hong Kong veterans deserve special consideration;

Whereas the United Nations Sub-Commission on Human Rights recognized the validity of the claims by the Canadian veterans with regard to their forced labour during World War II in concluding that the Japanese had seriously violated the Geneva Convention;

6) que le Canada favorise une réforme large et effective des structures de l'OTAN de manière que l'Alliance ait la flexibilité nécessaire pour relever de nouveaux défis de sécurité, permette l'intégration complète des anciens et des nouveaux pays membres dans sa structure militaire et tire le meilleur parti possible de ses ressources.

Un débat s'ensuit.

Il est convenu, — Que la motion soit modifiée par l'ajout dans la version anglaise, à la suite des mots « to create a new and effective partnership; », de ce qui suit :

« Whereas the North Atlantic Assembly as a forum for debate and discussion among the member states, fulfills an important role in ensuring a transparent, informed process toward final approval of new NATO membership in the participating parliaments; »

et par l'ajout dans la version française, à la suite des mots « de forger un partenariat nouveau et efficace; » de ce qui suit :

« Attendu que l'Assemblée de l'Atlantique Nord, en tant que lieu d'échange et de discussion entre les États membres, joue un rôle important en assurant l'application d'une procédure transparente et éclairée jusqu'à l'approbation définitive de l'adhésion de nouveaux États à l'OTAN par les parlements des pays membres; »

Après débat, l'amendement, mis aux voix, est adopté.

Il est convenu, — Que, dans la version anglaise, au point 4, le mot « relationship » soit remplacé par le mot « agreement », et que dans la version française, au point 4, le mot « relation » soit remplacé par le mot « entente ».

La motion, mise aux voix, est adoptée telle que modifiée.

Conformément au mandat que lui confère l'article 108(2) du Règlement, le Comité reprend son examen de la question d'un dédommagement pour les prisonniers de guerre en Extrême-Orient au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale (*Voir le Procès-verbal du 19 novembre 1996, fascicule n° 7, Séance n° 52*).

Il est proposé, — Attendu que 2 100 militaires canadiens ont été faits prisonniers par les Japonais à Hong Kong pendant une période de 44 mois lors de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale;

Attendu que lesdits prisonniers ont subi des mauvais traitements et effectué des travaux forcés pour les Japonais en contravention des Conventions de Genève;

Attendu que les anciens combattants canadiens sont bien fondés en fait et en droit de réclamer la somme de 18\$ par jour en contrepartie des travaux qu'ils ont effectués pour les Japonais durant leur détention;

Attendu qu'aucune somme d'argent ne saurait véritablement compenser les années que nos anciens combattants de Hong Kong ont perdues et les souffrances qu'ils ont éprouvées alors qu'ils étaient au service du Canada, nos anciens combattants de Hong Kong méritent des égards particuliers;

Attendu que la Sous-commission des droits de l'Homme des Nations Unies a donné raison aux anciens combattants canadiens en concluant que les Japonais étaient coupables de graves violations aux Conventions de Genève, relativement aux travaux forcés qu'ils ont fait exécuter lors de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale;



Whereas the Sub-Commission also deems that there is no moratorium on war crimes;

Whereas the 1952 peace treaty between Japan and the Allies cannot erase all the claims by Canadian World War II veterans, as their claims involve rights granted under customary international humanitarian law;

Whereas the Canadian Government has never demonstrated the necessary will to support its veterans until now,

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade recommends that the Canadian Government:

1) Recognize the justification for the claim made by veterans against Japan regarding the forced labour carried out during World War II;

2) Pay the amount of \$23,940, claimable from the Japanese, to every Hong Kong veteran and their widows; and

3) Claim the total amount from the Japanese Government according to international law.

After debate, the question being put on the motion, it was negatived on recorded division.

At 11:15 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Janice Hilchie

*Clerk of the Committee*

Attendu que ladite Sous-commission a également jugé qu'il n'y a pas de moratoire sur les crimes de guerre;

Attendu que le Traité de paix entre le Japon et les puissances alliées de 1952 ne peut mettre fin à toutes les réclamations des anciens combattants canadiens durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, considérant que ces réclamations concernent des droits prévus dans le droit international humanitaire coutumier;

Attendu que le gouvernement canadien n'a jamais démontré la volonté nécessaire pour soutenir ses anciens combattants jusqu'à ce jour,

Le Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international recommande au gouvernement canadien de :

1) reconnaître le bien-fondé des réclamations des anciens combattants canadiens contre le Japon concernant les travaux forcés exécutés durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale;

2) payer la somme de 23 940\$ due par les Japonais à chaque ancien combattant de Hong Kong et à leurs veuves;

3) réclamer ces sommes au gouvernement japonais en vertu du droit international.

Après débat, la motion, mise aux voix, est rejetée avec dissidence.

À 11 h 15, le Comité s'ajourne jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

*La greffière du Comité*

Janice Hilchie









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